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CONTEMPORARY BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT

GEORGE CATLIN
University of California (Berkeley)

I

The ideas of the bloodless and "glorious Revolution" of 1688, and especially those of John Locke, inspired the Founding Fathers of the United States and, both directly and indirectly, influenced the French Revolution. In the nineteenth century a successful Britain also made her great contribution to European civilization, and this not least in terms of her political ideas and of her parliamentary institutions. Politically it would be quite accurate to say that she led the world.

In this present generation, however, England is in a poorer way as a fount of political ideas than she has been for centuries. The great succession of Occam and Fortescue, More and Hooker, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, the Mills, Green, even Spencer, perhaps Bradley, seems to be broken. Many British writers are too content to subedit Hegel or Marx and to explain what they really meant. The most eminent now living, Lord Russell, is primarily a mathematical philosopher. Such distinguished theorists as Manheim and Cassirer and Popper, far from being British, fled to England from persecution on the Continent, either to die in London or, as birds of passage, to migrate to the more hospitable trans-Atlantic shore; and Sir Michael Polanyi, now of Manchester and perhaps the most brilliant of the visitors, writing on the social sciences at the present time, is nonetheless a visitor.

There are, however, four contemporary British writers who, if not of the same order as Hobbes, Locke, and J. S. Mill, nevertheless stand high in the second rank. One may even be of the first rank. By considering the writings of H. J. Laski, Sir Ernest Barker, and Professors Michael Oakeshott and E. H. Carr, we may be able to judge present trends and to estimate the contribution which the hitherto premier country in political thought is making to our civilization in these years.

With many of his papers still unpublished, perhaps the time has not yet come, nor is this the place, to make any full assessment of the work of the late Professor Laski. Only a provisional estimate is possible. Our difficulty is that there were at least three Laskis. First there was the continuator of the work of John Stuart Mill, as that proto-saint of Liberal individualism left it in his *Political Economy*, where, a century ago, he was already raising awkward problems which had socialist implications. As such, Laski, a Manchester man, was the apostle of what he styled "conditional anarchism," a monarchomach republican and protagonist fighting state absolutism, and the co-founder of a distinguished and, on the whole, very healthy school of Political Pluralism. He was an *enfant terrible,* already a marked anti-traditionalist although with kind words for the Oxford Movement; but much incentive to creative thinking can be derived from his defences of pluralism in society. The worst that his critics could say, especially the Bradleians, was that "Laski has no sense of community." That perhaps depended upon whether community spelled Nation-State.

This first, mauve decade, with quite a lot of liberal blue to it, was followed by a red period. In left-wing quarters it was pointed out to Laski by critics that he was "merely a Liberal," that the vogue of pluralism was past, and that he was (so they maintained) in an intellectual cul-de-sac, out of touch with the international working masses. No one was clearer on this than John Strachey. At about the same time a shift-over took place in the Fabian Society. The Webbs received very unenthusiastic reviews in certain political circles for their book *Methods of Social Study* (1932), in which they devoted an entire section to "The False Start of Asking a Question." Depressed, they visited Moscow and returned to write a book, of which, ironically enough, the very title ended with a question mark: *Soviet Communism, a New Civilization?* (1935). Laski also went to deliver lectures in Moscow and to insinuate, like Abelard, the suggestion there: Did the commissars never suffer from a doubt? He returned to develop a new philosophy, which consisted in footnotes by Laski to Marx, a kind of Coke on Littleton. His new book, *Democracy in Crisis,* which he delivered in lecture form in the critical year 1931, marked the beginning of this period. The Great Depression reshaped his ideas for it in a more extreme and pessimistic fashion, as it had those of many others.

In his third or pink phase, as an honoured member of the Labour Party Executive Committee, Laski muted his more vehement expressions and could usually be counted upon to produce a pamphlet in criticism, if not of the Kremlin, at least of King Street and the British Communist Party. The rejection of Bolshevism which he had written in his first phase, *Communism* (1927), here stood him in good stead as an alibi. However, much of the old spirit remained. It is witnessed by his uncertainty whether, on every ground of historical analogy, revolution must not come; his expectation of violence; and his confession, which the New York *Nation* published in 1939, "Why I am a Marxist." One of his last actions was to commit the unsuspecting fathers of the Labour Party to a memorial centennial re-edition of Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, in which he explained how much of that fulmination of atheist evangelism, with its denunciation of the family, either had been fulfilled or was still true prophecy. The little introduction was dynamite, but few knew how to explode it, especially since the charge, to trade union eyes, seemed to be safely labelled "London School of Economics."

"I see no evils in the world, except of course natural evils, that cannot be remedied by freedom, self-government and English institutions." As Professor Denys Brogan comments, Shaw's Broadbent, who was a good joke in 1904, perhaps is not quite so good a joke in 1951. If, however, we hold that, not just English institutions, but political democracy, although certainly not the whole of democracy, is yet very close to the core of those liberties for which we are prepared to fight, then it is not unjustifiable to see in Harold Laski, in his second phase, quite peculiarly one of the philosophers who sold, or tried to sell, the pass in the West by destroying the moral opposition to Marxist totalitarianism. (I am not here arguing whether there can ever be a "state withering away" kind of Marxism which is, or can become, not totalitarian.) Again to quote Dr. Brogan, Communist elements in the West are nowhere strong enough to take charge unless "the people from whom they propose to take over power are demoralized by fear, corruption, pessimism, bad consciences . . . . " Some people, from the Persian Gulf to Florida, perhaps deserve to have a bad conscience or should acquire a Christian social conscience. But what is important here is that sometimes pessimism and a bad conscience or sense of guilt can infect an entire civilization for reasons that have more to do with weariness than with moral stamina.

The thread of consistency which runs through all the forms of Laski's ideas are his dislike of the British so-called "ruling class," his anti-traditionalism, his deep historical pessimism, discounting mutual social trust, and his expectation of a time of violence when reason would be silenced. A rationalist by inclination and a Rationalist by profession, nevertheless, in accordance with the dangerous trend of the age, he fell in with deeply anti-rationalist beliefs in which force plays the decisive role. He held that men's thoughts are shaped not by universal logic but in private universes of experience, by which interpretation the rule of reason becomes either inanity or even a menace to freedom. However, Laski did not draw the individualistic or atomic conclusion from this but, in his later phases, the more orthodoxly Marxian conclusion that history is the story of inevitably conflicting classes. His conclusion had the rider that British, and indeed derivative Western, democracy rests on so-called axioms which are, indeed, not such at all, but mere incidents of highly specialized conditions which, construed as political axioms, became fallacious and illusory. In *Democracy in Crisis* Laski stated this position (which he later reiterated in an article, "Representative Democracy," published in the symposium *Recovery through Revolution*, 1933):

> We are bound to ask ourselves whether these influences [of minority acquiescence] are justified when the common ground between parties is narrowed so as to exclude that area upon which the whole character of the system has previously depended . . . . If the measures stand, their consequence, within some such period as a generation, is the erosion of capitalist democracy by its own consent. This second possibility need not be overlooked. Of it I will only venture to say that it is in direct contradiction to the previous history of all other social systems.

For an accomplished historian, Laski here offered singularly weak history. What is more to the point is that his philosophic comment was scarcely calculated either to inculcate confidence in the parliamentary democratic system of accommodation or to deter the headstrong from that revolutionary action which, as Dr. Brogan points out, has its heavy and sometimes quite unnecessary price.

In his posthumously published Manchester Lectures of 1951, entitled *Reflections on the Constitution*, Laski appears to have come to a condition of more mellow reasonableness. He speaks of "the splendid achievement"—if there can be peaceful change, despite financiers and rich men—which takes place within the unity of a commonwealth. Most, he admits, would hold that the alternative to House of Commons government is the concentration camp: nevertheless, he finds that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact displayed "grim realism". He dismisses the Mond-Turner discussions as essentially futile and castigates Professor Ramsey Muir for supposing that a sacred thing called "the party" must follow public opinion, and not lead it. Altogether, although Laski was as typical a Menshevik as can be found, he yet here displays something of the Esau hand of the Bolshevik. He continues, interestingly, that "there are many matters which are vital to the life of our people a judgement upon which is impossible in an electorate of thirty million people." Above all, to him an epoch was over. Whereas "up to the outbreak of the first World War of 1914, it is not very far from the truth to say that we were governed by a single party divided into two groups, each of which had little difficulty in accepting the same major principles of action," this description was now no longer true. In fact, Laski found it the outdated assumption upon which British constitutionalism rested. So much for all bipartisan policies.

Laski always welcomed the happy event of policy shaped by free and liberal discussion. But his pessimistic philosophy of history forbade him ever to put trust in the assumption that this discussion would prevail against the temptations of power, money, and force, for which he advised his listeners to be prepared. Curiously erudite in learning, keen in analysis, generous in sympathies towards the less fortunate, he yet provided not so much that new, creative philosophy which he had at first promised, as an impassioned denunciation of social evils to which Marxism (however much edited by Laski) was held to be the clue and cure.

II

Since H. J. Laski's rise, the Labour Party has produced no one of equal eminence. (R. H. Tawney and G. D. H. Cole, despite their very diverse distinctions, are no more systematic political philosophers than the Webbs.) While this lack may prove a very serious weakness in that Party, it cannot be said that the other present parties, or the universities themselves, where there is a tendency to take refuge in the uninspiring bogs of description of institutions, adding line to line, date to date, and president to president, are in much better plight. There is a horrible dearth of talent which not even the erratic stimulus of Mr. R. H. S. Crossman or the spinsterly and sub-acidulous monitions of the *New Statesman* circle can remedy. At least one exception to this generalization, however, is Sir Ernest Barker at Cambridge, Laski's own tutor but a philosopher with a very different emphasis, as "community minded" as, *per contra*, Laski "lacked the sense for community."

As a "testament of his old age," Sir Ernest has produced his *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (1951). He disarms criticism by expressing doubt whether he has a right to express his views since "I was very conscious of my want of that sort of knowledge of politics which comes from actual experience." It is the same doubt which Walter Bagehot expressed about a certain biographer of Bolingbroke. But Professor Barker, with his rich learning, has no need to be alarmed that elected persons may have reflected on the subjects covered in his book more than he has. There have been great exceptions among legislators, such as Lords Balfour and Haldane (both peers) and Mr. L. S. Amery, but for the most part the elected legislators have not been elected to reflect and have escaped the temptation.

On the other hand, it is perhaps true that practical experience might have modified Sir Ernest Barker's discussion of sovereignty and his possibly too ready dismissal of the political sovereignty of the electorate. He finds his sovereign in a very odd place—"the constitution." He repudiates the useful distinction between political sovereign and legal sovereign, largely because he chooses to define "the state as essentially law." "The term 'sovereign' belongs to the legal sphere and to that sphere alone." I suspect here a *petitio principii*. But he allows a more awkward distinction between the ultimate sovereign, the constitution, and the "immediate" or secondary sovereign which is "the law and rule-making body." Some American Senators and legists may be surprised to be told (and the reference is philosophical and general) that "the law-making body is never merely the legislature but the legislature *and the ministers acting in conjunction*," a "conjunction which is always present."

Broadly Sir Ernest Barker agrees with those statesmen and journalists who, whenever inconvenient issues of plebiscite (looked at not unfavourably by Lord Balfour) and the like arise, assure us that "in this country" Parliament or the King-in-Parliament (i.e., the Cabinet cracking down on the back benches[1]) is sovereign. This is to repudiate the fact that in most modern constitutions (and, as Sir Ernest says, "We have to adjust our theory to these facts"), we are legally assured that "we, the people, do ordain" and presumably have the sovereign right, sometimes explicitly stated, to ordain—unless, indeed, we accept Reason, operating through the people from on high, as alone ultimate sovereign under Natural Law. For myself, I feel tolerably sure that any member of Parliament to-day who told his constituents what Edmund Burke told the electors of Bristol, and so acted in practice, would learn at the next election who was the master, since he would not be re-nominated as a parliamentary candidate. If he thus prized his independence, the narrow and very costly road of the Independent candidate would be his. Rousseau is more right, and has progressively become more right, than Sir Ernest. A candidate is a mouthpiece of formulae for assembling electoral power which already represent a compromise of views, supposedly within the proper limits of the candidate's conscience and honesty. In the significant words of Mr. Herbert Morrison, "If I agree with my Party on two points and disagree on eight, I talk about the two points, and the sooner the young man [Edward VIII] learns that lesson the better."

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[1] Upon the limits of the present tendency to cabinet rule, Professor Laski has commented with admirable skill in *Reflections on the Constitution* (1951). It is precisely in these cases that one may suspect a revolt of the electorate. Incidentally, similarly effective warnings to Ministers have until recently been given in the privacy of the Carlton Club, the demi-king and little sovereign of the Conservative Party.

Although both Professor Barker and Professor Laski stem from the same great Liberal tradition, so emphatically Anglo-Saxon, in Sir Ernest's case enriched by his studies of Gierke and Troeltsch and of what I might call "Catholic Whiggery," yet the contrast between the two thinkers strikes the eyes. Professor Barker is as much conservative and even, in a good sense, conventional as Professor Laski is radical, even revolutionary, and responsive to clearly non-Anglo-Saxon patterns of thought. In the issue above, Professor Barker does not accept the sovereignty of the electorate (a) because it is not "legal" and (b) because he shrewdly suspects that it spells the Sovereignty of Party—indeed, in the U.S.S.R. it has spelled the sovereignty of *one* party. Now Sir Ernest does not like that, and hence he says that the sovereignty of the electorate is not valid—even "politically"; it is the opposite of 1066 and "a bad thing." This sovereignty, however, is somewhat more complicated than this. The party still has to get, by however devious methods in a political democracy, the assent of the electorate, just as the Members of Parliament have to get their assent, however passive, and, as Mr. Laski himself has to admit, the nefarious financiers have to get passive assent for their tricks. Nobody can save an apathetic electorate from the fruits of its apathy save itself.

Sir Ernest Barker is able to adopt a somewhat old-fashioned (and in my view most unsatisfactory) view of sovereignty because he defines it purely in terms of constitution and law, but does not ask radically about the framework and conditions of this positive law. Certainly sovereignty is *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*, as Laband said, and is tinged with a judicial quality rather than, as Hobbes and Bentham supposed, chiefly an executive one. But everything depends upon the constitutional suppositions upon which the sovereign functions, the frame of constitutional morality or "unwritten law." The sovereign state, says Sir Ernest, is competent to settle everything which comes up for *legal* decision *since* (i.e., this is his hypothesis and definition) sovereignty is legal, and indeed the state itself is the legal aspect of society. He gestures, as touching the rest, towards the very large social field, in which he rejoices, of voluntary organizations and groups and of voluntary activities. These, which are outside the state's proper ambit, include, interestingly enough, organizations of the schools and education as well as of the churches and unions.

But here he begs the question. Apparently the limits within which positive law and state sovereignty operate are those which it is competent and absolute to settle for itself. Here we might have expected, from the editor of Gierke and Troeltsch, a sympathetic and profound examination of Natural Law in conflict with which positive laws *vana* *et irrita sunt habenda.* However, in the relevant section Sir Ernest tells us that there is only one law, "the positive law which is actually imposed upon us"; yet one source of this law is an inherent justice "which *adds* to a law [validly and sovereignly] proceeding from the personal source of a human authority the further [subjective] sense that it is right and just in itself, apart from, and over and above, the fact of it being declared to be law."

The courts however are, by Sir Ernest's own contention, concerned with only one kind of law, positive and emanating from the personal source of the sovereign law-making body. What then is the advantage of his addendum, save to soothe the conscience? What has it to do with law? Does its absence make a law invalid? "Authority," Barker writes, "gives validity to law, and justice gives it value." "A law has *value*, and I am bound to obey it not only legally, and not by an outward compulsion, but also morally if," etc. I confess that, since the word "bound" usually carries the implication of moral obligations, I am quite at a loss to know what is meant by "bound by an outward compulsion" unless it just means "forced," which is irrelevant to a discussion of "law," unless it also means "force."

What indeed Sir Ernest may mean (but does not say) is that the State is Society (or some local part of it) in so far as it exercises the coactive function or, in traditional language, "the temporal sword." Such a definition could well stand. But it is not the one he has chosen; and therefore he evades, under phrases about law, the problem of the limits of the temporal function precisely because it is coercive, imperfect, and as Marx truly said, in some aspects of dominion over men, temporary.

This illustrates what I have called the conventional quality of Sir Ernest Barker's thought. But the criticism goes further. It will be recalled that the author of the famous article "The Discredited State" (1915) did not, himself, hold that the state was discredited. Indeed, since the days of the pluralist discussion (which is still a very relevant one), Sir Ernest has had a tender place in his affections for a Social and Economic Parliament, a conception which to-day scarcely troubles practical politicians—except perhaps Mr. Christopher Hollis, an intellectual publisher—and upon which Laski has comments of magisterial acerbity.[2] But what Sir Ernest really does—and I referred above with a certain imprecision to his views on the state as an aspect of "society"—is to make both the state and other social forms aspects of the "Nation."

Sir Ernest has long been concerned with the significance of the nation, although I cannot recall that, like Dr. Bernard Joseph in his *Nationality*

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[2] *Reflections on the Constitution* (Manchester, 1951), pp. 48–50.

(1929), he ever drew any explicit distinction between "nationality" and "nationalism." In 1927 he wrote a substantial book, *National Character*, in which he attached, for Britain, considerable importance to what I have elsewhere called the Anglo-Saxon tradition[3] and in the preface to which he praised a national tradition as "one of the greatest achievements of the human spirit." No knowledgeable man would accuse Sir Ernest of not being a great humanist and an internationalist, yet clearly he has chosen to fly in the face of Lord Acton's warning about the grave and evil consequences that can flow from identifying "state" and "nation." His bias of sentiment is in favour of directing attention to the spiritual fact of the nation, however determined by material factors, geographical, genetic, economic, and historic-accidental. Nevertheless, this surprising definition of the state, as being the nation in its legal form, is of great importance in shaping Barker's political thought. One suspects that he has mistaken the *Zeitgeist* of a particular age with its nationalist conventions, specifically the age from the sixteenth to the early twentieth (in Asia, late twentieth) century, for the basic hypotheses of political science, or, to steal Professor Herbert Butterfield's phrase, that he has substituted for the scientific the moralistic approach.[4] What scientific basis is there for identifying both state and society with aspects of the nation; and how many questions, which ought to be asked, will this beg?

Let us take the case of Great Britain, a fairly obvious one. As Joseph says, we have here three nationalities, English, Scots, and Welsh (incidentally, all with their national traditions). We may, however, take Ernest Renan's definition: "*Deux choses qui, à vrai dire, n'en font qu'une, constituent cette âme . . . . L'une est la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs; l'autre est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble.*[5] . . . Even here we should note, as a danger signal in the precise use of words, that we are getting entirely away from the philological history of "nation" as a word to describe those who are "born" from a common stock. Or perhaps born in one place, or in what Sir Ernest refers to as "contiguous" places. If we persist, then we arrive, as in America, at a definition of the "nation" that will include a congeries of "nationalities." Membership becomes precisely equivalent to what Mr. Joseph calls "citizenship," not creating the state but, by naturalization orders, created legally by the state, like the registration of a new dog or marriage by licence.

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[3] *The Anglo-Saxon Tradition* (London and New York, 1939).

[4] "The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach in International Affairs," *International Affairs*, Vol. 27, pp. 411–422 (Oct., 1951).

[5] "Qu'est ce qu'une Nation?" *Discours et conférences* (Paris, 1887), p. 306.

This, however, may well be felt not to be enough. What is "contiguity"? If I am born in Strasburg, am I not more contiguous to Heidelberg than to Paris; if in Eastern Pakistan, more contiguous to Delhi than to Karachi? Have we not here the illusion that all of us are like the English, with the English Channel separating us from the foreigners "by nature," and with "the Continent cut off"? If it is "spiritual contiguity" we mean, is not a Catholic more related to Rome than to Edinburgh; and is not Boston, Lincs., more closely related to Boston, Mass., than it is related to Zululand in the Commonwealth? Briefly, there are indeed, as Renan said, not only political traditions, but spiritual ones. But they are far more complex and overlapping than the nation-state theory supposes. Renan himself, in the very essay quoted, speaks of a future with the coming will of a Confederated Europe to live supra-nationally together.[6] If there is no supra-national community what, in Sir Ernest's own theory of "the legal aspect of society," sustains international law? Or is it not law? It seems most likely that an identification has been made, all too conventionally easy in a period now historically ending, between society (local to one area), nation (but not such by nationality), and state (as legal aspect of nation). The national state indeed exercises a coercive function over all the resident natives of a national and limited area. But we must not confuse a temporary social form, whether city-state or nation-state, with the fundamental data in the physiology and morphology of politics. The consequences for our philosophy will be very serious if we do so.

III

The most eminent of the younger political philosophers in Britain, not someone led astray into the heresy that much description of institutions makes a theory, is Harold Laski's successor in the chair at London, Professor Michael Oakeshott. In his work, unlike that of R. H. Tawney, Denys Brogan, Arnold Toynbee and Professor Butterfield, the theory does not emerge merely in the interstices of historical studies, however profound or brilliant, or of a would-be science of history improving on Spengler. It is deliberately essayed. However, in this case a judgment is made more difficult by the relatively small quantity of production by which we can assess the philosophy. Professor Oakeshott's *Social and Political Doctrines* (1939) is a valuable anthology of the work of other political philosophers. His introduction to a recent edition of Hobbes' *Leviathan* notifies us of his admiration for this work of that great eccentric, which Oakeshott—quite unlike Hobbes' own contemporaries—

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

claims is "the greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English language." The chief remaining evidence upon which we have to rely is his London inaugural lecture, *Political Education* (1951), which received something less than justice in the *New Statesman* at the hands of Mr. R. H. S. Crossman.

In this lecture at least we feel that we are coming to grips with real issues, although its language, it must be confessed, is inexplicably obscure. The attempt, popular in some official quarters to-day, to purge politics of the sepsis of all ideas is very rightly dismissed as "merely impossible, the product of a misunderstanding." Politics is properly defined as "attending to the general relations of a set of people," i.e., not just a matter of state "government," but also including the structure of churches and most of what is called sociology and "industrial relations," or labour relations. But Professor Oakeshott then turns to the issue of whether political education should be education in some set of abstract principles which, when joined to empirical activity, produces "a self-moved manner of activity." Should we attend to the examination of fundamental Marxist or, as Sir Norman Angell hopes, of Liberal ideology? Or, as Professor Carr more sinisterly suggests, should every child be educated in the official ideology of his country, just as the great Hobbes would have recommended?

What yet, asks Professor Oakeshott, are the essential political ideas? They may be abstract; but they are abstractions from "the manner in which people have been accustomed to go about the business of attending to the arrangements of their societies . . . knowledge of a traditional manner of attending." The catch phrase here is the small word "their." We are, therefore, not concerned with the sociology of human beings and with the political science of control of these beings—perhaps traditional or, as that great political scientist Machiavelli thought, anyhow recurrent owing to the psychological constants in our human nature. We are concerned with particular arrangements of particular societies with peculiar traditions. Zoölogy becomes not the study of life in animals, but of something special, such as horses, or maybe cantering horses or the parliaments of apes.

Professor Oakeshott is, however, fully entitled to say that he is not at all concerned with political science but with political philosophy, with values and with the concrete historical traditions which incarnate and enshrine values—even, we may suspect, not with human traditions but with "national" or "nationality" (they are, by definition, different) or class traditions. "Democracy," for example, is something specific to a particular "pattern of culture" and is not to be shipped abroad save as a concrete political working of the British—or is it the American or the Swiss?—"way of life." Obviously it may not appeal elsewhere, although its fruits will show that it is excellent for those whose stomachs can take it. Proportional representation is certainly no form of politics proper to every society—one may even ask whether it is proper anywhere when legislature and executive are at all intertwined. As for candid appeals to mankind about Human Rights, Liberty, Equality, Rule of Law, Salvation, and the like, they are superficial and suggest that "a knowledge of the chosen political ideology, and a political education confined to learning a catechism, can take the place of a tradition of political behaviour," for example, of true-born Britons. The *Koran* clearly is not a gospel for all, but for Arabs. The Rights of Man and Natural Law are formulations of, or contingent upon, one manner or another of "attending to arrangements." Moreover, they are the arrangements of "a single community." Of a world community or of Renan's confederation of Europe? Not at all; but presumably of Sir Ernest Barker's Nation (or is it Nationality?).

Professor Oakeshott reminds us that we cannot, indeed, cut the arrangements of a society to suit an ideology. (Something very similar has been done recently—rather extensively.) Shall we say that we cannot cut up human nature to suit an ideology? A revolution can break a tradition—"it would be foolish to deny the possibility"—but it will not so break it that we cannot still study its past in order to be enlightened as to its future. Presumably we can view Soviet Russia *sub specie* a continuation of czardom. Anyhow, the well-behaved societies are the more fortunate, at least to political students busy with "a municipal knowledge, not universal." Proper concern is with "the history of the manner of *our* political thinking . . . *our* tradition of political behaviour." One is here worlds away from the views of one of the Founding Fathers of America, Benjamin Franklin, who prayed that "a thorough knowledge of the Rights of Man may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface and say 'This is my country.' "

It cannot be denied that Professor Oakeshott belongs to a recognized political tradition, and that a reputable one, if Irish—the tradition of Edmund Burke. His support of this tradition is even more explicit than that of his tutor, Professor Barker. But as another pupil of Sir Ernest, perhaps I may yet express the doubt whether the great passages of Burke have not been those in which he escaped from the cult of municipalism and expressed truths resonant to the human heart of every clime or, as the Schoolmen would have put it, "to human beings of a rational soul consisting." The Christian Church is obstinately universalist and refuses to make Mr. Oakeshott's distinctions or to deny the wood in order to study the grain of the trees. So do I. However, in conclusion, I might call attention to one very significant, related passage from Professor Oakeshott's address where, having learned his distrust of abstract reason from Hobbes, who worshipped only power and felicity (success), he yet recalls that philosopher's obstinately scientific analysis of human nature—a little over-mathematical maybe but, by his lights, scientific. Writes Professor Oakeshott, apropos of "the rights of woman": "There was an incoherence in the arrangements of the society which pressed convincingly for a remedy." There are, then, in his system what Spencer and Marx—great men both—would have called "social dynamics." We are not told which society knew the answers, whether England, Scotland, or Norway. But at least we have a hint that maybe politics is such an arrangement of wills and power, by coordination or domination, as will provide a social adjustment of the pressure of human need; and this is at all times, from the Yukon to Timbuctoo and from the General of the Jesuits to Mr. Harry Pollitt or Tom Jones, the joiner's apprentice.

IV

Apart from these three fine lights of the political scene, and from the extravagant and uncovenanted activity of Lord Russell, who like some majestic luminary takes over the whole solar system for his ambit, from God to matrimony, from love to anarchy, a drear darkness has fallen on British political theory which was so bright. Maybe one cause is that, whereas once it was thought enough to be a political philosopher and a gentleman of independent mind and means, as it was from Bacon to Hume, from Bentham to J. S. Mill, it is now held to be essential to be fully occupied teaching school. There was, from Bentham to Sidgwick and even later, a fine British tradition in political science. Vigorous in America and still surviving in Britain among humble sociologists, since the deaths of Seeley, Bryce, and Wallas, the systematic study of politics has been almost extinct among the British political theorists, save in the debased forms of revised Marxism. It is true that the reign of the neo-Hegelians such as Bradley and Bosanquet, who lost themselves in the Absolute, was largely responsible for this extinction of modest science, left by them to the cataloguers of data. But even in something different from the political science of means, in political philosophy, although Dr. Toynbee has made a learned if very controversial contribution, the work of expounding the grand tradition of Humanism, and especially Christian Humanism, goes unperformed. It is of no especial interest to semi-

Marxists or Hobbesians and is unsympathetic to National Culture men. There is, in the British universities, no equivalent of a Maritain on the Continent, any more than of a Simmel or Pareto or Lasswell. Indeed, the latter may well be unheard of or unread.

There is, however, one other theorist who is, amid the dust and darkness, like a thunderous red sunset on the horizon, or perhaps a dawn. Professor E. H. Carr, academic, Foreign Office official, and writer of leading articles for the *Times*, is a man of many parts and roles. He writes, if not with the conscious conviction of the relevancy of logical positivism to politics of Mr. J. P. Plamenatz, yet with an erudition which equals that of Laski and with a precision and lucidity which exceed him. We are left in no doubt in detail about what he means. In fairness to Professor Carr, if I understand his general theory aright, I should say that it is one with which I deeply disagree. Yet at least it is a theory with which one can disagree.

Let me begin by stating the points upon which we are probably agreed. Professor Carr believes that the study of politics is of human control and power relations, not just a study of state governments—a position which I have maintained since 1926. "Politics," he writes in his *Twenty Years Crisis* (1939), "are in one sense always power politics." Acton's famous dictum, taken without careful reservations, is highly misleading—as, incidentally, Lord Radcliffe points out in his Reith Lectures of 1951. Probably both Professor Carr and I here owe something to Hobbes, as well as to certain modern schools of psychology, especially that of Alfred Adler, although the bi-valent attitude to power of Michael Bakunin may also have played its part with Professor Carr. Politics, moreover, is to both of us a science, which "must be based on a recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice." Finally, when he reaches the practical conclusions of his argument, Professor Carr has a soft place in his heart and a hard logic in his mind favouring Atlantic community integration, which I view with enthusiasm.

This said, our ways part. Professor Carr, who is no Francophil, obviously felt, until a very late stage, as did also Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny in *The Price of Peace* (1935), that our relations with a growing and "have-not" Germany could have been accommodated within the limits of peaceful change. "Resistance to aggression, however necessary as a momentary device of national policy, is no solution, for readiness to fight to prevent change is just as immoral as readiness to fight to enforce it." It is not practicable to enter here into the issue whether the Second World War should have been avoided; whether accommodation with a Germany which certainly based its strategy on the expectation of compromise would have been possible; or whether the policy of "unconditional surrender," with the great increase of the power of Russia and the concealed but effective eclipse of the European power of Britain, was not a disaster—to put it in other words, whether the Chamberlain and not the Churchill policy (or the Roosevelt policy) did not display better judgement. Perhaps Chamberlain was right and, despite Mr. Chester Wilmot, not Roosevelt only, but Churchill and Eden also were wrong. Briefly, I suggest that the reply is that we shall know the answer when we are certain whether we shall avoid a third World War, or at least know that we shall win it without the total ruin of Europe. Certainly the Second World War was a noble adventure against tyranny. Professor Carr, however, with his kindly attitude towards Munich, is at least consistent. He now holds that, in dealing with Stalin, what we require is more sympathetic understanding and a greater willingness, by peaceful compromise and appeasement, to let a growing Power find its rightful place in the balance of things. He remarks with equanimity, in *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (1947), that "seen in the broadest historical perspective, the impact of the Soviet Union on the Western world symbolizes the end of that period of history which began in the 16th and 17th centuries and was marked by the world-wide ascendancy of Western Europe and, in particular, of the English-speaking peoples." With a certain inverted sadism, no reference is made here to the possibility of ending those lethal and vestigial divisions of the Atlantic community which are a prime source of its weakness. Rather what is indicated is perhaps the wisdom of yet another Munich—which is, of course, consistent thinking.

This attitude causes Professor Oakeshott, in a fierce onslaught (March, 1951), to describe Professor Carr's history of *The Bolshevik Revolution,* of which he reviews the first volume, as "the story of those who were 'proved right' by success"; to suggest that the historian has "a bias in favor of what is successful . . . far more corrupting than any partisan bias"; and to say that indeed Professor Carr, his sympathy for Bolshevism developed to the point of "total immersion," has accomplished the feat of " 'going native' without being a Communist." If even part of this charge is right, then if Professor Laski first morally sold the pass, Professor Carr has walked over to the other flag. His answer presumably would be that, as with Hitler, he is concerned seriously with peace; and that the spirit of unencumbered plasticity is the best way to achieve it. Professor Carr would not have fought Napoleon along with Pitt: he would have remembered the virtues of the incorruptible Robespierre and made a deal in power politics. Sometimes, however, power politics may be too terrible a mistress for "deals."

In *The New Society,* broadcast by the B.B.C. in 1951, Professor Carr re-enforces his point. It is necessary to be clear about what this is. Since it emerges from his whole theory, it is a point carefully considered, not readily to be dismissed. (I might note that with most of what he has to say about the rise of Asia, I totally agree.) He does *not* assert belief in a "far-reaching agreement with Russia at the present time," but that some shrewdly calculated line has to be drawn between total disarmament (which Chamberlain never advocated) and "all America and Western Europe armed to the teeth." For one thing, he finds that the Western attitude to the Russian Revolution has been ambivalent and could be improved. There is much to learn. More harm has been done by the bogey of communism than by communism. J. S. Mill's theory of personal liberty is out of date and needs revision. In any event, "to-day Europeans know that little or nothing worth saving in Europe can survive a third world war: they are not concerned, like many Americans, with the question of how a third world war is to be won, but only with the question how it is to be avoided." In brief, peace must be preserved at all costs as a categorical imperative.

Professor Carr's position is not, of course, to be confused in any way with that of my friend Mr. George Kennan in his Princeton Lectures (1951) on foreign policy.[7] Mr. Kennan is, after all, the major author of the policy of containment and is merely seeking to disembarrass the Department of State of that easy American moralism of which Senator Borah was a great exponent, which holds that fundamental morality consists in conforming to what is seen as moral in the American pattern of life—i.e., the old Anglo-Saxon vice of combining hypocrisy (as in Asia, *cf.* Professor Carr on this) with moral preachments in the style of a Presbyterian dominie.

I would not have expounded this thesis on practical international relations at such length were it not that Professor Carr is a man who approaches these grave issues directly from a mature consideration (today much lacking elsewhere) of fundamental political theory, and therefore with high intelligence. I cannot applaud too much his plea that "besides armaments, there are other vital elements in our defences against communism," in brief, ideas. I do not equally applaud the notion that this is something upon which the British Foreign Office should be looked to for the making of representations to the Department of State. I suspect that, on the record, the Department of State might resent it. A Power declining is always tempted to be a reactionary Power. Even if it compromises opportunistically with "the future" (Lenin or Mao or some other massacrer of millions), it usually does so for the wrong reasons. I strongly believe that the future lies in the British Commonwealth and the Atlantic Community, advancing towards world government, with recognition of the rise of Asia.

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[7] *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951).

Professor Carr thinks quite otherwise. He regarded Geneva, and regards the United Nations, as a mischievous busybody and a bolsterer of the *status quo*, on the whole *against* change which, with an odd idealism contrasting with his realism, he describes in 1951 adjectivally as "peaceful." If he describes the old balance of power as "finished" in Europe, in his *Conditions of Peace* (1942), nevertheless as a consultant his recommendation is always for accommodation, checks, in fact *balances*, perhaps of units larger than the old, perhaps with not *all* the old petty national units, but still with national units. It is these which are regarded as final. His thesis is a Great Power politics. To him much of the democratic and Western creed may be dusty and out of date, but these units of an archaic political apparatus are not seriously in need of change. The uniting process which converted England and Scotland into Britain is not in urgent need of being continued. One may conjecture that Professor Carr finds the Marxists right: our real trouble is economic.

We can agree with Professor Carr in his cynicism about pre-established harmonies among nations, according to the descriptions handed out by the public relations officers of the Yalta-San Francisco epoch. Politics abhors a power vacuum. We can agree, moreover, that the assumption is inane "that there is some 'solution' or 'plan' which, by a judicious balancing of interests, will be equally favourable to all and prejudicial to none." Most "new society" arrangements mean that somebody is going to be hurt—and with the rise of Asia and the Union of Europe (which for centuries it was the main design of our policy, in the name of "liberty," to avoid), it is perhaps especially the good British, "God's Englishmen" according to Milton, who are going to be hurt. But I, for one, cannot sympathize with Professor Carr's reactionary contempt—for, if economically he is a mild revolutionary, politically his position is reactionary—for "the metaphysicians of Geneva." Here the cure for metaphysics is more and better metaphysics. The trouble, indeed, with the Geneva men was that they halted between two worlds—and the United Nations unreformed (by virtue of the nefarious veto) is "half a League, half a league backwards."

"We must, therefore, reject as inadequate and misleading the attempt to base international morality on an alleged harmony of interests which identifies the interest of the whole community of nations with the interest of each individual member of it." Here Professor Carr is correct. The interest of the individual "nation," i.e., the Scottish or Zulu or "British

Commonwealth" people, must be pooled in, and even rationally—with proper respect for states' rights—subordinated to, the sovereign good of the whole community as the sense of community may emerge, be it "Great British" or Atlantic or world-wide humanity. We must not take the defeatist and heretical Dr. Niebuhr's way out, of "moral man and immoral society." But it is, of course, fully open to us to agree with Schwarzschild and Simonds and Emeny, and indeed with Carr, that peoples or electorates or states which may (and even historically do) pay this cost of sovereignty for Scotland (or maybe Great Britain or United Europe or the Atlantic Community, selected to taste) will never, never, never pay the costs of peace for anything wider (be it Great Britain or United Europe or Atlantic Union or world organization, also selected according to taste). There is no proof against this opinion. National security, *salus huius civitatis,* is the prime, unshakeable mandate, it is alleged—together with power to protect this security against all comers, magnifying oneself, as says Machiavelli, and with "power after power" beyond that, as says Hobbes.

"Power goes far to create the morality convenient to itself," according to Carr. Therefore, "We can discard as purely utopian and muddle-headed plans for a procedure of peaceful change dictated by a world legislation or a world court." But the power courts need not just be the old national ones, all of them—Bulgaria, Nicaragua, and the rest—but something mightier, creating a *pax Anglo-Saxonica.* Visualizing a dynamic nucleus, I once wrote two books, *The Anglo-Saxon Tradition* and *One Anglo-American Nation.* But I certainly did not mean what Professor Carr here means—something primarily negative and exclusive. There must indeed be foci of power: the question is of their purpose and to what function they are dynamic.

Those who take it as their spoken or unspoken axiom that in politics the prime mandate is the preservation of national security, and this by means of reserves of power to meet all occasions, do not usually reflect that diplomacy on this basis is impracticable for small countries. Professor Carr does. He sees no future for them. But the State-Nationalists and the Great Power theorists alike —including Carr, Simonds, Spykman, Schwarzschild, and often Morgenthau (but not Schwarzenberger) —have, up to date, culpably omitted to make any close analysis of what they mean by "power," which they take uncritically.

May not Cooperation—shall we say based upon Natural Law, restated psychologically and sociologically—and not Domination, *contra ius naturale,* be the real secret of lasting power? I have here only space to put the question. Certainly almost all theorists of the modern world, the post-Erasmus world from Machiavelli on, have uncritically made the second and more obvious assumption, that we must have the sovereign and subject, top-dog and under-dog, relation. I doubt whether we shall have a satisfactory theory of internationalism until this problem is investigated at a more profound level than, let us say, that of either Benthamite or Manchester School assumptions or Marxist assumptions, now "dated," in psychology. (The trouble, indeed, with Marx was that he was too much of a Manchester capitalist in his axioms.) It is yet interesting that such pessimistic or "realist" writers as Schwarzschild, operating with the assumptions of a psychology of domination ("power," in Acton's sense) have no doubt that only an internationalist solution, if it could be obtained, would bring that lasting secular peace of which they despair.

One observation, however, can be made. Of the four writers whom I have discussed, the one with the widest international appeal and influence, Laski, was himself an internationalist and a convinced one. Much of the greatest political theory of the world, from the Stoics and Aquinas to Jefferson and Marx, has been written in a fashion that transcended frontiers; that was, in Goethe's phrase, "above all nations"; and that made an appeal to the intelligence and judgment of every man as a reasonable human being. There is no intrinsic reason why a praiser of national traditions, such as Burke, should not make this appeal; but it must be confessed that he carries an apparatus of local history and "patterns of life," or native cultures, around with him, uninteresting, unintelligible, or antipathetic to many, which, as it were, muffles his voice. I doubt whether Marx can be answered by Burke alone. And I wonder whether the present eclipse of British political theory on the international stage may not be due to the fact that, both as science and philosophy, it has become too infected by historicism. Uncertain of voice and national of garb, it presents itself without either a Christian or humanistic assessment of values or a dispassionate analysis of means and facts.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A NOTE ON THE STATE OF THE UNION*

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By tradition public administration is regarded as a division of political science. Woodrow Wilson set the stage for this concept in his original essay identifying public administration as a subject worthy of special study, and spokesmen for both political science and public administration have accepted it since. Thus Leonard White, in his 1930 article on the subject in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, recognizes public administration as "a branch of the field of political science." Luther Gulick follows suit, observing in 1937 that "Public administration is thus a division of political science . . . ."[1] So generally has this word got around that it has come to the notice of the sociologists, as is indicated in a 1950 report of the Russell Sage Foundation which refers to "political science, including public administration. . . ."[2] "Pure" political scientists and political scientists with a public administration slant therefore are not alone in accepting this doctrine, which obviously enjoys a wide and authoritative currency.

But if public administration is reckoned generally to be a child of political science, it is in some respects a strange and unnatural child; for there is a feeling among political scientists, substantial still if mayhap not so widespread as formerly, that academicians who profess public administration spend their time fooling with trifles. It was a sad day when the first professor of political science learned what a manhole cover is! On their part, those who work in public administration are likely to find themselves vaguely resentful of the lack of cordiality in the house of their youth. In his preface to a recent textbook on public administration, one of the least-offending of these felt it necessary to avow his undiminished loyalty to political science, notwithstanding his current fling among the fleshpots of administrative practice. Like the prodigal son, he returned to ask forgiveness for his transgressions, the while pocketing craftily whatever gain his deviation may have produced in the form of royalties.

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* The Committee on Public Administration of the American Political Science Association held a meeting in August of 1951, in connection with the annual conference of the Association. During the discussion I expressed views which I was requested to formulate for the committee as a basis for further thinking. This I did, and Chairman John M. Gaus circulated my draft memorandum informally among the members of the committee for comment. In addition, I asked a few colleagues outside the committee to read and criticize the manuscript. As many as eight individuals responded with suggestions which proved extremely useful to me in revising the memorandum. I shall not attempt to shift or to share the responsibility for what I have written by citing names, but they will know from this acknowledgment that I am grateful for their counsel.

Meanwhile, the committee at whose instance the memorandum was drafted gave way to a new one. Prepared for one committee even as it approached the end of its life and not submitted to the successor group, this paper has no institutional standing. I offer it as my own thinking, with my thanks to John Gaus and the Committee on Public Administration of 1951 for their encouragement and assistance in its preparation.

[1] In his paper titled "Science, Values and Public Administration," in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York, 1937), p. 191.

[2] *Effective Use of Social Science Research in the Federal Services* (New York, 1950), p. 27.

The argument developed in this essay rests upon three major propositions. The *first* is that the rise of public administration represents a centrifugal tendency which, if unchecked, could lead to the complete divorce of political science and public administration. The *second* is that, while this tendency results from several contributing factors not all of which are subject to control, some things might be done to modify, though perhaps not to reverse, the trend. The *third* is that it would be very greatly to the advantage of political science if these things were done. Undoubtedly there are other and broader considerations than the interests of political science involved in the emerging relationships, but I do not here examine what they are. Nor do I inquire in what direction the advantage of public administration lies. The emphasis throughout is on public administration *from the point of view of political science.*

I. THE SEPARATIST TENDENCY

It appears to be inherent in the nature of a young profession that it develop specialties which in their day will demand separate recognition. So medical practice proliferates into a number of specialty fields of which even a layman can name half a dozen. So, too, political science, but lately an inchoate field striving for status, now finds itself beset by several vigorous offspring each demanding its own place. For public administration is not the first nor the only son with aspirations for a separate household: international law has already effected substantially complete withdrawal, what with its own association, its separate annual meeting, and its special publication; international relations is at least as far advanced as public administration along the way to independence; and public opinion even now moves tentatively and experimentally down the same path. The problem of intradisciplinary relations therefore is not one in any sense peculiar to political science in respect of public administration.

By most standards political science represents an important and healthy segment of higher education in the United States. The American Political Science Association has increased in membership from 1,819 in 1930 and 2,857 in 1940 to almost 6,000 in 1952, and has recently completed a significant reorganization. The Association's Committee for the Advancement of Teaching reported in 1951 that there were some 5,000 persons engaged in teaching political science, adding that more than 7,000 students have taken degrees with emphasis on this subject each year since the close of World War II.[3] Examination of any half-dozen university catalogues selected at random will confirm the impression conveyed by these figures that political science is an important activity in the academic world. The smaller institutions are content to offer five or ten courses, but the larger require that many pages for their listings. Moreover, these courses deal with the greatest variety of subjects. Gone are the days of the fundamentalists, with their Three R's approach to a master science; this is the age of the specialists, in which others may turn the pages and read course titles in bewilderment. The annual meeting of the Association contributes further evidence of the fragmentation of the field. The program of the twenty-fifth anniversary meeting could be autographed and mailed home as a memento of New Orleans for one cent; now it takes twenty pages of publishers' advertisements to pay for the cost of printing the program. It is a lean day during the conference when there are not a dozen round tables running simultaneously, some of them on fairly technical subjects. Actually, the controlling factor now with regard to time and place of the annual meeting is space and accommodations.

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[3] See the Committee's report, *Goals for Political Science* (New York, 1951), p. 100. This is the latest of several reports on the state of political science, the first of which goes back almost forty years. It constitutes a very useful analysis of problems and trends in the field. Among other services, it summarizes briefly each of the earlier reports.

These lines are not written in a spirit of complaint. The thesis is not that the development experienced is bad, but only that it suggests the imminence of certain problems with which political scientists need to concern themselves. For it may be argued that the field of political science appears to bear within it the seeds of disintegration as a united discipline, not through decadence but precisely through the strength and variety of the specialization characteristic of maturity. It is necessary to insist that this state has come about through natural causes, and indeed through a process of growth that most have regarded with satisfaction. Nevertheless it is not inappropriate to inquire whether the profession, as it prepares to enter its second half-century, is as sound internally as it might be. To ask the question is not, of course, to propose nor yet to imply a negative answer.

One aspect of the specialization besetting political science which has *not* developed into a serious problem is found in the various local and regional societies. Beginning with the Southwestern Political Science Association more than thirty years ago,[4] the number has increased steadily until there are now about ten such societies. There was a time when those responsible for the affairs of the American Political Science Association viewed these local and regional organizations with apprehension, deeming them to be potential threats to the national body. Happily this attitude has given way to one of mutual confidence and cooperation, and the relations between the local and the national associations are now in satisfactory shape despite a lingering suspicion on the part of a few that all is not well. The local and regional societies are mentioned here only for the purpose of noting regional interests as a potential threat to political science nationally, a threat that through vision and flexibility in thinking has been contained to the satisfaction of nearly all concerned.

I spoke earlier of international affairs and public administration as two of the

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[4] The Southwestern Political Science Association soon became the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association and subsequently the Southwestern Social Science Association, but none familiar with its origin doubts that political science supplied the stimulus and leadership.

divisions of political science which are insistent, by force of circumstance if not by voice, in their demands for special consideration. All the evidence available indicates the growing importance of these two branches in comparison with other segments of the field. In 1950 American colleges and universities awarded 7,183 degrees in political science; the numbers for international affairs and public administration were 1,285 and 477 respectively. These figures are mutually exclusive, which means first that the degrees granted in these two fields were separate and special, and second that the total number for political science includes many, in all likelihood many hundred, degrees covering specialization in international affairs and public administration. The sources at hand do not provide separate listing for the other familiar fields of political science; indeed, so far as can be learned, no such listing has been made.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 1920–1950*

	1920		1930		1940		1950	
	Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total
Total Dissertations in Political Science	82		271		388		705	
Total Dissertations in International Affairs	23	28	64	24	99	26	230	33
Total Dissertations in Public Administration	8	10	21	8	79	20	93	13

* Compiled from the annual listing in the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. The figures for political science include those for both international affairs and public administration. International affairs includes international organization, international politics, and international law. (Public Administration first appeared as a separate listing in 1936.)

The annual REVIEW compilation of doctoral dissertations in process in political science provides more explicit data regarding specialization within the field so far as graduate work is concerned. The table included here may prove well worth a few minutes' time for study and reflection. It will appear at once that both international affairs and public administration have grown more rapidly in recent years than the field as a whole, as measured by the number of doctoral dissertations under way. The respective figures indicate growths of 10 and 11.6 times the original figures, as compared with an overall increase of 8.6 times. It will appear also that public administration has grown more rapidly since 1920 than international affairs: percentage-wise, the respective increases were 30 and 18.[5]

Closer analysis of the data on doctoral dissertations for the decade 1940–50 indicates that, while political philosophy and psychology is a more popular field for graduate study in 1950 than it was in 1940, all other areas except the two presently under discussion either marked time or lost gradually during the decade. A significant general finding is that in no year during the decade did international affairs and public administration combined contribute less than 42 per cent of the total, while for six of the ten years the contribution was 46 per cent or more.

The evidence thus far examined indicates only that two branches of political science have grown faster than the others. It speaks eloquently of the specialization which has come to characterize the field, but does not prove that that specialization suggests schismatic tendencies, or indeed that it is damaging in any other way. Let us turn now to public administration alone. The purpose will be to explore somewhat more carefully the rise and present place of administration as a division of political science.

University education and training for public administration in the United States goes back to the very beginnings of higher education; yet as late as 1920 only 8 institutions in 7 different states offered training in the field as such. By 1930 the number of schools had increased to 31 and the number of states to 16; by 1940 the respective figures were 79 and 32, and by 1948, 117 and 44. It is worthy of special note that the number of institutions offering training in public administration increased 48 per cent in the eight years from 1940 to 1948. Of the 117 colleges and universities offering such training in the latter year, almost 100 made available the Bachelor's degree for concentration in public administration; more than 80 offered the Master's degree in the field, and several designated it the Master's in Public Administration; and 35 offered the doctorate, some terming it the Doctorate in Public Administration. The special (as distinguished from the general political science) character of this training is indicated by the fact that more than 40 institutions provided internship programs, while an additional 30 employed field or laboratory courses to bring their students into contact with public offices. The wide attraction of the public administration training movement is suggested by the spread of the 117 colleges and universities so engaged among 44 of the 48 states.[6]

Another suggestive summary deals with assistance available to graduate students in public administration in 1951–52. A questionnaire addressed to 177 colleges, universities, and other institutions produced replies indicating that as many as 85 provide support for graduate students through financial or other assistance. Of these, 76 are colleges and universities, 9 are institutions or programs not educational in the usual acceptance of the term. The forms of assistance offered may be classified as follows: fellowships, 57; scholarships, 39; assistantships, 57; and internships, 3. A question as to course of study required of the holder brought a considerable variety of answers, with simple "public administration" leading a field of 18 entries, many of them quite specialized, by a wide margin.[7]

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[5] Two practices followed in compiling the list serve substantially to depress the figures for administration; first, public administration for the purposes of the listing means public administration *in the United States*, which automatically rules out dissertations on foreign and comparative administration; second, American state and local government and politics are established as a separate category which naturally includes many studies of public administration.

[6] The data for this paragraph are summarized from the several issues of *Educational Preparation for Public Administration*, of which the most recent edition at hand was published by Public Administration Service (Chicago) in 1948.

Most college and university teaching of public administration is done through departments of political science or government. Thus of the 76 educational institutions represented in the pamphlet on graduate assistance, 31 operate through departments of political science and 12 through departments of government. The remaining 33 employ 26 different organizational structures, though it may be assumed from the list that individual differences normally involve nothing more serious than nomenclature—normally, but not always. The institutes, divisions, centers, curricula, and the like may be by-passed here, but three forms of organization should be considered for their special significance for political science.

The first of these is the school of business and public administration (or equivalent), of which *Educational Preparation for Public Administration* reported four in 1948. Technically, this figure must be accepted for want of a better one; actually, there are some scores of business schools which are moving in on public administration. In many instances this development has gone quite far, with courses leading to majors and sometimes to certificates and even degrees in public administration, and with bureaus of business research busying themselves indiscriminately in business and government studies. There are those, even among political scientists, who maintain that this trend is entirely sound: that administration, public or private, is administration. Some go so far as to forecast that the business schools are destined to swallow up public administration through the process of assimilation. This is not the time or the place to argue that view, but a single observation may be allowed: here is stark and very tangible evidence of a separatist tendency which might well rob political science of any except a quite formal relation with public administration. Here probably is the gravest single threat to the continuing dominion of political science over public administration.

The second is the school of public administration, numbering, again according to *Educational Preparation*, six in 1948. I pass by the question whether, from the point of view of public administration, there *should* be a separate school in favor of emphasis on the point that the existence of such a school constitutes a clear and distinct threat to the traditional relations between political science and public administration.

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[7] Public Administration Clearing House, *Graduate Assistance in Public Administration, 1951–1952* (Chicago, 1950).

The third form of organization that appears to have special importance for political science is the research and service bureau, by whatever name found—bureau of public administration, of government, of governmental research, of municipal research, of public affairs, etc. A count taken in 1946 revealed some 25 of these organizations; the number today is probably in the neighborhood of 40, perhaps even more. About the bureaus three propositions may be set down at this point: first, they serve important purposes, but not purposes which require their separation from the department of political science; second, as currently set up, they frequently represent a separatist tendency which affects (or may affect) political science adversely; and third, there is little reason why this should be so, assuming a hospitable attitude on the part of political science.

It is clear, then, that there are grave threats on the campus to the continuance of the relations which have prevailed in the past between political science and public administration. Off campus, in government circles, for example, there is much evidence of an intention to deal with administration without reference to its academic origins in political science. In view of the emphasis here on the separatist tendency in political science, however, it is not necessary to examine the latter aspect of the problem at this time.

II. ON TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

It is possible that the lack of enthusiasm for public administration on the part of some of the long-time leaders of political science may stem from failure to recognize (or to accept as *bona fide*) important current trends in that area. The public administration of 1952 in general resembles that of 1940, of course, but there are readily recognizable differences. There have been many and significant modifications in thinking about administration in the last twelve years, and nearly all of them have had the effect of reducing the area of seeming incompatibility between administration and political science.

The history of public administration in the United States can be divided into three periods. The first, the period of origins, may be said to have come to an end about 1915. The universities early took tentative note of the new subject and an occasional course began to appear. Authors interested in public affairs began to turn to public administration, and more and more books and articles found their way into print. The most important institutional development of the period came with the launching in 1906 of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, which, both individually and through its numerous progeny, has exerted a significant influence on the course of public administration for almost half a century. During these beginning years men sought for definitions and delimitations; the striving was for apprehension of a new (or newly identified) field of study. The work of the pioneers was of the first importance, but its details are not directly relevant to development of the present theme.

The second period covered the years 1915–1940, approximately. In so far as political scientists wrote the contemporary history of this era, they produced a varied and uneven account. Some saw in public administration a new area without much in the way of antecedent, others discovered its roots deep in history; some treated it as essentially a library-and-classroom subject, others pursued it to the courthouses and the capitols; many identified it as an emerging field of political science but some gave it special billing, as science or art or profession or trade, depending on predilection; and some ignored the rising tumult, proceeding with their personal preoccupations as before. It would be futile to attempt to generalize on the attitude of political scientists toward public administration in this period, particularly in its early years.

But political scientists were not alone in their appraisals of the developing field of public administration. Their voices were joined by those of management engineers, of business and industrial experts, of leaders of reform groups, and of manifold other interests concerned with administration, public or private or both. From the resulting discussion there developed wide acceptance of the doctrines of scientific management as applied to the public's business. In the congealing of this sentiment the influence of the political scientists may well not have been determining, but few would argue that it was not significant. And whatever the source or the responsibility of inspiration, it is plain that many of those who spoke for public administration came to put great faith in the canons of scientific management during the period from 1915 to 1940.

Scientific management *per se* meant many things during these years, for it was itself an evolving concept whose content varied with time and place and identity of spokesman. As applied to public administration, the credo of scientific management came in time to be characterized by attention to administration as administration without much stress on the *public* part of the term, by faith in "principles," by emphasis on science in administration, and by divorce of administration and values. This period may be said to have approached full fruition when, in 1927, W. F. Willoughby published his *Principles of Public Administration;* for Willoughby adopted the contemporary dogmas of scientific management, principles and all, and his book gained, and for some time held, wide currency. The era of scientific management achieved its pinnacle with the publication, in 1937, of the Gulick and Urwick *Papers on the Science of Administration.* There Urwick boldly proclaimed:

> It is the general thesis of this paper that there are principles which can be arrived at inductively from the study of human experience of organization, which should govern arrangements for human association of any kind. These principles can be studied as a technical question, irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise, the personnel composing it, or any constitutional, political or social theory underlying its creation.[8]

In the atmosphere provided by scientific management, a mechanistic concept of public administration came to prevail widely and in important circles. Administration was separated severely from the legislative body, toward which its spokesmen frequently manifested not only impatience but also profound distrust. "Politics" was anathema—not the politics practiced by administrators, but the politics of the "politicians." The emphasis seemed to be on answers, not on questions. Champions of the new order wrote and spoke, as was remarked

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[8] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 1), p. 49.

subsequently, as though man were nothing more than "administrative man," eager to spring to his place in the organization table and fall to on his appointed segment of POSDCORB.

Those who tended to equate public administration with scientific management claimed more for it than the content and methods of the new discipline could sustain. Their talk of the One Best Way to do a job had no appeal for one who could see with his own eyes that there were frequently at hand half a dozen ways, all promising. Their rejection of the time-honored methods of library scholarship and their emphasis on form and procedure were not calculated to win converts to the new way of administrative life. It was the scientific management complex that set the stage for the familiar political science reaction to public administration. That this reaction was somewhat less than enthusiastic is scarcely cause for wonderment.

The third stage in the history of public administration began about 1940 and is even now in full career. Its overwhelming mark is the approach to maturity for the field, with critical self-examination as a prominent undertone. The process of self-analysis received early impetus from the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, which began its work in 1928 and continued until 1945, when its final report appeared in print.[9] This committee through its labors served notice, even during the heyday of scientific management, that all was not mechanics in administration. And the founding and coming to age during the 'thirties of the Public Administration Clearing House and its several associated agencies lent added authority to the voice of the committee.

The event which above all others signalized the advent of a fresh approach to public administration was the founding, in 1939, of the American Society for Public Administration. The Society, dedicated from the beginning to the cause of advancing "the Science, Processes, and Art of Public Administration," has pursued its chosen career with diligence for more than a decade. Its annual conference, the frequent meetings of its half-a-hundred chapters, and the quarterly issues of its *Public Administration Review* have combined to exert a profound influence on the course of thinking about administration in the United States during the last twelve years. Two aspects of this influence are worthy of special remark: the first, that it has been brought to bear precisely where its effect would prove greatest, on the administrators themselves; the second, that practicing administrators have joined with academicians in its exercise. This latter is a consideration the importance of which it would be difficult to over-emphasize.

One who seeks evidence of a changing spirit in public administration need look no farther than the pages of the *Public Administration Review*. The editors from the very beginning have encouraged analytical and critical contributions, though of course not excluding pieces of a technical nature. The result has been a nice—and withal a satisfactory—balance between practical and theoretical (including some genuinely philosophical) articles, in which the latter have enjoyed at least their share of time and space. Illustrative of the temper of the *Review* is the series of four articles published during the tenth year of the journal in an "attempt to set forth significant recent developments and emerging trends in some of the principal sectors of public administration."[10]

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[9] William Anderson and John M. Gaus, *Research in Public Administration* (Chicago, 1945). This is a report whose modest pretensions give no outward sign of the significance of the activities which it describes.

The effect of the continuous reëxamination to which public administration has been subjected since 1940 has been to challenge many of the cherished dogmas of the era of scientific management. Thus the whole concept of principles in public administration has been questioned of recent years, not once and not by one voice but repeatedly, as has been the contention that administration is or can be a science. The identification of public administration with private or industrial management no longer passes unchallenged, for there are credible witnesses who find fundamental points of difference. The isolation of administration from the remaining processes of government likewise is subjected to sustained attack by those who view administration as only another part of the forest which seen whole is government; a lively if friendly debate proceeds on the place of politics in administration, though there are few to defend the earlier position that the two are mutually incompatible.[11]

The scientific management proposition that administration can be "studied as a technical question" apart from ends and values, brought to its apogee by L. Urwick in the article cited above, has been the object of continuing criticism in recent years. Administration to have meaning, the argument goes, must also have roots. Those roots will be found embedded in the soil provided by program. The administrator does not administer only: he administers *something*, and what he administers is of basic importance in the administrative process. Thus we hear relatively less these days about *posdcorb* and relatively more about program administration—about the administration of public health and education and public works and agriculture. The trend represented by this shift in emphasis may be expected to continue, for it has produced substantial advantages not previously enjoyed. Among these may be noted a significant three-way cross-fertilization among students of administration, practicing administrators, and professional specialists with a public service orientation. The value of such interplay would not have been denied by the devotees of scientific management, but it is recognized explicitly in the current emphasis on program administration.

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[10] George A. Graham, "Trends in Teaching of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 69–77 (Spring, 1950); John M. Gaus, "Trends in the Theory of Public Administration," *ibid.*, pp. 161–168 (Summer, 1950); Charles S. Ascher, "Trends of a Decade in Administrative Practices," *ibid.*, pp. 229–235 (Autumn, 1950); and Wallace S. Sayre, "Trends of a Decade in Administrative Values," *ibid.*, Vol. 11, pp. 1–9 (Winter, 1951).

[11] See Paul H. Appleby, *Big Democracy* (New York, 1945) and *Policy and Administration* (University, Albama, 1949); see also Arthur W. Macmahon's review of the latter in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 9, pp. 278–282 (Autumn, 1949).

It should be observed, at least in passing, that the doctrine of business (industrial) administration likewise has undergone considerable modification since 1940, some of it along lines not unlike those summarized for public administration.

The tendency to question basic assumptions of the public administration of fifteen years ago has had many interesting by-products, among them the current critical re-analysis of administrative reorganization. Earlier criticism of the reorganization movement questioned the efficacy or even the desirability of an integrated administrative machine. More recent critics emphasize the view that occasional and violent reorganization measures may be expected to achieve only partial success, in consideration of "informal organization" and other environmental factors which preclude the likelihood of wholehearted cooperation in implementing reorganization plans. John Gaus indeed has gone farther in suggesting that administration must take more account of its surroundings, that it not only must recognize but must take advantage of what he calls its "ecological" framework.[12] Others have joined to insist that administration can be understood only in terms of its social, political, economic, technological, and physical setting, thus further subordinating the mechanical aspects of the subject.

It would not be correct to conclude that scholarly efforts of the decade have been either purely destructive on the one hand or purely defensive on the other. On the contrary, the spokesmen of the new public administration have been keenly aware of the deficiencies of their discipline and have striven positively and mightily to remedy them. They have sought to supply flesh and blood for the bones of organization; they have torn down the walls separating administration from the rest of government, and so have given it breathing space; they have summoned aid from the various social sciences, aid as to both content and method (a process, it may be added, just getting well under way). As promising a portent as any currently discernible in the field is that offered by the interest of some of its leaders in probing the theoretical aspects of administration. The subject has been weak in philosophical content, partly it may be assumed because of its youth; partly because of preoccupation with workaday problems, and with war and depression; partly perhaps because the field did not attract theorizing minds in its early days. Happily there appear now to be time, will, and talent for the task of exploring the deeper meanings of public administration, and the emergence of something approaching a philosophy of administration is in prospect. Lincoln Gordon has written a penetrating brief comment on this subject. He does not foresee the early development of a rounded philosophy, though he remarks favorably on the efforts to build, if not a philosophical superstructure, then at least a foundation which will support further inquiry of a more elevated character.[13]

Out of this welter of discussion have come two major attacks on what may be called the political science character of public administration. One takes the view that to concede (or to relegate) administration to political science is to condemn it to too narrow a framework. In this view public administration concerns not only the organization and operation of government but also the subject matter of the several social sciences—economics, sociology, anthropology, and social psychology notably, with history thrown in for perspective, and, of course, law. Administration emerges from this synthesis as an eclectic discipline, one which draws strength from all and fuses the learning of all into a new activist social science. A second line of attack insists that public administration is in essence human behavior; its protagonists propose to cut the subject loose from political science and to re-root it in social psychology. Public administration thus would become a science once more, the argument goes, but this time not a pseudo-science of building blocks but a true science of human relations.[14] Whatever the outcome of these attacks—and they well may have no determinate outcome—it is evident that both reject the mechanistic concept of public administration. It is clear also that they have no patience with the view that administration is a branch of political science.

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[12] See the first essay in his *Reflections on Public Administration* (University, Alabama, 1947).

[13] Lincoln Gordon, "Public Administration in Perspective," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 263–267 (Autumn, 1947).

Lest it be concluded that public administration has become wholly introspective, it should be noted that its substantive contributions have been of considerable significance during the decade. Thus in the domain of international affairs there has been wide interest in the applicability of the tenets of administration both to international organizations and to "underdeveloped" countries. So the United Nations Organization, to cite but one example, has designated public administration as one of the areas in which it will make technical assistance available. Within the United States there is increasing attention to what may be called administrative (as against formal or legal or constitutional) federalism. This may be seen in the growing emphasis on intergovernmental relations—in the University of Minnesota studies on this subject, for example; in the renewed concern for regionalism; and in what appears to be generally a more active interest in the whole subject of area and administration. Other illustrations might be noted; but these will suffice as evidence that administration has not stood still substantively, for all its concern with basic problems of character and content.

Meanwhile the professionization of public administration has proceeded apace throughout the decade. Few would maintain, and certainly it is not maintained here, that the public service in the United States constitutes a profession or even, in the whole, an aggregate of professions. Yet it cannot be denied that there is accumulating a body of knowledge about the public service, an attitude among public servants about their positions and about government work, and a system of practice that add up to substantial steps in the direction of professionism.[15] In shaping the course and determining the speed of this trend, the organizations which head up in the Public Administration Clearing House play an important role, while it would be difficult to overestimate the contribution of the American Society for Public Administration and the *Public Administration Review.*

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[14] For a summary statement of the first view, see the comment by Lincoln Gordon cited above. For an exposition of the second, see Herbert A. Simon, "A Comment on 'The Science of Public Administration'," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 200–203 (Summer, 1947); Morton Grodzins, "Public Administration and the Science of Human Relations," *ibid.*, Vol. 11, pp. 88–102 (Spring, 1951); and Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York, 1950).

In general summary, it may be said that the developments of the decade 1940–1950 produced a chastened public administration. The scientific management men of the 'thirties knew many things for sure that we are no longer certain about in 1952. The current attitude leads to more questions than answers, yet the questions themselves result in expansion of the range of knowledge about administration. Two things perhaps stand out as we move well into the second decade of the period of maturation. One concerns the prevailing attitude regarding the nature of public administration. Administration, it is now generally held, finds its chief satisfaction in providing a way of looking at government. It offers no alchemy for transforming a modest calling into a scientific enterprise, no promise of easy solutions to age-old administrative problems. It "is not a bounded area but a center of interest and effort."[16] The spokesmen of administration are not unduly humble in their reduced role, but they are patently (and pleasingly) more temperate than they were fifteen years ago.

A second hallmark of the public administration of 1952 is found in an ever-increasing emphasis on the human aspects of the administrative process. This is implicit in almost every question raised of the mechanistic concept of the subject, and it has been mentioned more than once in the preceding pages. Present purposes will be served, therefore, if we note in passing that the author of one of the "trends" articles has listed *humanization* as the final and controlling trend of the decade. In one short, succinct paragraph he has said all that really needs to be said for appreciation of this subject. His words are worth the while of any who would read in shortest time an abstract of "the new public administration."[17]

III. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

How did political science, vis-à-vis administration, weather the decade of administrative self-analysis? What are the relations between political science and public administration, effective and prospective, as the latter moves ahead with its business of reorientation? The argument thus far appears to justify certain generalizations, which are numbered for greater explicitness.

1. Political science is still recognized as the natural academic base of public administration. The recognition is not universal, and sometimes when made it is given grudgingly; but there are few to argue outright a contrary proposition. If the relations between the two are not so close as they were twenty-five years

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[15] Gordon Clapp's views on this subject are suggestive. See his "The Long Road to Profession," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 6, pp. 171–174 (Spring, 1946).

[16] Graham, *op. cit.* (above, n. 10), p. 76.

[17] Ascher, *op. cit.* (above, n. 10), p. 235.

ago, they are still such that political science has an option as to the attitude it will adopt toward administration. Time is an important element here. Political science needs to declare itself, not in words alone but in deeds, not once but through conscious and continuous policy.

2. Considered as a branch of political science, public administration enjoys certain special advantages in comparison with most other divisions of that field. These may be catalogued in terms quite objective. Wilson noted sixty-five years ago the difference between what he called "practical statesmanship" and "closet doctrine." Translated into contemporary examples, this distinction means in simple terms that when a governor needs help, he is likely to prefer a public administration man as an adviser. It means also that a legislative committee which is in need of information probably will seek assistance of a person known to have a lively interest in the action side of government. Translating further, a political scientist who frequently receives such calls is quite likely to find himself provided presently with travel funds, either by a public agency seeking aid or by a university administration anxious to see such relations flourish, and mayhap he will wind up with a research assistant or two and possibly even a secretary. This has been the genesis of many of the bureaus of public administration (or equivalent), which normally have come into existence because there was work to be done which could be handled more satisfactorily on an institutional than on an individual basis. The bureau is, of course, not an inevitable development, for many universities and many political scientists have found ways to serve governments without setting up a formal agency. But it is a device which an increasing number of institutions seem to find useful.

Concerning the research and service bureau there are certain misconceptions which it may not be inappropriate to note here. One is that such an organization attacks the integrity of the department of political science, competing with it for funds, for esteem in the eyes of the students, and for administrative (not to mention popular and, in the case of public institutions, legislative) support. If (or where) this is true, it need not be true. On the contrary, the bureau can be built into a source of added strength for the department: it can serve as a bridge to government, and give the department representation where it would not be appropriate (or even possible) for a classroom teacher to appear; it can make available to departmental personnel research assistance, money for books and other supplies, and travel funds; it can provide research opportunities and field experience for both faculty and advanced students; it can draw upon its staff for teaching strength which would not otherwise be available; it can supplement in a significant way the holdings of the general library; it can function as an instrument of communication between the department of political science on the one hand and various divisions (in particular, the social science departments) of the university on the other. Not only can these things be done: they have been done in many instances, though regrettably not universally. On the other hand, there appears to be little substantial evidence that the existence of a bureau costs the department anything in financial support.

The budget of the bureau normally represents a clear, net accretion to the resources of the department.

A second misapprehension flows from failure to understand that the services rendered by the bureaus will continue to be discharged by one university agency or another—though not necessarily in bureau guise—and this largely without reference to the desires of the department of political science. They are important services, and in a field which university administrations more and more deem significant in terms of total institutional progress. The option usually open to the department of political science is not whether the bureau will be continued, but whether it will be continued under departmental auspices or with departmental support. The recommendation of the Association's Committee for the Advancement of Teaching regarding the bureaus thus does not appear to be realistic, for it seems to leave complete option with the department.[18] The department normally has the choice of developing close relations with the bureau—relations which almost universally would be embraced by that establishment—or of bringing suit for divorce. The latter ordinarily would be found to be an option legally available; it would almost never be one which it would be justifiable to elect.

3. Notwithstanding the special status of public administration which arises from certain advantages accruing from its peculiar character, there is little evidence of danger that administration will swamp political science, that it will run away with the field, that it will over-vocationize at the expense of traditional emphases, that it will over-divide through excessive specialization, or that it will do any of the dire things sometimes predicted and often feared in the past. In those few instances where consequences undesirable for political science have accompanied the rise of administration, there is warrant for the conclusion that the seeds of disharmony were local in origin and that they did not inhere in the subject matter. Time and again vigorous political science leadership has proved adequate to offset a possible tendency toward disaffection through recognition of the special character of public administration.

4. Political science and public administration not only have a natural mutual affinity through interest in the same general subject matter area: they also have a mutual and reciprocal need for each other. Robbed of concern for a vigorous and vital administration, political science would become largely a thing of library and classroom, hardly worthy to treat of so buoyant a subject as government. On its part, administration cries for the intellectual stimulation which can come only from the thinker of general qualities of mind. An overtone of the renaissance of public administration is the casting of the subject in a broader setting. Two of the "trends" articles cited earlier emphasize this point, and John Gaus indeed closes his comment on precisely this note: "A theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics also."[19] Political science and public administration thus appear to be interdependent, with each drawing strength from and contributing strength to the other.

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[18] *Goals for Political Science*, pp. 93, 97.

[19] John M. Gaus, "Trends in the Theory of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 10, p. 168 (Summer, 1950). See also Sayre, *op. cit.* (above, n. 10).

5. At the same time, it would not be realistic to ignore the broader implications of public administration. There are those, and their voices grow in both number and volume, who insist that political science as defined and practiced in the past provides too narrow a context for administration. Some of these are political scientists of long standing and high repute, others are newcomers who chafe at subject-matter boundary lines set for academic convenience, others still are outsiders. The threats to the political science orientation of public administration may be classified, according to the "broader" setting sought, as coming from the schools of business; the schools of public administration; those who would rebuild public administration on the foundation of the emerging science of human relations; and those who conceive administration to partake of the nature of all the social sciences, and who view it therefore as a discipline essentially eclectic in nature. In the aggregate, these threats are real and imminent. For political science the need for imaginative thinking is urgent, for the hour is late.

What is to be the role of political science in respect of the new public administration? This will depend in part, perhaps in good part, on the answer to the further question, what is to be the role of political science in the larger sense? For political science, along with the other social sciences as traditionally defined, is under general attack as being too narrow, too segmental, too restrictive in outlook. Everywhere we witness the recrudescence of general education, of the "humanities" approach to learning. At a conference held in the spring of 1952, the president of an eastern university, one which for thirty years has had an active department of political science, stated in so many words that "The day of the departmental major is done." This may be minimized as an over-statement or even dismissed as without foundation; nevertheless, it sounds a note of warning. Another contemporary trend in education emphasizes the social science character of our group existence. To one steeped in the social science school of thought, sociology, economics, political science, and the rest offer at best nothing more than a variety of ways of looking at things, while at worst the partitions dividing these vantage points into separate disciplines and departments are positively destructive of the total view necessary to an understanding of the human experiment. Yet a third development of interest here is found in the area study programs, which treat of such regions as Southeast Asia, the Near East, and Latin America in special courses or in cross-departmental concentrations of courses defined in geographical rather than subject-matter terms.[20] The effects, actual and potential, of these and like movements on the historical departments are at least dimly to be seen (or surmised), yet there is evidence that relatively little serious thought has been given to the place of the departments in these programs or to their net results for departmental structure.

Internally, perhaps the most pressing problem confronting political science concerns the relations of the several specialty areas with one another, with the central field itself, and with related disciplines. Much has been said on this subject—the last two presidential addresses at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, for example, have dealt with aspects of it—but much remains to be said. Public opinion draws not only from other divisions of political science but also from statistics, social psychology, and sociology. International affairs and public administration rely upon each other and upon companion political science sectors as well, but they also range into economics, sociology, cultural anthropology, geography, and other fields, not all of them of the social sciences. It is not clear at this juncture where or how far these manifold cross-relations will lead; what is reasonably clear is that a traditional or narrow concept of political science will prove in no wise adequate to the demands of that discipline's newer and more volatile areas. Political science can, if it chooses, go forward to a new inclusiveness, to a new flexibility, to broader vistas and wider horizons which will (or may) permit it to give continuing haven to all its specialty fields. Such a development is worthy of, and will require, the best thought available. It is hardly to be expected that it will come about of itself.

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[20] *Goals for Political Science* contains a suggestive treatment of these trends, particularly in Ch. 6.

The relations between political science and public administration thus emerge as a problem which in a significant sense is generic rather than special in character. The nature of political science is therefore perhaps the more urgent consideration, as it is certainly, from the point of view of the political scientist, the more important. It is within this larger framework that the aspect of the question examined here is best seen. Assuming the broader setting, there is (or may be) merit in studies of segments of the problem. This returns us to the subject with which we began, a note on political science and public administration.

Why should political science and political scientists concern themselves at all with the bothersome problems of public administration? One answer is, to keep from going sterile. Another, to keep in touch with government in action. Another, to take advantage of a wide and inviting road for communication with the other social sciences. Another, to participate in the exciting business of rethinking a field of knowledge. Another still, to profit from the enforced introspection which the process involves. As regards the last, public administration has shown a willingness, indeed an eagerness, to search its soul for basic meanings and significances. Can political science afford to do less? "We—even we here—hold the power and bear the responsibility."[21]

[21] From an address by President Lincoln before Congress in December of 1862.

NEW DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

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I. THE UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the chilling atmosphere of the cold war, attention is more readily turned to the politics of power and to concepts of the national interest than to international law and the services it may perform. Indeed, two distinguished writers have recently warned us against what George Kennan calls "the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems," or "the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints," "some formal criteria of a juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of states could be defined," instead of by dealing with "awkward conflicts of national interest . . . *on their merits* with a view to finding the solutions least unsettling to the stability of international life."[1] Instead of "making ourselves slaves of the concepts of international law and morality," Kennan writes, we should "confine these concepts to the unobtrusive, almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest in which they find their true value."[2] Thus he opposes "the carrying-over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment," since "whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the lawbreaker and feel a moral superiority to him"—to the extent, perhaps, of indulging in political excesses such as "unconditional surrender."[3]

In similar vein, Hans Morgenthau—who should know his international law better than Kennan—refers to a so-called "iron law" of international politics, from which "no nation has ever been *completely* immune," that "legal obligations must yield to the national interest";[4] and, in this connection, he discusses a so-called "need to violate treaty obligations," the "need" (*sc.*: tendency) apparently being greater for expansionist than for *status quo* states.[5] Like Kennan, Morgenthau objects to the evaluation of politics or of a particular foreign policy in terms of international law or of "abstract" moral standards on the ground that the national interest contains its own morality.[6]

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[1] George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951), pp. 95–96. (Italics added.)

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 54. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[4] Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1951), p. 144. (Italics added.)

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 33 ff., 101 ff. Morgenthau has himself admitted that "mankind has at all times refused to forego ethical evaluation of political action" and that "political practice, in turn, takes ethical evaluation of political action for granted. The actors on the political scene, however they may be guided by considerations of expediency, must pay their tribute to these standards by justifying their actions in ethical terms" (*Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Chicago, 1946, pp. 176–177).

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze all the ambiguities, half-truths, and misconceptions expressed in these quotations.[7] It is sufficient to note here that the adjustment of a dispute on its "merits" is not necessarily in accordance with the political power of the contestants. Unless one accepts the etymologically fantastic notion that "merit" is to be equated to preponderant power, the settlement of a dispute on its merits means precisely an adjustment based on considerations other than power, namely, legal considerations or considerations of right and wrong. The willing "acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints" by which "the permissible behavior of states could be defined" has been given by the sixty states, including Soviet Russia, which have ratified the United Nations Charter; and at least twenty more states are eagerly awaiting—and should be granted—the opportunity of accepting the same standards.

The principal reason why international law is riding out the cold war, just as it has survived all the wars and dictators of modern history, is that, so long as there are independent and interdependent states, some of their relations must be expressed in legal terms of right and obligation. No alternative has ever existed except in theory. Now, the expectations of states, when they express certain relationships in the form of legal obligations, are twofold: (1) that they will be observed, and (2) that they may not be observed. These are precisely the expectations when, for example, municipal law prohibits murder (or makes it illegal)—and then provides penalties for expected violations. It is on the remedial side, of course, that international law has been weak. Traditional international law has distinguished between violations of international law and crimes against international law, and has stressed substantive rights and obligations rather than remedies. This has not prevented widespread observance of international law; but, periodically, the utility of that law is questioned because of the exceptional cases when problems of "enforcement" arise because traditional methods of negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, retaliation, or organized political pressures have failed and the only alternative seems to be war.

We are passing through one of the difficult periods at the present time, and the suggestions of Kennan and Morgenthau amount to this: Throw over "abstract" standards like international law and morality; it is useless to expect them to bridge the gap between the Soviets and the Western world; it is worse than useless to indulge in recriminations about contemptuous disregard of law and decency by the Soviets; we, too, should have a free hand, unhampered by these "abstract" principles, and should work out whatever political settlement we can get on the basis of our relative power.

There is a certain irrelevancy about the strictures of these gentlemen on international law, since the problems of the cold war are primarily political rather than legal. In so far as legal questions are involved, it is at least debatable whether we should embrace their suggestions of disregarding or minimizing law and morality as a general rule or as a desirable pattern. Should they be dispensed with in Anglo-American relations? Should we assume that they are unimportant in our relations with Latin America, Western Europe, or the new states of Asia?

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[7] See Myres S. McDougal, "Law and Power," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46, pp. 102–114 (1952); Robert W. Tucker, "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political 'Realism,'" AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 214–224 (1952).

Even in our relations with the Soviets, international law and the United Nations Charter provide an accepted, if precarious, frame of reference. Should we dispense with them as completely useless because we interpret them divergently? A recent study[8] of Communist conceptions of international law reveals "an extensive area of agreement" and "a substantial measure of equivalence" between "Communist and non-Communist theory and practice." Divergences which stand out are on the law of succession, on the Soviet thesis that self-determination is a "legal" principle, and, particularly, on the unilateral denunciation of treaties, where Soviet practice is such as to suggest the possible lack of utility of broad treaty engagements. Curiously enough, both Morgenthau and Secretary of State Dean Acheson envisage an overall treaty settlement with Soviet Russia in the expectation that it will be kept if it registers existing facts. As Secretary Acheson phrased it, "agreements with the Soviet Union are useful when those agreements register or record an existing situation of fact, but otherwise they are not of much use."[9] In more general terms, the present writer has elsewhere stated:

> The treaties most likely to be observed are those which recognize and develop within a legal framework a positive mutuality of interests. The treaties most likely to be violated are those which, taking no account of the political considerations which sometimes cause states to disregard law, nevertheless attempt to control political conduct by a series of negative or prohibitory rules.[10]

A comparable idea is expressed by Georg Schwarzenberger as follows:

> In the Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe it is asserted—with truth for most, but not for all of the signatories—that they share "spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy." For an official document, this passage shows remarkable insight. One is only left wondering why the same powers do not consider the reverse proposition to be equally true when they sit down together with representatives of totalitarian States to draft universal declarations and covenants on human rights or on the freedom of the press.[11]

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[8] Emanuel Margolis, "Certain Aspects of the Impact of Communism on International Law," abstract of Harvard doctoral dissertation in Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, External Research Staff Paper, *Abstract Series No. 1* (March, 1952), pp. 40–42.

[9] Extemporaneous remarks by Secretary Acheson at his press conference, Feb. 8, 1950, in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No. 555, p. 273 (Feb. 20, 1950). Secretary Acheson and Professor Morgenthau, as is well known, differ on the timing of any attempt at an overall settlement with the Soviet Union.

[10] Herbert W. Briggs, *The Progressive Development of International Law*, Publications of the Turkish Institute of International Law, No. 4 (Istanbul, 1947), p. 45. Cf. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, p. 147; Frederick S. Dunn in Bernard Brodie (ed.), *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York, 1946), pp. 7 ff.

[11] "The Frontiers of International Law," in *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1952*, Vol. 6 (London, 1952), pp. 246, 273.

These reflections suggest both the practical utility of international law as a means of expressing shared values or complementary interests and its limited utility in attempting to reconcile fundamentally divergent interests merely on the basis of legal formulae. "People whose moral perspectives preclude the deliberate resort to violence, except for self-defense or organized community sanction," writes Myres McDougal,[12] "have in the contemporary world only the alternative of some form of law. The choice we must make is not between law and no law, or between law and power, but between ineffective and effective law." The attribution to international law of prohibitory, punitive, or even legislative functions for which no basis exists in political or social realities will not provide effective law.

Nor is the task exclusively one for international lawyers. International law is no substitute for foreign policy or for the operating functions of international organizations, although it is—in a literal sense—indispensable for both of them. It is an instrument which, as Secretary Acheson said of international organization, must be skillfully used: "The existence of an instrument does not eliminate the need for craftsmanship nor does the existence of international organization eliminate the need for statesmanship."[13]

Such craftsmanship and statesmanship are being displayed today in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and in the enlightened policies of many of their members. It is the purpose of the following pages to survey, without detailed legal analysis, some of the current developments through which the frontiers of international law are being extended.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

To the international lawyer, one of the most interesting developments of the past fifty years has been the emergence of new states, the traditional subjects of international law. In 1902 the independent states in the world numbered forty-seven.[14] By 1952 there existed about eighty-five.[15] It is noteworthy

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[12] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 7), p. 113.

[13] "Law and the Growth of the International Community," address before the American Society of International Law, April 24, 1952, in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 26, No. 671, pp. 694, 698 (May 5, 1952).

[14] *In the Western Hemisphere, twenty:* The United States of America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

In Europe, nineteen (excluding Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino): Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland.

In Africa, two: Abyssinia, Liberia.

In Asia, six: China, Japan, Korea, Persia, Turkey, and Siam.

[15] The following states, existing in 1952, had emerged during the preceding fifty years:

In the Western Hemisphere, two: Canada, Panama.

In Europe, ten: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Poland, and Yugoslavia. (Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro, exist-that few of the states which acquired independence during this period had to resort to armed revolt in order to establish their independence. The liberal policy of the British Empire in nurturing self-government, autonomy, and eventual independence for her Dominions and more advanced colonies and the peace settlements of 1919 accounted for the peaceful emergence of many new states. The rising tides of nationalism in the Near East and Southeast Asia accounted for others, not always without bloodshed. Existence as independent states was attained by most of these entities through their own efforts, eased in some cases by the acquiescence of the former parent state and in others by the assistance of the Great Powers. Recognition of the existence of the new states was generally accorded by other states on the basis of their individual recognition policies.

In only a few instances was the concern of the organized community of states expressed with reference to the creation of new states. In 1932 the League of Nations, in connection with the admission of Iraq to membership, sought to establish general principles for the evolution of mandated areas into independent states, but no further applications of the principles occurred before the replacement of the League by the United Nations. The United Nations may be said to have established the Republic of Korea as an independent state in 1948, to have created Libya in 1951, to have assisted as midwife at the birth of Israel in 1948 and of Indonesia in 1949, and to have certified the existence as states of Ceylon, Jordan, and Nepal.[16]

Since some thirty other states came into existence from 1902 to 1952, without benefit of guidance from the organized community of states, little opportunity arose for the development of rules of international law with reference to the creation of new states. However, several factors suggest the desirability of devising collective procedures for assisting in the creation of new states by peaceful means and for clarifying and centralizing the legal function of certification of the existence of statehood in international law. "One-fourth of the population of the world," wrote Trygve Lie in 1951, "has gained political independence within the span of only six years. The pressure of other dependent peoples towards freedom and equality has become much stronger since the war and continues to increase."[17] An examination of United Nations debates and

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ing in 1902, had disappeared; and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania rose and fell as independent states between 1919 and 1940.)

In Africa, three: Egypt, Libya, South Africa.

In Asia, twenty-two: Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Korea (Republic of), Laos, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Viet Nam, and Yemen.

[16] See citations in Herbert W. Briggs, *The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents, and Notes*, 2d ed. (New York, 1952), pp. 65–66, 69, 74–75, 78–82, 84–85; Briggs, "Community Interest in the Emergence of New States: The Problem of Recognition," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* (1950), pp. 169–181.

[17] Introduction to the *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1950–30 June 1951*, United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, 6th Sess.*, Supp. No. 1A (A/1844/Add. 1), p. 2.

documentation reveals that the sympathies of the newly independent peoples are clearly with those peoples still aspiring to self-determination. If Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Pakistan, The Philippines, Syria, and Viet Nam—not all of whom are yet Members of the United Nations—have acquired independence or autonomy and juridical capacity in international law, why not others? If Libya, why not, for example, Tunisia? The most recent expression of this attitude may be found in the Resolution on Self-Determination adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on April 21, 1952:

> THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
>
> RESOLVES to insert in the draft Covenants on Human Rights, the following article on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination:
>
> 1. All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely, the right freely to determine their political, economic, social and cultural status.
>
> 2. All States, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise of that right by another people, shall promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall respect the maintenance of that right in other States, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. . . . [18]

When it is recalled that there are over one hundred non-self-governing and trust territories[19]—some of them mere dots on the map—the note of caution sounded by Joseph Nisot (Belgium) may command more reflection than it apparently received in the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission, he said, "would be failing in its task if it merely kept on repeating, in one way or another, that peoples had the right to self-determination, and did not study those problems which, once elucidated, should make it possible to transfer the whole problem from the theoretical stage to that of practical application." To what "peoples" was the principle of self-determination applicable? At "what stage of its development should a people's right to free self-determination be recognized"? To what actions might peoples legitimately resort to achieve their independence? What action would an established constitutional order be entitled to take in the face of a revolt or a claim of the "right of secession"? To what extent was the right of a state to deny self-determination valid? What attitude should be adopted by other states towards a conflict between a state and a group of its people claiming self-determination? Was aid to insurgents justified? At what stage could their independence properly be recognized? To what extent would a right of self-determination overcome the principles of nonintervention established by international law?[20]

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[18] U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/663, 21 April 1952. See also Summary Records of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/SR. 252–261 (covering April 14–21, 1952); Secretariat Memoranda on Self-determination, E/CN.4/649 and 662 (1952); *United Nations Bulletin,* Vol. 12, No. 9, pp. 371–373 (May 1, 1952).

[19] Those under the control of Members of the United Nations are listed in the *Yearbooks of the United Nations.* Lyle W. Shannon classifies 85 of "the 196 major political entities of the world" as self-governing and 111 as non-self-governing. See "The Non-Self-Governing Political Entity," abstract of doctoral dissertation, in Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, External Research Staff, *Abstract Series No. 1,* pp. 45–50 (1952).

The legal problems raised by Nisot were given scant consideration by the Commission. Nevertheless, so pronounced are the trends towards self-determination and towards welcoming these aspirations that the problems must soon be faced.[21] Although the Charter contains no express authorization for the creation or collective recognition of new states, the United Nations has already been able to assist in creating new subjects of international law without finding it necessary to amend the Charter.[22] The standardization of these procedures may eventually be desirable along the lines suggested by Philip C. Jessup for the drafting of a general convention or General Assembly declaration to establish the essential criteria of statehood and to provide procedures both for a finding that a particular entity meets the criteria and for collective recognition by the United Nations.[23] However, the jealous care with which states continue to safeguard their autonomy in the field of recognition[24] suggests that the United Nations may find it more feasible to continue its present approach, dealing with the individual problems of a Libya, Eritrea, Indonesia, Israel, or Korea on an *ad hoc* basis, without attempting to standardize procedures or to crystallize legal criteria. Even this method will serve to provide grist for the mills of international law.

A different type of problem with reference to the recent emergence of some of the new states requires a brief comment. Suggestions have appeared that traditional international law is little suited to the needs of the new nationalism which has found expression in the creation of Asiatic states including over 500,000,000 peoples since 1945. To the extent that these suggestions are not a reflection of Soviet propaganda or of Communist and Nazi concepts of an ideologically reformed international law, their purport is not entirely clear.[25] Conceivably, treaties or other contractual arrangements entered into by new states are regarded even by them as governed by existing rules of international law. So far as established customary rules of international law are concerned, no argument that such rules were evolved by the practice of states prior to the emergence of a new state as a subject of international law has ever been regarded as justifying their disregard. Nor has the fact that, historically, these rules evolved largely as a function of European state relations prevented their extension to American, African, Asiatic, and Near Eastern states. It seems quite possible—judging in part from debates on questions of international law in United Nations organs and committees—that some of the more recent states of the world have few experts in international law. The alleged inadequacy or inapplicability of certain customary rules of international law to new Asiatic states may thus be taken with some reserve. On the other hand, the (in some cases) newly found interest in "the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" and the promotion of "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" should suggest to those who conduct state affairs—whether in old or in new states—the desirability of providing rules of international law more adequate for the contemporary world.

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[20] E/CN.4/SR. 252, 30 April 1952 (meeting held 14 April 1952), pp. 7–9.

[21] The pressing nature and the non-legal complexities of the problem are set forth by Francis B. Sayre in "The Quest of Independence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, pp. 564–579 (July, 1952).

[22] See above, and Briggs, "The Problem of Recognition."

[23] *A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction* (New York, 1948), pp. 44–51.

[24] Cf. remarks of Mr. Austin, United Nations, *Security Council, Official Records*, 3rd Year, No. 68 (294th Meeting, May 18, 1948), p. 16; and further citations in Briggs, "The Problem of Recognition," p. 180.

[25] See Kurt Wilk, "International Law and Global Ideological Conflict: Reflections on the Universality of International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 45, pp. 648–670 (1951); Josef L. Kunz, "Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law," *ibid.*, Vol. 41, pp. 119–126 (1947).

In holding, in its Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949, on *Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, that the United Nations "is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims,"[26] the International Court of Justice made an observation the applicability of which is even wider than the context in which it appeared: "Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States."[27] Thus, the long-mooted question whether certain international organizations could be regarded as subjects of international law was effectively settled by the Court's opinion "that fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims."[28]

Whether "the requirements of international life" in 1952 have called for endowing individuals with rights and obligations as subjects of international law is less obvious. Despite the suggestive observation of the International Court of Justice in the opinion just cited, that "the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community,"[29] the "fundamental human rights" and "fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" referred to in the United Nations Charter remain in practice the rights conferred upon the individual by the law of his nationality or of his domicile. Thus, the Supreme Court of California, in holding on April 17, 1952, that the California Alien Land Law which prohibited ownership of land by any alien ineligible to citizenship (unless a treaty right existed) was invalid because in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, rather than because it was in violation of the United Nations Charter (as had been held), said in part (*per* Chief Justice Gibson):

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[26] *I.C.J. Reports, 1949*, pp. 174, 179.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 185. Procedurally, the United Nations still lacks capacity to bring a claim before the International Court of Justice because of the provision in Article 34 (1) of the latter's Statute that "only states may be parties in cases before the Court." This should be amended so as to permit certain international organizations to become parties.

See also Clive Parry, "The Treaty-Making Power of the United Nations," *British Year Book of International Law, 1949*, Vol. 26, pp. 108–149.

[29] P. 178.

> The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and Legislatures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace and for equality of rights and opportunities. The Charter represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. We are satisfied, however, that the Charter provisions relied on by plaintiff [U.N. Charter, Preamble and Articles 1, 55, 56] were not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation, and we cannot hold that they operate to invalidate the alien land law.[30]

Despite Universal Declarations and proposed Covenants of Human Rights, it seems that international law has not conferred upon the individual rights of emigration, immigration, naturalization, or expatriation, not to mention "the right to work" or "the right to rest and leisure." Nor is it merely the existence of totalitarian regimes in Soviet Russia and her satellites which has prevented the transformation of these rights from rights acquired under national law to rights conferred by international law. Democratic regimes like the United States and the United Kingdom have been just as reluctant to regard these rights as international rights of the individual. And the new states of Asia and the Near East have been jealously sensitive of the sovereign prerogatives of their newly acquired statehood, despite their intense interest in problems of human rights.

It was perhaps wise, therefore, that at San Francisco the drafters of the Charter limited the purposes and functions of the United Nations in the field of human rights to "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms" rather than to arousing the false hope that the United Nations might assure or protect the observance of such rights within the territories of Member States.[31] Candid recognition of the fact that the human rights available to any individual are derived from, and actionable under, the law of his nationality or the law of his domicile, rather than his supposed capacity as a subject of international law, provides a more realistic basis for promoting and encouraging respect for human rights than some of the wild and wooly proposals made in the Commission on Human Rights. Such recognition also serves to concentrate attention upon the real problem, *viz.*, the better implementation through national law or policy of any agreed proposals on human rights.

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[30] *Sei Fujii* v. *The State of California*, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952). *Cf. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 26, No. 672, p. 744 (May 12, 1952): "Although the California Supreme Court split 4–3 on the constitutional issues in the case, all seven justices agreed that the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter did not operate of themselves to invalidate the Alien Land Law." See also Lawrence Preuss, "Some Aspects of the Human Rights Provisions of the Charter and Their Execution in the United States," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46, pp. 289–296 (1952).

[31] See *United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945, Documents*, Vol. 6, pp. 705, 325.

Implementation of international obligations to respect human rights will inevitably be by national law or policy in the first instance and only secondarily, and perhaps rarely, by international agencies.[32] Nevertheless, the possibility of bringing state officials who cause or permit the violation of international obligations to respect and protect human rights before an international criminal court has been given consideration in relation to the other efforts looking towards the establishment of the delictual capacity of the individual as a subject of international law. Thus, by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which entered into force on January 12, 1951,[33] the High Contracting Parties "confirm" that genocide "is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish," whether the persons committing it are "constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals," and agree that persons charged with genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction." The ghost of the concept of a "criminal" state, apparently laid by the *obiter dictum* of the Nuremberg Tribunal that "crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced,"[34] may have raised its head again in Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which provides that "disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide . . . shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute."

However, the Nuremberg dictum and the *ex post facto* establishment (in the special agreements setting up the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals) of the international delictual capacity of the major war criminals have given impetus to the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction in which the *ex post facto* nature of the proceedings would be eliminated. Former proposals for the establishment of an international criminal court have been studied and refurbished and new suggestions made.[35] It appears that the organizational structure of such a court presents little difficulty. The major problems include the nature, scope, and methods of invoking the jurisdiction of the proposed court and the law to be applied by it.[36] Earlier proposals for the establishment of an international criminal court foundered because of the absence of a generally accepted international criminal law.[37] At the request of the General Assembly, the United Nations International Law Commission has engaged in the preparation of a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind[38] as well as in the formulation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.[39] It is noteworthy that the offences against the law of nations included in these proposals, as well as in the Genocide Convention, fall short of constituting a complete code of international criminal law[40] and are limited to international crimes usually containing a political element in the sense "that they have often been initiated or stimulated by governments."[41] Thus, the International Law Commission, in the Report covering its Third Session, observed that the term "offences against the peace and security of mankind"

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[32] Compare the remark of Rapporteur of Subcommittee I/1/A to Committee I/1, U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 723, June 1, 1945, Vol. VI, p. 705, that "assuring or protecting such fundamental rights is primarily the concern of each state. If, however, such rights and freedoms were grievously outraged so as to create conditions which threaten peace or to obstruct the application of provisions of the Charter, then they cease to be the sole concern of each state"; and Article 54 of the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights: "Normally, the [Human Rights] Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only if available domestic remedies have been evoked and exhausted in the case . . . " (*Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 24, No. 626, p. 1013, June 25, 1951).

[33] For the text, see U.N. Doc. A/810, p. 174; for thirty-six ratifications to April 1952, see *United Nations Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 9, p. 370 (May 1, 1952).

[34] *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1945–1946, Official Documents*, Vol. 1, p. 223.

> should be limited to offences which contain a political element and which endanger or disturb the maintenance of international peace and security. For these reasons, the draft code does not deal with questions concerning conflicts of legislation and jurisdiction in international criminal matters; nor does it include such matters as piracy, traffic in dangerous drugs, traffic in women and children, slavery, counterfeiting currency, damage to submarine cables, etc.[42]

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[35] See *Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction*, Secretariat Memorandum, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1 (1949); Vespasien V. Pella, *Memorandum Concerning a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/39, 24 November 1950.

[36] See Quincy Wright, "Proposal for an International Criminal Court," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46, pp. 60–72 (Jan., 1952); Yuen-li Liang, "The Establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction: The First Phase," *ibid.*, pp. 73–88; and editorial comment by George A. Finch, C. G. Fenwick, and Pitman B. Potter, *ibid.*, pp. 89–102.

[37] Cf. *Historical Survey*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1, pp. 3, 8–12, and materials there cited.

[38] See *Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Third Session*, May 16–July 27, 1951, U.N. Docs. A/1858 and A/CN.4/48 (1951), paragraphs 54–59; reprinted in *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 45, Supp., pp. 123–132 (1951).

[39] See *Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Second Session*, June 5–July 29, 1950, U.N. Docs. A/1316 and A/CN.4/34 (1950), paragraphs 95–127; reprinted in *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44, Supp., pp. 125–134 (1950).

[40] Cf. *The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal: History and Analysis*, Secretariat Memorandum, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, 3 March 1949, pp. 21–23.

[41] Wright, *op. cit.* (above, n. 36), p. 71.

[42] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 38), par. 58.

The Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction appointed by the United Nations General Assembly, in its Report and Draft Statute of 1951 for an International Criminal Court,[43] displayed a comparable reluctance to regard the international delictual capacity or the international procedural capacity of the individual as having been established *ipso jure* by international law. By Article 1 of the Draft Statute, the Court is to be established "to try persons accused of crimes under international law, as may be provided in conventions or special agreements among States parties to the present Statute." By Article 26, "jurisdiction may be conferred upon the Court, by States parties to the present Statute, by convention or, with respect to a particular case, by special agreement or by unilateral declaration," subject (by Article 28) to the approval of the United Nations General Assembly (in order to prevent the creation of novel categories of international crimes). However, "no person shall be tried before the Court unless jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court by the State or States of which he is a national and by the State or States in which the crime is alleged to have been committed" (Article 27); and proceedings before the Court may be instituted only by the General Assembly, an international organization so authorized by the General Assembly, or by "a State party to the present Statute which has conferred jurisdiction upon the Court over such offences as are involved in those proceedings" (Article 29).

These rigidly restrictive provisions indicate that the proposed International Criminal Court will acquire no jurisdiction from its Statute to try individuals for crimes under international law. The content and offences of any international criminal law must be determined by agreement of states parties to the Statute; jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by states; and the right to institute proceedings before the Court against individuals charged with crimes under international law is narrowly limited.[44]

Thus, to paraphrase the opinion of the International Court of Justice quoted above,[45] although states, as members of the international community, have the power, in conformity with international law, to endow individuals with objective international personality together with capacity to bring international claims, the proposals currently under consideration envisage a more limited approach to problems of human rights and international criminal jurisdiction. Nor is it basically unsound, in the absence of a workable alternative, to recognize and build upon the existing competence of states under international law. Despite the dictum of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the observance and enforcement of international law have never depended upon the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction; nor has international law, in regulating the rights and duties of states, ignored the needs and interests of individuals. However, the burgeoning community interest in human rights is healthy. It is bound to increase the sensitivity of those who have the power to infringe or to assure those rights, and to suggest the reassessment of traditional procedures for their protection.

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[43] United Nations, General Assembly, Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report to the General Assembly on the Session held 1–31 August 1951, A/AC.48/4, 5 September 1951. See also Summary Records of the Committee, A/AC.48/SR. 1–31 (1951); Secretariat Memorandum on Creation of an International Criminal Court A/AC.48/1, 2 July 1951; Pella Memorandum Concerning the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/AC.48/3, 17 July 1951.

[44] Cf. Wright, *op. cit.*

[45] See p. 684.

III. THE EXTENSION AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The needs and interests of individuals are basic in the purposes and functions formulated in the treaties establishing such international organizations as the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization,[46] although their expression in legal terms is in the traditional form of interstate obligations and institutional functions. Moreover, while many of the functional operations of these and other specialized agencies are non-legal, the accomplishment of some of their purposes is effected by the treaty method. Thus, under the sponsorship of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, six years of preparatory work culminated on May 21, 1952, in the coming into force of a treaty to end barriers to the free exchange of books, newspapers, magazines, painting, sculpture, musical scores, educational films, sound recordings, scientific equipment, and other educational, scientific and cultural materials.[47] Similarly, several years of work by the World Health Organization have culminated in the International Sanitary Regulations, to be known as WHO Regulations No. 2, which will replace or codify thirteen previous treaties in the field and which will enter into force October 1, 1952.[48] Mention might also be made of the preparatory work of the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization in the revision of the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929, for the Unification of Certain Rules Regarding International Air Transport, and on comparable matters relating to the legal status and operations of civil aircraft.[49]

More familiar, perhaps, are the 100 International Labor Conventions and the 92 Recommendations adopted by International Labor Conferences since 1919. The Fifth Report of the International Labor Organization to the United Nations comments:

> The International Labor Code—the social standards embodied in the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference—derives its ultimate value from the extent to which these standards contribute towards shaping national social policy. . . . The provisions of the Code may leave their mark on the fabric of national legislation even in the absence of any binding international obligations for the States in question. It is the formal step of ratification of Conventions, however, which signifies

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[46] See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47*, pp. 670, 678, 693–694, 793–794 (1947).

[47] See *United Nations Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 11 (June 1, 1952) p. 445. Ten states, not including the United States, had ratified by May 21, 1952.

[48] See below, pp. 690–693.

[49] See, for example, *Minutes and Documents of the 8th Session (Madrid, 1951) of the Legal Committee*, International Civil Aviation Organization, Doc. 7229-LC/133, pp. xxx, 326 (Montreal, Nov., 1951), and the minutes and documents of previous sessions.

most unequivocally that the relevant standards have been or shortly will be incorporated in the law of the land.[50]

Although, as the Report says, the second World War brought ratifications almost to a standstill, in 1944, of the 67 Conventions by then adopted, 52 were in force with a total of 887 ratifications. The resumption of more normal activities after the War brought over 300 new ratifications, so that in 1951, of the 100 International Labor Conventions adopted by the Conferences, 71 were in force with a total of about 1200 ratifications, not including the extension to Pakistan of 15 Conventions and to Burma of 14 which had been ratified by India when they formed a part of that country.[51]

The functional representation of governments, employers, and workers at International Labor Conferences[52] and the system of voting in which "every delegate shall be entitled to vote individually on all matters"[53] and by which "a majority of two thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present shall be necessary on the final vote for the adoption of the Convention or Recommendation . . . by the Conference"[54] are no longer novel. Negotiation exclusively between government officials has been replaced in the International Labor Organization by the drafting of conventions in the Conference and its committees. The traditional function of signature of a draft convention by representatives of all participating states so desiring has yielded to functional authentication of texts by the President of the Conference and the Director-General of the Organization, after their adoption by a two-thirds vote of the Conference. However, despite the trend in the practice of states by which they dispense with the necessity for ratification of certain instruments which have been signed on their behalf, International Labor Conventions are not binding on states until ratified. It is understandable that, whatever tendencies there may be to dispense with either the signature or the ratification of an international instrument, the practice of states has revealed little inclination to dispense with both of them as to the same instrument.[55] If the function of signature is regarded as a mere authentication of texts, it can safely be left to a conference officer, but states will reserve the function of acceptance of obligations by means of ratification. Where, however, as with executive agreements in United States practice, acceptance of the obligations contained in the agreement is expressed through signature, ratification loses its importance as a requirement of international law.

It is all the more interesting, therefore, to note the method by which the International Sanitary Regulations, WHO Regulations No. 2, will come into force. The situation which led to their adoption by the World Health Assembly has been summarized as follows:

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[50] *Fifth Report of the International Labor Organization to the United Nations*, p. 183 (1951).

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 184. Cf. *International Organization*, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 600 (1951).

[52] Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Art. 3, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47*, p. 671.

[53] *Ibid.*, Art. 4. [54] *Ibid.*, Art. 19(2), p. 674.

[55] See Briggs, *The Progressive Development of International Law*, pp. 22–24.

> During the first half of the twentieth century there were no less than thirteen conventions or arrangements of a diplomatic character relating to health control measures to be taken at frontiers. Unfortunately, however, none of these conventions had ever completely superseded all its predecessors. The multiplicity of the obligations undertaken by States—some being party to certain of these diplomatic [*sc.: legal*] instruments but not to others—has always been a cause of trouble and confusion in international traffic. Further, the procedure by which conventions had to be signed subject to ratification did not allow the rapid simultaneous application of the agreed text everywhere, nor could they readily and easily be brought up to date to take into account the changing epidemiological situation, the experience gained or the progress of science and technique.[56]

For "the revision of the International Sanitary Conventions and their consolidation into one text applicable to all means of transport," two methods were open to the World Health Organization. By Article 2(k) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, the Organization may "propose conventions, agreements and regulations and make recommendations with respect to international health matters." Article 19 provides:

> The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such conventions or agreements which shall come into force for each Member when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.

However, by Article 21, "the Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease . . . "; and Article 22 provides:

> Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all Members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the period stated in the notice.[57]

The latter procedure offered obvious advantages; and, after the Second World Health Assembly had approved certain guiding principles, special drafting committees undertook the preparation of the Regulations. As described by the Director-General of the World Health Organization:

> WHO Regulations No. 2 have been drawn up by practicing port medical officers, by experts on health control and quarantine practice and by epidemiologists and lawyers of world repute. Expert advice on every facet of the problem was available and was consulted. After nearly three years of patient and careful consideration these experts and specialists, using all previous international sanitary conventions and agreements as a basis, have prepared these Regulations which, in their opinion, give to each territory observing their provisions the maximum security against international transmission of epidemic disease with the minimum interference with world traffic.[58]

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[56] "International Sanitary Regulations, Proceedings of the Special Committee and of the 4th World Health Assembly on WHO Regulations No. 2," *Official Records of the World Health Organization*, No. 37 (Geneva, April, 1952), pp. 1–2.

[57] Constitution of the World Health Organization, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47*, pp. 794, 796.

[58] *Official Records of the World Health Organization*, No. 37, p. 329.

On May 25, 1951, the Fourth World Health Assembly adopted the International Sanitary Regulations, consisting of 115 articles, with appendices and annexes, by a unanimous vote of the representatives of the 60 Member States represented at the session.[59] The Regulations were signed, not by the representatives of Member States, but by the President of the Fourth World Health Assembly and by the Director-General of the Organization. Article 109 of the Regulations provide that "these Regulations shall come into force on the first day of October 1952"; and Article 106 reads:

> 1. The period provided in execution of Article 22 of the Constitution of the Organization for rejection or reservation shall be nine months from the date of the notification by the Director-General of the adoption of these Regulations by the World Health Assembly.
>
> 2. Such period may, by notification to the Director-General, be extended to eighteen months with respect to overseas or other outlying territories for whose international relations the State may be responsible.
>
> 3. Any rejection or reservation received by the Director-General after the expiring of the periods referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article shall have no effect.[60]

By Article 107 (1), "if any State makes a reservation to these Regulations, such reservation shall not be valid unless it is accepted by the World Health Assembly, and these Regulations shall not enter into force with respect to that State until such reservation has been accepted by the Assembly or, if the Assembly objects to it on the ground that it substantially detracts from the character and purpose of these Regulations, until it has been withdrawn." With the entry into force of the Regulations, twelve of the thirteen[61] previous sanitary conventions will be replaced, stipulates Article 105, "as between the States bound by these Regulations and as between these States and the Organization" (with certain possible qualifications). Finally, by Article 112, "any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of these Regulations or of any Regulations supplementary to these Regulations," may, if not settled by the Director-General or the Organization, "be referred by any State concerned to the International Court of Justice for decision."

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[59] *Ibid.*, p. 323. For the text of International Sanitary Regulations (WHO Regulations No. 2), see pp. 335–365.

[60] Since the Director-General notified "all States" by letter dispatched June 11, 1951, of the adoption of the Regulations, the deadline for notification, in order for rejections or reservations to be "effective," was midnight March 11, 1952. See Explanatory Memorandum of the Director-General, *ibid.*, p. 329. Non-Members of the World Health Organization may become parties to the Regulations under certain circumstances (Art. 110).

The President of the Fifth World Health Assembly, which met in May, 1952, observed: "The fact that, of the eighty-nine governments which could have done so, only twenty-five submitted reservations or amendments shows that patient efforts motivated by respect for others and by enlightened self-interest can lead to agreements even in a field where differences in technical development, geography, and climate play such an important role" (*United Nations Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 12, p. 483, June 15, 1952).

[61] The Pan American Sanitary Convention signed at Habana, November 14, 1924, U. S. Treaty Series 714, remains in force with the exception of 44 of its 63 articles. In effect, its provisions are superseded by the WHO Regulations No. 2 except for the continued obligations of parties to communicate information to the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the continuation of that bureau's informational activities. On "regionalism" in the World Health Organization, see Charles S. Ascher, "Current Problems in the World Health Organization's Program," *International Organization*, Vol. 6, pp. 27–50 (1952).

Here, then, is a treaty which, although imposing important substantive legal obligations upon states, requires neither signature nor ratification by the parties. As the Director-General of the Organization has observed:

> Although a treaty in the sense ascribed to that term by international law, the International Sanitary Regulations provided for in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of the Organization differ greatly from the generally recognized form of international agreement. . . . Contrary to the procedure to be followed for the conventional type of treaty, even for the conventions or agreements which the Health Assembly has authority to adopt under Article 19 of the Constitution, no positive act is required by a State [except by a non-Member of the Organization] desiring to become a party to the regulations, a positive act being required only if it wishes to reject, or offer reservations to, the regulations. . . .
>
> The International Sanitary Regulations provide an instance of a flexible means of treaty-making particularly suited to a technical international agreement which has to keep pace with the changing epidemiological situation, the experience gained and the progress of science and technique, and it is hoped that these Regulations will prove a considerable advance in treaty-making procedure.[62]

The specialized agencies related to the United Nations are thus developing the potentialities of international law both substantively and procedurally. With the gradual extension of international law to such fields as labor legislation, civil aviation, food and agriculture, currency stabilization, economic development, international trade, public health, human rights, dependent peoples, and other social, economic, and cultural problems, the scope of international law bids fair to become as broad as the recognized need for regulation of fields of human endeavor. And where the need for concerted international action is recognized as paramount to individual freedom of action, methods designed to further functional realization take precedence over traditional forms.

The inexorable development of an international constitutional law can only be noted here. Whether attention is confined to a particular constitution, as Hans Kelsen has done in his brilliant juridical analysis of *The Law of the United Nations*,[63] or whether a comparative approach is made, such as C. Wilfred Jenks has done in his suggestive article on "Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations,"[64] the material exists in the official documents and proceedings and is calling for further analysis and comment. Already controversies have arisen between the strict constructionists and those who, with Mr. Justice Holmes, realize that in a constituent act like a constitution there has been called into life "a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters." To mention only one example, there are the unremitting efforts, illustrated in part by the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly,[65] to make the United Nations "a workable instrument for peace and security" despite the veto.[66]

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[62] *Official Records, World Health Organization*, No. 37, p. 332. "The procedure for amendment of the regulations is equally simple, and the World Health Assembly can ensure that the regulations are promptly and continually adapted to changing circumstances and needs" (*ibid.*, p. 2).

[63] *The Law of the United Nations—A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems* (London, 1950), pp. xviii, 903, and his supplement thereto, *Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations* (London, 1951), pp. 909–994.

[64] In *The British Year Book of International Law, 1945*, Vol. 22, pp. 11–72.

The legal memoranda of the United Nations International Law Commission and its secretariat are indispensable in the study of current problems of international law. Although some of them are more ably prepared than others, it is to be regretted that they are largely issued in impermanent mimeographed form and are not more readily available.[67] The Commission, when it could find the time after dealing with *ad hoc* problems thrust upon it by the General Assembly—e.g., the Rights and Duties of States, the Nuremberg Principles, International Criminal Jurisdiction, Definition of Aggression—has been preparing drafts on the Law of Treaties, the Regime of the High Seas, and the Law of Arbitral Procedure, and is undertaking work on the Regime of Territorial Waters and Nationality, including Statelessness.

Perhaps the most significant contribution so far made by the International Law Commission is its *Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related Subjects*, completed at its Third Session in 1951.[68] The Commission had the benefit of a noteworthy *Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas*,[69] prepared for the Secretariat by Professor Gilbert Gidel, in which, stressing the "essentially negative" character of traditional doctrine of the freedom of the seas as a reaction against claims to sovereignty over high seas, he suggests that, although the rule of non-interference with foreign-flag vessels on the high seas has assured freedom of navigation, it has failed to provide a regime for the regulated utilization or conservation of the resources of the sea or to provide standards for proscribing acts *contra bonos mores*.[70] The problem, therefore, is one of establishing a legal regime, which, while safeguarding the high seas as a medium of communications and precluding "a revival of obsolete claims to sovereignty over the seas," furthers the disciplined exploitation of the resources of the high seas, its sea bed, and subsoil. "From the point of view of legal technique," he suggests,

> the problem does not appear insoluble provided the extension of the jurisdiction of littoral States to the high seas in the vicinity of their coasts does not develop into a territorial

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[65] Resolution 377 (V) adopted at 302nd plenary meeting, Nov. 3, 1950.

[66] See, e.g., the interesting legal study of Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, *Voting and the Handling of Disputes in the Security Council*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Nations Studies, No. 5 (New York, 1950).

[67] Although some fifty documents or memoranda have appeared in the United Nations series on the work of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/ , only about half a dozen have been printed and made available for purchase.

[68] Annex to *Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Third Session, May 16–July 27, 1951*, United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records, 6th Sess.*, Supp. No. 9, Doc. A/1858; also in Doc. A/CN.4/48, July 30, 1951, and in *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 45, Supp., pp. 139–147 (1951). See comment thereon by Richard Young, *ibid.*, Vol. 46, pp. 123–128 (1952).

[69] U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/32, 14 July 1950, 112 pp.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–14.

> jurisdiction, similar to the rights of sovereignty formerly claimed over the high seas, but is confined to a special jurisdiction over one or more of the natural elements distinguishable in the high seas: the stratosphere or atmospheric area, the surface of the sea, the sea depths, the bed and the marine subsoil.[71]

In attempting to determine the legal status of submarine areas in terms of a "continental shelf" theory, the International Law Commission was confronted with problems of terminology and of the nature and extent of the shelf. Areas like the Persian Gulf, the Sicilo-Tunisian plateau, and the northern Adriatic and Aegean Seas, although not "continental shelves" to the geologists, contain shallow waters reputedly rich in oil or other natural resources, the exploitation of which is feasible.[72] The Commission therefore rejected the geological concept of the term, and, as a basis for legal regulation of submarine areas, defined the continental shelf as follows (Article 1):

> As here used, the term "continental shelf" refers to the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of territorial waters, where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed and subsoil.

The crux of the Commission's draft is found in Article 2, which provides:

> The continental shelf is subject to the exercise by the coastal State of control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.

In drafting this article, the Commission was confronted with several difficult legal questions. Were the sea bed and subsoil beyond territorial waters *res nullius?* Were they *res communis?* Were they subject *ipso jure* to the control and jurisdiction or sovereignty of the littoral state? Or must they be claimed by proclamation, or perhaps actually exploited, in order to found jurisdictional rights? Considerations of space prevent a juridical analysis here of these questions. However, the Commission, by providing that "the exercise by a coastal State of control and jurisdiction over the continental shelf does not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas" (Article 3) or "of the airspace above the superjacent waters" (Article 4), and that "the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result in substantial interference with navigation or fishing" (Article 6), introduced limitations on the jurisdictional rights acquired *ipso jure* by the coastal state and rejected by clear implication more extravagant national claims to sovereignty over the high seas and its continental shelf.

In other articles, the Commission recognized the right of a coastal state to regulate adjacent high seas fisheries, for purposes of conservation and on a nondiscriminatory basis, and the historic right of certain states to regulate sedentary fisheries outside their territorial waters, "provided that non-nationals are permitted to participate in the fishing activities on an equal footing with nationals" and without affecting "the general status of the areas as high seas." It also gave its imprimatur to the legal regime of the "contiguous zone," already well established except for the territorial limit, as follows:

> On the high seas adjacent to its territorial waters, a coastal State may exercise the control

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 102 ff.

> necessary to prevent the infringement, within its territory or territorial waters, of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations. Such control may not be exercised more than twelve miles from the coast.

These Draft Articles are neither a legally binding treaty nor the judicial decision of an international court. Conceivably, they could be incorporated in a treaty for formal acceptance by states. However, whether implemented in this fashion or not, they will serve the purposes which the International Law Commission was created to advance. Such drafts, it was predicted,

> would exercise influence partly as statements of the existing law and partly as pronouncements of what is a rational and desirable development of the law on the subject. They would be at least in the category of writings of the most qualified publicists, referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as a subsidiary source of law to be applied by the Court. Most probably their authority would be considerably higher. For they will be the product not only of scholarly research. . . . They will be the result of the deliberations and of the approval of the International Law Commission. Outside the sphere of international judicial settlement they will be of considerable potency in shaping scientific opinion and the practice of Governments.[73]

In the field of international judicial settlement, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has been outstanding, despite the paucity of legal controversies submitted to the Court. Since receiving its first case in May, 1947, the Court has given eight judgments and seven advisory opinions. States appearing before the Court as parties include the United Kingdom (5 judgments delivered, 2 pending); Albania, Colombia, and Peru (3 each); Norway; United States (pending); France (2 pending); Greece (pending); Iran; Guatemala (pending); Liechtenstein (pending).

In the course of its fifteen judgments and advisory opinions[74] the Court has had occasion to make authoritative pronouncements upon a wide range of rules and principles of international law, such as the nature of customary international law, the legal nature and interpretation of treaties and of reservations thereto, the capacity of states and of international organizations to bring international claims, the legal nature of international organizations, diplomatic asylum, diplomatic protection, jurisdiction over straits, delimitation of territorial waters, innocent passage, intervention, responsibility of states, obligation to make reparation for injurious acts, obligation to prevent injurious use of territory, nationality of claims, nature and measure of damages, respect for territorial sovereignty, termination of mandates, and succession or devolution between international organizations. The Court has also decided important questions as to its own jurisdiction.[75]

As contributions towards the progressive development of international law, the opinions of the Court are not dependent upon the political importance of the parties before the Court (who, for example, was Mr. Tompkins in the legally influential decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, [304 U. S. 64, 1938]?) or upon the importance of the interest at stake (for example, the uninhabited islets or rocks, sovereignty over which is in issue in the pending *Minquiers Case*) or even upon whether a party abides by the decision ("it is not part of the Court's function to enforce its judgments").[76] The eminence of the Court and its reputation for judicial integrity are sufficient to command respect for its opinions on international law whether or not one agrees with a particular holding.

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[73] *Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission*, Secretariat Memorandum, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1, 5 Nov. 1948, p. 16. For comments by certain governments on the Commission's Draft Articles, see U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/55, 16 May 1952.

[74] See *International Court of Justice Reports*, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952.

[75] See, further, G. G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and Substantive Law," *British Year Book of International Law, 1950*, Vol. 27, pp. 1–41 (1951); "Trends in the Work of the International Court of Justice," unsigned note, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 660–673 (1952).

This is not to deny that the influence of the Court as an institution for pacific settlement of international legal disputes will be judged by practical results. It is no reflection on the Court to note that some of its judgments and advisory opinions have been flouted. Albania has not yet paid the compensation which the Court held that she owed for her responsibility in the Corfu Channel affair; Iran refused compliance with interim measures indicated by the Court in the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy; advisory opinions of the Court, although uniformly accepted by the organ requesting advice, have had no appreciable influence on the conduct of Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, or South Africa, or on the admission of new Members to the United Nations. On the other hand, the United Kingdom has accepted an adverse judgment in the *Fisheries Case* with Norway; Colombia and Peru are attempting to settle the asylum controversy over Haya de la Torre in conformity with the Court's pronouncements on the law; pursuant to the advisory opinion of the Court on *Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, the Secretary-General of the United Nations claimed and received from Israel satisfaction in the form of an apology and an indemnity of $54,628 for the assassination of its agent, Count Folke Bernadotte, on the territory of Israel;[77] and the United Nations General Assembly has used advisory opinions requested by it as a basis for further efforts to settle the problems to which they relate.

The usefulness of the Court is seriously limited by the fact that only 35 of the 62 parties to its Statute have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction, some of them on the basis of potentially crippling reservations such as the one by which the United States pretends to reserve to itself the determination of whether a matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. The basic problem of increasing resort to the Court, is, of course, political, and not a legal problem. However, within the limits of its opportunities the International Court of Justice has performed noteworthy service in the clarification and application of international law. Its potentialities have scarcely been tapped.

* * *

Realization of the services of which international law is capable depends upon a better understanding of its nature and limitations. Our adherence to the principle "a government of laws and not of men" may mislead us into assuming that the law itself actually "governs," whereas it is men who govern; the principle only requires that they govern in accordance with legal standards rather than arbitrarily. Quite often, perhaps, international law is also regarded as a self-operating mechanism, a set of rules which are expected to prevail of their own force and whose prohibitory aspect is commonly overstressed.

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[76] "Trends in the Work of the International Court of Justice," p. 671.

[77] See *International Court of Justice, Yearbook, 1950–1951*, pp. 69–70 (1951). The *Yearbooks* include useful information on the "effect" of the judgments and opinions of the Court.

Hans Morgenthau, criticizing the "liberal conception" of "the intrinsic regulative powers of the rule of law" in the domestic field has observed that

> those who erected this historic experience into a universal principle mistook for a relation of cause and effect what was actually a coincidence or, at best, took for cause what was actually effect. They believed that the peace, order and prosperity of the Victorian age stemmed from the reign of the rule of law which, wherever established, would of necessity lead to similar results. As a matter of fact, it was the peace reigning in the affairs of men which made the peaceful functions of the law courts possible, not vice versa. It was because of the order existing in the social fabric that the orderly processes of the rule of law could give normative directions to social activities, not vice versa.[78]

The United Nations Charter, for example, can be variously conceived of as "the law" or as a framework to facilitate the development of the required "social fabric" which in turn permits the establishment of the orderly processes of the rule of law. Already, Trygve Lie has been able to say: "Virtually all important developments in the evolution of international law during the past six years have been closely connected with the United Nations."[79] The difficulties along the path of social, political, and legal progress are formidable; the opportunities are immeasurable.

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[78] *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, p. 116.

[79] *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, 1950–1951*, p. 5.

PAN-SLAVISM AND WORLD WAR II

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In spite of later claims that it had been the leader of the anti-fascist camp and of the Slav world from the beginning of the second World War, the Soviet Union followed a strictly Russian policy, neither anti-fascist nor Pan-Slav, from August, 1939, to June, 1941. This policy clearly foreshadowed a nationalist revival of the language and aspirations that had been most characteristic of Old Russia but were assumed to have been definitely buried in the ten November days of 1917 which shook the world. During these two years not the slightest sympathy for the Czechs and Poles suffering under German occupation was expressed. Indeed, although Leninist communism during World War I had conducted a violent defeatist propaganda compaign in *both* warring camps, the subversive communist propaganda that was resumed in 1939 was directed only against the democratic nations. "Moreover, officially, even ostentatiously, help was granted to the camp of fascism so that, from 1939 to 1941, the Soviet Union could be considered a non-belligerent partner of the Axis. From the policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Axis the Soviet Union was removed against its will. Circumstances made it an ally of the democracies. This change was performed reluctantly, only because no other choice was left."[1]

The communist leadership was convinced even as late as May, 1941, that its policy of neutrality would safeguard Russia's peace,[2] but in January, 1945, the same leadership boasted of having "always" correctly foreseen the course of events, as well as of being alone able to recognize how and whither events must develop in the future.[3] In any event, in his report to the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1941, Stalin rightly accused the German invaders of having "perfidiously attacked our peace-loving country."[4] Clearly against its foresight and will, the Soviet leadership was forced to enter, not a war for proletarian revolution, social justice, or democracy, but a "war of national liberation"—a

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[1] N. S. Timasheff, "Four Phases of Russian Internationalism," *Thought*, Vol. 20, p. 47 (March, 1945). In 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Stalin declared: "The revolution in USSR is only part of the world revolution, its beginning and the base for its successful advance."

[2] *Bolshevik*, No. 10, pp. 1–2 (May, 1941).

[3] "Our Party is theoretically equipped and united as no other party on earth because in its activity it leans on the Marxist-Leninist theory and masters the knowledge of the laws of social development. The duty of the Party and Soviet personnel . . . is unceasingly to study the theory of Marx and Lenin, remembering that it gives the Party the ability to orient itself in any circumstances, to foresee the course of events, to understand the inner connections of current developments, and to recognize not only how and whether events are now developing, but also how and whether they must develop in the future" (*Bolshevik*, No. 1, p. 10, Jan., 1945).

[4] Stalin, *O velikoi otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soyuza* [*On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*], 5th ed. (Moscow, 1946), p. 17. See also, from his radio address of July 3, 1941: "Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact of 1939" (p. 10).

"great patriotic war," the title previously given by the Russians to the war of 1812. In his report to the Moscow Soviet, Stalin accordingly used words not heard officially since the "Great October Socialist Revolution," the twenty-fourth anniversary of which he was celebrating. Hitler, he said, was out to "exterminate the Slav peoples, the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, and Byelo-Russians." The Nazis had the audacity "to call for the annihilation of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoi, Glinka and Tschaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sechenov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov." And in his address to the Red Army Parade the next day, Stalin called upon Soviet soldiers to let themselves be inspired in this war by "the manly images of our great ancestors—Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov." The feudal saints of the Orthodox Church and the generals serving tsarist reaction, all of them exclusively Russian, were thus proclaimed the ancestors of the supernational revolutionary Red Army.[5]

In the war years themselves the Russian fatherland completely overshadowed the Soviet fatherland.[6] Traditional national values were restored without any reference either to class war or to the revolutionary struggle and without any regard for the national feeling of the non-Russian Soviet nationalities. To the nationalist heroes and warriors of the past, everything was forgiven. At the end of S. Golubov's novel *General Bagration* (1943), Prince Peter Bagration, the general mortally wounded in the battle at Borodino, was presented as kissing the Emperor's signature on a letter of thanks just brought to him and as dying with the words, "Soul and body alike and my blood to the last drop, I give all to my fatherland and to his Majesty's service."[7] Field Marshal Count

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 26–28, 36. In his Order of the Day as National Commissar for Defense on February 23, 1942, Stalin rightly emphasized that the policy of racial equality of the USSR was a factor of strength in comparison to Hitler's racial policy (*ibid.*, p. 42).

[6] In November, 1941, the popular young poet Konstantin Simonov (see the article on him by Elena Mikhailova in *Soviet Literature*, No. 8, pp. 46–49, Aug., 1946) wrote in a famous poem to his friend Alexei Surkov: "I am proud of this dearest of countries, this dear sad country that gave me my birth. I am proud that in Russia my life is to finish, that the mother that bore me was Russian of race, that when seeing me off, in the old Russian manner, she locked me three times in her loving embrace." And Surkov replied: "In the midst of night and darkness we have carefully borne before us the inextinguishable flame of faith in our Russian, our native folk." A fervent Russian patriotism became the theme of all the poems, short stories, novels, and plays, glorifying the "Holy Homeland" (*svyashchennaya rodina*). The general slogan was "*za rodinu, za Stalina*"—"for fatherland and Stalin."

[7] See Michael Karpovich, "Soviet Historical Novel," *Russian Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 53–63 (Spring, 1946). This novel was translated into English by J. Fineberg under the title of *No Easy Victories* (London, 1945). A number of other Russian war novels and biographies about historical heroes are available in English translations, among them S. Sergeev-Tsensky, *Brusilov's Break-Through* (London, 1944); S. Borodin, *Dmitri Donskoi*, trans. E. and C. Paul (London, 1944); Mikhail Bragin, *Field Marshal Kutuzov* (Moscow, 1944); K. Osipov, *Alexander Suvorov; A Biography*, trans. E. Bone (London, 1944); and R. Wipper (Robert Yuryevich Vipper), *Ivan Grozny*, trans. J. Fineberg (Moscow, 1947). In the last,

Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov (1729–1800), who cruelly subdued, on the Tsar's behalf, the peasant rebellion of Pugachev and the last resistance of free Poland, became the greatest hero of the communist youth; even General Alexei Brussilov, who was appointed in May, 1917, commander-in-chief of the Russian Army which the Bolsheviks did everything at the time to undermine, was honored by a great war novel and by the "deep respect" which the Red Army paper, *Krasnaya zvesda*, expressed on September 3, 1943, for "the man who in the stern years of the last war upheld with dignity the honor and glory of the Russian Army."

The Russian nationalism set loose by events did not confine itself to a defensive patriotism, the chauvinism of which might be explained by the military catastrophe facing the country. It immediately asserted itself in an aggressive way. The annexation of eastern Poland, of Bessarabia, and of part of Bukovina could be "justified" by nationalism, by the goal of uniting all Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians under the Soviet flag (though this unification deprived the Soviet Ukrainians of that consideration which they had received from Moscow when the Soviet Ukraine was yet to attract the "brothers by race" living in Poland and Rumania). No similar justification existed for the annexation of the Baltic Republics, but, quite naturally, many Russian non-Bolshevik nationalists greeted this step. People who had pleaded for the independence of the Magyars or the Irish accepted the control by Moscow of Transcaucasia, of the Baltic coast, and of the Ukraine, as justified by Russian needs of security and economy.[8] Understandably, meanwhile the "Internationale" was abolished as the national anthem of the Soviet Union; its expansive promise "the Internationale unites the human race," did not ring true in an atmosphere satiated with glory to *Velikaya Rus*, "the great Russia," as distinct from the rest of mankind. And the daring challenge to the self-reliance of the masses, "Nobody will bring us liberation, neither a Tsar, nor a God, nor a hero," became unacceptable in the era of *Veliky Stalin*, "the great Stalin"—Tsar, God, and hero to his people and, what no tsar had claimed, of all "progressive" mankind.

In his election speech broadcast from Moscow on February 9, 1946, Stalin praised the "Soviet multinational state system" as having survived successfully the test of the war, because it was built on foundations promoting the feeling of friendship and fraternal collaboration between the various peoples of the USSR. But in June, 1941, the Soviet government had thought itself obliged to apply against one of these peoples a "barbarous measure" which the tsarist government had long hesitated to decide upon. The victims were those Germans who, in the later eighteenth century, had settled along the lower Volga and developed a prosperous community there. In 1916, two years after the out-

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a historian of repute tried to save Ivan's reputation as a reformer and "progressive" military strategist against moralistic "liberal" considerations. The liberal historians, according to Wipper, translated "the significant, and on the lips of Russians extremely majestic, surname 'Grozny' by the vulgar words . . . 'Ivan the Terrible' " (pp. 233–234).

[8] The Russian nationalist point of view was expressed, for example, in Walter Kolarz, *Stalin and Eternal Russia* (London, 1944), pp. 48 ff.

break of World War I, the Russian government had made up its mind to remove temporarily the Volga Germans, but the March Revolution had intervened before the plan could be carried out. After 1917 Lenin singled out these same Volga Germans for especially favorable treatment. Their *Oblast*, the first autonomous unit created by the communist government (in July, 1918), was raised in 1924 to the status of an autonomous republic of the RSFSR. Their city of Pokrovsk was renamed Engels and became the capital of the republic, while their other large town, Katherinenstadt, named after Catherine II who settled the Germans there in 1764, was rebaptized Marxstadt.[9] However, in June, 1941, Stalin apparently became convinced that the two decades of Soviet life and education which supposedly had promoted the fraternal solidarity of peoples had been a failure. While Hitler's armies were still far away in western Russia, Stalin ordered, without any proof of collective treason or any trial, the permanent eviction and dispersion of the Volga Germans. Their autonomy proved to be nothing but a scrap of paper. The region was cleared of all traces of German culture and ruthlessly Russified, with the cities unprotected even by the names of Marx and Engels. Furthermore, this policy of wholesale destruction of cultural and political entity by the Bolshevists themselves was not carried through on a class basis, but purely on a racial one.

Only somewhat different was the case of four Mohammedan peoples in the Soviet Union. On December 17, 1917, a proclamation of the new Soviet government signed by Lenin and Stalin was addressed to the Moslems of Russia and the East: "The rule of the robbers and enslavers of the peoples of the earth is about to end . . . A new world is being born, a world of workers and free men . . . Moslems of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirgiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan . . . Chechens and mountaineers of the Caucasus—all those whose mosques and chapels have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled under foot by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia. Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are free and inviolable. Build your national life freely and unhindered." But in 1943 and 1944, four of the Mohammedan autonomous Soviet states—the Kalmyk ASSR, the Crimean Tartar ASSR, the Chechen-Ingush, and the Karachayev autonomous regions in the northern Caucasus—were removed completely from the map and from life, the peoples transported to unknown regions in northern Asia, their languages eradicated, their cities and villages renamed. No trace was left of these historic communities, and the lands were resettled by Russians.

No reasons were given for any of these nationalist excesses, but apparently all were based upon the assumption of collective racial "guilt." And as the Mohammedan territories were in fact reached by the German armies, it can be assumed that parts of the populations did collaborate with the Germans. In any case, many Soviet citizens of all nationalities went over to the German side; if Hitler had followed a less beastly policy of human extermination and degradation, the number of the elements disloyal to Stalinism probably would have been much larger. As it was, Stalin apparently became convinced that he could count only upon the support of the Great Russians, to whose emotions the annexations of the years 1939–1941 had appealed and among whom some began to look upon him as the leader who would bring about both the Pan-Slav and Pan-Asian expansionism of extreme Russian nationalists and the utopia of universal social justice of Slavophil messianists.

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[9] On the establishment of the autonomy of the Volga Germans, see Rudolf Schilze-Molkau, *Die Grundzüge des Wolgadeutschen Staatswesens im Rahmen der russischen Nationalitätenpolitik* (Munich, 1931), and Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg, *Die Wolgadeutschen, ihr Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, zugleich ein Beitrag zum bolschewistischen Nationalitätenrecht* (Berlin, 1929).

Conscious of the debt which he owed to the Great Russians, Stalin acknowledged it publicly in the toast with which he concluded the Kremlin banquet for the Red Army commanders on May 24, 1945: "I should like to drink to the health of our Soviet people—and first of all to the health of the Russian people. I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union. . . . It has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country. . . . The confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet government was the decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of mankind—fascism." The historical sorrows and triumphs of Russian imperialism became now officially Stalin's. After he had attacked Japan in August, 1945—breaking his pact of friendship and nonaggression of 1941 with Japan as treacherously as Hitler had broken his own with Stalin—he celebrated the quick victory in a broadcast from Moscow on September 2, in which he said: "The defeat of Russian troops in 1904 in the period of the Russo-Japanese War left grave memories in the minds of our people. It was a dark stain on our country. Our people trusted and awaited the day when Japan would be routed and the stain wiped out. For forty years have we, men of the older generation, waited for this generation, waited for this day. And now this day has come." This astonishing declaration, describing victory in a way which resembled so closely Mussolini's triumph in wiping out the stain of the battle of Adua forty years later in the victorious war against Ethiopia, was a complete reversal of the official attitude of Russian Socialism in 1905—an attitude unaltered in high school textbooks published in 1941, which declared that "Lenin and the Bolsheviks worked for the defeat of the tsarist government in this predatory and shameful war, because the defeat facilitated the victory of the revolution over tsarism." And in one of his leaflets against the Russo-Japanese War, Comrade Stalin had written: "Let us wish that this war will become a still greater disaster for the tsarist regime than was the Crimean War. . . . Then serfdom was ended. Now, as a consequence of this war, we will bury the child of serfdom, the tsarist regime with it stinking secret police and gendarmes."[10]

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[10] The first quotation is from *Istoriya SSSR*, Vol. 3 (for the tenth grade), 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1941), p. 29. The quotation regarding Stalin's attitude is from Lavrentii Pavlovich Beriya, *K voprosu ob istorii bolshevistskikh organizatsii v Zakavkazie* [*Concerning the*

Thus when the Soviet Union after thirty years revived Russia's past, it revived that past in its most nationalist and imperialist mood, which had never before been sanctified as official policy and had always been resisted by strong liberal and humanitarian trends of thought. But the new Stalinist nationalism did not shed the worldwide implications and ambitions of Leninism; what emerged was the "universal Russian monarchy" which the Czech historian Palacký had dreaded in 1848, but with the addition of a new kind of monarch at its head, a man of the masses, a bearer of the social gospel endowed with qualities of "genius" and "omniscience" such as no Russian ruler and no leader of a people had ever claimed. It was only natural that in such an atmosphere the ghost of Pan-Slavism rose again—not the liberal Pan-Slavism of the Western Slavs of 1848, but the Pan-Slavism of Moscow and of the Pan-Slav Congress of 1867, a Pan-Slavism which preached the liberation of the other Slavs from alien influences by the Russian people, a Pan-Slavism which was Pan-Russism.

The Chairman of the Commission on Credentials of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, P. A. Sharia, as reported by *Izvestiva* on March

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Question of the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia], 5th ed. (Moscow, 1939), p. 56. In the new edition of the *Istoriya SSSR*, published in 1946, the text has been changed and Stalin's speech on September 2, 1945, after the victory over Japan is quoted (Vol. 3, p. 45). The military technology of the tsarist army is blamed for its backwardness: "In Port Arthur there was not even a wireless telegraph, though it had been invented in 1895 by A. S. Popov" (p. 29).

The spirit of invincibility under a better government than that of the tsars was expressed in a pamphlet by N. M. Korobkov, *Mikhail Kutuzov* (Moscow, 1945), written especially for officers: "We are on the road to a new growth of the power of our country. Prepared historically for great feats, our army and our new Stalinist military art surpass everything that Russian history has ever known. But we do not forget our great ancestors, we do not forget the heroic past of our nation. [Their] memory is a faithful guarantee of the great future to which the genius of a leader (*genialny vozhd*), Generalissimus Stalin, leads the country on new paths" (p. 5).

Two official translations into English exist for the text of the pamphlet by Beriya, Stalin's fellow countryman and faithful follower: *On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*, trans. from the 4th Russian ed. (New York, 1939) and trans. from the 7th Russian ed. (Moscow, 1949). Beriya's speech reveals the switch from "socialism" to "nationalism" in Stalin's line and establishes the official legend about Stalin's activities in his younger years. Stalin's attitude in 1905 is discussed on pp. 44–46 of the 1939 ed. (pp. 71–73 of the 1949 ed.): "In January 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out. The Bolsheviks of Transcaucasia, headed by Comrade Stalin, consistently pursued Lenin's line of 'defeat' for the Tsarist government, constantly urging the workers and peasants to take advantage of the military overthrow of the autocracy. The All-Caucasian Committee of the RSDLP (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Bolshevik organization), the Tiflis and Baku Committees of the RSDLP issued a number of leaflets exposing the imperialist predatory character of the Russo-Japanese War on the part of both warring powers and calling for the defeat of Tsarism. One of the leaflets . . . said: 'However much they may call us non-patriots and the enemies at home, let the autocracy . . . remember that the RSDLP represents 99% of the population of Russia. . . . Their brothers are being driven into the jaws of death to shed the blood of the sons of the Japanese, a brother people! . . . We want this war to be more lamentable for the Russian autocracy than was the Crimean War. . . . ' Day in and day out the Bolsheviks urged the soldiers to support the revolutionary struggle of the people against Tsarism."

15, 1946, enlarged on Stalin's statement of the Russian people as the leading force of the Soviet Union: "Every people in the Soviet Union understands perfectly well that the main, decisive role in the achievement of victory over the enemy in the Great Patriotic War . . . was played by the great Russian people. For this reason the prestige of the Russian people is so immeasurably high among the other peoples; for this reason the peoples of the USSR bear toward it boundless confidence and a feeling of tremendous love and gratitude." The same love and gratitude were expected from the younger Slav brothers who had been liberated by the Russian Army. The new Pan-Slavism, turning away from the West and looking to Moscow, was also justified by the unique position of Russian culture. "Naturally our literature, which reflects a system much higher than any bourgeois democratic system, a culture many times higher than any bourgeois culture, has the right to teach others a new universal morality. Where can you find such a people or such a country as ours?" wrote Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov in *Pravda* on September 21, 1946, when he was probably the second most influential man in the Soviet Union. On June 27, 1947, *Pravda* declared: "We may say with confidence that the center of artistic culture of the world has now moved to Moscow. From here mankind receives the art of the most advanced thought, of great feeling, of highest morality and noteworthy artistry." This highest culture on earth had, of course, found its instrument in the Russian language. "The future belongs to the Russian language as the language of socialism," *Moskovsky Komsomolets* asserted on March 6, 1949; "the democratic peoples are learning the Russian language, the world language of internationalism." Under these circumstances, would not the Slav peoples of the West gladly accept the Russian culture and the Russian language, akin to them by blood and tradition and at the same time the most advanced on earth?

II

Less than two months after the German attack on the Soviet Union a Pan-Slav Committee was formed in Moscow, and on August 10, 1941, it held its first meeting under the chairmanship of General Alexander Semyonevich Gundorov. Though no official Soviet leaders participated, the Russian communist intelligentsia was well represented by such foremost members as the authors Nikolai Simenovich Tikhonov (the first writer to receive the Order of the Patriotic War, First Class), Alexander Alexandrovich Fadeev, and Alexei Tolstoi, and the composer Dmitri Shostakovich. The Poles were represented by Wanda Wassiliewska, wife of the Ukrainian playwright and communist leader, Alexander Korneichuk; the Czechs by Zdeněk Nejedlý, professor of musicology at Prague University and biographer of Smetana and Masaryk, and by Jan Šverma, a communist who died fighting in Slovakia in 1945. In his opening words, Tolstoi "rejected the old ideology of Pan-Slavism" as reactionary and contrary to the principles of equality among the nations. "Slavs, let us unite, that each Slavonic nation may be entitled, as the other nations are, to a free, peaceful existence—that the culture of our nations may flourish without restraint." The main emphasis of the meeting was on the fight against the

German enemy, a call upon all Slavs to establish armed forces and to sabotage the enemy's efforts. Much more representative and more carefully prepared was the second meeting of the Slavs in Moscow on April 4 and 5, 1942. Shostakovich issued a call to arms: "I am proud to be a Russian, I boast of being a Slav. . . . May all the spiritual forces, all the intellectuals of the glorious family of the Slavonic nations fearlessly fulfil the great mission entrusted to them by history!" And Tolstoi summed up the revised Slavophile interpretation of history in an article in *Pravda*: "We must revise the whole history of the Slav peoples. . . . During one thousand years, our young blood vitalized decrepit Byzantium. Thanks to the Slavs, Byzantium preserved ancient civilization and transmitted it to feudal Europe. The Slav peoples, hard-working, lovers of liberty and peace and culture, had as their neighbors on the East nomadic empires which always cherished the utopian design of world conquest, and on the West medieval emperors whose imposing cavalcades were equally vain. The aggressions from East and West broke against the fearless resistance of the Slav world. The role of the Slav peoples in the formation of European humanism has not yet been appreciated at its true value. . . . "[11]

What no previous Slav congress had attempted was now realized, thanks to official government support. A monthly periodical *Slavyane* [*The Slavs*], began to appear in Moscow in January, 1943; special committees to work among Slav youth, Slav scholars, and Slav women were formed; Slav scholarship and publications were encouraged in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Professor Nikolai Sevastyanovich Derzhavin, who since 1898 had published numerous works on Slav history, especially on the Bulgarians, and who was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1945; above all, the Pan-Slav propaganda was carried to Britain, Canada, Latin America, and the United States, appealing as Hitler had done to the racial solidarity of citizens of Slav descent. A congress of Slavonic nations meeting in London on May 25, 1944, under the chairmanship of R. W. Seton-Watson, was attended mostly by Slavs living in England in temporary exile. Of much greater importance was the American Slav Congress which took place in Detroit on April 25 and 26, 1942. It made use of the wartime enthusiasm for "our Russian ally" and tried to organize the ten million Americans of Slav descent immediately in support of the common American-Russian struggle against Hitler and permanently in support of the Soviet Union and its policy.[12]

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[11] A good discussion of the Slav peoples in and after World War II is in Albert Mousset, *The World of the Slavs* (London, 1950), which is a revised edition of the French original, published in 1946.

[12] Testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Judge Blair F. Gunther of the Court of Common Pleas, Pittsburgh, accused the American Slav Congress of being "the most dangerous fifth column operating among our Slav population. Its chief aim is to subvert millions of Slavic Americans operating in our basic industries in order to cripple our national defense apparatus. It gives every evidence of Moscow direction and control." The Congress was listed as a subversive agency by the Attorney General of the United States on September 21, 1948. On June 25, 1949, the House Committee on Un-American Activities found that the Congress changed its keynote at the end of World

The official recognition of the Russian Orthodox Church by Soviet authorities in September, 1943, and the elevation of the Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow to the dignity of a patriarch of all Russia made the Church—as it had been among the Pan-Slavs of the second half of the nineteenth century—an instrument of Russian imperial policy. Patriarch Alexei, who succeeded Sergius in May, 1944, praised Stalin as "a wise leader, placed by the Lord over our great nation." All churches were ordered to offer prayers "for the health and well-being of the God-sent leader of the peoples of our Christ-loving nation." As in the nineteenth century, Pan-Orthodoxism was to support Pan-Slavism; Orthodox churches everywhere were to be united under Moscow's leadership. Patriarch Alexei, at whose coronation the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Georgia participated, visited the Near East in 1945 to renew the ties which had existed in the time of tsarist Russia; Orthodox churches in Europe and America which had split away from the Moscow patriarchate were warned to reënter. In the same year Roman Catholics in Czechoslovakia held a conference at Velehrad in Moravia, where St. Cyril and St. Methodius had worked in the ninth century for the Christianization of the Slavs and where the Pan-Slav enthusiasm of the nineteenth century had led to many demonstrations of Slav spiritual solidarity. The keynote address at this conference called on all Catholic theologians of Slav descent to join "the general Eastward orientation of the country."

The victories of the Soviet Union in 1944 and 1945 in the Balkans, in the Danubian Basin, and along the Vistula completely changed the picture in central-eastern Europe. The Russian Army entered Königsberg, the cradle of the Prussian monarchy, and Berlin, Budapest, and Vienna; the Kremlin claimed the legacy of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. Though the Soviet Union had not entered the war for any purpose of "liberation," nevertheless it demanded the gratitude of the Slavs as their liberator. From London, King Peter of Yugoslavia declared on January 11, 1945, that "fraternal union with Russia is one of the most deeply-rooted sentiments of the Slav peoples." With greater clarity the new situation was put forward by a Bulgarian writer:

> For one hundred and fifty years the Slav idea served the private interests of two parasitic classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, i.e., it was exploited to the harm of the Slav peoples themselves. Today for the first time in 1300 years, Slavdom lives through a propitious moment which will make its security forever possible. The German danger has disappeared. The governments which fanned hatred among the Slav peoples have been thrown out. Now the Slavs can proceed to build up their society. What should be their program? The Slavs form a racial, linguistic and cultural group with a common character. They constitute a geopolitical and economic bloc which can be an important factor in the preservation of European peace. The Slav nations, in order to liberate themselves from German capitalism, must build up technically perfected national economies which would secure their independence. Their inner structure must be democratic, freedom-loving and socially just. The Slav nations have to work out a political system for Pan-Slav coopera-

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War II "from super-patriotism to outright treason." The Committee charged that the embassies of the USSR and of the Slav states cooperated actively with the American Slav Congress.

> tion, the principle of which ought to be full equality of small and great nations. The USSR should organize and lead this Slav society.[13]

Pan-Slavism was to become the vehicle of a common civilization—the civilization of communist Russia, of the Soviet Union, and of its leading people, the great Russian people.

In 1946 the Soviet Union controlled all of Europe east of a line running from Stettin on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. Behind this line there were not only all the Slav peoples but, as Danilevsky in 1869 and other Pan-Slavs had demanded, the Magyars, Rumanians, and Albanians as well. That Greece and Constantinople did not live up to Danilevsky's expectations was due not only to the will of resistance of their own citizens, but also to the far-sighted statesmanship of Winston Churchill and Ernest Bevin. Yet there was no doubt that Königsberg had become Kaliningrad; Potsdam was under communist domination; the two western Slav nations, Poland and Czechoslovakia, had emerged from the war with their territory much diminished and (under communist inspiration) on a purely racial basis, since they had driven out the Germans and other national minorities; Moscow claimed now the right —which had fallen in 1919 to the Western democracies and had been exercised in 1939 by Hitler's Germany—of settling all territorial and other disputes in the area. In addition, by the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine from Czechoslovakia, Russia became the immediate neighbor of Czechoslovakia and of Hungary, commanding a strategic foothold in the Danubian plain south of the Carpathian Mountains and establishing frontiers there and along the Oder-Neisse line which conjured up, as the fascist dictatorships had hoped to do, a racial past many centuries old. Of all the Slav peoples, only the Poles abroad and the Polish government in London raised a passionate protest. As they had so often in the last two hundred years, the Polish national traditions and hopes had to live on in exile. In the homelands, however, the Slav spokesmen stressed the "democratic" and "peace-loving" character of the Slavs. This was no new melody. The romanticists among them had done it since the time of Herder. It had been the constant chant of the Slavophiles, and it was not changed substantially by being communist-directed. The hope was now held out to all peoples that they might partake in this "democratic" and "peace-loving" community if they would affirm, as the Slavs did, their undying gratitude and indissoluble attachment to the great leader of the Slav world and of progressive mankind, Soviet Russia under Stalin.

In this atmosphere a Pan-Slav congress met in Belgrade for five days beginning on December 8, 1946. It marked the third great congress in the history of the Pan-Slav idea: the first, in Prague, represented the Western democratic trend among the Austrian Slavs of 1848; the second, in Moscow, expressed the aggressive Russian nationalism of the 1860's; the third, in the Yugoslav capital, was the triumphant affirmation of Moscow's hold over the Slav world. Of all its members, at that time the Yugoslavs and their wartime leader, the old and trusted communist fighter and organizer, Marshal Tito, received the highest consideration, second only to that of Russia's Marshal Stalin; and it was not by accident that Belgrade was chosen as the seat of the Pan-Slav Congress, the center of the new Pan-Slav movement. (After September, 1947, Belgrade was also the home of the newly established Cominform [Communist Information Bureau] and of its official magazine, the first issue of which appeared there on November 15, 1947.) The program of the Congress comprised three points: the Slav peoples in the world struggle for peace and democracy; the contribution of the Slav peoples to world culture; and organizational problems of Slav cooperation. For the first time in the history of Pan-Slavism, this program and this Congress were regarded as an official and not a private manifestation; for the first time, too, the Congress was worldwide, with Slav delegates from the United States, Canada, South America, Australia, and New Zealand attending—*Auslandsslaven* similar to the *Auslandsdeutschen*, or men and women of German descent and loyalty, though citizens of non-German countries, of Hitler's time. Interestingly enough, however, the Slav representatives were organized not on a basis of nationality but of states. There was a representation from the Soviet Union (including Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, but without taking into account the many non-Slav nationalities of the Soviet Union, which now acted officially as a Slav state), Yugoslavia (comprising Serbs, Croats, Slovenians and Macedonians), Poland, Czechoslovakia (comprising Czechs and Slovaks), and Bulgaria. The official state-concept definitely replaced the formerly predominant nationality-concept.

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[13] Christo Gandev in *Slavyansko bratstvo, sbornik* [*Slav Brotherhood; A Symposium*], Biblioteka Izvori [Sources], No. 2 (Sofia, 1945).

The Congress was opened by Marshal Tito, who was received, according to the official reports, with a "long-lasting ovation." ("Equally enthusiastic" was the reception accorded to Marshal Fedor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, who had commanded the Soviet armies which victoriously entered Rumania, Bulgaria, Belgrade, and Vienna and thus "liberated" the southern Slavs.) In his opening address Marshal Tito said: "What would have happened if the glorious Red Army had not existed? What would have happened if this state of workers and peasants with Stalin, the man of genius, at its head, had not existed, which stood like a wall against fascist aggression and which with innumerable sacrifices and rivers of blood liberated also our Slav nations in other countries. For these great sacrifices which our brothers in the great Soviet Union made, we other Slavs thank them. . . . " He finished his talk with a three-fold toast: to Slav solidarity (using the word which the Slovak Pan-Slav poet Kollár had coined in 1837), to "our greatest Slav brother," the Soviet Union (forgetting that the Soviet Union was not Slav but supraracial), and to its leader of genius, Stalin (a climax of personal adulation unthinkable at the Moscow Pan-Slav Congress of 1867). Marshal Tito was followed by the two main speakers, the Yugoslav Milovan Djilas, who discussed the struggle of the Slavs for peace and democracy, and Professor Boris D. Grekov of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who read a long catalogue of names as "Slav contributors to world culture." The trite verbosity and the lack of ideas of these papers distinguished the Belgrade Congress from the nineteenth century Pan-Slav congresses as much as did the harmonious unanimity manifest in all discussions and decisions. A Pan-Slav Committee was elected, on which each of the five states was represented by five members. A Yugoslav, Major General Bozhidar Maslarić, became its president; a Russian, a Pole, a Czech and a Bulgarian were elected vice-presidents. Belgrade became the seat of this Pan-Slav Committee, and the former Pan-Slav Committee in Moscow was reorganized in March, 1947, as the Slav Committee of the USSR, with Gen. A. S. Gunderov as its chairman, and three vice-presidents, Alexander A. Veznesensky, rector of the University of Leningrad, Alexander Vladimirovich Palladin, president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and Yakub Kolas, a Byelo-Russian poet and vice-president of the Byelo-Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1947 the monthly *Slavyane,* which so far had appeared as the organ of the Pan-Slav Committee in Moscow, became the organ of the Slav Committee of the USSR.

The Pan-Slav Congress in Belgrade represented the crest of the Pan-Slav tide after World War II. Its resolutions, plans, and hopes came to naught—as had those of all the previous congresses—when far-reaching designs broke upon the rocks of reality. One more success, however, was to be registered by Moscow's Pan-Slavism, interestingly enough among the Czechs, whose conciliatory realism and spirit of political maturity were unique among the Slavs. Despite this stability, it was only in Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech parts of Czechoslovakia, that the communists were able to achieve in free elections in Europe—held on May 26, 1946—a vote of 40.17 per cent. Wide circles expected a recession of the communist vote in the elections of May, 1948, and it might have been the fear of such a defeat which prompted the communist leadership to seize total control of the country in February, 1948. Czechoslovakia quickly became an integral part of the Moscow-controlled and directed Pan-Slav empire, apparently adjusting fully to the intellectual, moral, and political model set by the Kremlin. But this success, achieved against the most Westernized Slavs, was more than balanced by the event of June 28, 1948, which took the world by surprise in its revelation of an open and widening rift between Moscow and Belgrade—between Marshal Stalin and Marshal Tito, the two most prominent leaders of the new Pan-Slavism.

The Yugoslav defection created in the Slav "family of nations" a situation similar to that which had existed between 1830 and 1945 as a result of the enmity of the Poles and the Russians. As Poland had done then, Yugoslavia now became the "Judas" and "traitor" to the Slav cause and a "tool" of "Western scheming" against the Slav world which the Russians, then as now, magnanimously identified with Moscow. The similarity, even to the very words used in the diatribes by Katkov and his generation and those now used by Stalin's spokesmen, was astonishing. But while the Polish communists acknowledged that it was only thanks to Moscow that Poland could end the "feudal" age, and that Poland's liberation from German occupation was due only to the Red Army—forgetting that it was Soviet Russia's cooperation in 1939 which facilitated Poland's subjugation by Hitler—the Serbs could point to a long tradition of peasant proprietorship and to their courageous fight, independent of Russian help, waged against Turks and Germans for independence. The communist leaders in Belgrade refused to admit that their country owed its liberation and its new order of "social justice" only, or primarily, to Russia's help and guidance. They denied the thesis propagated from Moscow that the Slav peoples could not preserve their independence except under Russia's protection. They did not wish to subordinate the economic modernization of their country to the needs of "the motherland" of the Slavs and of the socialist world revolution. Furthermore, Tito's defection had repercussions in the Pan-Slav Congress in the United States; some of its most active leaders, like Louis Adamic, sided with the dissident communists. The growing hostility of the Kremlin to the democracies had made the American people more aware of the threat to the West implied in the theory and actions emanating from Moscow, the center of the now intimately-fused movements of Pan-Slavism and world communism, with the result that the American Pan-Slav Congress ceased most of its activities.

Altogether, the period of Pan-Slavism in its third, communist, Pan-Russian form came to its end. But even in its heyday it had been unable to solve, in spite of all totalitarian pressure and conformity, the old problems disputed among the Slav peoples: the control of Teschen contested by Czechs and Poles, the allegiance of Macedonia to Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, and the desire of the Ukrainian people for independence from the Great-Russians.

III

The Pan-Slavism of the war years, promising the equality of all Slav peoples, was openly replaced after 1947 by a Pan-Russism which imposed Russian predominance and leadership on the Slav peoples first, but also on Magyars and Rumanians, on Uzbeks and Caucasians. In fact, the new Soviet patriotism hardly distinguished between "Russian" and "Soviet." Soviet historiography had to follow the trend; books written and praised as recently as 1941, were rejected as not patriotic enough in 1947. Russian scholarship now began to extol the Russian past beyond anything that the most extravagant instances of former Russian historiography had ever attempted. The Kievan state now received a Slav past on Russian soil. Its rise was now found to have originated in a very ancient high east-Slav civilization, much superior to that of its neighbors; the multinational and yet centralized Russian state was dated back for many centuries, even before the sixteenth century, with the Great Russians, thanks to their cultural superiority, the leading element. The Great-Russian people was now generally called "the great Russian people," and more and more emphasis was put on the fact that the Russians owed their whole development to their own creative originality and initiative. As one writer has explained, "The Soviet imperial idea of a union of socialist peoples has given body to its own thinned spiritual substance by its absorption of the old Russian idea of the State, with all its expansionist and centralizing tendencies. It must by all means be made acceptable to the other peoples of the Soviet Union that the Russian people—unlike Lenin's idea—has at present become the true bearer of the world revolutionary tasks of Marxism. The Great Brother is now the leader on the road to progress and liberty. If subjection to Russia was once proclaimed 'the lesser evil,' it has now become no evil at all but sheer good fortune and a blessing."[14] Accordingly, it is not surprising that in 1951 Professor Militza Vasilyevna Nechkina (one of the well-known younger historians of Russia, author of many works on the Decembrists, and editor of the second volume, covering the nineteenth century, of the official textbook *Istoriya SSSR*) wrote in the official organ of the Soviet historians, *Voprosy istorii*, that the conquest of colonial peoples by tsarist Russia had been not only "the lesser evil" compared with the conquest by Britain or Turkey to which they might have otherwise succumbed—the official Soviet theory since 1934—but a positive good: the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, and Usbeks were actively helped in their economic progress by inclusion in the Russian empire. Tsarism oppressed the peoples, above all the Russian people, "the older brother of all the peoples of the Soviet land." But the struggle against the common enemy, tsarism—a struggle led by the Russian people—became the foundation of a fraternity of all the peoples devoted to the common construction of a new socialist society, and the education of the non-Russian peoples by the Russians created the condition for their liberation and progress. To elucidate these more "profound" aspects of the annexation of the non-Russian peoples by the Russian Empire, had become one of the great tasks for Soviet historiography.[15]

In 1931 in *Burzhuasnaya istoricheskaya nauka v Rossii* [*Bourgeois Historical Science in Russia*] (p. 92), Sergei A. Piontkovsky had violently attacked the well-known book by Matvyei Kuzmich Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovskoi gossudarstvennoi territorii velikorusskoi narodnosti* [*The Development of the State Territory of the Great Russian Nationality*] (Leningrad, 1929), because it stressed "chauvinistically" the Great Russian element in the history of the Russian state. The book was then characterized by the disciples of Pokrovsky as the "political program of the NEP bourgeoisie." Now, however, both Pokrovsky and Piontkovsky are regarded as un-Marxist and unscientific, and present-day Russian historiography goes infinitely further than Lyubavsky (1860–1936) and his generation in glorifying the Russian national element. In 1951 *Voprosy istorii* praised the thesis of Lt. Col. L. G. Beskrovny, professor of the history of warfare of the Military Frunze Academy, entitled "Stroitelstvo russkoi armii v XVIII veke" ["The Building of the Russian Army in the 18th Century"]. In it the author rejected the "cosmopolitan" views of "bourgeois historians," according to which Peter I built the Russian army upon German models. On the contrary, Russia in the eighteenth century produced the best arms in Europe and made many inventions in the field of artillery; the Russian army was then trained according to its own national system, which was the most progressive in Europe; the leading officers were Russians and not foreigners, and Napoleon learned much from the tactics and the strategy of Suvarov.[16] The same issue of *Voprosy istorii* bestowed similar praise on a symposium on the "progressive influence of the great Russian nation on the development of the Yakut nation. . . . The Yakuts, as a result of their inclusion into the centralized Russian state, entered the most advanced culture of the period and accelerated thereby the process of their social-economic and cultural development. The concrete elucidation of this question has at present, besides its purely scientific interest, great political significance. The study of the process of the historical development of the nationalities in the light of their historical interaction appears as one of the important moments in the education of the workers of our country in Soviet patriotism."[17] It is hardly astonishing that, in an official programmatic article about the tasks of historical science published in the same journal later in the year, I. Kon asserted: "Marxist historical scholarship must wage an incessant war against the falsification of history by the bourgeoisie. This war, which places Soviet historians in the firing line, is being conducted (and must be conducted) in all fields of historical science. . . . Soviet historical science develops under the constant and close leadership of the Soviet state, the Bolshevik party and Stalin himself. . . . All Soviet scholarship works under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin for the welfare of our nation."[18]

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[14] Georg von Rauch, "Die Sowjetische Geschichtsforschung heute," *Die Welt als Geschichte* (1950), No. 4, p. 258.

[15] Mrs. Nechkina's article "K voprosu o formule neimenchee zlo" ["On the Question of the Lesser Evil"], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, pp. 44–48 (1951) was in the form of a letter to the editor and was specially recommended by the editor. Yet her volume in the *Istoriya SSSR*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1947–49) had been censored in *Voprosy istorii*, No. 7 (1950) for insufficient understanding of tsarist colonial policy on the ground that she had not recognized the reactionary, pro-British and pro-Turkish character of the independence movement of the Caucasian peoples under Shamil against tsarism.

"The historians into the firing line" was not a new slogan but in line with Lenin's attitude. The difference was in what they were firing at. In 1939 *Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya*, the great depository of communist scholarship, devoted to Pan-Slavism a very short article, less than a column. This article quoted Marx and Engels as pointing out that "the immediate goal of Pan-Slavism appears to be the creation of a Slav empire, from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathian Mountains to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas, under Russia's rule." It also stressed the reactionary and expansionist character of Pan-Slavism; Marx and Engels were reported to have looked with horror on a result which would make all Slavs share "the terrible fate of the Polish nation."[19]

In their characterization of Pan-Slavism as Russian imperialism which would subject the other Slavs as the Poles had been subjected during Marx's lifetime, Marx and the *Communist Encyclopaedia* seem for once to have been proved right. As in the worst period of tsarist nationalism, the right of national originality has recently been claimed for, and reserved to, the Russians alone; the other Slav nations, Poles and Ukrainians, have had to adapt themselves to Russian nationalism. The result, so far as the Poles are concerned, was made clear at the seventh congress of Polish historians which met in Breslau from September 19 to September 22, 1948: "It is interesting to note that, while the campaign for the cultural and national distinctness (of Russia) was being trumpeted, at least one significant exception was made. The seventh congress of Polish historians . . . was criticized principally for writing history from a nationalist point of view and for contrasting Russian and Polish culture rather than drawing comparisons between their fundamental similarity."[20] Even the Poles who had propagated the new Pan-Slavism after 1945 came in for sharp criticism. Henryk Batowski, editor of the Pan-Slav magazine *Życie Słowiańskie* (which began publication in January, 1946) and author of *Historia Wspolpracy Slowianskiej* [*History of Slav Cooperation*], was branded a bourgeois nationalist because he overemphasized Poland's role in the Slav world and glorified past instances of Slav cooperation at the expense of the present.[21]

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[16] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, pp. 155–156 (1951). The thesis had been defended on June 26, 1950.

[17] Review of *Progressivnoe vliyanie velikoi Russkoi natsii na rozvitie Yakutskogo naroda*, Pt. 1, ed. A. I. Novgorod (Yakutsk, 1950) in *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, p. 140 (1951).

[18] I. Kon, "K voprosu o spetsifike i zadachakh istoricheskoi nauki," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6, p. 63 (1951).

[19] "Pan-Slavism," *Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 44 (Moscow, 1939), Cols. 68 ff. The reference to Marx and Engels there is to *Sochineniya*, Vol. 7, p. 277.

Had Stalin forgotten the warning which he voiced in his "Report on National Factors" before the twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on April 23, 1923? He then regarded Great-Russian chauvinism, "a force that is gaining in strength," as a factor impeding the amalgamation of the Soviet peoples, undermining the confidence of the "formerly oppressed peoples" in the Russian proletariat. "This is our most dangerous enemy, which we must overcome; for once we overcome it, we shall have overcome nine-tenths of the nationalism which has survived and which is developing in certain republics."[22] In the discussion at the same Congress Bukharin went even further: "In our capacity as a former great-power nation, we must counter nationalist ambitions and place ourselves in a position of inequality, in the sense of making still greater concessions to national tendencies. By such a policy alone . . . whereby we artificially place ourselves in an inferior position as compared with others, only at such a price, can we purchase the real confidence of the formerly oppressed nations." Stalin opposed this point of view because "We must not overshoot the mark in politics, just as we must not undershoot it." Thirty years later, it seems that Stalin has more and more undershot the mark. In spite of all totalitarian control and of the ever-growing purges of "local nationalists," Great Russian chauvinism has apparently aroused and strengthened the opposition of the Slav and non-Slav peoples subject to Moscow.[23]

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[20] Anatole G. Mazour and Herman E. Bateman, in *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 24, p. 64 (March, 1952).

[21] See the review in *Slavyane*, August, 1947, pp. 51 ff; Elizabeth Valkenier, "Soviet Impact on Polish Post-War Historiography, 1946–1950," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 11, pp. 372–396 (Jan., 1952); and Roman Werfel, "Konferenz polnischer Historiker," *Für dauerhaften Frieden, für Volksdemokratie* (the official Cominform organ, Bucharest), March 6, 1952.

[22] Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, tr. from the Russian ed. prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (New York, n.d., 1935?), pp. 167–168, 301.

Soviet patriotism, the official term most frequently used, has become more and more tinged with Slavophile Russianism. On August 13, 1947, *Izvestya* published a lecture on the Soviet people's national pride which S. Kovalev had delivered in the Moscow All-union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. Kovalev had said: "In the process of socialist construction in our country, the Soviet people have worked out their own world outlook, peculiar to themselves alone. One of its most important characteristics is Soviet patriotism, a feeling of the most profound love for and devotion to the Socialist Motherland. A most important peculiarity of Soviet patriotism is the profound understanding of the superiority of the Soviet system over the bourgeois and all other class systems. . . . It is precisely this peculiarity which above all characterizes Soviet patriotism as patriotism of the highest kind. . . ." Like the Slavophiles, he attacked Peter I for his Western reforms and the nineteenth century Westernizers for their "worship of the West." "Great are the services of our people to history. Our people have repeatedly saved Europe from destruction by barbarians. . . . The great Russian people, as well as the other peoples of Russia, was also in the past not dependent on other peoples in the struggle for progress, for the development of science, literature and art." Kovalev, the official report went on, "dwelt in detail on Russia's priceless contribution to world civilization in all spheres of culture."[24] *Pravda* of the same day said editorially: "For centuries Russian intellectuals fell over themselves in servility and obsequiousness before everything foreign. For centuries their consciousness was poisoned with absurd prejudices which attributed leadership in science, technology, and culture to the West . . . . This most harmful survival from the past can still be found among a certain section of our intellectuals. It is a survival which Bolshevik propaganda must utterly destroy. Our intellectuals must be daily educated and strengthened in their feelings of Soviet national pride."

In spite of all these educational efforts, some Soviet intellectuals have continued to succumb to the sin of "cosmopolitanism." In 1951 L. Knipper wrote a long article, "Protiv kosmopolitizma, za russky natsionalny stil" ["Against Cosmopolitanism, for a National Russian Style"], in *Sovyetskaya Muzyka* [Soviet Music], Moscow, in which he asked: "Can it be that Russian music is no

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[23] The future nationalist trend of Lenin's revolution had been foreseen by the Russian nationalists who published the symposium *Smena vekh* [*The Change of Guideposts*] in Prague, 1921. See especially Nikolai Vasilyevich Ustryalov, *Pod znakom revolyutsii* [*Under the Sign of Revolution*], 2nd enl. ed. (Kharbin, 1927), where in the introduction he writes: "No doubt, the motherland is being rebuilt and rises again" (p. v). His articles, written between 1921 and 1926, are divided into two sections: political articles on national Bolshevism, and sketches of the philosophy of our time. Some of the articles are remarkable for an understanding of the Russian nationalism of the twentieth century, especially "National Bolshevism," pp. 47–53 (originally published Sept. 18, 1921); "Of the Future Russia," pp. 132–135; "The Nationalization of October," pp. 212–218; "Russia and Blok's Poetry," pp. 346–356; and "Of the Russian Nation," pp. 374–393 (written originally for a *Vseslavyansky Sbornik* [*Pan-Slav Symposium*] published by the Union of Slav Committees in Zagreb in honor of the one thousandth anniversary of the Kingdom of Croatia).

[24] The lecture by Kovalev was regarded as so important that it was published in English by *Soviet Monitor*, issued by Tass Agency (London), No. 8815, Aug. 13, 1947.

longer Russian music because it became Soviet music? The Russian nation, which has changed in some respect in the last thirty-three years, has in no way ceased being Russian by becoming Soviet. . . . For there can be no art which is not rooted nationally. . . . We own the treasure of the truly popular art of our great Russian classics. Only by going back to these glorious traditions, can we find new ways for the development of the Russian song of the Soviet era. . . . In the brotherly family of the Soviet republics, the Russian culture is the first among equals. The national cultures not only of the Soviet republics but also of the people's democracies, orient themselves after the Russian culture and grow to strength through it."[25] And the famous directives of Stalin on the question of language in 1950 had one purpose—to make clear that the "international" language of socialism would be Russian. In an article, "The Great Language of our Epoch," in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of January 1, 1950, David Zazlavsky declared: "The Russian language is the first world language of international significance which rejects sharply the destruction of the national character by cosmopolitanism. . . . Nobody can regard himself as educated in the full and true sense of the word, if he does not understand Russian and cannot read the creations of the Russian mind in the original language." The Russian nationalism of nineteenth century Pan-Slavs had never voiced such uncompromising claims.

In the nineteenth century even the Slavs most friendly to Russia never went so far as to back Russia's claims to leadership, and at the Pan-Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867 even much milder pretensions aroused strong opposition on the part of the Czech spokesmen. Now, however, on March 4, 1952, the Prague communist organ *Rudé Právo* reported a long speech in which the Minister of Information, Václav Kopecký, speaking before a conference of teachers, had said:

> It is known to us that one of the main weapons in America's ideological war is cosmopolitanism, which destroys the tie to one's native land and people. . . . The case of the miserable traitor Slanský . . . has shown how the malicious agents of Western imperialism tried . . . to use cosmopolitanism in its Trotzkyite-Zionist form. Therefore we must resolutely destroy cosmopolitanism, this ideological monster which is today put to the service of American war-barbarism. We also know that, besides cosmopolitanism, the Western imperialist enemies use in their preparations for a criminal war another ideological weapon, nationalism. . . . The Judas-treason of the Tito clique in Yugoslavia . . . and the case of Clementis . . . prove that American imperialism . . . tries in this way to loosen the close ties of the people's democracies with the Soviet Union. . . . Today before all the workers

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[25] The struggle against cosmopolitanism began with an article in *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1949, "Ob odnoi antipatrioticheskoi gruppe teatralnikh kritikov" ["About an Anti-Patriotic Group of Theater Critics"], and in *Kultura i zhizn*, Jan. 30, 1949, "Na chuzhdikh pozitsiakh" ["On Foreign Positions"]. Stalin's articles on linguistics began to appear on June 26, 1950, as a contribution to a discussion started by *Pravda* on May 9, 1950, about the theories of Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr (1864–1934), a Georgian like Stalin, whose recognition as the official and the leading Marxist philologist had been assured by Stalin and who was now completely repudiated by the same Stalin. See Clarence A. Manning, "Soviet Linguistic and Russian Imperialism," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 8, pp. 20–27 (1952).

of the world the question of a just and an unjust war and the question of patriotism are raised, and this in the sense that every action against the Soviet Union is unjust, while every action of the Soviet Union is sanctified with the seal of supreme justice because its goal is the welfare of the workers, of the whole working population of the world—the welfare of all peoples and of all mankind. . . . [26]

IV

After 1950 communist dialectics had to solve the difficulty of harmonizing Russia's national uniqueness and the glorification of Russia's past with a condemnation of the slightest emphasis on the national originality of other peoples. This may explain the violence of vituperation, unusual even for communist language, used against violators of the new line, as it helps account for the uncertainties of Soviet policy. One result was that the Western Slavs faced the possibility of a new German-Russian rapprochement which would sacrifice them to Moscow's interests—a possibility foreshadowed in Stalin's wire of October 13, 1949, to Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl on the occasion of the establishment of the German Democratic Republic: "The experience of the last war has shown that the German and the Russian peoples have borne the greatest sacrifices in that war and that these two nations provide by far the greatest potential forces in Europe for the accomplishment of great actions of world significance." In their reply the two German communist leaders acknowledged, on behalf of the German people, the historical guilt which Germany had assumed by attacking the Soviet Union. Thus a positive and a negative community of fate was again established between the two peoples: in 1945, as in 1918, they were the two chief victims of a World War; and Germany had become guilty not by her march into Prague nor her dismemberment and subjection of Poland (helped by the Soviet union), but only by her aggression of June 22, 1941.

Altogether, the little Slav brothers were bound to realize their dependence on the self-centered policy of the older brother, with whom Yugoslavia had broken because it felt itself treated as a colony and its communist party used as an instrument for the country's exploitation in the economic, military, and political interest of Moscow. By 1950 Pan-Slavism was hardly mentioned any more in the Soviet orbit. Moscow's policy toward Poland and Czechoslovakia differed as little from that toward Hungary or Rumania as its attitude toward the Ukraine differed from that toward its Mohammedan subject nationalities.

In June, 1951, a "decade" of Ukrainian art was celebrated in Moscow, fifteen years after the 1936 "decade," which closed the terrible persecution of the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia begun in 1929. The new decade, which culminated in a glorification of Stalin, of Soviet patriotism, and of the Pereyaslav Council of 1654 which decided on the union of the Ukraine with Moscow, coincided with a new attack on Ukrainian writers and on the Ukrainian Communist Party for "nationalist deviation." In 1944 Volodimir Sosyura, one of the most respected older working-class poets of the Ukraine, had written a poem, "Love the Ukraine," sentimental and patriotic as a thousand Russian poems were at that time:

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[26] Kopecký stressed the point of supreme loyalty of all workers to the Soviet Union: "Wherever the question arises whether the working people prefer the land in which they live (but in which they are exposed to class exploitation, growing misery, and oppression) or the Soviet Union—they will always decide for the Soviet Union, even should they be exposed to the greatest terror of capitalist and pseudo-socialist patriots. The working masses of France, Italy, and other capitalist lands have already taken this decision. They declare that they will never bear arms against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies and that they will greet the Soviet army as liberator whenever it opposes the aggressor. Yes! The just character of such a war puts the seal of sacred patriotism on the effort of the peoples which lead it."

> . . . The Ukraine lives for us in the songs which we sing,
> In the stars and in the willow trees along the rivers,
> And in the beat of our heart.
> How can one love other peoples,
> If one does not love her, our Ukraine?
> We are nothing without her, like dust of the fields or smoke,
> Eternally driven away by the winds.

For seven years this poem was many times reprinted in the Ukraine, and it was even twice translated into Russian. Only in July, 1951, did *Pravda* discover the "nationalist deviation" in the poem and bitterly attack the author, as well as Alexander Prokofiev, whose translation had appeared in May, 1951, in the Leningrad literary magazine *Zvezda*. "It is the duty of Soviet writers," *Pravda* wrote, "to fight implacably against all forms of nationalism . . . and to sing in their works the heroic deeds of our great fatherland, which builds communism." *Pravda* did not say how to reconcile the implacable fight against all forms of nationalism with the glorification of the great and unique Russian people and its past, but its article opened a whole series of attacks on "Ukrainian nationalism."[27] Alexander Korneichuk and Wanda Wassiliewska were even accused of having not sufficiently stressed the pro-Russian character of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation from Poland under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitski, in the libretto to an opera of that name composed by Konstantin Dankevych. And immediately after the appearance of the article in *Pravda*, a meeting of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers in Kiev was called. This meeting recognized the great importance of the *Pravda* article for the development of Ukrainian literature, and all those present indulged in a "profound analysis" of their "mistakes." A Ukrainian literary critic, Leonid Novichenko, summed up the accusations against Sosyrua; He had not "freed himself from the influence of hostile bourgeois nationalistic ideology, which finds a complete reflection in the corrupt poem 'Love the Ukraine.' . . . He represents the Ukraine as standing alone . . . without connection with the great Russian people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . He refuses to see that in the battle to free the Ukraine, the sons of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, and in the first instance the sons of great Russia, took part; about them he crudely and insultingly keeps quiet. . . . While praising a certain exclusiveness of the Ukrainian language, he considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language, which is to every Ukrainian as much a native language as is Ukrainian itself."[28]

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[27] See "Protiv ideologisheskikh izvrashchenii v literature" ["Against Ideological Perversions in Literature"], *Pravda*, July 2, 1951, and "Ob opere Bohdan Khmelnitsky" ["About the Opera Bohdan Khmelnitsky"], *ibid.*, July 20, 1951. On July 10 *Pravda* printed an apology by Sosyura: "I think (your) criticism fully justified. I am deeply aware that the Soviet Ukraine is unthinkable detached from the powerful growth of our state of many nationalities; for the Ukraine achieved its happiness thanks to the fraternal help of the great Russian people and the other peoples of our motherland."

Novichenko's last sentence is revealing for the new trend. When Professor Alexander Vladimirovich Palladin, President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Ukrainian representative in the Soviet Pan-Slav Committee, returned from the International Congress of Physiology in England in 1947—one of the many international scholarly congresses which the aged scholar had attended—he reported in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* how he had there scored a nationalist triumph. Though he knew French and English perfectly well, he refused to use either of these official languages. Instead, "We said we could not accept such a humiliating treatment of Soviet science and of the Russian language. This, we said, was the language of a great victorious nation, and of the nation which had created the greatest and most advanced form of state in the world, and this language must receive its legitimate place in the work of the congress. We scored our point. We read our papers in our own language." What strikes one in this statement is not only the spirit of nationalist pride and intransigence shown at an international scientific gathering ("This episode, showed," Professor Palladin continued, "how important it is never for a moment to yield on points affecting our national honor and dignity, nor must we ever tolerate any kind of toadying to the West"), but the fact that the President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, an avowed nationalist, is not a Ukrainian nationalist. He is a Russian nationalist, who regards Russian as "our" language and reads his paper, in defiance of the rules of international courtesy, in Russian, not in Ukrainian.[29]

A similar revaluation of their history and culture has been imposed by Moscow on the non-Slav Soviet peoples. Until recently Shamil, the famous fighter for the independence of the North Caucasus (1834 to 1859), and Kenesary Kasymov, who led the Kazakh revolt against Russian conquest (1837 to 1846), were recognized as heroes of liberty. Soviet Russian historians agreed with the new Kazakh and Daghestani communist intelligentsia in praising the "anti-colonial" and "progressive" character of these wars for independence. But in 1950 it was found out that these national heroes were no liberators; "objectively, Russia fills the role of liberator of the Caucasian peoples from the cruel and arbitrary oppression by the Iranian and Turkish bandits." It was only natural that the new Soviet scholarship suddenly discovered that "the longing of progressive people in the Caucasus for union with Russia had reflected the feelings of the broad masses," and that "Shamil was forced to overcome the stubborn resistance of the people. who expressed their sympathy for Russia, the savior of Daghestan from the eastern brutes."[30] No lesser body than the "presidium" of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR adopted in November, 1950, a resolution blaming leading Russian historians, among them the academy member Anna Mikhailovna Pankratova, for having idealized and misrepresented the "war of liberation" of the Caucasian mountaineers under Shamil's leadership.[31] Therein was seen a remnant of the "un-Marxist" school of Pokrovsky, who had not understood the importance of the Black Sea and the Caucasus for the security of (tsarist) Russia. The independence movements of the Mohammedan people against Russian control could not be considered progressive, for they allegedly played into the hands of Pan-Turanism and of British imperialism, the foes of mankind.

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[28] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 15, 1951. The same paper reported, on July 22, that the Ukrainian Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge complained that "too few lectures are being given about the eternal friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and about the struggle against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism."

[29] See the report sent from Moscow to the *Manchester Guardian* by Alexander Werth, Oct. 26, 1947.

The new communist intelligentsia among the non-Russian peoples had been encouraged, at the beginning of the Soviet domination, to explore the past, and especially the folk songs and epic poems, of their own peoples. The various state publishing houses and academies of sciences of the national republics had published, and glorified, such epic poems and heroic songs as "Altamych" (Uzbek), "Dede-Korkut" (Azerbaijan), "Korkut-Ata" (Turkmenistan) and "Gesser Khan" (Buryat-Mongol). But while the Russians were exhorted, after 1934, to take pride in the unique beauty of the "Song of the Expedition of Igor" and of the byliny (oral popular poetry celebrating the exploits of the pre-Tartar Russian princes), the epic poems of the other peoples were unmasked as reactionary after 1949. In his Russian translation of the "Altamych," M. Sheikhsade had characterized it as the revelation of "the best traits of character of the working population in the past, of its unceasing longing for social justice, for happiness and for the good, a symbol of all the heroic and noble aspirations which lived among the working masses of Uzbekistan." Now it was condemned, as was the similar "Gesser Khan" epos:[32] "The poem cultivates a hostile attitude towards the Russian people. The Buryat-Mongol people, which owes its freedom and happiness to the great Russian people, cannot tolerate that its sentiments for the fraternal Russian people be hurt. . . . Only under the protection of the Soviet power . . . could the culture of the Buryat-Mongol people . . . flower as never before. It forms an indissoluble part of the united and harmonious Soviet family of peoples and progresses towards communism, thanks to the support of the great Russian people under the leadership of the party of Lenin and Stalin."

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[30] See Solomon M. Schwarz, "Revising the History of Russian Colonialism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, pp. 488–493 (April, 1952); Mark Alexander, "Tensions in Soviet Central Asia," *Twentieth Century*, Vol. 150, pp. 192–200 (Sept., 1951); and above all M. H. Ertuerk, "Was geht in Turkestan vor?", *Ost-Probleme*, Vol. 3, pp. 1010–1016 (1950).

[31] "Ob antimarksistskoi otsenke dvizheniya myuridisma i Shamilya v trudakh nauchnykh sotrudnikov Akademii" ["About the Anti-Marxist Appreciation of Myuridism and of Shamil in the Works of the Scientific Collaborators of the Academy"], *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 11 (Nov., 1950); E. Adamov and L. Kutakov, "Iz istorii proiskov inostranny agentury vo vremya kavkazkikh voin" ["From the History of the Intrigues of Foreign Agents at the Time of the Caucasian Wars"], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 11 (Nov., 1950). The most criticized book was that by R. Magomedov, *Borba gortsev za nezavisimost pod rukovedstvom Shamilya* [*The Struggle of the Mountaineers for Their Independence under Shamil's Leadership*] (Makhach-Kala, 1939). The author was especially blamed for the "horrifying assertion" that this war of independence formed part of the international revolutionary movement.

Historians of the Mohammedan peoples who had pointed to the influence of Arab, Iranian, and Turkish civilizations, were accused of being "cosmopolitans." According to the new theory, the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tadjiks, and Turkmens developed independently until the nineteenth century, when they came under the benevolent influence, not of the Russian tsars, it is true, but of the Russian people and the Russian culture. Kazakh communist historians who had regarded the struggle of their people for independence from Russia as a school for the political education of the masses, were censored because "they failed to recognize the deep progressive significance of the union of Kazakhstan with Russia. . . . The Kazakh working class had the greatest interest in this union. The activities of the Kassymovs (leaders of the independence movement) who wished to hinder the union, were in sharp opposition to the desires of the progressive part of Kazakh society."[33]

V

The future of Pan-Slavism is uncertain today. In 1930 it seemed a dead issue. World War II brought an unexpected revival, with an unprecedented breadth and intensity. There was for a time some hope of a Pan-Slavism based upon the equality and free development of the various Slav peoples; Dr. Beneš and Jan Masaryk apparently believed in its possibility. What emerged was a Pan-Russism of the kind preached by the extreme Pan-Slavs of the nineteenth century but never adopted by the tsarist Russian government and always combatted by liberal and humanitarian trends among the Russians themselves, as well as by the nationalism of Ukrainians and Poles, Czechs, and Serbs. Now, however, a new dimension has been added, apparently as a permanent feature, to the exclusive and all-inclusive state religion of the Soviet Union. Before World War II, Soviet citizens had to worship the party of Lenin and Stalin and the great Stalin himself. Now a compulsory obsequious deference to the "great" Russian people has been imposed on all its "younger brothers"—a category which all non-Russian peoples must enter. In this respect the Pan-Slav frame has been broadened and racial equality throughout the Soviet empire maintained: all its peoples, whether white or colored, Slav or Turk, Christian or Mohammedan, have equally and continually to pay their deep respect to the Russian people and even to the Russian past!

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[32] See "Ob epose 'Altamych' " ["About the Epic Poem 'Altamych' "], *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Feb. 14, 1952; and "O reaktsionnoi sushchestnosti eposa Gesser Khan" ["About the Reactionary Nature of the Epos Gesser Khan"], *Kultura i Zhizn*, Jan. 11, 1951.

[33] "Za marksistko-leninskoe osveshchenie voprosov istorii Kazakhstana" ["For the Marxist-Leninist Elucidation of the Questions of the History of Kazakhastan"], *Pravda*, Dec. 26, 1950.

Yet there are signs—in Titoism, in the ever-repeated official accusations by Moscow against Polish, Ukrainian, Uzbek, and Caucasian writers and historians—that the non-Russian peoples, Slavs as well as non-Slavs, do not sufficiently appreciate being constantly reminded of the deep gratitude which they owe to the "great" Russian people and of their immutable dependence upon the leadership of the Russian people. It is not impossible that an enforced conformity and loyalty, driven to such length, may prove a weakening factor in the vast Moscow empire and may help one day to restore the principles of liberty, equality, and diversity on which the Pan-Slav movement insisted in 1848, when it rejected categorically Moscow's leadership and looked to the West for guidance and inspiration.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN GERMANY AND THE "SOUTHWEST CASE"

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I

The new German Constitution, the Basic Law for the German Federal Republic of May 23, 1949, provides in Article 92 that the highest judicial power shall be vested in a Federal Constitutional Court. Although the Bonn Basic Law thus created a new institution, it is an institution with a precedent in the former Weimar Constitution of 1919. In accordance with the latter, the Constitutional Tribunal (*Staatsgerichtshof*) had jurisdiction over constitutional controversies within any *Land* which had no tribunal of its own for the adjustment of such controversies, as well as over controversies, other than civil law matters, among the various *Laender* or between the *Reich* and one of the *Laender*. And the Supreme Court (*Reichsgericht*), as the highest authority, could establish finally whether disputed *Land* statutes were compatible with the federal Constitution.

The Basic Law, however, grants the new Federal Constitutional Court considerably wider jurisdiction than that accorded either to the Constitutional Tribunal or to the Supreme Court under the Weimar Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court must, above all, arbitrate both disputes which may arise among the constitutional organs of the Republic, the so-called "federal constitutional" cases, and the so-called "conflicting rules" (*Normenkollisionen*) cases—the latter designating disputes involving the compatibility of the written federal law or *Land* law with the Basic Law, as well as the compatibility of the *Land* law with the federal law. The Court is furthermore charged with the tasks of determining whether a particular, generally accepted rule of international law forms part of the federal law; whether a political party is to be considered unconstitutional because it strives to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order and whether an individual's basic rights (*Grundrechte*) are to be forfeited when he has put these rights to the service of attacking this free democratic basic order; and, finally, whether a person may appeal who claims to have suffered infringement of his basic rights at the hands of a public authority.

These functions of the new German Constitutional Court, which by no means constitute an exhaustive list, clearly show the enormous authority entrusted to it. Indeed, the *plenitudo potestatis* of this highest federal court is such as not only places it at the head of all judicial power and makes it the guardian of the Constitution, but also causes it to be regarded as a constitutional organ, equal in its constitutional power to the *Bundestag* (the Lower House of Parliament), the *Bundesrat* (the Federal Council, or Upper House), the Cabinet, and the President of the Federal Republic. That this conception is shared by the legislature was made evident by the federal law of March 12, 1951, which implements the provision of the Basic Law concerning the Federal Constitutional Court. The first paragraph of this law states explicitly that the Federal Constitutional Court is not a mere court of law, but that it is at the same time a court which is separate from, and independent of, all other constitutional organs.

As an independent organ not administratively attached to another superior court, the Court is composed of two senates of twelve members each. One half of each senate is elected by the *Bundestag* and the other half by the *Bundesrat*, with four judges of each senate selected from the ranks of the higher federal courts for their terms of office with these courts and the remainder, with some exceptions in the first election, chosen for eight-year terms. A three-fourths majority of the election committee of the *Bundestag* is required for election, while a two-thirds majority suffices for election by the *Bundesrat*. The members thus elected to the Court are officially appointed by the President of the Federal Republic.

II

The Federal Constitutional Court convened for the first time at Bonn on September 7, 1951. On that very day the Court had to concern itself with a case which has since attracted a certain amount of attention outside Germany.[1] This case well illustrates the position within the entire constitutional framework which has been accorded to the Court.

The "Southwest Case" began after the end of the war in 1945, when the Occupation Powers divided the two former German States[2] of Wuerttemberg and Baden into the following three States: Wuerttemberg-Baden, comprising the northern part of the former states of Wuerttemberg and Baden; Baden, consisting of the southern part of the former Baden; and finally Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, consisting essentially of the original Wuerttemberg. After 1945 these three States drew up their own constitutions, and they became independent members of the new German Federal Republic. This territorial division of the German Southwest was soon found to be generally unsatisfactory, however; and it was the Military Governors themselves who in 1948 asked the Minister Presidents of the States concerned to reëxamine the matter and to propose the necessary changes, taking into account traditional boundaries. This was the reason that in 1949 a special provision for the reorganization of the Southwest was included in the Bonn Basic Law, a provision which deviated from those governing the general reorganization of the federal territorial structure. The pertinent clause of Article 118 of the Basic Law stated that, departing from existing general regulations, the southwestern region could be reorganized by agreement among the States concerned; but that in case such an agreement could not be reached, the reorganization should be regulated by federal legislation, which was required, however, to provide for a plebiscite.

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[1] Cf., e.g., Claude Lassalle," Le Tribunal Fédéral Constitutionnel et la réorganisation des Länden de l'Allemagne du Sud-Ouest," *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Étranger*, Vol. 68, pp. 396–420 (April–June, 1952).

[2] In this discussion the German *Laender* are translated as *States* with full knowledge that some precision of meaning is lost.

Since the three States were not able to come to an understanding on the problem of reorganization, the federal government was called upon by the terms of the Constitution to pass the necessary laws. Consequently, on May 4, 1951, the so-called First and Second Reorganization Laws (*Neugliederungsgesetz*) were enacted. The first provided for an extension of the terms of the Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern legislatures until the expiration of their own constitutions following the reorganization of the southwest region, but not beyond March 31, 1951. The second made detailed provisions for the reorganization of the region. The State of Baden contested both Laws before the Court, charging that they violated her constitutional rights and therefore could not command any legal force under the Constitution.

A referendum on the formation of a Southwest State had been provided for by the contested Second Reorganization Law and was scheduled to be held only a week after the Court held its first constituent meeting on September 7, 1951. Since in the short time available it proved impossible for the Court to decide on all the questions presented by the case, on September 9 it issued a temporary injunction which provided that the referendum be postponed until a decision on the major issues could be announced. To this extent the Second Reorganization Law was thereby suspended, with Paragraph 32 of the law on the Federal Constitutional Court furnishing the necessary basis for the injunction.

III

When making its decision in the legal dispute, the Court felt the need to set forth a number of fundamental tenets. They may be of particular interest to other countries with special constitutional authorities.

One of the first tenets laid down by the Court, for example, states that the Court is concerned with determining only the legality, not the expediency of a contested rule. It stresses explicitly that the Court is not to decide whether the legislature has put the discretionary power which it has been granted to proper use in individual cases, although it adds that the extent to which the legislature may exercise its discretionary power is in itself a legal question which comes under the jurisdiction of the Court if the limits of this power are considered to be defined by the Constitution.

Another tenet of fundamental importance formulated by the Court states that no single constitutional provision may be taken out of its context and interpreted by itself. The Court holds that each constitutional clause is in a definite relationship with all other clauses, and that together they form an entity. It considers certain constitutional principles and basic concepts to have emerged from the whole of the Basic Law to which other constitutional regulations are subordinate. The Court even goes so far as to acknowledge the existence of a higher law which transcends positive law and to which it is necessary to hold responsible both the legislature and the constituent power. In the opinion of the Court, therefore, every constitutional provision must always be interpreted in such a way as to render it compatible with the fundamental principles of the Constitution and the intentions of its authors. And in answer to the question as to which parts of the Bonn Basic Law are to be considered fundamental, the Court mentions three: the democratic principle, the federal principle, and the principle of the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat.*)

The Court holds that the democratic principle not only calls for popular representatives to control the government, but also demands that those qualified to vote must not be deprived of, or restricted in, the use of their franchise in a manner not provided for by the Constitution. The Court does not deny that the term of a parliament may be extended for important reasons, as for instance in times of war; but it believes that in a federation the national state has no authority to prevent an election from taking place in any of its member States (*Gliedstaaten*) at the time that the election becomes due under the latter's constitution. In fact, it cannot even be postponed for a specified period without the approval of the member State.

In the opinion of the Court, such an act of interference constitutes, moreover, a violation of the federal principle within the meaning of the Bonn Basic Law because, by virtue of this principle, a federal state may not interfere with the affairs of the member States so long as the constitutional order of the latter conforms to the principles of the federal Constitution. This would remain true even when a State might agree to accept the planned action of the nation to which it belongs, for in a federation the national state cannot acquire legislative competence through acceptance of its action on the part of its members. In this connection the Court established that, under the Bonn Basic Law, the German Federal Republic is a true federation and that the individual States are endowed with sovereign power—a power of their own which is not derived from, but acknowledged by, the federation. It was added that as long as a State exists and its constitutional order keeps within the limitations of the Basic Law, the Republic cannot interfere with its constitutional order without violating the federal principle guaranteed by the Basic Law.

For these as well as additional reasons, the Federal Constitutional Court in its first important judgment concluded that the First Reorganization Law of May 4, 1951, through which the federal government wanted to extend the terms of the Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern legislatures, was actually unconstitutional. This judgment carried force of law in accordance with Paragraph 31, Section 2, of the law on the Federal Constitutional Court, and it was published in the Federal Legal Gazette (*Bundesgesetzblatt*). In addition, the Court stated explicitly that this judgment, along with the opinion on which it rests, was and is binding on all constitutional organs to the extent that the legislative bodies may not again debate and pass a federal law of the same content.

IV

The so-called Second Reorganization Law, however, which dealt with the actual reorganization of the southwestern region, was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in all essential aspects. This law specified the manner in which the proposed referendum was to be conducted and stipulated that its outcome would determine the form of the new state system. Beyond that it indicated how the change from the old to the new order was to be effected.

The fact had remained uncontested that, in compliance with the previously mentioned stipulations of the Basic Law, the Republic had the authority to enact a special law for the Southwest because the south German States had not been able to agree on their own reorganization. There merely was disagreement as to whether the *Bundestag* had acted within the confines of the Basic Law. In its decision, the Court started from the assumption that it must examine from every possible legal angle the validity of all regulations embodied in the law of which the legality had been contested. In fact, the Court even went so far as to consider such aspects as had not been submitted by the contesting parties either in writing or orally.

(1) To begin with, the meaning of "plebiscite" had to be established, since the constitutional provision which allows for reorganization does so only on the condition that a plebiscite will take place. With reference to this point, the Court ruled that the democratic principle, when applied to a territorial reorganization of States, demands that the will of the people as expressed in a plebiscite be *decisive* for the manner in which the reorganization shall be effected. The Court strongly emphasized that the plebiscite must not be thought of as a mere guide for the legislature from which it could depart under certain circumstances. In the opinion of the Court, however, this does not require the legislature, once the people have rejected a proposal submitted to them, to submit *every* further proposal for their approval in a separate plebiscite. On the contrary, the Court holds that in a case of this nature the legislature enjoys complete freedom of action. Consequently, the Federal Constitutional Court saw no reason to object to the formulation of the specific question to be submitted to the voters, which stated that in the event the electorate should reject the formation of a Southwest State, the former States of Baden and Wuerttemberg would automatically be restored.

The Court also reached certain conclusions of general importance on the subject of the referendum. It held, for instance, that the question placed before a voter must be so phrased as to enable him to answer clearly by "yes" or "no." If the question concerning a law on which a vote is to be taken should be phrased in such a way as to be ambiguous or misleading or contradictory in itself, the law may be declared null and void on grounds of incompatibility with the principles of the rule of law.

(2) The Court furthermore had to determine whether the Bonn Basic Law was violated by the provisions of the Reorganization Law which stated that one voting district in the southwest region could be outvoted by the others. It was necessary, above all, to establish whether, within a federation, a member State could be abolished against the will of its population. According to a fundamental provision of the Constitution, which cannot even be made subject to an amendment, the Federation must be organized into *Laender* (Article 79, Section 3 of the Basic Law). Yet the decisive factor in this instance

is that the Basic Law does not guarantee the *status quo* of the States and their borders. On the contrary, Articles 79 and 118 of the Basic Law state clearly that territorial changes of the individual States, as well as a reorganization of the federal territory itself, may be effected, and that in the course of such reorganization one or even several States may be abolished. According to German law, such reorganization may even be carried out *against the will* of the population of the affected States. It seemed clear to the Court, therefore, that it is not irreconcilable with the principles of the Basic Law to abolish a State against the will of its population in the course of reorganization.

The Court has emphasized that the will of the people of a member state may be disregarded only if Parliament has enacted new legislation, and if in addition the matter is referred to a nationwide plebiscite (Article 29, Section 4 of the Basic Law). The underlying idea of this rule is that to abolish a State is, after all, a matter of important and serious political implications, and that such a course can be taken only upon approval of the majority of the entire population of the federal state. However, this important general principle enunciated by the Court did not figure in the reorganization of the southwestern region since, as pointed out above, the Constitution provided that the reorganization in this region could and should depart from the general principles for the reorganization of the federal state. As explained previously, this special constitutional provision resulted from postwar conditions in the constitutional structures of the Southwest which were considered particularly unsatisfactory and in urgent need of revision.

(3) A further task of the Federal Constitutional Court was to decide whether the historic States of Baden and Wuerttemberg, by virtue of their special historical development, could claim the right to be restored to their original borders within the framework of a reorganization. Inevitably, this would have made it imperative to declare the Reorganization Law enacted by the German Federal Republic to be unconstitutional and therefore null and void, because the special voting procedure it prescribed would have rendered ineligible the old claims pressed by the former States on the basis of their past history. Baden (the former South Baden) in particular argued that she had never ceased to exist *de jure* and that in effect she was the trustee of the whole of Baden which had been divided by the Occupation Powers.

The Court commented that, generally speaking, it was true that the old States, including Baden, had survived the collapse of 1945 with their original borders intact; yet the adoption of state constitutions by the people of the newly created south German States had changed the situation. In this way the States of the new federation had been formed in a democratic manner; there can indeed be no doubt that the Bonn Basic Law presumes the legal existence of the States named specifically in its Article 23. But certainly the existence of the States of Baden, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern would preclude any possible belief in the coexistence of the original States of Baden and Wuerttemberg.

The Court, moreover, denied Baden the right to base its opposition to the reorganization on international law. The Court did not raise the question as to whether any rules of international law provided that no State could be forced to renounce its existence and to become part of another State against the will of its people. Instead, the Court argued that even if international law should contain such a rule, Baden could not invoke it because such a rule could be applied in federal constitutional law only if the mutual relationship of the States was under discussion and if the issue concerned their equality before the law. The case to be decided did not deal with the mutual relationship of the State involved but was, above all, an issue between the federal state and its members. Since this legal relationship was settled exclusively by the Basic Law, there could be no room for the application of principles of international law.

(4) Baden raised a final objection to the federal law on the ground that its voting procedure violated the principle of equality before the law. The scope of this article does not permit a detailed account of the reasons which Baden advanced, but the fundamental importance of the decision on this point is that the Court used it as a precedent to define authoritatively once and for all the meaning of equality within German constitutional law—a question which had given rise to controversy in law and literature since the Weimar Republic. The Court ruled as follows: "The law of equality is also binding on the legislature. It prohibits differential treatment of that which is essentially equal, but does not prohibit that that which is essentially unequal shall be treated differentially in proportion to its inequality. The law of equality is violated if a legal regulation accords either equal or differential treatment, but no plausible reason can be found for this act, either a reason which stems from the inherent qualities of the matter nor one which can otherwise be logically explained: in short, whenever the regulation must be termed as arbitrary." The Court thus subscribed to a theory which has always been an integral part of constitutional law as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.

From this interpretation the Court concluded that a voting law with an arbitrary voting procedure which either is prejudicial to part of the voters or predetermines to some extent the outcome of the referendum, is unconstitutional and therefore null and void. However, the findings of the Court in this particular case did not warrant the conclusion that such a law was under consideration.

(5) The Court also found it necessary to examine the legality of that clause of the Second Reorganization Law which provided that persons born in the area subject to plebiscite could be legally prevented from voting on grounds of nonresidence at the time of the vote. The Court left the question open as to whether the principle of birth must be applied in compliance with international law in the case of a plebiscite held to determine whether a population belongs to one state or another. There is a difference, the Court held, in whether a population is called upon to decide if it wishes to remain part of, or to be separated from, a federation or whether it is to be given an opportunity, within a given federal state, to replace the present federal system by a new one while

maintaining its close association with the entire nation. It rejected as unfounded the assumption that in the latter case eligibility to vote *must be based* exclusively, or even partly, on the principle of birth, and that any other procedure must be considered an act of misfeasance and arbitrariness.

(6) Another matter, and one which was widely discussed by other western nations, caused the Court to consider the extent to which a cabinet member may be authorized to promulgate "regulations necessary for the implementation of a law." To curb the misuse of authority in promulgating regulations, which had been rampant under the Weimar Constitution, Article 80 of the Bonn Basic Law specifies that legal authority for the promulgation of any regulation must be clearly defined as to its contents, purpose, and extent. This provision was intended to remind the *Bundestag* of its responsibility as a law-making body; the *Bundestag* was thus to be prevented from shirking its duties by delegating part of its legislative power to the government without determining the exact limits of such delegated power. The Court stressed that the question of whether the power to issue regulations is sufficiently limited in its content, purpose, and extent, is a matter which can be decided only from case to case. In the opinion of the Court, the Second Reorganization Law failed to provide the necessary limitations because its definition of authority was so vague as to make it impossible to foresee when and for what purpose it might be used, or what might be the contents of regulations issued on the strength of it. It stated that, once it becomes impossible to ascertain the kind of cases in which authority may be used, the clear definition of authority demanded by the Constitution is lacking. According to current German law, such authority is unconstitutional and null and void.

(7) In the course of the proceedings the Court finally dealt with the important question of the character of a Constituent Assembly. It was necessary to discuss this subject because certain directives in the Second Reorganization Law made provisions for the eventuality that the majority of voters from the area subject to the plebiscite might decide in favor of the Southwest State. The pertinent clause provided for a Constituent Assembly which would give this newly created State a binding constitution. It is stated in the judgment of the Court that such a Constituent Assembly is superior in rank to the popular representatives elected under a constitution, because it alone possesses *pouvoir constituant.* To impose external restrictions on such a Constituent Assembly appears incompatible with its privileged position, and the Court emphasized that such an Assembly is bound merely by higher legal concepts, transcending even positive law and forming the basis for all written law. In addition, of course, the Constituent Assembly of an embryonic member State of a federation is subject to the limitations which the federal Constitution provides for state constitutions. Otherwise, however, such an Assembly is distinguished by its independence and need abide only by self-imposed restrictions.

It is, moreover, peculiar to the nature of such a Constituent Assembly that its task is confined exclusively to its objective. As the Court emphasized, it must have no other function than to end a situation marked by the absence of a constitution and to reëstablish constitutional government—that is, to draft a constitution for the new State and to create the necessary laws which will enable the State to function effectively through its constitutional organs. This does not mean, however, that the independent position which the Constituent Assembly enjoys in creating a new constitution is confined to decisions regarding the content of the future constitution; necessarily it extends to the procedure to be employed for the drafting of the constitution.

On the basis of the legal principles formulated by the Court, the individual regulations of the Second Reorganization Law were examined. While a number of regulations were sustained after close scrutiny, others were found to be in contradiction to the previously mentioned legal principles. To quote an example, the Federal Constitutional Court held that it is inadmissable for the *federal law-making agencies* on their own authority to alter the scope of authority or role originally assigned to a Constituent Assembly. To be specific, these agencies cannot declare that the Constituent Assembly, upon completion of its task—that is, following the creation of the framing of a constitution—may convene as a regular parliament and assume its functions.

V

This brief report by no means includes all of the questions pertinent to the Southwest Case, and especially has omitted procedural questions which were presented, discussed, and decided by the Federal Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, it may serve to give a general picture of the fundamental problems which the Court had to consider in its first case, and to explain the significance that these decisions have for the new German constitutional system.

According to the decision of the Court, the plebiscite on the Southwest State was held in Baden, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern in December, 1951. The creation of a Southwest State was favored by a vast majority of the voters in the entire Southwest, as well as by the majority of voting districts formed by the law which was declared valid; and as a result of this plebiscite, the three States held elections for the Constituent Assembly of the Southwest State on March 9, 1952. Thus the judgment has already fulfilled a historic mission.

In conclusion it may be said that the raging political controversies which ensued from the disputes in southwestern Germany, especially between Wuerttemberg and Baden, subsided visibly as a result of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court, which was readily accepted by all parties concerned. Even at this early date there can be no doubt that the judgment of the Court had a pacifying influence on the political life of all States involved in the controversy, and that it cleared the political atmosphere considerably. Beyond that, it had a politically unifying effect which proved beneficial to the new German State as a whole.

THE INDEPENDENT VOTE: MEASUREMENT, CHARACTERISTICS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTY STRATEGY

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The problem of inconstancy in party affiliation has generated occasional research interest for a half-century now. We still know very little about the political behavior of that segment of the electorate which presumably is highly irregular in party allegiance. We have a penchant, however, for generalizing about the extent of independent voting, the characteristics of the independents, and, particularly, the significance of the independent vote for campaign strategy and the political system. Today, with another national election approaching, a summary of the status of our research and the presentation of new findings may be in order.

METHODOLOGY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

We have done research on this subject by fits and starts. An early study was A. Lawrence Lowell's work on political "oscillations" in 1898.[1] This pioneer effort set the pattern for subsequent inquiries up until lately. While most of the literature to date has been reviewed elsewhere,[2] a few further observations about it may help to provide a perspective for the data presented here.

Four types of research on independent voting can be differentiated. They differ in methodology, nature of findings, and usefulness. First, some writers have scrutinized trends in election statistics, using various time sequences. They have hoped thereby to secure some measure of the amplitude of independent voting in the aggregate, in terms of transference of party allegiances over time. Lowell's 1898 study of political trends in England and America is an example. Chapin's 1912 study, using the method of standard deviations, is another.[3] It analyzed trends in the United States from 1856 to 1908. Millspaugh's 1918 study,[4] the Ogburn and Jaffe study of 1936,[5] the Fletchers' study of the same year,[6] and some of Harold Gosnell's work[7] employed the same approach in part, while, in a sense, Louis Bean's calculations today are of the same nature.[8] These studies are concerned with the extent of the transference of political affiliation as measured by shifts in party percentages, the direction of this shift, its geographical patterns, and its cyclical characteristics.

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[1] "Oscillations in Politics," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 12, pp. 69–97 (July, 1898).

[2] See particularly V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1950), pp. 595–603.

[3] F. S. Chapin, "Variability of the Popular Vote at Presidential Elections," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 18, pp. 222–240 (Sept., 1912).

[4] A. C. Millspaugh, "Irregular Voting in the United States, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 33, pp. 230–254 (June, 1918).

[5] W. F. Ogburn and Abe J. Jaffe, "Independent Voting in Presidential Elections," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, pp. 186–201 (Sept., 1936).

[6] R. and M. Fletcher, "Consistency in Party Voting from 1896 to 1932," *Social Forces*, Vol. 15, pp. 281–285 (Dec., 1936).

[7] H. F. Gosnell and W. G. Coleman, "Political Trends in Industrial America," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 4, pp. 473–486 (Sept., 1940). See page 482 for a unique computation of independent voting. The authors arrive at the independent vote by taking the low

Second, certain studies have applied interesting formulae to an analysis of the votes cast in a single election in an attempt to understand the phenomenon of split-ticket voting. An early study by Philip Allen, in 1906,[9] used as a measure the differential between percentages of the major party vote secured by candidates of the same party running for different offices. Millspaugh later used a different method for measuring ticket-splitting, one based on the differential pluralities by which candidates won.[10] Such types of single-election statistical analysis have become quite common.

A third category of research has relied on official records of split and straight voting. Gosnell's 1932 study of Chicago uses such records to establish the index "party voting," which is related to other variables by correlational analysis.[11] Similarly, Donald Hecock's study of Detroit voting patterns includes figures on split-voting for 1935 and 1936 secured from the actual records.[12] This category of studies, like the preceding one, is not concerned with independence over time, but rather with its manifestations in any one election.

Finally in recent years the sample poll or survey has been employed to study independent voting. From 1936 on, Gallup's polls have been asking respondents to identify themselves as partisans or independents. In 1948 Lazarsfeld and his associates in their Erie County, Ohio, study,[13] used the survey method to analyze more intensively the time of voting decision and the factors related thereto, a component of independence which previously had been neglected. The study of the 1948 election by the Survey Research Center[14] also investigated this matter, as well as ticket-splitting and the transference of allegiance over time. It seems clear that the survey tool is very valuable for certain purposes and must be utilized more. It alone can provide more than aggregative information; it can identify the independents and discover their characteristics (demographic, social, political); and it can relate independence

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Democratic and Republican percentages over any given series of elections, subtracting the sum of these minimal percentages from 100, and calling the remainder "the independent vote."

[8] See his *How to Predict Elections* (New York, 1948), especially pp. 74 ff., where the author attempts a measure of "political flexibility."

[9] "Ballot Laws and Their Workings," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 21, pp. 38–58 (March, 1906).

[10] *Op. cit.*

[11] Harold F. Gosnell and Norman N. Gill, "An Analysis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in Chicago," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 29, pp. 967–984 (Dec., 1935).

[12] *Detroit Voters and Recent Elections* (Detroit, 1938).

[13] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948).

[14] Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, *A Study of the Presidential Vote: November, 1948* (Ann Arbor, 1949).

to other factors such as attitudes, group membership, community integration, and perceptions of the party system and political process.

Critical evaluation of these techniques is difficult since each has its own objective. But it should be obvious that techniques which seek to measure independent voting by analysis of the shift in party percentages or votes from election to election are unreliable. Any given percentage or voting total in any election may reflect in the aggregate many other types of behavior than independent voting behavior, particularly the movements of individuals from a voting to a nonvoting status, and vice versa. The possibilities are too complicated to be neatly summed up in a single percentage.

Computations based on the "highs" and "lows," as used by Gosnell and partly by Bean, are measures of the range of party strength for many areas or over time. They do not permit exact conclusions as to the movement of voters in and out of parties. The Chapin device of standard deviations (of state party percentages from the national mean) is useful only for expressing the dispersion of total party strength for certain subunits. It measures party variability within the total constituency, the United States, but it does not measure the extent of individual independent voting.

Similar objections can be made against attempts to infer the extent of split-ticket voting by quick and easy arithmetic with election returns. Millspaugh admitted that his addition or subtraction of pluralities has limitations because the assumed interchange of voters may not take place. Allen's arithmetic is even less defensible because it takes no account of the votes cast for each office and cannot identify those who vote for only a few of the candidates. Such studies can at most provide a clue that split-voting has occurred.

If political science is really concerned with the phenomenon of "independence" of political behavior, it is time that we resort either to painstaking analysis of the official ballot statistics or to carefully designed sample surveys. The former approach can provide us with aggregative data on the areal patterns of split-voting. Obviously only the latter method can at the present time help us achieve our objectives of identifying and characterizing the independents.

THEORIES OF INDEPENDENT VOTING

Despite the use of unsatisfactory techniques and the generally unsystematic nature of our inquiries, many hunches, informative guesses, and even dogmatic generalizations have been articulated about the phenomenon of independent voting. Theorists of parties and of the electoral process have readily made assumptions about it. We have guesses about the volume of "independence" and "persistence" of party affiliation, estimates varying from 15 to 30 per cent or more. We have before us different conclusions as to the geographical variations of independent voting—the Fletchers claiming it to be highest west of the Mississippi, Gallup maintaining that the greatest incidence is in the East Central states, and Bean asserting that since 1896 the nation has been continuously showing less variation by regions.[15] To another question, "Is independent voting increasing?" the answer is usually in the affirmative, although no serious historical study has been undertaken. This answer appears to be based on two bits of evidence: Chapin's study in 1912, from which he concluded that there "is real evidence of an increasing independence in voting,"[16] and the figures from polls since 1936, which are based on answers to requests for respondents to identify themselves as partisans or independents. This can scarcely be called substantiation. We even have available to us classifications of independents, such as hazarded in Herring's suggestion that "some voters are floaters, others might be called independents, still others special interest advocates."[17] The American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties has contended that "the electorate consists of three main groups," that the third group consists of those "who base their electoral choice upon the political performance of the two parties," and that this group is usually the deciding factor in elections. . . . "[18]

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[15] These variations in findings are summarized by Key, *op. cit.* (above, n. 2), pp. 599–601.

The truth is that the strategic significance of the "independents" has never been carefully studied, although we are quick to say they may hold "the balance of power." Further, the factors related to, or causing, "independence" have generally eluded us. Allen and Millspaugh disagreed in 1906 and 1918 respectively on whether the party-column ballot diminished independence. No thorough study of this possible variable has been made. Rather, today we talk of self-perception by independents as "morally superior" to traditional partisanship, as one among many possible factors contributing to political independence.[19] And because we have not begun yet the real work in this area, our high-level generalizations are translatable in many ways. Independents may be many or few; they may be increasing or not; areal patterns may or may not exist; independents may be of many undetermined types; they may be intelligent or fickle; and the effects of independent voting on the political system may be beneficent or dangerous. The state of our knowledge about independent voting is obviously not precise, well documented, or unanimous.

We assume the existence of a phenomenon in individual voting behavior which is characterized by the absence of party loyalty or by the periodic transference of party allegiances. This is variously labelled "independent voting," "irregular voting," or some similar term. We assume further that it is of tremendous importance for the party process as well as the political system generally. But, so far, the unsustained and unsystematic nature of our research, combined with questionable research techniques, has left us practically uninformed. Our objectives presumably are to determine the extent, characteristics, relevant factors, and effects of independent voting. But the theory basic to such research has been nonexistent or ill-defined, and as a consequence we have mere fragments of information. To pull these fragments together is perhaps the first job. The second is the initiation of a systematic program of research over time. The third is to relate our information to a broader study which can establish the relationship of independent voting to the conditions of the political system and the society in which we live. Although a long way off, no doubt, it is only in such a research context that a study of the "unattached vote" or of "inconstancy of party allegiance" or of "split-voting" can be meaningful.

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[16] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 3), p. 240.

[17] Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940), p. 248.

[18] *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York, 1951), p. 90.

[19] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park, Maryland, 1948), p. 6.

NATURE OF THE PRESENT STUDIES

As a beginning towards these goals, presented here are the findings from three different studies, as well as a résumé of some of the findings of previous related research. The following are the studies upon which most of the interpretations below are based:

1. A study of the presidential vote in 1948, made immediately after the election by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. This study relies on a national sample of 662 respondents.
2. A study of split-ticket voting in the Michigan gubernatorial election of November, 1950. Statistics on 35 counties and 40 cities, including most precincts in Detroit, were available.
3. A study of Washtenaw County, Michigan, made in the spring of 1949 by the author with the assistance of Survey Research Center personnel and volunteer party workers. The sample for it included 464 respondents.[20]

The aspects of independent voting studied most intensively in these studies were: classification of types of "independence," implications for party strategy, areal patterns, political factors, and social characteristics. It is hoped that these findings may start the process of isolating some of the basic variables and problems of methodology involved in such research.

TYPES OF INDEPENDENCE

Since theorizing in the abstract may be misleading, the initial problem in any study of this type is to establish valid criteria of the phenomenon itself. Certain categories of independent voters emerged from our contact with survey and election data. These types or categories are: split-ticket voters; those who transfer allegiance over time; voters with no crystallized party predispositions; those who waver in making a voting decision; and minor-party supporters. No data were available for determining other possible categories. Consequently these types of "independence" will be used in this study.

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[20] The Survey Research Center Study of 1948 was the product of two nationwide surveys conducted during October and November, 1948. The sample was selected by the method of probability and area sampling. The data used here are taken from the survey made after the November election. The author is indebted to Angus Campbell, Director of the Center, for permission to use these data.

The Washtenaw County Study was based on the same sampling method but was not so rigorous in methodology. Certain rural areas of the county were not included in the study; the sample was fulfilled more completely in some areas (particularly Ypsilanti and Ann Arbor) than others, and the interviewing was not as professional. As a consequence, only in a few instances are the data relied on here, and then only for suggestive purposes.

Unfortunately, up to now we have relied primarily on two limited criteria for measuring "independence": (1) some objective measure through the use of official election statistics, such as a computation of split-ticket voting or of the fluctuation in party percentages; (2) some subjective measure, such as asking respondents in a survey whether they consider themselves to be partisans or "independents." Neither is satisfactory. The first is too narrow and rigid; the latter may not reveal who actually are the independents. For more reliable measures we need data on voting behavior, attitudes, and predispositions, in order to determine the accuracy of self-classifications. Self-perceptions may be completely erroneous. Our analysis uses both official data on split-voting and computations based on responses to survey questions concerning voting behavior. It does not rely on self-classifications by respondents.

To demonstrate the inadequacy of self-classification as a technique for identifying the independents, the data in the Washtenaw County Study are suggestive. This study gave 464 respondents the opportunity to classify themselves. It also included an elaborate series of questions designed to sift out the actual independents, in terms of their actual voting for all offices (national, state, and local), in 1948 as well as in their previous voting behavior.[21] By objective criteria almost one-half of those who claimed to be independents in the Washtenaw study were not actual independents, while less than a third of those who claimed to be partisans were not. It appears that it may be a socially more respectable response to call oneself an "independent" than a "partisan;" and for this reason self-classification, although interesting, is not a valid criterion if used by itself. Yet, it is on this technique that pollsters like Gallup based their computations that 20 per cent of the electorate were independents in 1940 and 29 per cent in 1948.[22]

TABLE 1. SELF-CLASSIFICATION AND OBJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENTS AND PARTISANS, WASHTENAW COUNTY, 1948

Actual Behavior	Classify Self as "Independent" (26.3%)	Classify Self as "Partisan" (61.2%)
Independents	50.8%	30.7%
Straight Party Voters		19.9
Other Partisans	49.2	49.4
	100.0%	100.0%
No. of Cases	122	284

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[21] Self-classified "partisans" were considered "independents" if they admitted to "often splitting" their ballot, quite frequently voting for "the opposite party," or splitting their ticket in 1948. On the other hand, self-classified "independents" were considered "partisan" if they demonstrated none of these tendencies.

[22] The latter figure is found in the Gallup poll released June 25, 1948.

The complexity of the phenomenon of independence in voting is illustrated by an analysis of the data in the Survey Research Center's 1948 study. Of the 662 in the sample, 243, or 36.7 per cent were classified as independents on the basis of voting behavior criteria: 1948 voting, 1948 preference (if nonvoter), 1944 voting, previous pattern of voting, split or straight voting, time of decision. Numerous types of independents were revealed, as the accompanying table indicates in part. Some showed independence in their voting booth behavior; some were independent because of their fluctuating party allegiances; some cast a protest vote for minor parties. Of the independents who voted in 1948, 56.5 per cent split their ballots but over 40 per cent did not. Three patterns of transferring allegiance over time were found, but over 25 per cent could not be called "shifters." Only one-tenth were perennial third party voters. Most of the independents who always vote apparently decided early. Altogether, it appears that many behavioral symptoms have to be considered in making inferences about the number of independents. Certainly we would need data on attitudes towards the parties and the party system before further refinements would be possible.

TABLE 2. TYPES OF INDEPENDENTS, NATIONAL SAMPLE, 1948

Types	Distribution		No. of Cases
1. Ballot-marking (1948 voters)	Split	56.5%	191
	Straight	43.5	
2. Party shifters (of all voters)	Shift regularly from one major party to other	36.9	220
	Shift regularly from major party to minor	5.5	
	Shift occasionally from one major party to other	30.9	
3. Third party voters (of all voters)	In 1948	4.5	220
	Previously	10.9	
4. Time of decision (1948) (of independents who always vote)	By Convention	62.5	144
	During Campaign	32.6	
	Not ascertained	4.9	

THE STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VOTING

Generalizations are legion concerning the potential electoral power of "the independents." Presumably they can swing the balance of power and decide elections. On the other hand, one presidential aspirant in 1952, Senator Robert Taft, is reported to have asserted that the Republicans can win without the independent vote.[23]

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[23] See, for example, "Quizzing Taft," *U. S. News and World Report*, March 14, 1952, p. 56.

Use of the 1948 national survey data again permits a tentative answer to these claims. The 662 respondents were first placed on a continuum, one extreme of which represented the absolute Democrats and the other extreme the absolute Republicans, with the mid-point representing the most ambivalent independents:

Democrats |——————————|—————————| Republicans
Independents

By use of the relevant data from the study, five categories of respondents were determined: definite Democrats, independents tending to be Democratic, ambivalent independents, independents tending to be Republican, and definite Republicans. In addition, the dimension of voting frequency was considered, four categories being distinguishable: always vote; usually vote, but not always; infrequently vote; never vote. Each respondent then was placed in one of eighteen subcategories.[24]

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF ELIGIBLE ADULTS BY VOTING BEHAVIOR AND POLITICAL PREDISPOSITION, NATIONAL SAMPLE, 1948 (662 CASES)

Voting Frequency

	Always	Usually	Infrequently	Never	Totals
Definite Democrats	17.5%	11.3%	3.2%	11.6%	43.7%
Independents—Democrat	10.0	2.1	3.6	3.5	36.7
Ambivalent Independents	1.2	1.7	.8		
Independents—Republican	10.6	1.7	1.7		
Definite Republicans	12.8	3.0	1.8	1.9	19.6
Totals	52.1%	19.8%	11.1%	17.0%	100.0%

Note: Each percentage should be read as a proportion of the Total Adult Population.

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[24] "Definite Republicans" and "Definite Democrats" were respondents who voted consistently for one party in 1948, 1944, and "previously." "Independents" were those who split their ballots and who indicated no consistent pattern of adherence to one of the two major parties. The political predisposition of "independents" was determined by analyzing the frequency and direction of transference of party allegiance, and their preference if nonvoters in 1948, as well as from the pattern of respondents' split-voting, if ascertainable. It was too difficult to determine the political predisposition of the independents who never voted—hence eighteen instead of twenty categories. Even so, the data on voting frequency are subject to certain reservations. Although the responses to several questions were used, no doubt there still was an over-reporting of "always voting."

Such a distribution of adults is helpful for gaining a perspective on the eligible electorate. The study showed that about 72 per cent of the eligible adults vote with some degree of regularity. Of these 28.8 per cent were Democrats, 15.8 per cent were Republicans, and 27.3 per cent were independents. About 28 per cent of the eligible adults never vote or do so infrequently. Of these, 14.8 per cent were Democrats, 3.7 per cent were Republicans, and 9.6 per cent were independents. The implications of such a breakdown are considerable because these figures indicate the different types of voters to whom the parties must direct their strategies. The strategies must be different. Both major parties have potential supporters who do not have to be sold on the party, but merely have to be integrated into the organization and motivated to vote—with the Democrats' job here a much greater one than the Republicans'. Then, both parties must consider a group of independents predisposed to support them, but who must be "sold." The job of the parties is about equal here. Finally, there is a group of stalwart independents who are perennial protesters —3.7 per cent of the total.

To spell out more graphically the electoral situation which confronts party strategists, the following diagram, based on these data, may be helpful.

ACCESSIBILITY OF INDEPENDENTS TO PARTY STRATEGY



The Apathetic—Never Vote	9.4%
The Ambivalent—Often Vote	10.0
The Irregular—Seldom Vote	14.4
The Irregular—Usually Vote	10.3
The Irregular—Always Vote—decide by Convention	37.4
The Irregular—Always Vote—decide during campaign	18.5
	100.0%

It would follow from this that for three types of independents party effort is not likely to "pay off": those who never vote, those who consistently cast a protest vote against the major parties, and those who vote infrequently. These groups constitute 33.8 per cent of all independents. The other 66.2 per cent are accessible to party maneuvers, however. Especially since over five-sixths of these are individuals who always vote, it clearly is worthwhile to campaign for their support. One interesting thing to note here is that in our sample these 66.2 per cent of all independents (161 cases) divided almost equally as to partisan tendency: 50.3 per cent were Republican, 49.7 per cent were Democratic in tendency. And a final factor to consider is the time of voting decision. Of those who always vote and who are independents, three-fourths

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The number of cases in each of the "infrequent" and "never" (except Democratic "never") categories was small, by necessity. The allocation of the "nevers" was most difficult, greatest reliance being placed on voting preference in 1948 "if you had voted." Demographic data were not helpful here.

made up their minds in 1948 by the time of the nominating conventions. This fact should have real consequences for party strategy.

In sum, then, the most accessible independents, represented by the outer rim in the diagram, are those who always vote, tend toward being partisan, and make their voting decision late in the campaign. These are 18.5 per cent of all independents, or about 13.0 per cent of all regular voters, and about 7.0 per cent of all eligible adults. But it would appear that party strategy is most realistic which takes into account the entire breakdown of categories of independents in terms of their potential accessibility.

A theoretical formula for Democratic or Republican party success in national elections can be derived from the above data. From 1940 to 1948 the percentage of estimated adults voting in presidential elections fluctuated from 63 per cent to 51 per cent. To assume a 55 per cent turnout, and to assume, further, a 5 per cent vote for minor parties would mean that slightly more than 52 per cent of the eligible adults would vote for either of the major parties. Theoretically, how can either major party secure one-half of this, or 26 per cent of the adult voters? Our distribution indicates that this is a more difficult job for the Republicans than for the Democrats:

Theoretical Democratic Formula:
17.5%—Definite Democrats, Always Vote, plus
10.0 —Independents, Always Vote, Tend Democratic

equals 27.5%

Theoretical Republican Formula:
12.8%—Definite Republicans, Always Vote, plus
10.6 —Independents, Always Vote, Tend Republican, plus
3.0 —Definite Republicans, Usually Vote

equals 26.4%

Increase the turnout to 60 per cent, and/or decrease the vote for minor parties, and the Republican job becomes more difficult. Whereas the present distribution shows that the Democrats can win by concentrating on two blocs of voters, the Republicans may have to attract at least three blocs and probably three in addition (independents who usually vote, Republicans and independents who vote infrequently).

The actual composition of the Democratic and Republican vote in 1948 in terms of our sample may throw some light on this problem. The table below conforms in many respects to the theoretical formula set up for each party. The Democrats in 1948 did secure the bulk of their vote from two sources: those definitely Democratic and independents tending to be Democratic who always vote. Apparently, however, they were unable to mobilize these groups completely, and made up their deficiency by securing support from definite Democrats who usually vote and other independents. Most surprising is the large percentage (10 per cent) of the Democratic vote which came from independents who tend to be Democratic but who vote infrequently.

The Republicans also secured the large bulk of their vote in 1948 from two groups: definite Republicans who always vote and independents who always vote. In addition, they were more successful than the Democrats with their own party members who seldom vote, and it may be noted that a larger percentage of the Republican vote came from independents who decided early.

A careful analysis of these data would suggest that in 1948 both parties failed in motivating the "usual voters." The Republicans also failed particularly in getting the vote of independents tending to be Republican who infrequently vote, and the Democrats failed in inducing their partisans who infrequently vote. The 1948 election may well have been decided for the Democrats by their surprising success in getting out the vote of the independents tending to be Democrats who admit to voting infrequently. Most of these were late deciders. They made up 10 per cent of the Democratic vote. Or, extrapolating to the total Democratic vote of 1948, which was approximately 24,045,00, they represented 2,400,000 votes, or 250,000 votes more than was the popular vote difference between the two major parties.

TABLE 4. COMPOSITION OF VOTES OF MAJOR PARTIES, 1948

	Democratic		Republican	
Definite Partisans				
Always Vote	54.7%		47.8%	
Usually Vote	3.8		3.9	
Seldom Vote	0.0		3.9	
Independents				
Ambivalent	0.0		0.0	
Seldom Vote	10.0		2.3	
Usually Vote	3.7		3.9	
Always Vote	27.0		37.0	
1. Early deciders		14.2		23.0
2. Late deciders		12.8		14.0
Not ascertained	0.8		1.2	
	100.0%		100.0%	

To summarize, it may be observed that over one-third of the potential electorate is made up of bona-fide independents, and that two-thirds of these independents are "accessible" to partisan appeals and vote quite regularly. It seems clear that the chances of both parties must be computed in terms of the voting behavior of these independents. Not all independents, but certainly a few categories of independents, do indeed hold the balance of electoral power.

GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS IN THE INDEPENDENT VOTE

If there is validity to the contention that the basis of American politics is no longer sectional, but rather is founded on an urban-rural cleavage, and that major party success can be so interpreted,[25] then the make-up and voting behavior of the urban and rural electorates become of immediate importance. The division of these electorates into overt partisans and bona-fide independents is, then, a very relevant undertaking. For example, to attempt to predict the extent of the success of the Democratic or the Republican party in the cities and, therefore, in the nation requires a knowledge of the extent of "independence."

Our national sample of 1948 permits a geographical breakdown of partisans and independents for cities and rural areas. The table below shows this breakdown as well as the distribution of respondents who always vote and who never vote. These figures tell us that the incidence of non-voting is non-metropolitan, that a larger proportion of Democrats than of Republicans is found in metropolitan areas, and that the largest proportion of Independents is found in cities which are not of metropolitan status. As would be expected, rural areas contribute a small proportion of both the partisan and the independent vote.

TABLE 5

	Metropolitan	Urban	Rural	No. of Cases
Democrats—Always Vote	43.1%	42.2%	14.7%	116
Republicans—Always Vote	35.3	54.1	10.6	85
All Those Who Never Vote	13.3	57.6	29.1	113
All Independents—Always Vote	32.4	53.8	13.8	145

A more precise breakdown of the electorate in these geographical areas is necessary, however, if we are to answer the question posed above. The following table attempts this breakdown in as great detail as is permissible by the use of our survey data. These data on the composition of the electorate suggest some important conclusions. To begin with, the "big city" electorate is by no means in the Democratic fold. It consists of a larger percentage of independents than exists in other urban or in rural areas, and a sizeable percentage of the metropolitan electorate can be considered "accessible" to a Republican appeal: 3.3 per cent who are Republican but do not always vote and 13.8 per cent who are independents but tend Republican. The body of voters potentially accessible to the Democrats in the big cities is much larger—28.2 per cent—but the stakes are very worthwhile for both parties. In smaller urban areas there is a real opportunity for both parties, more so for the Republicans here than in the metropolitan areas, despite the fact that there are a larger number of eligible voters who never vote and a larger proportion who are perennial ambivalents. Rural areas will be perhaps the least productive from the standpoint of party strategy: one-fourth of the electorate never vote, admittedly; there is the largest pro-

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[25] Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 43, pp. 1189–1206 (Dec., 1949).

TABLE 6. COMPOSITION OF ELECTORATE BY GEOGRAPHY, NATIONAL SAMPLE, 1948

	Metropolitan		Urban		Rural	
Never Vote	8.3%		18.3%		25.6%	
Partisans	56.3		48.0		45.5	
Democrats						
Vote Always		27.6		13.8		13.3
Vote Sometimes		8.8		15.2		21.1
Republicans						
Vote Always		16.6		13.0		7.2
Vote Sometimes		3.3		6.0		3.9
Independents	35.4		33.7		28.9	
Ambivalent		2.1		3.6		6.0
Tending Democratic						
Vote Always		13.3		8.3		9.3
Vote Sometimes		6.1		6.0		4.8
Tending Republican						
Vote Always		12.1		11.8		4.7
Vote Sometimes		1.7		4.0		4.1
	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%	
No. of Cases	181		354		127	

portion of ambivalents; and there is the smallest percentage of independents. Only 8.8 per cent of the rural electorate consists of independents who tend to be Republican and do vote (while 15.8 per cent of the urban electorate is in the same category). Despite this, Republican rural strategy priorities should be: (1) to appeal to the independents; (2) to get out the "sure" Republicans. In terms of potentialities, the Democratic rural strategy should reverse the order of these goals.

Another way of looking at geographical variations is by types of "independents." As the following table indicates, this throws additional light on the differentiated appeal necessary for the urban and rural areas. The most straight-voting occurs in rural and metropolitan electorates; fluctuation in party allegiance is slightly more prominent in big cities; and the rural independent electorate makes up its mind early. This again is significant for the Republicans, especially if they are intent on competing for the metropolitan vote. In sum, 35 per cent of the metropolitan electorate is "independent," 14 per cent are independents tending to be Republican, at least 40 per cent of whom wait late in the campaign to decide. Furthermore, the size of the urban and metropolitan vote being what it is, with the recent emphasis on the crucial nature of this vote, it would appear that the contest for power in presidential elections can be fought out before the urban and metropolitan electorates today.

Some but not all of the geographical variations discussed above are confirmed by a study of the actual statistics on one type of independence, split-voting,

TABLE 7. TYPES OF INDEPENDENTS (ALWAYS VOTE)

	Metropolitan	Urban	Rural
Splitters (1948)	70.2%	79.5%	61.1%
Shifters	53.2	48.7	38.9
Time of Decision (1948)			
By Convention	57.5	59.0	88.9
In Campaign	42.5	41.0	11.1
No. of Cases	47	78	18

in the Michigan gubernatorial election of 1950. In this study 35 counties in the state were used.[26] The total breakdown was:

Split for Republican candidate	24.1%
Split for Democratic candidate	32.5
Total split	28.9

There was consistently more splitting by those who voted for Williams, the Democratic candidate for governor (who won in a close election), than for the Republican candidate, Kelly. The various sections of the state varied considerably also. Thus, the Upper Peninsula counties had a total of 37.8 per cent of all ballots split, in contrast to 24.9 per cent for the lower half of the Lower Peninsula. In terms of the urban-rural division of the electorate, however, the distinction was not marked. Detroit was high in the percentage of splitting by those who supported the Republican candidate, Kelly. Urban areas (minus Detroit) were phenomenally high in splitting by those who supported Williams, but the rural areas were not far behind. Ballot-splitting was not a peculiar phenomenon of urban and metropolitan electorates. This suggests again that, although those who vote Republican do this mainly with a straight ballot, in rural areas independent voting behavior bulks large potentially.

Considerable variation among cities and counties was found in Michigan. For the 40 cities the range in per cent of split-voting was from 12.0 per cent

TABLE 8. URBAN AND RURAL SPLIT-VOTING IN MICHIGAN, 1950

	Republican Split	Democratic Split	Total Split
Detroit	27.6%	28.7%	28.3%
Urban (minus Detroit)	25.2	43.8	35.1
Rural	18.7	37.3	27.0

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[26] A sample of Michigan counties was used for this study since an examination of data for all counties would have required more time than was available. The 35 counties include 10 from the Upper Peninsula, 13 from the upper half of the Lower Peninsula, and 12 from the lower half of the Lower Peninsula, including Wayne and almost all of the Detroit precincts.

to 60.0 per cent; for counties the range was 16.7 per cent to 59.2 per cent. Analysis of the cities by population classes suggests this in part. For the 38 cities below 20,000 population, the following distribution was found:

TABLE 9. SPLIT-VOTING IN MICHIGAN, 1950
BY SIZE OF CITY

Number of Cities	Population Interval	Total Split (M)
6	9–16,000	36.0%
10	4– 7,000	31.4
12	2– 4,000	33.8
10	400– 2,000	28.8

This suggests that it is not necessarily true that the larger the city the more split-voting. Detroit had only 28.3 per cent split-voting. The actual coefficient of correlation was insignificant, almost zero (.079). Although generally it may be true that "independence" is more an urban and metropolitan phenomenon than a rural one, as measured by split-voting it cannot be said that the amount of independence is directly related to the size of a city.

Similarly, great variation existed within Detroit itself, for wards and precincts. While Detroit had a total of only 28.3 per cent splitting, Hamtramck, an "island city" within Detroit, had 38.0 per cent. Some Detroit wards were extremely high, Ward 7 having 41.1 per cent of its ballots split; Ward 15, with 20.5 per cent, was low. An intensive analysis of the population and political situation by wards and precincts would be interesting.[27]

Of major importance is the discovery of the wide variation in split-voting which exists in a metropolitan center like Detroit. This is the type of information which may be lost sight of, by necessity, in surveys of total independence for all metropolitan, urban, and rural areas. One might well find out more about political "independence" by designing intensive surveys of individual precincts and townships.

POLITICAL FACTORS RELATED TO "INDEPENDENCE"

We have scanty information on the relationship to "independence" of such factors as voting participation, close electoral contests, party dominance, and party variability in an area, but some light can be thrown on these matters by our data.

On voting turnout, actual independents do not have the high record generally believed; certainly it is not superior to that of all types of partisans. Our Washtenaw County Survey shows, for example, the following comparison:

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[27] An analysis was made of precincts which were high and low in split-voting in 1950 in comparison to their split-voting percentages in 1940. The five highest precincts in 1950 were also high in 1940, above the city average of 27.3 per cent. But the correlation of all first ward precincts in 1950 with 1940 was not significant (.286). The author is indebted to Professor Donald S. Hecock of Wayne University, Detroit, for data on split-voting in previous elections in Detroit.

	Vote Always	*Cases*
Partisan "Straights"	45.6%	57
Independents	40.3	62

For our national sample in 1948 the breakdown was as follows:

	Vote Always		*Cases*
Independents	59.3%		243
Tending Democratic		57.9	114
Ambivalent		30.0	27
Tending Republican		68.6	102
Partisans	48.0		419
Democrats		40.1	289
Republicans		65.4	130

Here all independents, as a group, have a better participation record than all partisans. But Republican partisans have a better record than all independents as a group. The most ambivalent independents have the lowest turnout. This is interesting, for it suggests that the less an individual is committed to one of the two major parties and the more his political predisposition is uncrystallized, the less likelihood there is of his voting. The hard core of independence does not rate high in political participation.

An areal analysis of the same problem is possible by using our split-voting figures for Michigan in 1950 and by computing participation as the percentage of the population who voted in cities and counties. Here we find generally that areas with a high percentage of split-voting also had a high turnout. But this was much more true for counties than for cities. (The actual coefficients of correlation were .715 for counties and .369 for cities.) In Michigan counties where few people vote, there is likely to be more straight-party-voting. In Michigan cities, although there is on the average more split-voting than in the counties, split-voting is not as directly correlated with high turnout. Detroit,

TABLE 10. SPLIT-VOTING AND VOTING PARTICIPATION IN MICHIGAN AREAS, 1950

Voting Turnout	No. of Units	% Split-Voting, 1950 (means)	
		Counties	Cities
High Turnout Areas			
Counties (over 40%)	5	43.4%	
Cities (over 44%)	5		52.8%
Medium Turnout Areas			
Counties (34–39%)	11	35.7	
Cities (38–43%)	10		46.1
Below Average Areas			
Counties (30–33%)	9	27.6	
Cities (34–37%)	12		47.0
Poor Turnout Areas			
Counties (below 30%)	9	23.8	
Cities (below 33%)	10		41.6

for example, with a low turnout of 30.9 per cent of its population in 1950, ranked in the category of cities with "poor turnout"; but its percentage of split-voting —28.3 per cent—was only slightly below the mean split-voting per cent for all 40 cities included here, which was 29.6 per cent.

Another political factor possibly related is the closeness of the election contest. Is there more, or less, independent voting where the margin for one party is small? Again, using our areal analysis of split-voting, one type of independence, we find some indications of significance here. For Michigan cities and counties generally, there appears to be more split-voting as the margin of victory becomes smaller. Thus a negative correlation exists (the smaller the margin of victory, the larger the percentage of split-voting): for counties, −.693; for cities, −.450. Again, the relationship is more significant for counties than for cities.

TABLE 11. SPLIT-VOTING AND MARGIN OF VICTORY, MICHIGAN, 1950

Margin of Victory	No. of Units	% Split-Voting, 1950 (Means)	
		Counties	Cities
Large Margin			
Counties (over 32%)	13	22.4%	
Cities (over 40%)	12		24.3%
Medium-sized Margin			
Counties (13–28%)	16	37.2	
Cities (20–39%)	13		31.6
Small Margin			
Counties (3–11%)		38.4	
Cities (1–16%)			39.3

The reverse relationship exists, however, if one analyzes Detroit wards. There actually was more split-voting in wards with a large margin of Democratic victory in 1950. The following was the split-voting by categories of wards:

	% Split-voting, 1950 (means)
Large margin of victory	
6 wards (over 67%)	36.1%
Medium-sized margin	
8 wards (25–56%)	27.4
Small margin	
6 wards (.2–22%)	26.3

A similar conclusion was reached after examining Detroit precincts. In Ward 1, for example, for 49 precincts for which reliable data were available, the following relationship was observed:

	Plurality (in votes)	*% Split-voting (means)*
21 precincts	over 300	40.9%
20 precincts	70–300	32.4
8 precincts	under 70	25.2

The coefficient for the precincts was +.665. Although outside of Detroit some relationship may obtain, in Detroit a close election appears either to have no effect (the split-voting pattern being well established) or to contribute to more "straight-voting" partisanship. Much more study of this phenomenon is needed.

Bound up with this problem is the relationship of party dominance over time to "independence," as manifest in split-voting. Are areas which have had a high Democratic or Republican strength in past elections the locus of little split-voting? The conclusions emerging from our data were:

1. The more Democratic a city, county, or Detroit ward was, the more split-voting there was in 1950. (Coefficients: counties, .617; cities, .812; wards, .731)
2. In areas of overwhelming Republican dominance, split-voting was at a minimum.
3. Except for Detroit wards, the very highest percentages of split-voting were found in areas (cities and counties) with consistent marginal party control.

TABLE 12. AREAL PARTY DOMINANCE IN MICHIGAN AND SPLIT-VOTING, 1950

Party Dominance (Based on Average Party Strength, 1946–1950)	No. of Units	% Split-Voting, 1950 (means)	
Democratic Dominance			
Counties (over 55% Dem.)	5	35.9	
Cities (over 55% Dem.)	5		38.9
Marginal Party Control			
Counties (45–52% Dem.)	4	40.8	
Cities (45–54% Dem.)	6		43.5
Moderate Republican Dominance			
Counties (56–65% Rep.)	11	37.6	
Cities (56–65% Rep.)	11		32.6
Definite Republican Dominance			
Counties (66–70% Rep.)	8	23.6	
Cities (66–70% Rep.)	8		31.9
Extreme Republican Dominance			
Counties (over 70% Rep.)	7	22.8	
Cities (over 70% Rep.)	10		22.3

Areas habitually Republican have from 14 to 17 per cent less split-voting than those controlled by the Democrats—a fact which suggests that it is not just one close election which is accompanied by split-voting but a pattern of close elections over time.

Detroit wards showed pretty much the same relationship, except that the marginal wards did not have the highest percentages of split-voting, as the following breakdown suggests:

	% Split-voting, 1950 (means)
6 wards (70–82% Av. Dem. Strength)	36.1
7 wards (60–68% Av. Dem. Strength)	27.6
5 wards (50–59% Av. Dem. Strength)	26.5
2 wards (57–67% Av. Rep. Strength)	25.7

In Detroit, then, the more Democratic and the less marginal a ward or precinct is, the higher the amount of split-voting is likely to be.

The average party strength in an area over time is one measurement; another is the extent of fluctuation or variation in party strength. Do areas with a stable political-affiliation structure have less independent (here, split) voting than those which are "unstable"? The evidence on this is not clear, and the correlations not significant (−.320 for counties, .003 for cities). In other words, for counties there is a slight tendency for split-voting to increase as less fluctuation in party percentages occurs, but for cities there is no perceivable relationship. What this in effect means is that transference of allegiance over time, one component or type of independence, does not appear to be related to the split-voting type or manifestation of independence. Political "independence" cannot be measured by one simple calculation.[28]

TABLE 13. PARTY SHIFT IN MICHIGAN COUNTIES AND CITIES AND SPLIT-VOTING, 1950

Party Shift (Percentage Point Shift, 1946–1950)	% Split-Voting, 1950 (means)	
	Counties	Cities
Highly Inconsistent (16–28 points)	24.4%	33.0%
Moderate Fluctuation (10–15 points)	28.7	33.2
Fairly Constant (7–11 points)	33.2	29.0
Very Stable (2–7 points)	36.1	34.0

In summary, high political participation is not a characteristic of all types of independents. Areas in which split-voting occurs are inclined to have a generally high level of participation, however, as well as to be characterized by close elections and considerable Democratic strength. Detroit wards and precincts are somewhat unique, suggesting that the metropolitan pattern of independence may be atypical.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH "INDEPENDENCE"

What types of individuals are the independents? What implications do demographic and other social data on them have for party strategy? Polls and other studies have presented some information on this subject, resulting in such conclusions as: "The independents do not constitute a narrow group with common class interests. . . . "[29]

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[28] The Washtenaw Study revealed the following interesting pattern of split-voting in 1948:

Split for national and statewide candidates		33%
Split for President	10%	
Split for Congressman	11	
Split for Governor	10	
Split—not ascertained	2	
Split for local candidates		28%

No one office was primarily responsible for split-voting.

[29] Key, p. 602.

Some basic facts are in large measure substantiated by our data from the 1948 national study. For example, although more women split their ballot in 1948 than men, a larger percentage of men were bona-fide independents. The older voters did not reveal as much split-voting and independence. The least-educated were most likely to vote straight and consistently partisan. There was a definite distinction between those under and over $3,000 in income. A smaller percentage of union members were independents than nonmembers. All of this suggests two important strategic facts: the party which has most appeal to certain social and demographic groups—the educated, prosperous, middle-aged—will presumably have more success in attracting independents; the party, on the other hand, which secures the support of other groups—the poorly educated, those of low economic status, the young—will find less trouble in maintaining partisanship.

A comprehensive analysis of attitudes on political issues was not possible on on the basis of the 1948 data. One division of opinion, however, on the necessity for price control, was analyzed and proved interesting. The independents were somewhat more ambivalent than partisans, but the majority of them took extreme positions, as did the partisans. This might suggest that a party strategy aimed at independents should be one which takes a definite stand on political issues. The old cliché of American campaign behavior that campaigners should "be general" and be moderate in issue-stands does not appear to be tenable, for this type of issue at least.

TABLE 14. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INDEPENDENTS, National Sample, 1948

	% Split-voters	Cases	% Independents*	Cases
Sex:				
Male	27.6	174	44.2	172
Female	31.9	182	39.2	171
Age:				
18–34	35.4	99	44.9	69
35–54	30.0	180	41.5	183
55 and above	19.7	76	38.9	90
Education:				
Grade School	21.3	136	37.7	138
High School	32.0	156	38.2	136
College	43.5	62	60.6	66
Income:				
Under $2,000	21.3	75	34.4	64
$2–$3,000	21.8	87	33.3	87
$3–$4,000	30.5	88	44.0	86
over $4,000	39.4	104	47.6	105
Union-membership:				
Yes	26.5	98	33.7	86
No	31.3	256	44.0	252

* Only those independents who always vote.

TABLE 15. ATTITUDES OF INDEPENDENTS AND PARTISANS TOWARD PRICE CONTROL

	Independents (Who Always Vote)	Partisans (Who Always Vote)
Reinstate controls	48.6%	57.7%
Neutral—pro and con	9.0	4.5
Keep off controls	30.6	27.9
Don't know and not ascertained	11.8	9.9
	100.0%	100.0%
Cases	(144)	(201)

The study of split-voting in Michigan made possible one further analysis of social groups. Precincts in Detroit with a high percentage of Negroes and foreign-born were arranged by nationality and race, and their split-voting percentages in 1950 were recorded. The following distinctions emerged:

TABLE 16. SPLIT-VOTING IN DETROIT PRECINCTS ARRANGED BY ETHNIC AND RACE GROUPS

Precincts	No. of Precincts	% Split-Voting, 1950 (means)
Negro (over 10% Negro)	49	38.9%
Italian (over 10% Ital.)	23	35.5
Russian (over 10% Russ.)	26	28.1
Polish (over 20% Polish)	27	26.3
Canadian and British (over 10% Can. and Brit.)	75	25.8

It is interesting that Detroit's negro precincts are highest in split-voting despite the contention of some Michigan politicians that they are instructed to vote "straight." Voters of Canadian and English origin were lowest. The question might well be asked: Does this reflect the tradition of party discipline which students of Canadian and British politics have noted? Or is it because the ballot is small in those countries and the voting procedure less confusing? Further analysis is necessary to shed light on such group differentials in independence.

THE SIZE OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTE

Estimates of the volume of independent voting today as contrasted to ten or more years ago are hazardous. We have not utilized any one satisfactory yardstick systematically. The Ogburn and Jaffee study (1936), based on shifts in party percentages, is not useful. Chapin's 1912 study, using a highly questionable measurement technique, claimed that an analysis of the election statistics from 1856 to 1908 showed "real evidence of an increasing independence in voting." The Allen study, based on computations in vote differentials for various offices, suggested a great variation in independent voting by states in 1904—from 31.7 per cent in Minnesota to 0.8 per cent in Indiana. Taking up where Allen left off, and applying yet another measure—the official record of split-voting in Rhode Island—Millspaugh showed an increase in independence from 21.7 per cent in that state in 1906 to 34.5 per cent in 1912. Gosnell's Chicago study in 1932 showed that 41.6 per cent of the voters split their ballots. Our examination of the actual records in Detroit recently revealed the following amount of split-voting:[30]

1936—33.4%
1940—27.3
1946—32.0
1950—28.0

For 35 counties in Michigan in 1950, 28.9 per cent of the voters split their ballots. Estimates of the amount of national independent voting vary:

Gallup Poll (June, 1948—on the basis of self-classification)	29.0%
Survey Research Center (Nov., 1948—on the basis of objective analysis of data)	36.7

We have accumulated a hodgepodge of data. Until we systematically get at all the components of independence in voting through some objective measurement, we can never know with assurance the volume and direction of this tendency.

Independent voting is an aspect of our political process which it is extremely important to study. Studies of split-voting (Hecock) and of the time of decision (Lazarsfeld), as well as attitude surveys and polls, have been chipping away at the problem for some time. Now it is time to realize that independence is a complex of behavior patterns and attitudes, and to study it as such. We may have to reëxamine our old adages about the "remarkable persistence" of party loyalty and "the mass conditioning of the electorate" in view of the facts that only 60 per cent of the voters in the Survey Research Center Study were definitely committed to a party and that only 55.4 per cent of our Washtenaw sample, an area which has been a traditional Republican stronghold, were ascertainable partisans. Further studies of this nature may radically modify more of our guesswork on the traditional vote as well as on the independent vote.

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[30] Data on Detroit split-voting by precincts for 1936 through 1946 were secured from Professor Donald S. Hecock, Wayne University, Detroit, who has done a prodigious job in collecting these figures.

ROOSEVELT'S THIRD-TERM DECISION

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The twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which became effective February 26, 1951, would seem to ensure that the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to a third presidential term will long remain unique in American history. Yet ratification of the amendment was achieved so quietly as almost to suggest a conspiracy of inattention. Even in political science literature the wisdom of so specific a limitation on popular choice has been little explored. Given the periodicity and tempo of professional journals, indeed, there was scant opportunity for such consideration concurrent with legislative consideration of the amendment.

Quick and easy approval of the amendment probably came incident to a subsidence in Roosevelt's popularity, which in turn constituted in determining part, a belated slap at him while attention was turned to later problems and personalities. Almost any recent attempt at objective discussion of the issue would have been suspect, presumed to reflect chiefly a disguised personal or party affection or hate. Perhaps more thorough consideration of the important matters involved will come much later, when an acute national desire for the retention of some leader is frustrated.

It may not be too soon, and in another decade or so it will be too late, to begin to fill in the story of the third-term decision to which the constitutional amendment is sequel. A single effort of this kind will also be suspect, and in the present instance can only be undertaken with a confession of a bias which may or may not be significant. I write as an admirer of Roosevelt, and what I have to say can be said in full only because I happened to have a vantage point within the Roosevelt circle. Yet Roosevelt's acceptance provides an exceptionally interesting study in decision-making; it is an important feature of our national history; and if it is to be understood, various accounts must be given and drawn together.

Roosevelt's own story we shall never have except in fragments of oblique quotations. The most important of these probably are now in print, but in little more than single sentences in various memoirs; these sentences are incidental to broader stories, and their significance to the third-term decision is neither stressed nor clarified. Here I attempt to bring together the essence of these scattered items, add some items of personal knowledge, and provide an interpretation of the third-term decision.

Evidence in the more authoritative memoirs seems to me altogether clear when it is assembled, and I believe that it supports the view that I have had all along. None of the memoirs of Roosevelt's real intimates contains any refutation of my interpretation beyond a few vague guesses that Harry Hopkins or Frank Walker "knew" what none of the authors themselves knew. Walker has never claimed any such knowledge, and I shall here report Hopkins' own statement to me in his bedroom early in the morning following Roosevelt's nomination.

I believe that Roosevelt did not finally decide to accept the nomination until late in the day following the actual voting of it by the 1940 convention of his party, and I think that the assembled evidence will point clearly to this conclusion. Contrary to the belief widely spread by press reports at the time of the convention, a belief still generally held and not quite conclusively dealt with in any single volume of memoirs, I am convinced that Roosevelt had no convention manager, that no one there had explicit instructions from him pointed toward *getting* the nomination.

To no one other then Harry Hopkins has the role of convention manager ever been attributed. Yet Hopkins himself told me, as we mapped our common program for the day following the nomination, that he had had no word of Roosevelt's desires or intentions and no word of instruction—indeed, that he had had no direct communication with the President at all during the convention until the morning after the nomination had been overwhelmingly voted. Even then Roosevelt had not said that he would accept. The conversation had been a mulling over of the convention situation and a discussion of the vice-presidential nomination still to come.

Some of the items to be reported here can be presented only as individual recollections. It is because their interpretation and that of relevant items already made public require some special familiarity with the scene within which Roosevelt made his decision that my story necessarily will be told in personal terms.

* * *

Ten or twelve days after Roosevelt's first inauguration I came into the government, somewhere near the fringe of his personal reach, in his office only twice—and then as the least important of the dozen or more present—during the first two months. This degree of remoteness or intimacy continued until about the early spring of 1940, when I began to see the President more often and to have more and more personal dealings with him, although never, until after the 1940 convention, was I closer than in a secondary or tertiary circle. The point is simply that I was in that rather large group of near-intimates who, mingling and talking freely with the more intimate, were able to share confidence, gossip and speculation which existed, to the same extent, nowhere else.

A highly charged concern of a peculiar sort was concentrated among the two hundred or so members of this whole group—excluding the military and other career men—as the time of the 1940 nomination approached. The clearest common attitude was one of loyalty to Roosevelt. Of the higher-ranking personages three, with personal ambitions, were exceptions, now ready to slough off their earlier subordinate character. Two or three more were ready to pursue the nomination if Roosevelt withdrew, but, though eager for the vice-presidential nomination, they were sincerely desirous that the President should seek and secure reëlection. Intimate subordinates of these men tended to reflect the attitudes of their chiefs, but as a whole the men of lesser rank were even more ardently pro-Roosevelt. In other words, nearly all members of this large circle found their attitudes basically harmonious unless Roosevelt should withdraw, although subject to minor disagreement over the vice-presidency. The question was what Roosevelt would do.

Within the group there was an almost feverish interchange of information and speculation. Any talk with Roosevelt about the approaching convention was cautiously reported, usually reaching several dozen of us. Tangential conversations were more widely reported and speculated about. Circumstantial evidence of all kinds was brought to all of us for analysis. I was myself able to contribute a few small chunks of ore.

For example, I could pass on the report made to me by my friend Thomas H. Beck, then president of the Crowell-Collier Publishing Company. Two months or more after he had made the arrangement, he told me of a contract whereby the President was to be employed as a contributing editor of *Collier's* beginning January 20, 1941. That contract was entered into at a meeting between Beck, William Chenery, then editor of *Collier's*, and Roosevelt at Hyde Park on January 20, 1940.

This arrangement was referred to in general terms by Mrs. Roosevelt in *This I Remember* and also has been cited by John Gunther in *Roosevelt in Retrospect.* Some of the details, as confirmed by Beck a fortnight before his death on October 16, 1951, are of considerable historical interest. To begin with, the contract was not in the least the result of a quick or an impulsive decision. It grew out of a long and close friendship between Beck and Roosevelt, and was the culmination of several specific discussions. The contract was to run for three years and to be continued thereafter unless either of the contracting parties had given at least three months notice of a desire for discontinuance. It carried a salary of $75,000 a year, Roosevelt flatly declining more than he was receiving as President. Office space and suitable personal assistance were to be provided by the company, and Roosevelt was to write twenty-six articles a year, a page or more in length, on subjects to be discussed in advance with the *Collier's* editor. All material was subject to approval or rejection before publication. The magazine also had the right to publish serially any book Roosevelt might write; and if not accepted, the book was not to be offered to any competitive weekly, but was to be available to daily newspapers, newspaper syndicates, and monthly magazines.

In discussing the arrangement with me, Beck expressed some doubt that the President could live up to the contract; but this was a reflection of his own judgment of the political situation and was not based upon any doubt indicated by Roosevelt. All this I reported to my associates.

I reported also the interesting aspects of a visit I had at the White House late in the spring. An extraordinarily influential citizen of a Middle Western state had told me, with no implied importunity, that he had never met the President. I thought it very much worth the President's time to get acquainted with this man, and arranged an appointment. We were ushered to the upstairs hallway, just outside the door open into the President's White House study. Suffering from a cold, Roosevelt had not gone that day to the Executive Office and had permitted very few appointments. He was spending his time more than ordinarily was feasible according to the dictates of his own interests, and the two of us sat waiting for a full hour outside that open door. During the whole time we heard his part of a conversation with an unidentifiable aide. We could not fail to know that he was talking with the greatest enthusiasm about the removal of his presidential papers to the new library at Hyde Park. To us it seemed clear that, with the nominating convention only about two months away, the President was getting ready to quit!

As the convention drew still closer, the interchange of intelligence—and the pursuit of it—speeded up. Those of cabinet or semi-cabinet status queried each other daily, reporting what hints they thought they had as the price of reciprocal confidence. Up to the time they took the train for Chicago, no one in that group professed to have any explicit word from the President. Indeed, all left complaining, with hurt and almost with bitterness, that they didn't really know with certainty what he wanted or expected, all suspecting that someone else, more favored, did know—probably Hopkins. The three who opposed Roosevelt were less hurt than bitter. Those who were pro-Roosevelt but hopeful of inheritance from him left with the knowledge that they had some convention votes for either the presidency or the vice-presidency, but altogether uncertain about which one.

The pro-Roosevelt candidates left with one other impression which may be relevant to this tale. It was that the President would not be pleased if their own efforts, for whatever nomination of a new candidate was to be made, were too aggressive. There were no direct quotations on this point, and indeed Roosevelt may not have felt as they thought; the impression may have been simply an extension of the feeling of uncertainty about the President's personal intentions, or even a reflection of the President's intention not to pursue his own nomination. Certainly a number of the Roosevelt group had reason to know that he had been encouraging to various heirs-aspirant. He had brought home from the Philippines Paul McNutt, whom he was believed not to like, in order to give McNutt a chance to develop followership. He had wanted Robert H. Jackson to become Governor of New York for a similar reason, but was blocked in the endeavor to push his candidacy by Farley. He had encouraged Hull, Hopkins, Ickes, and more mildly, Wallace. A very short while before the convention, as Mrs. Roosevelt clearly tells, he favored Hull as his successor, but without enthusiasm.

As a master politician and as one who believed mightily in politics, Roosevelt had tried to put a good many in a position to develop. He looked to each for a showing of his own actual strength, and he was generally disappointed. He must have come to the time of the convention without confidence that there was even one strong and appealing alternative to himself. During the Chicago convention, however, he obtained one type of intelligence from many sources; this information included reports of the developing alignments, reports that particular delegate leaders were "for X" or "for Y," and that state delegations were likely to go for one or another. Those in the strongly pro-Roosevelt group in particular saw that he got reports of this sort, knowing how he valued them. Accordingly, they sent these reports from Chicago through aides who were with the President in Washington, and senators, national committeemen, state chairmen, and close friends also reported by telegraph. Hopkins, of course, gathered such information and summarized it in messages to Judge Samuel Rosenman and other members of the White House staff.

The staff at the White House undoubtedly reflected to Chicago their own wishful expectations, including their protective interest in the President. Nonetheless, even then, they either had no flat mandate from him to go on or felt unable to quote him. No one in Chicago actually asserted anything more than his own opinion or desire. "Authority" for an opinion, when it was spelled out rather than assumed, was attributed to Hopkins, whose activities were presumed to reflect presidential intention and instructions.

Roosevelt knew, of course, that, unless he declined the nomination, it was almost certain that he would receive it. This was not enough. He knew, too, that, unless he declined, he was altogether likely to be nominated with the unity and enthusiasm that would be essential to an effective campaign. Even this knowledge was not enough. I feel sure that he waited the fact, and then waited again to appraise the final unity with which the whole ticket would be presented to the nation.

He had gone closer to the point of declining than to the point of seeking the nomination. Hopkins had carried to the convention a pencilled note to Speaker William B. Bankhead, the temporary chairman, which Roosevelt had asked Bankhead to convey to the delegates. In that note the President had written, "You and my other close friends have known and understood that I have not today, and have never had, any wish or purpose to remain in the office of President, or indeed anywhere in public office, after next January." This message was not delivered under the temporary organization but by the permanent chairman, Senator Barkley, on the evening of the second day.

On the evening of the third day, the nomination was voted on the first ballot: Roosevelt 946, Farley 72, Garner 61, Tydings 9, Hull 5. But no word came to the convention from Roosevelt.

It was very late when the session of the third day ended, and for most of us there were many talks back in the hotel lobbies and suites. It was after three o'clock when I got to bed. At 7:30 a.m. I received a telephone call, which was a request to come at once to a certain room in a hotel several miles up the lake shore from the Stevens, where I was staying. This room was the unpublicized suite of Harry Hopkins. (His daytime quarters were in the Blackstone, across the street from the Stevens.)

Hopkins greeted me in his pajamas, and told me that "for the first time, at 2:30 this morning," he had finally been able to talk directly to the President. In a few sentences he expressed his previous frustration in not knowing the President's desires or intentions, and he said that even after his telephone conversation he had only one positive instruction. He had reported to Roosevelt the dispositions of leaders and delegations with respect to the vice-presidency, and the President had said flatly, "It's Wallace." To me Hopkins said, "It is our job so to arrange things that word of the President's choice will be spread as inoffensively and persuasively as possible, and that choice made effective."

In the very first stages of our planning, the two of us agreed that it was highly desirable that Roosevelt himself communicate word of his choice to each of the half-dozen of his associates who had hoped to receive the nod. Hopkins went into another room and telephoned this word to the President, listing the most important of the disappointed. He returned after a few minutes to say that the President had agreed to call one and only one. Unhappily, I cannot now recall which one. Hopkins was to see the others, Wallace was to follow with personal visits in several instances, and I was to arrange, under new conditions, for nominating and seconding speeches and was to garner votes by conferring with various delegate leaders.

At this point it should be made clear that many indications of strong support for Wallace had been reported both to the White House directly and to Hopkins. Ed Flynn, who was to succeed Farley as national party chairman, had come out for Wallace; so had Mrs. Leach, a New York delegate-at-large representing a different element; Governor Bailey of Arkansas, Governor Olson of California, Leo Crowley and friends in the Wisconsin and Minnesota delegations, the Iowa delegation (over the competitive aspirations of Senator Herring), even Senator Gillette who had come late from Iowa because of unwillingness to support a third term, important individual delegates from California, Oregon, Ohio and Colorado—all these had taken a stand in support of Wallace. Philip Murray and his handful of scattered labor delegates had declared for the Secretary of Agriculture. Crucially, under the leadership of Luther Harr, state committee chairman at that time in Pennsylvania, two-thirds of the members in that large delegation, as well as leaders in the Delaware and Connecticut delegations, had indicated the same choice. And Michigan had declared for Wallace after a complimentary first-ballot vote for Senator Prentiss Brown.

The size and spread of such sentiment seemed to weigh importantly with Roosevelt, indicating again his reliance upon a demonstration of political strength. His choice was decisive, but it was made within certain political bounds. Furthermore, there appears in this a kind of consistency with his approach to his own nomination at this particular convention. For himself, the show of strength had had to be very much greater.

Hopkins did become Roosevelt's manager in the convention, then, at two-thirty in the morning after Roosevelt himself had been nominated—not before. He was charged with effecting the nomination of Wallace, and only with that.

I was Hopkins' lieutenant on this one assignment; and we worked and waited out that final day of the convention, Hopkins in his Blackstone suite, I in and out throughout the day as I went from conference to conference, the two of us together from about four until time for the evening session of the convention. There was no more final word from Roosevelt until after the ticket had been completed. Then, and only then, came his word of acceptance, and it came as a formal message to the entire convention. To me this made it clear that Roosevelt had actually waited until he could see, with certainty, the whole outcome of the convention's deliberations before finally committing himself, even to himself. This judgment was later confirmed when I learned, as Robert E. Sherwood tells in *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, that the President had actually begun, on the evening of the fourth and last day, "preparing a draft of a speech refusing the nomination."

This inclination of the President at the penultimate moment requires some explanation. He was listening to the radio broadcasts of the convention, and they gave to him, as they gave to the general public, a picture of a much more bitter and extensive division of the convention than actually existed. Even on the floor, the appearance was deceptive, for which there were several reasons.

A principal factor in making the convention appear as it did that evening was the packing of the galleries by the McNutt organization. I cherish among my keepsakes a little cardboard ticket, given to me after the close of that final session by one of the McNutt leaders who explained its significance to me. It was one of some 3,500 unofficial and legally invalid tickets of admission to the convention galleries that had been printed by McNutt supporters, who had arranged with one gateman to honor them. The tickets had been issued to a McNutt claque, the members of which had come through the one gate early enough and in numbers sufficient to occupy a very large part of the gallery seats. McNutt's speech of withdrawal, therefore, was occasion for a tremendous demonstration in the galleries—an apparent demand for McNutt—which spread to the floor.

All of the frustration of supporters of candidacies other than Wallace's, an element personally and especially opposed to Wallace, and some elements basically hostile or cool to Roosevelt himself gave voice with the gallery in its demonstration. While actual balloting in political conventions tells the essential story of the resolution of complex sentiments, it never directly reflects the simple personal preferences of delegates. Not nearly all of the votes for Roosevelt the night before had reflected, therefore, the full sentiments of many delegates. A good many of those votes had come from politicians who felt that another candidate would be easier to work with, but who expediently deferred to popular sentiment, to a desire for certain victory in November, or to a desire to be counted with the winner. Votes so arrived at have high significance and validity, but voices of delegates who had so voted quite naturally helped to swell the chorus of frustration and opposition. Some of the hubbub was also a product of sheer mob spirit, some delegates joining in with great enjoyment who, when their delegations were polled a little later, voted as vehemently for Wallace.

The entire demonstration was most convincing on the radio, and it was impressive and confusing in the convention hall. It followed frenzied efforts during the day on the part of the anti-Roosevelt and anti-Wallace leaders to unify their forces around some single candidate. McNutt had been offered, and had refused, such of this support as Farley had to offer. And in the actual balloting the anti-administration forces did substantially coalesce—not around McNutt, the apparent center of their demonstration, but around Speaker Bankhead. The Speaker was not himself anti-Roosevelt, and he was highly and affectionately regarded by the President. Bankhead's vote therefore maximized the available dissident showing in the ballot show-down and made it something less than a phenomenon of violent opposition. Even so, it became clear early on the first ballot that the previous demonstration had grossly exaggerated the voting realities.

It was at this point that Roosevelt came to his final decision. Listening to the broadcast report at the White House, he required no such spelling out of the situation as would have been needed by most radio listeners. He began to dictate his acceptance message during the balloting.

What support or refutation of this whole interpretation of Roosevelt's course do we find in the memoirs of those qualified to give evidence? Farley, for one, has written that he believes Roosevelt came to his decision sometime after May 17. He fixes no precise date and cites no explicit statement by Roosevelt. Edward J. Flynn has indicated a very similar view in a very similar way. But others closer to Roosevelt have had more to say on the subject.

Mrs. Roosevelt, in *This I Remember*, wrote: "Franklin always insisted, however, that Harry Hopkins had had no headquarters and no official authority. Harry had simply gone ahead and acted on his own." In so doing, Hopkins differed from many others who were working for Roosevelt's nomination only by being presumed by others to have some special status and information. In her book Mrs. Roosevelt also made it plain that she had had no explicit word from her husband about his intentions. She reported her own interpretations of the situation; and, speaking of the time immediately preceding the convention, she said: "*I think* he had been persuaded that if he were nominated, he could not refuse. *I believe* he did not honestly want the nomination. If he had not been nominated, he would have been completely satisfied. . . . In his mind, *I think*, was a great see-saw. . . . Sometimes one is at a loss oneself to know just how one feels."

Miss Frances Perkins told, in *The Roosevelt I Knew*, of the President's strong and detailed refusal to consider a third candidacy when importuned by Dan Tobin. She was unable to recall the time of this conversation, but placed it in a sequence which suggests early 1940. She wrote: "Those of us who were associated with him in this period have differing views of when he made up his mind. Certainly he discussed the problem with many people. With me he was always negative." She wrote on the assumption that Hopkins was the authorized agent of Roosevelt at Chicago, and that Frank Walker "knew," but she was interpreting a complicated series of events and she produced no direct evidence. This, indeed, is significantly typical of the memories of those closest to him during this particular period.

Robert E. Sherwood, whose rare talents were brought to an ideal vantage point shortly after this Chicago convention, fell into the natural error of exaggerating the opposition force on the floor of the convention on that last night of its meeting. But his whole report is most conclusive with respect to the points here stressed—the character of Hopkins' agency at Chicago and the time of Roosevelt's decision to accept the nomination. Sherwood made these pertinent statements in *Roosevelt and Hopkins*:

> However, the insurrection was not quite strong enough to stop Wallace's nomination on the first ballot, and Roosevelt relaxed and started to dictate his acceptance speech with the aid of Sam Rosenman, for whom this was one of the worst nights of his life.
>
> [Hopkins] had assumed this job [at the convention] on his own initiative because it had to be done and there was no one else who had the courage or perhaps the effrontery to do it without written instructions from the President.

These citations together represent the whole published record and point rather consistently to the same, clear conclusions, even though alone some of the items of record reflect slightly variant beliefs. A reëxamination of those items provides an explanation for each of them and focuses new light on Roosevelt's ways and on the conditions of that momentous third-term decision.

* * *

The principal basis for a pre-convention belief among Roosevelt's intimates that he had already determined to run was the fact cited by Miss Perkins that "he did discuss the problem with many people." But we need only remind ourselves that such discussion was his way, and that it was not as indicative as often was assumed. The language he used, as chronicled for us in the memoirs, seems always to have fallen short of the altogether natural and usually wishful interpretations sometimes given it. Roosevelt savored the importunities and reports that came to him as political intelligence, offered comment as a stimulant to amplification and clarification, and considered aloud in "iffy" terms the situation with which he was going to have to deal.

In one respect, if perhaps in only one, Roosevelt was a thoroughgoing lawyer: he had the most precise regard for language. He rather exaggerated his listeners' capacity or inclination to hear with the same fine discrimination as that with which he spoke. This was the case in some instances merely because many persons unconsciously and sincerely hear more readily what they wish to hear and are relatively deaf to what they wish not to hear. In other instances listeners administratively unskilled attribute finality to a casual word of a person in high position, whereas the latter speaks with the awareness of many limitations on his own power and with sensitivity to many elements of the problem yet to be surveyed.

I have known, in particular, two eminent and honorable men who have been charged with "lying" and "breaking promises." One of these was Roosevelt. The other finally became aware of his problem and its occasion, and explained it to me. I had gone to him immediately after a caller, in leaving his office, had told me that "Mr. X had agreed to" a certain proposal. I asked whether the visitor had been so assured, and was given an emphatic negative. He sat then for several moments, thinking back over the conversation, and then slowly began to nod his head in comprehension. "When I came into this office," he said, "I was determined to be considerate of everyone, and to try hard to understand their attitudes. When visitors come to me I do try, for the moment, to put myself in their situations and to identify my thinking with theirs. As they speak, I nod to express my understanding; I ask sympathetic questions to draw them out and make certain of my perceptions. When they leave, I can see that they will feel that I have indicated agreement, when I meant only to indicate sympathetic understanding."

Roosevelt had no such conscious technique. In a most extraordinary way he was temperamentally outgoing. He liked his callers, he was sympathetic. Without effort he did identify himself for the moment with them and with their thinking, turning it over in his mind and storing it in his prodigious memory. Many times, particularly in his first years as President, he was misinterpreted because of this manner and believed to have made definite commitments he had no intention of making. But his language, with respect to specific commitments, was more precise and cautious than that of any other man I have known. Fairly often, when it appeared to be definite, it was in a context in which he expected the hearer to have sophistication enough to realize that democratic public decision-making is more tentative, modifiable, and revocable than the less responsible observer might believe. The great determinant is not presidential or other personalized power, but institutional performance patterned to public consent.

Even the nonpolitical administrator learns quickly, in democratic public institutions especially, to avoid making decisions before they must be made, to preserve discretion, to keep open the lines of institutional judgment. He must learn also to keep open a line of modification and retreat in deference to the many ramifications of responsibility, the many developments not yet revealed. Decision-making in the foreign policy field is dramatically distinguished today by these considerations. In a sense, it may be said that all of our foreign-policy decisions in recent years have been decisions postponing the decision to go to war. The hope is that this process may long continue.

Roosevelt's skill in avoiding the flat statement he was unready to make was most exceptional, his use of that skill deeply habitual. It was associated with great reliance on time and the political processes of distilling social wisdom. These were the sources of his flexibility and a kind of opportunism intricately related to democratic leadership. He was in a high-level and political sense a planner, always looking forward, calculating the future, but seeing the future in terms of a variety of alternatives which would always develop from a set of current alternatives. It was this quality that enabled him to encourage different men along somewhat different or competitive lines; it was this that permitted him to see and to defer to diverse values, and thus to give to many observers an impression of inconsistency, some of which was real with him, and some of which was necessary and desirable to the nation. He was a pluralistic leader of a pluralistic people.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that Roosevelt's intimates reflect in their memoirs various interpretations of many actions, conversations, and events as bearing on that highly personal and highly impersonal third-term decision; but they are interpretations only, and present no conclusive statement made by him. It was not necessary for him to decide, actually and finally, until the convention had functioned, and uncertainty among even his closest associates lingered up to the last moment.

Many factors, of course, contributed to their confusion besides Roosevelt's careful use of language for the sake of discretion. His own disinclination toward renomination surely weakened as the war situation worsened. France surrendered late in June, and it was this which moved Hopkins to go to Chicago to discuss convention arrangements. "Acting without express instructions from Roosevelt, but also without prohibition, Hopkins was now moving to take charge of the third-term nomination himself," writes Sherwood. That Roosevelt withheld his prohibition may well have turned on the spreading tragedy in Europe, without even this having brought him to "express instructions" or to form a clear personal intention. His disinclination was too deeply rooted in his nature and in his judgment to have been finally cast out even then.

There was from the beginning, of course, the element of protection which the delay in announcement provided for his second administration. It is well known, although the fact is still insufficiently appreciated, that once an incumbent president is out of the running his leadership is drastically impaired. No man holding the office can fail to see the maintenance of his fullest influence as essential to his responsibility. Once in the situation, no one can invite the damage to his own work before what appears to him to be the last decent moment.

As already suggested, the shrewd and strong habit of refusing to make a major decision until the need for it is clear and urgent was surely a factor in Roosevelt's decision. There may have been also some special concern for the historical record, a desire to have the record of this particular decision as free as possible from evidence of self-seeking.

Roosevelt may have felt that it was part of his responsibility to permit other candidacies to develop and to be weighed on the scales of politics, and not merely by his own subjective judgment. He may have wondered whether he had misjudged the capacity of some of those he had tried to put into position to succeed him. As an ardent democrat with deep confidence in the wisdom of the political process, he may have wished for the convention by its own devices to meet and weigh the strength of his own, momentarily undirected, leadership. Or he may have felt that the decision on the two-term tradition at that moment of present and impending world tragedy was at least as much the responsibility of the convention as it was his own.

Self-confident as he was, Roosevelt had no personal sense of *relative* inadequacy as a world leader. He must have felt that it was possibly of great importance that he continue as President. But in the face of responsibilities dwarfing all earlier ones, he may have been in need of convincing confirmation of that judgment, both at the hands of his party and at the hands of the voters at the polls. This need may have been combined with some inner, quite personal feeling as he and the country faced world catastrophe; there may have been a distaste for reaching in an ordinary way for a responsibility needing most extraordinary unity, devotion, and wisdom. Similar considerations surely weighed in his later insistence on injecting the issue of conscription into the campaign, rather than waiting until after the election.

He had great respect for the processes of politics. And he knew the burdens ahead as few could have known them. He did not come suddenly and without anticipation to that day over four years later, significantly only a few weeks before the Yalta Conference, when he greeted a friend in a completely somber mood, expressing his sense of terrible responsibility, able to talk of nothing but the war casualties. Perhaps he had come in the spring and summer of 1940 to a time when the great gravity of the times and the deep seriousness of the man combined to balance his extraordinary vitality and buoyancy. Perhaps this and all such other factors as are suggested here together explain why he had become reluctantly willing to accept the continued responsibility as an obligation, but only when the obligation was laid upon him, not as something assumed or sought or procured.

SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS

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Out of the middle-class businessman's "Efficiency and Economy Movement" that reached full strength in the second decade of the twentieth century came a series of innovations designed to place government "on a business basis" and to weaken the power of the political parties. The movement was inspired both by the example of the success of the corporate structure in trade and industry and by revulsion against the low standards of morality to be found in many sectors of political party activity around the turn of the century. The contemporary brand of politician had recently been exposed by the "muckrakers" and the prestige of the parties had reached a very low level.

Of the numerous ideas and mechanisms adopted as a result of the reform movement, one of the most unusual was that of election without party designation. Early in the twentieth century, under the theory that judges are neutral referees, not political officers, and that political activities should therefore be discouraged in the choosing of them, many communities initiated "nonpartisan" elections (the term that is usually applied) in the balloting for judicial posts. Next, using the argument that local officials should be businesslike administrators—there being no Republican way to pave a street and no Democratic way to lay a sewer—and that politics on the national scene have nothing in common with local problems, the movement spread to other offices. In a number of states various district, county, township, judicial, school, and city offices were made nonpartisan. And in 1913 largely as the result of a strange political accident, Minnesota not only made its county and muncipal offices nonpartisan, but extended the principle to the election of the state legislature.[1]

The principle lost much of its fascination for the public after the early years of the 'twenties, although it enjoyed some revival after Nebraska applied the method to the choice of its widely discussed unicameral legislature authorized in November, 1934.[2] In recent years the nonpartisan plan has not spread further but the fact that nearly one-half of the nation's voters are called upon to make some of their electoral choices from a nonpartisan ballot makes its nature and consequences matters of continuing importance for study.

As a term, "nonpartisanship" is at best somewhat ambiguous, and to the poorly informed voter it may often be misleading. The expression cannot be said to denote the absence of adherence to factional groups or political interests.

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[1] See Charles R. Adrian, "The Adoption of a Nonpartisan Legislature in Minnesota," in a forthcoming issue of *Minnesota History*. For the spread of nonpartisanship on the state level, see C. C. Young, *The Legislature of California: Its Membership, Procedure and Work* (San Francisco, 1943), pp. 129–130.

[2] Legislative nonpartisanship has been urged by various persons and groups in more than a dozen states, including especially California, Michigan, New York, and North Dakota. See Charles R. Adrian, "The Nonpartisan Legislature in Minnesota," unpubl. Ph.D. thesis (Minneapolis, 1950), Ch. 6. Later citations are to this work by this author.

No matter how ephemeral the organizational structure, wherever men are elected to offices that require the making of *public policy* decisions, there are always persons and groups interested in getting certain candidates elected and in defeating others. All elections are partisan in the sense that people and groups take sides and struggle against one another for victory; and offices filled "without party designation" are partisan enough according to this meaning. As it is used in the United States, "nonpartisanship" actually describes a situation in which (1) public offices are filled without party designations being placed on the ballot and (2) the long ballot is used. (The Australian ballot, employed in many British Commonwealth elections, has no party designation, but the voter is ordinarily called upon to cast but a single vote for a single office and presumably can hardly avoid knowing the political affiliation of the two or three candidates for the seat.)

While nonpartisan elections have not been given close study by many scholars, the materials available indicate that the system has certain characteristics which reappear wherever the plan is used. The purpose of this study is to submit some tentative propositions which seem to be characteristic of nonpartisanship. These propositions are based upon available empirical evidence, and all require verification through additional research. Owing to space limitations little evidence is actually presented here; personal observations and studies of the state legislatures of Minnesota[3] and Nebraska[4] and of the city councils of Minneapolis[5] and Detroit[6] have furnished most of the data suggesting the hypotheses.

Certain qualifications must be made in establishing a frame of reference. First, where comparisons with partisan situations are made, a general two-party system is presumed—not necessarily an "ideal" two-party system, but one in which members of one party may conceivably replace members of another party in office. In one-party situations, a quasi-nonpartisanship obtains that makes comparisons with nonpartisanship meaningless. In addition, where local, rather than general, parties are found, it is probable that some of the characteristics postulated for nonpartisanship would be valid while others would not. Second, what might be called an impersonal type of politics is presumed. Where elections are held in constituencies small enough to have government by personality, it would be unsafe to say that the material below is applicable.

The following are offered as propositions:

1. *Nonpartisanship serves to weaken the political parties in those areas where it is in effect.* This is what its creators intended that it should do. They felt that the

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[3] See Adrian's dissertation and the sources cited therein.

[4] A wealth of material is available on the Nebraska legislature, dealing more with unicameralism than with nonpartisanship, however. Much of it has appeared over the years in the *National Municipal Review*. See Adrian, esp. pp. 331–353 and the bibliography.

[5] Personal observations by the author supplied this data. There is no comprehensive study of the Minneapolis council.

[6] See Maurice M. Ramsey, "Some Aspects of Non-Partisan Government in Detroit, 1918–1940," unpubl. Ph.D. thesis (Ann Arbor, 1944). The author also was again in a position to make personal observations.

established political parties, closely tied up with the system of spoils and other Jacksonian precepts, were not to be trusted. Ideally, they wanted to see the principles of "sound business management" applied to government, not by professional politicians, but by established and successful business men of the community.

The removal of the party label from certain parts of the ballot has resulted in the weakening of political party organizations for several reasons. The reduction in the number of offices to be filled by the parties has weakened them by making active participation in their activities less attractive to the citizen: with fewer elective or appointive jobs available as rewards, there is less incentive for the individual to give his energies. There is not even the incentive of seeking to influence party members in the many areas where the parties are no longer effective in the determination of policy. Furthermore, the removal of some or all of the state and local offices from the party ballot has served to cut away the local roots of the party; weak local organizations in turn have made effective campaigning difficult by removing the ordinary citizen from regular and frequent contact with the parties.[7]

Altogether, in states where nonpartisanship applies to an important sector of the ballot, the party organizations have been weak. This remains true, for example, in California, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota;[8] and further evidence of the debilitating effect of nonpartisanship upon the established parties is to be found in the attitudes of professional politicians. When the system was first proposed in Minnesota, Republican leaders in large measure stood in opposition to the elimination of the party label.[9] While some Democrats at first believed that the party had nothing to lose in a situation in which it was already extremely weak, they later changed theirs mind, and leaders of all three of the state's major parties eventually took strong stands against the plan.[10] In Michigan, Democrats at first supported the nonpartisanship movement, but subsequently regretted their action.[11] Party leaders viewed nonpartisanship in the Nebraska legislature with apprehension.[12]

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[7] For an extreme example, see John W. Lederle, "Political Party Organization in Detroit, 1920–1934," unpubl. M.A. thesis (Ann Arbor, 1934), and also Arthur Pound, *Detroit; Dynamic City* (New York, 1940). It should be noted, however, that party organization in Michigan has never been very strong; see Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Party Organization and Machinery in Michigan Since 1890* (Baltimore, 1917).

[8] The rigidity of structure in a city with a high degree of political organization may delay the weakening effect, especially where nonpartisanship is grafted onto a "machine-governed" city, as was the case in Boston and in the city council in Chicago. In recent years party organizations have been weakened in both cities. The degree to which this has been caused by the long-range effect of nonpartisanship as against possible other causes, including the decline of the factors that made the nineteenth-century political boss possible, this writer is not prepared to say. Recent developments in Boston, in particular, would appear to support the general hypotheses expressed in this paper.

[9] Adrian, p. 17.

[10] *Ibid.*, Ch. 7 and *passim.* Today, some members of the conservative faction of the Republican Party, for special reasons, appear to be satisfied with the present arrangement (*ibid.*, pp. 377–378).

[11] Ramsey, p. 161.

2. Segregation of political leaders strictly to either partisan or nonpartisan areas is the general rule. The effect of this tendency upon Minnesota politics when the legislature of that state was removed from the party ballot is clearly described in the following quotation:

> The new law which requires county officers and members of the legislature to be elected as nonpartisans takes all of the vitality out of a party campaign. Heretofore it has been the county officers and legislative candidates who have paid most of the expenses and harrowed up the country for the benefit of state candidates. This year it is all different. Only two of the county offices have contests and as they are nonpartisan they are taking no part in the state campaign nor are they paving the way for the state contestants.[13]

Here was a basic alteration in traditional campaign techniques. The local organizations had been the very heart of the political parties in Minnesota, but it now became necessary for the parties to establish regional campaign personnel separate from politicians on the local scene. (The obverse situation obtained as well: party state central committees immediately chose virtually to ignore legislative and county contests.) With some exceptions, as indicated below, parallel sets of office-seekers, aides, and organizations had to be created, with very little intercourse between them. This was the case in all four of the areas observed for this article; an individual who wished to become active in politics had to choose one road or the other.

3. Channels for recruitment of candidates for partisan offices are restricted by nonpartisanship. It is unusual for a successful nonpartisan politician to move up into higher partisan ranks. Thus the fact that personnel for the two ballots are kept largely separate creates a problem for the parties, which ordinarily use local and legislative positions as the training ground for higher offices.

The problem has not been acute in Minnesota (though certainly it is present), because a workable, particularly competitive two-party system has in recent years provided impetus for recruitment of able personnel. But in Michigan where Detroit, most of its suburbs, and other cities have nonpartisan elections, the system appears to have had a definitely adverse effect upon the quality of party personnel. This is particularly true of the Democratic party, which draws most of its strength in the state from the city of Detroit, and the results are especially apparent in the consistently low overall quality of the Wayne county legislative delegation.

In exceptional circumstances an outstanding campaigner from nonpartisan ranks will receive overtures from one or both political parties, but even in these rare cases there are many obstacles to success. For example, Edward J. Jeffries, Jr., the greatest vote-getter ever to serve as mayor of Detroit, was wooed by both major parties as a gubernatorial candidate, and after having served four terms as mayor (the longest tenure in city's history), he filed for the Republican nomination for governor in 1946. He ran a poor fourth in a field of four.[14] Some members of the Minnesota legislature have looked fondly toward the governor's chair; but party regulars understandably take a dim view of bringing in candidates "from outside the party," and success is rare.[15] Since the overwhelming majority of the members of the Nebraska and Minnesota legislatures are inactive in the regular parties and so without chance for further advancement there, their services are not available for positions of higher party leadership. Similarly, almost no members of the Minneapolis or Detroit city councils have been active in party affairs, and the same, with only a few exceptions, may be said of the mayors of the two cities. These office-holders are not available to the political parties, or, at the very least, the parties do not wish to avail themselves of their services.

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[12] See Charles D. Green, "Nebraska Launches Unicameral," *State Government*, Vol. 10, pp. 3–5 (Jan., 1937); Robert L. Cochran, "Nebraska's Unicameral Adjourns," *ibid.*, p. 131 (July, 1937); and William E. Johnson, "Unicameralism Works," *ibid.*, Vol. 12, pp. 198, 207 (Nov., 1939).

[13] *Fergus Falls Daily Journal*, Oct. 19, 1914, p. 2.

4. Channels for recruitment of candidates for nonpartisan offices are restricted by nonpartisanship. The securing of active political party members to fill nonpartisan positions is difficult. In Minneapolis, a party regular seeking a nonpartisan council or mayoralty seat is at a disadvantage and seldom makes good, especially in the case of the former. In Detroit, where nonpartisanship has become a refuge of conservatism, any attempt by an active party member to penetrate into the city's nonpartisan elections, and especially an effort to carry along "partisan politics," is greeted by powerful and effective blasts from the newspapers and from the Detroit Citizens' League. And status as active party members almost invariably places legislative candidates at a disadvantage in Minnesota and Nebraska.

Occasionally it is possible for an active party member to enter the nonpartisan lists and sometimes even to go on from there to higher positions within the party. Frank Murphy, the only mayor of Detroit to achieve national fame in the more than three decades since the city's present charter was adopted, was an active Democrat both before and after his tenure in the city hall. Murphy's election, however, was the result of a combination of unusual circumstances—including the recall in 1930 of the incumbent mayor, whose unethical behavior in office had temporarily weakened public confidence in some of the groups ordinarily most influential in choosing the chief executive, the extreme economic depression that affected Detroit even more than the rest of the nation and the very strong support given him by the *Detroit Times*; and Murphy made a strenuous effort to keep his partisan and nonpartisan political activities separate from one another.[16] A few other Detroit mayors have had loose party connections and one had served in Congress before becoming mayor, but that was in the earliest days of nonpartisanship in the city government.[17]

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[14] It should be added that his effort was made after his popularity in Detroit had waned somewhat.

[15] For an elaboration on this point, see Adrian, pp. 397–404. These pages compare the situation in Minnesota just before and just after the establishment of nonpartisanship. The change in the political future of the Speaker of the House of Representatives is especially significant.

[16] Ramsey, pp. 58–59.

Hubert H. Humphrey, an active Democrat, became mayor of Minneapolis in 1945, but on a largely nonparty campaign to "clean up" the city and with support from the Republican Cowles newspapers. Very active in partisan affairs while mayor, he moved on from that position to the United States Senate, while his successor, who had never been active in partisan activities, returned to the customary nonpartisan pattern. It is also to be remembered that James Michael Curley was for a time head of both the nonpartisan city government and the Democratic party in Boston, although his once vast support was always more of a personal than a party matter.

Certainly cases of party actives successful in obtaining nonpartisan offices are always exceptional. The usual picture finds nonpartisan mayors rising from nonpartisan councils and nonpartisan councilmen coming from political obscurity—successfully reaching the council usually only after several tries have afforded the chance for the public to become familiar with their names.

5. *Limited new channels for recruitment of candidates for nonpartisan offices are opened by nonpartisanship.* Proponents of nonpartisanship have always argued that the system encourages many able, successful, well-known citizens of the community to run for office who would never become candidates under the traditional method since they would be unwilling to become entangled in the ordinary processes of party politics. There is evidence in all nonpartisan jurisdictions to support this contention. To be sure, the candidate under any elective system (except, perhaps, in very small communities with a purely personal type of government) must have a yen, or at least a tolerance, for electioneering; but many persons who have established reputations as business or professional men would fear the condescending attitudes often taken by Americans toward candidates who engage in party activities. These individuals sometimes can be persuaded to hold a nonpartisan office in the council or legislature as a civic duty. Such persuasion appears to be effective from time to time and probably helps bring many capable persons into law-making bodies or mayoralty offices.

Nonpartisanship does not, however, *insure* the filling of available seats from among the community's successful. The individual who has never "made good" at anything else, who is a perennial office-seeker, and who depends for a livelihood upon scraps from the political table—the "political hack" of the vernacular—is a familiar figure around the Minneapolis council table and certainly is not unknown in the Detroit council or the Minnesota and Nebraska legislatures.

6. *Segregation of funds for financing nonpartisan and partisan election campaigns is nearly complete.* Nonpartisanship has produced parallel financing systems. In Michigan this separation of funds is required by law,[18] but even in

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[17] In addition, Mayor James Couzens was appointed to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate in 1922; but he was not, and had not been, a Republican party regular, and he remained almost continuously at odds with party leaders (*ibid.*, p. 57).

[18] To discourage direct party activities, Michigan law prohibits overt participation by

Minnesota, where rapport with the regular parties is close to being established, most individual candidates must shift for themselves. In that state, the Republicans, indirectly and *sub rosa*, give aid to certain needy candidates who agree to join the Conservative caucus in the legislature; but the Democratic Party has given no similar assistance, and the general practice in nonpartisan jurisdictions is for the individual candidate to seek out his own support. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that political parties are almost never really rich and, needing money to support their own candidates, can scarcely be expected to give assistance to persons over whom they probably would exercise little or no control, granted election.[19]

Individual financing has a tendency to confuse the voting public, leading many persons into believing that, while the political parties are beholden to those who pay their bills, nonpartisans are "independent." This naive belief is often encouraged in nonpartisan jurisdictions and results in a definitely undesirable development, for it means that the public is quite unaware of the nature of the commitments made by, or the type of support being given, a candidate. (The fact that state law may require the filing of a statement of campaign contributions does not fundamentally alter this situation.)

7. *Facilities for fund-raising by candidates for nonpartisan offices are restricted by nonpartisanship.* Under the traditional political system, the party carries on much of the financing burden as a staff function. If a candidate can secure organizational backing, he is free to carry on his campaign with little or no worry about the requisite funds: the party has machinery to care for this problem. On the other hand, the nonpartisan candidate is an individual who, when he first enters politics, has no organized support or money-raising mechanism. When he knows that he must spend his own money, or that of friends, or persuade an important interest group to give him aid, the burden of campaigning is made so heavy that the likelihood of an individual's trying to gain a seat is decreased. When this situation is combined with the discouraging advantage held by the incumbent (discussed below), it is not surprising that relatively few persons run for nonpartisan offices and that those who do become candidates do not, and cannot campaign extensively.[20]

8. *Nonpartisanship encourages the avoidance of issues of policy in campaigns.* Since voting "for the man" and other frontier concepts have kept American political parties from exercising responsibility, the lack of definite platforms and the failure to carry out concrete campaign promises under nonpartisanship have not been as apparent as would otherwise be the case. The system does not make campaigning upon issues profitable, but discourages it even more than

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parties in nonpartisan elections and forbids both party endorsements previous to election and the spending of party money on behalf of nonpartisan candidates. The law is so drawn as to be easily circumvented, but little evasion appears to take place. Minnesota, in contrast, has no such legal restrictions.

[19] In this connection, see the quotation above (referred to by n. 13) from the *Fergus Falls Daily Journal.*

[20] This conclusion is based largely upon personal observations of the author. See also the comments of W. K. Kelsey in the *Detroit News*, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 30.

does the present party system. Seldom does a nonpartisan candidate take a firm, widely-publicized stand upon the important issues of the day, and this is especially true if he is running for a seat in a collegial body.[21] He prefers to take no stand at all, or an amibiguous one, or to discuss irrelevancies. He would rather try to be all things to all people, depending upon a well-known political name, or upon religious, ethnic, or other extraneous associations.[22] In fact, fence-straddling is much more tempting than under the conventional election system, since in the latter the presence of a party label suggests some sort of "position" to the electorate. And since under nonpartisanship the voter seldom can associate a candidate with a position, he comes, as a last resort in his confusion, to choose "name" candidates. This means that there is a premium upon personal publicity; that the individual with newspaper backing often has an inordinate advantage; and that the *incumbent* nearly always (unless he has somehow managed to develop notoriety) is in a very strong position simply because his name has appeared more or less regularly before the public during his years in office.

9. *Nonpartisanship tends to frustrate protest voting.* This is so because the electorate, when disgruntled, tends to vote on a party basis and, of course, cannot do so without party labels. American politics is characterized by an "in" party versus an "out" party. Even if there is little philosophical cohesion within each, there is at least the label to serve as a guide for the voter. Under ordinary circumstances, the voter will accept the "in" group; but in times of grave dissatisfaction he can turn to the "out" party for the hope of relief. In nonpartisan jurisdictions, this is impossible. In the first place, there is no collectively identifiable "in" or "out" group. Whether or not there is within a legislative body a majority clique, caucus, or set indebted to the same interest groups, its members are to the voter, who seeks to hold them accountable, merely a collection of individual names. In the second place, if the voter seeks to "turn the rascals out," he has no guide for doing so. He may, if interested enough, determine the incumbents' names, but he usually has no way of knowing whether the opposing candidates will follow a policy of reform, or whatever it is that the voter desires. In partisan politics, the "out" party under such circumstances would promise changes akin to what the voter wanted and could be held accountable for producing them after the election. But the non-incumbent nonpartisan candidate usually prefers the middle-of-the-road; even

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[21] In the not untypical 1951 election for the Detroit council, perhaps two of the eighteen finalists in the run-off could be said to have campaigned energetically and clearly upon several major issues of the day. A few others made fairly definite positions known on one or two issues. Most candidates preferred ambiguity, generality, or silence upon these matters. One incumbent campaigned for "the perpetuation of our way of life," while another stood largely on the implicit platform that he had been an able shortstop on the Detroit Tigers' baseball club. A similar type of campaign regularly takes place in Minneapolis. For many illustrations from Minnesota legislative campaigns, see Adrian, pp. 187–235.

[22] For a detailed description of a vicious use of extraneous associations in a municipal nonpartisan campaign, see Carl O. Smith and Stephen B. Sarasohn, "Hate Propaganda in Detroit," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 10, pp. 24–52 (Spring, 1946).

if he makes definite commitments, his eventual voting behavior can be known to the individual voter only with the greatest difficulty; and under no circumstances need he bear responsibility for the acts of the body to which he belongs.

Although violent changes have taken place in partisan legislative bodies, as in the early day of the great depression, no similar drastic changes can be found in nonpartisan bodies. In 1931 the Michigan House of Representatives was under Republican control by a majority of ninety-eight to two; in 1933 the Democrats organized the House with a fifty-five to forty-five majority. A similar result took place in the Senate, where in 1931 the Republicans held a majority of thirty-one to one; two years later the Democrats were in control with an advantage of seventeen to fifteen.[23] Evidence of the effectiveness of protest voting was even more spectacular in the state of Washington. There, the Republicans held a majority in the 1931 House of Representatives of ninety to eight. In 1935 the relative positions had been completely reversed and the Democrats were in control, ninety-one to eight. Similarly, in the 1931 Washington Senate the Republicans were in charge, forty-one to one; four years later the Democrats held a majority of thirty-seven to nine.[24] No such changes took place in the nonpartisan Minnesota legislature during the same period, despite drastic changes in the partisan state offices. In 1931 when the Farmer-Labor radical Floyd B. Olson was swept into the governorship, the House Liberals were too weak even to have a candidate for the speakership.[25] In 1933, fifty-eight per cent of the House and fifty-five per cent of the Senate were made up of incumbent holdovers from the previous conservative era. Olson never held a working majority in either house, although he won three consecutive decisive victories for himself. The voters apparently did not know how to give him a legislative majority.[26]

10. Nonpartisanship produces a legislative body with a relatively high percentage of experienced members, making for conservatism. This follows from the lack of provision for protest voting, the scarcity of campaigns based upon issues, and the resultant advantage given the incumbent as the voter casts about for a familiar name.

In Minnesota, nonpartisanship has produced a continuing trend toward a large number of holdovers from one legislature to the next.[27] In Nebraska, the trend has been striking and uninterrupted since the adoption of nonpartisanship[28] and in Detroit the incumbent's advantage has been one of the most definite characteristics of elections to the council.[29] In the 1951 Detroit election, in fact, all nine incumbents were returned to office. An incumbent in that city is rarely defeated so long as he contests for a seat.

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[23] *Michigan Legislative Handbook,* 1931–1933.

[24] Leslie Lipson, *The American Governor; From Figurehead to Leader* (Chicago, 1939), p. 28.

[25] See Adrian, pp. 116–123.

[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 320–330, Table 13. Also see Arthur Naftalin, "The Failure of the Farmer-Labor Party to Capture Control of the Minnesota Legislature," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 71–78 (Feb., 1944).

[27] In the six elections for the House preceding the establishment of nonpartisanship, the percentage of holdovers averaged 36.8. In the six elections following, the holdovers averaged 50.9 per cent and the trend continued, reaching an all-time high of 77.9 per cent in the election of 1944. Senate elections followed a similar development. For complete data, see Adrian, pp. 236–243 and Table 13.

A study of ten non-southern states made a number of years ago indicated that Minnesota had a more experienced legislature than any except the most populous states, where the salary is outstanding (among state legislatures) and a high degree of political organization aids stability.[30] Unlike the situation in many state legislatures (as in the Michigan and Washington cases cited above), where first and second-term members must be called upon to shoulder committee chairmanships and other important positions, the Minnesota legislature has almost never had to place inexperienced persons in key positions. This is also true in the Nebraska legislature and in nonpartisan city councils.

The tendency to reëlect members of the policy-making body has helped to make nonpartisan organizations lean toward conservatism. As indicated above, traditional legislative bodies are often called upon to sacrifice experience for flexibility in the face of demands of the public. Sessions that result are often chaotic, but they are ordinarily productive and responsive. Under nonpartisanship, a much more conservative approach may be expected, and as a result there is a tendency for legislators to diverge from contemporary public thinking on issues.[31]

In Detroit, and to a lesser extent in Minneapolis, the vacuum caused by the absence of party labels as a guide for the voter has been partly filled by newspaper activity. Since daily newspapers are for the most part conservative, especially on local affairs, and since they have a disproportionate advantage in nonpartisan elections by the dissemination of all-important publicity, the conservative tendency of nonpartisan bodies is enhanced. (In legislative constituencies of rural Nebraska and Minnesota, newspapers are of less influence than they are in metropolitan areas, probably because of the more personal nature of a rural campaign.)

11. There is no collective responsibility in a nonpartisan body. This follows from the fact that there is no unifying organization or symbol. Each individual stands alone, responsible to his constituents for his own acts only, and for them but vaguely, since nonpartisan campaigns do not ordinarily center upon definite issues. Individual political behavior is not tempered by the fact that a political party has "a past to honor and a future to protect," in the words of a former Minnesota governor.

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 345–346, Table 18. In the six elections for the House preceding the establishment of nonpartisanship, the percentage of holdovers averaged 41.6; for the Senate, 46.9. In the six elections following, holdovers amounted to 56.2 per cent. The percentage followed an *uninterrupted* upward trend, reaching 62.7 per cent in the 1948 election. In each election since 1944, the percentage of holdovers has been higher than it ever was in *any* election under the partisan system. (Figures for 1950 are not available.)

[29] Ramsey, pp. 86–92, 107, cites statistics demonstrating that "the public showed a marked preference for incumbents and lengthy tenure was frequent."

[30] See Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," *Annals*, Vol. 195, pp. 21–31 (Jan., 1938).

[31] For the difficulties experienced by Floyd B. Olson owing to this phenomenon, see Adrian, pp. 273–289.

Without collective responsibility and a well-knit internal organization, a legislative body is likely to be lacking in a collective, comprehensive program. This often results either in a great deal of wasted motion and ineffective floundering or in the leadership's passing to an individual outside the legislative body who is in the public eye—the governor or mayor. In Nebraska, the former appears to have resulted,[32] while in Minnesota the governor has become the dominant policy-maker, taking away much of the potential legislative leadership.[33] In Detroit, the mayor has completely overshadowed the council in policy leadership—aided, to be sure, by the fact that the city has a strong-mayor form of organization.

Without collective responsibility, no one, except possibly the governor, is answerable for the budget in Nebraska or Minnesota. The individual legislator can always, and frequently does, assert that he voted for those items of interest to his district, while disclaiming responsibility for the budget as a whole, or for the legislative pork barrel. From the beginning of legislative nonpartisanship in Minnesota, claims have been made that the system encourages excessive legislative expenditures and logrolling for this reason. The writer has heard similar charges voiced against the Minneapolis and even the Detroit councils, although the fact that the latter is elected at large probably mitigates the tendency there. The Nebraska legislature has been charged with being a "fraternity of tolerance" because of vote trading and pork barreling.[34] Nonpartisan legislatures could hardly be called unique in this respect, but the lack of a party answerable for padding of the budget surely places legislators in sore temptation.

It should be noted that although the Minnesota legislature is organized into two caucuses, "Liberal" and "Conservative" to which nearly all members nominally belong, these two groups do not bear collective responsibility for legislative actions. Caucus labels do not appear on the ballot, and the voter often finds it very difficult to discover the allegiance of a non-incumbent candidate, especially since membership is largely optional and often is not announced publicly until after election. Furthermore, caucuses do not directly parallel the two major parties and are not party adjuncts; caucus membership may be very nominal; and both caucuses are without effective methods of disciplining "members."

The twenty-six member Minneapolis city council is likewise divided into two caucuses, "Liberal" and "Progressive," but the same statements may be made about this structural arrangement as have been made concerning the Minnesota legislative caucuses. The Nebraska legislature, in a proper respecting of the spirit of nonpartisanship, does not have caucus organizations, while the Detroit and many other nonpartisan city councils are too small to have even a nominal bifurcation.

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[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 337–338, 350–352, and the sources there cited.

[33] *Ibid.*, Ch. 5.

[34] See Richard C. Spencer, "Nebraska Idea Fifteen Years Old," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 39, p. 86 (Feb., 1950).

SOME RELATIONS BETWEEN EVENTS AND ATTITUDES

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The assumption that the general public reacts rationally to its changing political and economic environment is basic to democratic theory; for if rational reaction to the complex of events having broad political significance is *not* general but is limited to a minority of the public, then the rational few must govern the irrational many. Yet this democratic assumption has been little explored empirically. Protagonists of government responsible to the general public assert it; antagonists deny it—both groups basing their judgment on the common sense of everyday observation or on the rigorous *a priori* requirements of their own political theories, values, and ideologies or of those of such theorists as Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson.

The assumption cannot be examined indirectly and inferentially from analysis of reactions to nonpolitical stimuli. It is of no political consequence that an individual sensibly responds to a sharp object that touches his body by getting out of the way. It is of no political consequence as such that the hungry individual responds by seeking or fantasying food. It is of political consequence when individuals respond to high prices of food or to the threat of war or the prospect of peace by forming attitudes which are or may become the basis for political action.

As a step in the direction of qualifying and quantifying the notion of the rationality of men's political action in this means-end sense, it may be worthwhile to explore directly the changes in attitude which follow gross political and economic events that may "objectively" be said to touch all segments of the general public. By the term "objectively" we refer to events which have in fact affected the general public or may reasonably be expected to do so.

The following hypotheses are suggested:

1) The general public does react meaningfully, sensibly, rationally,[1] to objective events having broad political or economic significance.
2) The more relevant an event is to the individual, the greater will be his reaction to it. For example, the individual who is a potential draftee will react more intensively to a change in the draft laws than an individual who is not.
3) The more relevant an event is to an attitude, the greater will be its influence in changing or strengthening that attitude. For example, the occurrence of a disastrous flood will more markedly change attitudes toward the construction of dams and levees than toward the building of highways and schools.
4) The highly educated individual will respond more sharply to an event, because such

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[1] By "sensibly" or "rationally" we mean here that the general public does shift its attitudes as a consequence of events, in a direction that is consistent with logical inference from the event to its consequences. This does not imply that the public's inferences are correct but that they are arrived at by a *process* basically the same as that used to make any inference from observed or assumed phenomena. In this first hypothesis we are making the basic assumption that the thinking processes of the general public exist and—though doubtless less rigorous—are qualitatively no different from those of the scientist or the logician.

an individual sees the relevance of a happening more readily than the ignorant individual. The individual with high income, because he is more sensitive to events which may increase or diminish his wealth, will similarly respond more sharply.

5) The highly educated individual, because he exposes himself more broadly and deeply to news and news interpretation,[2] will more accurately appraise the impact of an event than will the slightly educated individual.

Two events afford an opportunity to investigate these notions. One is the slump in the grain commodity market in February, 1948, and the other is the proposal for Korean truce negotiations that was made by Jacob Malik in June, 1951. Since both events occurred during a period when the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan was taking interviews, it has consequently been possible to ascertain differences in attitudes before and after the mentioned events. The samples in the two surveys were nationwide and, within the limits of sampling error, representative of the adult population living in private dwelling units in the United States. This does not mean, of course, that the subsamples before and after the events in question were separately representative of the adult population. The subsamples are approximately representative—and representative to a lesser degree than the total samples. The two events will be considered separately for their impact on attitudes and for their support or lack of support of the listed hypotheses.

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The slump in the grain commodity market in February, 1948, was sharp and sudden. Wheat dropped in price to farmers from an average of $2.81 per bushel in January, 1948, to $1.96 in August. Corn dropped from $2.46 in January to $1.21 in November. By the end of the year, the wholesale price of farm products had declined almost 11% from the level of December, 1947. But consumers' prices at the end of 1948 were up about 3% from the December, 1947, level, the slight drop in food (close to 1%) being offset by price increases in all other items, including clothing, rent, fuel and electricity, and housefurnishings. The drop in wholesale and retail food prices was not reflected in income levels, even for farmers. Wages and salaries increased about $13 billion (from about $122 to $135 billion) during 1948; farm income increased about $3 billion (from about $15 to $18 billion).

This being the objective situation during the year of the first major postwar price break in a major segment of the national economy, there is a basis for appraising the reaction of the general public in terms of price and income expectations. The 1948 Survey of Consumer Finances was conducted by the Survey Research Center for the Federal Reserve Board during January and February, 1948. By comparing the proportions of the population sampled before and after the initial, sharp break in the commodity market on February 4, it is possible to observe the impact of the slump on attitudes. Somewhat more than half (53%) of the interviews (about 1850 out of 3500) were taken before the market break. Of the interviews taken afterward, about 30% (1050 out of 3500) were taken ten days or more after the initial break and are used in the present analysis.[3]

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[2] See A. Campbell and C. Metzner, *Public Use of the Library* (Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1950), p. 8 (Table 3), p. 10 (Table 4), and p. 24 (Table 12).

The two relevant questions on price and income expectations were:

What do you think will happen to the prices of the things you buy during 1948—do you think they will go up, or down, or stay about where they are now?

How about a year from now, do you think you will be making more money or less money than you are now?

The most striking fact is the pronounced change in price expectations among all segments of the population sample. The proportion expecting prices to go up before the slump was almost reversed afterwards. Of those who said that prices were going up or down, three out of four before the slump said they were going up. After the slump, close to three out of four said prices were going down.[4] Regardless of their income, education, or occupation, the respondents generally reacted sharply to the slump. Regardless of how the news of the slump reached them, they took cognizance of a major economic event and shifted their opinions in consequence. Although there are slight differences in reactions of various segments of the sample, the sharpness and promptness of the responses among these segments were far more alike than different. The commodity market slump appears mediately or immediately to have caught the attention of, and had meaning for, the poor, unlettered, unskilled individual just as it did for the elite, the ones who as a rule get the most of what there is to get.

Which of the respondents interviewed had got a well structured, sophisticated picture of the slump is not known. In some cases, it may have been that understanding of the actual slump was clear. In others, the understanding may have been no more than a third-hand absorption and repetition of the sentence, "Prices are going down," without knowledge of why prices might do so. Whatever the process by which the respondents' price expectations changed, it is clear that they changed markedly, in apparent consequence of the slump, and in a reasonable direction. That is, respondents did not, following the slump, retain the same price expectations or change them upwards. They reasonably guessed that prices would go down.

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[3] This latter 30% of the total sample is used for the present study in order to avoid any possible distortions caused by the first shock reaction to the break in the market or by the relatively small number of interviews taken immediately after the slump. When the 600 interviews so taken are broken into subgroups, the instability of the small numbers is such as to make impracticable any comparisons based on income, education, occupation, etc.

[4] Of all respondents, interviewed before the slump, 50% expected prices to go up, and of those interviewed 10 days or more after the slump, only 15% expected them to go up. Sixteen per cent expected prices to go down before the slump, and 39% expected them to go down after. The remaining respondents gave answers indicating that they thought prices would stay the same, or they qualified their answers in other ways. See "1948 Survey of Consumer Finances," *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, Vol. 34, p. 643 (June, 1948). In tables throughout the present article, those who gave other than "up" or "down" answers are excluded.

Before continuing with this main theme—that, in accordance with the first hypothesis stated above, the general public does react rationally to large public events—let us examine briefly the differential reactions of various segments of the general public.

In accordance with the second hypothesis—the more relevant an event is to an individual, the greater will be his reaction to it—we may guess that farm operators would react more sharply to the commodity market slump than other occupational groups. Whether or not farmers raise grain crops, to the large majority of them a drop in price of any major farm products is a major change in the area of the economy which is most central to their thinking. Whether or not they should turn out in fact to be wrong in thinking that a drop in grain prices would induce a drop in the prices of the things that they buy, they should be more generally influenced in price expectations than other occupational groups. The following table compares farm operators with members of the other major occupational groups[5] who said that prices would go up and who said they would go down, before and after the break in the commodity market.

TABLE 1

PRICE EXPECTATIONS OF FARMERS COMPARED WITH MEMBERS OF THE OTHER MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARKET SLUMP BEGAN

	Before		After		Percentage Point Shift
	% Up	% Down	% Up	% Down	
Farm Operators	82	18	25	75	57
Others	75	25	22	78	53

The shift in price expectations following the slump is 57 percentage points for farm operators, as compared with 53 points for other occupational groups, a difference of 4 percentage points in favor of farmers being more influenced. The sampling standard error of this difference between the two categories is, however, 4.4, indicating that there is only about one chance in two of the difference being due to factors other than sampling error. The difference is therefore not a significant one.

We might also guess that housewives, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers would react more sharply to the slump than professional men, the self-employed, and managers, because the food-cost items bulk larger for the former than for the latter groups. The table below indicates a percentage-point shift of 56 for the former and 54 for the latter. With a sampling error of 3.5, again there is no significant difference between the shifts of the two combined categories.

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[5] Professionals (doctors, teachers, accountants, etc.), self-employed, managers, other white collar workers, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers, farm laborers, retired, unemployed, and housewives.

TABLE 2

PRICE EXPECTATIONS OF HOUSEWIVES, SKILLED, SEMI-SKILLED, AND UNSKILLED WORKERS COMPARED WITH PROFESSIONAL MEN, SELF-EMPLOYED, AND MANAGERS BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARKET SLUMP BEGAN

	Before		After		Percentage Point Shift
	% Up	% Down	% Up	% Down	
Housewives, *et al.*	79	21	23	77	56
Professionals, *et al.*	73	27	19	81	54

Note: Farm workers, a relatively small group, are unavoidably included with unskilled workers in these tabulations.

In accordance with the same hypothesis, we might guess that lower income groups would react more sharply to the slump than higher income groups. Grain prices are related to food costs, which for lower income groups are a larger portion of the price schedule relevant to their expected expenditures. The following table is divided between those with income of $0–1999 and those with income of $7500 or more during 1947. The shift in price expectations is 53 percentage points for the lower income groups and 46 for those with higher income, a 7 percentage-point difference in favor of the category presumably more affected. With a standard error of 6.2, there is again no significant difference between the two income categories.

TABLE 3

PRICE EXPECTATIONS OF RESPONDENTS WITH LOW INCOMES COMPARED WITH THOSE WITH HIGH INCOMES, BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARKET SLUMP BEGAN

	Before		After		Percentage Point Shift
	% Up	% Down	% Up	% Down	
Income of $0–1999	77	23	24	76	53
Income of $7500 or more	66	34	20	80	46

We do not find significant differences in the reactions of farm operators versus other occupational groups; housewives, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers versus professional and businessmen; and low versus high income groups. But we do find differences that are consistently in the predicted direction. In consequence we may infer (a) that the available data are insufficiently precise to support or refute the second hypothesis; (b) that the event of a marked slump in the commodity market was, for perhaps different reasons, of substantially equal relevance to all groups; or (c) that the hypothesis itself is untenable. It is apparent that the data *are* insufficiently precise. Of the two remaining alternatives, (b) appears to be more likely. The hypothesis itself appears to be psychologically tenable and, as we shall see below, gets support from the data relative to Malik's speech. About the particular meaning of the slump to housewives or business managers or farmers, we can only speculate. We may guess that, although less concerned with food costs than the housewife, the businessman might see this first break in the postwar price structure as a portent of a general economic slump which would affect consumer prices other than food and might even affect the stock market. For whatever reasons, all segments of the population reacted pretty much the same to the slump in its influence on prices. The hypothesis as to relevance of the slump to different groups cannot be satisfactorily verified.

The third hypothesis—that the more relevant an event is to an attitude, the greater will be its influence on that attitude—can be examined in light of the difference in reaction to the slump as affecting price expectations and as affecting income expectations. We have already noted the striking change in price expectations following the slump. When those respondents of the entire sample who said prices were going up are compared with those who said prices were going down, there is a 53 percentage-point shift following the slump. There is only a 3 percentage-point difference between the responses of those who guessed either that their 1948 income was going up or that it was going down. The table below indicates the differences. Although the percentages expecting both prices and incomes to increase before the slump are about the same, expectations of price increases after the slump drop over 50 percentage points while income expectations remain substantially the same. The significant point is that respondents did not react to the slump by modifying their views on a subject (income expectations) which is for most of them not markedly related to the slump in grain prices. The shift in their expectations is limited to prices, which are related to the slump, in terms of the reasonableness of expecting a drop in food prices following the drop in the major commodities from which most food, directly or indirectly, is produced.

TABLE 4

PRICE EXPECTATIONS COMPARED WITH INCOME EXPECTATIONS

	Before		After		Percentage Point Shift
	% Up	% Down	% Up	% Down	
Price Expectations	75	25	22	78	53
Income Expectations	74	26	71	29	3

Note: Farm operators are omitted from this table because of the unavailability of comparable data on farm operators' income expectations.

The fourth hypothesis—that individuals with high income and those with high education will respond more sharply to public events—cannot readily be tested on the basis of the data available on the effect of the commodity market slump. When the professional occupational group is compared with the group of unskilled workers (and farm laborers, unavoidably), as in the table below, there is a difference in the percentage-point shift—5 points in favor of professionals—but with a standard error of 6.8, this difference is not significant. Among these two occupational categories, income and education are probably more highly correlated than in any other occupational groups. When the comparisons are made separately of the differential response of (a) those with low and high incomes and (b) those with low and high education, the results are similar. Table 3 compares on income; Table 6 on education. With 7 percentage points difference between the low and high income groups and a standard error of 6.2, there is no significant difference between the reactions of these categories. With 16 points between the uneducated and most educated categories and a standard error of 8.9, again there is no significant difference between responses related to educational level.

TABLE 5

PRICE EXPECTATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MEN COMPARED WITH UNSKILLED WORKERS (AND FARM LABORERS) BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARKET SLUMP BEGAN

	Before		After		Percentage Point Shift
	% Up	% Down	% Up	% Down	
Professionals	77	23	26	74	51
Unskilled and Farm Laborers	78	22	32	68	46

TABLE 6

PRICE EXPECTATIONS OF RESPONDENTS WITH NO EDUCATION COMPARED WITH THOSE WITH COLLEGE EDUCATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARKET SLUMP BEGAN

	Before		After		Percentage Point Shift
	% Up	% Down	% Up	% Down	
No Education	80	20	42	58	38
College Education	74	26	20	80	54

The fifth hypothesis is related to the superior ability of the highly educated individual to appraise the impact of an event. In this case, the hypothesis dealt not with the problem of *how* highly educated individuals arrived at their predictions but *whether*—because they supposedly had a more complete picture of the factors which might cause consumer prices to go up or down—they more precisely judged the impact of the commodity slump on prices. We have already noted that, despite the severe commodity slump reflected in an 11% drop in the wholesale price of farm products and a 1% drop in retail food prices, overall consumers' prices were up 3% in the year following December, 1947. So the group that, following the slump, forecast in least proportions price decreases and in most proportions price increases was most accurate in appraising the impact of the slump. When the population is divided according to education, this group is the one with no formal education whatsoever, although the difference, as we noted above, is not statistically significant. But when the usual correlates of low education—low income, low skill—are compared, again the groups which most accurately appraised the effect of the slump are those with income of less than $1000 and those who were unskilled or farm laborers.

This relationship doubtless reflects the influence of other factors. It may simply be that the poor, unlettered, unskilled individuals did not hear of the slump in such large numbers as their opposites, for, in terms of impact, a potential drop in food prices should move those individuals more than others. The relationship may in part also reflect—among the poor, uneducated and unskilled segments of the public—a pervading pessimism, with those who get the least of what there is to get expecting a continuation of their hindmost position in the social procession. Further study may reveal that such relationships to political attitudes as income, education, and skill are statistically significant. If so, it may be that such pessimism indicates fortuitously not merely as good a capacity to evaluate reality among the hindmost, but in fact superior capacity. Such relationships may in part indicate a capacity that is not fortuitously superior, but one that is superior because the world with which the poor, uneducated, unskilled individual has contact may be more like the "real," typical world than the more gratifying but "unreal," atypical world in which the richer, educated, skilled individual lives. Squalor, though otherwise scarcely desirable, may in all its forms provide the best vantage point for viewing political reality. Such a finding would be of extraordinary importance with relation to the ability to act sensibly in politics and—to understate the situation—would scarcely vitiate the precept of democracy mentioned in the first paragraph of this analysis.

II

The second event which affords some opportunity to test the listed hypotheses was the speech of Jacob Malik on June 23, 1951, containing the first major proposal made to end hostilities in Korea by beginning armistice negotiations. As in the 1948 commodity market slump, the Survey Research Center was interviewing on a survey before and after Malik's speech, so that comparable data are available from the same sample. Again, it must be mentioned that, whereas the total sample is representative of the adult population of the United States, the before-and-after subsamples are not necessarily cross-sectional. There is the further shortcoming on this survey that only about 16% of the 999 respondents were interviewed after Malik's speech.[6]

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[6] The survey questions here examined were:

1) "Do you think in the next few months our relations with Russia are going to get worse, better, or what?

Despite these shortcomings, a comparison of the responses before and after the date of Malik's speech does indicate a pronounced impact on the general public and significant shifts in attitude following the proposal for armistice negotiations. There was a distinct shift (significant at the 1% level) in expectations of relations with Russia and also a shift (significant at the 5% level) in attitude toward the locus of blame for our international troubles and toward the administrators of American foreign policy. Since there is a considerably more logical relationship between a conciliatory Soviet speech on foreign policy and expected relations with Russia than between such a speech and the other two responses mentioned above, the variations in shift of attitude are as one might expect. Table 7 below presents the shifts on all eight of the questions here analyzed, in the rank order of the statistical significance of the respective percentage-point shifts. Although there is a significant shift only in expectations of relations with Russia, attitude toward the locus of blame for our international troubles, and attitude toward foreign policy administrators, the shifts in response to all the other questions are in a direction which suggests responsiveness to Malik's speech.

On the second hypothesis—the more relevant an event is to an individual, the greater will be his reaction—differential relevance is again, as in the commodity market slump reaction, not significantly present when the sample is compared in income, education, or occupation. But it is quite markedly borne out in the reactions of those living in large metropolitan areas when compared with the nonmetropolitan portion of the sample. As indicated in Table 8 below, metropolitan residents shifted 31 percentage points in their expectations of the course of relations with Russia, whereas nonmetropolitans shifted only 8 points. This 23 percentage-point difference between the two categories, with a standard error of 11.5, is significant at the 5% level. No other shifts in attitude between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan respondents are significant.

The most reasonable explanation for the difference between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan residents is in terms of the differential relevance of Malik's speech to these two groups. Probably the greatest hope of the general public in international relations is for peace, and the greatest fear is of general, total war. And, although casualty lists on the warfront weigh evenly on the entire country, the prospect of casualties from atomic bombing must almost inevitably

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2) "Do you think our troubles with other countries are mainly our own fault or not?
3) "Do you think the people running our affairs with other countries have done a pretty good job or do you think that some other people could have done better?
4) "Do you think the United States should send troops to help protect Europe against Communism?
5) "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea last summer or should we have stayed out?
6) "And what do you expect these prices of household items and clothing will do during the next twelve months or so—stay where they are, go up, or go down?
7) "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the United States has been acting towards other countries?
8) "In the disagreements between President Truman and General MacArthur about how to carry on the war in Korea, who do you think was most nearly right?"

TABLE 7

DIFFERENTIAL SHIFTS IN RESPONSE TO EIGHT QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY BEFORE AND AFTER MALIK'S SPEECH

	% Before		% After		Percentage Point Shift	t-Score
	(Much) Better	(Much) Worse	(Much) Better	(Much) Worse		
Relations with Russia	21	79	40	60	19	3.3
	Mainly No	Mainly Yes	Mainly No	Mainly Yes		
Our international troubles our own fault	66	34	76	24	10	2.2
	(Very) Good Job	(Very) Poor Job	(Very) Good Job	(Very) Poor Job		
Satisfaction with foreign policy administrators	49	51	59	41	10	2.0
	Yes	No	Yes	No		
Troops to Europe	70	30	76	24	6	1.4
	Yes	No	Yes	No		
Right to fight in Korea	50	50	56	44	6	1.2
	Down	Up	Down	Up		
Price expectations next 12 months	22	78	29	71	7	1.1
	(Very) Stsfd	(Very) Dsstisfd	(Very) Stsfd	(Very) Dsstisfd		
Satisfaction with foreign policy administration	43	57	48	52	5	1.0
	Pro-Truman	Pro-MacArthur	Pro-Truman	Pro-MacArthur		
Truman vs. MacArthur	31	69	33	67	2	.4

bear heaviest on dwellers in and around large cities, the prime targets of an enemy attack. It would be strange indeed if a Russian proposal leading supposedly (though not actually) to peace in 1951 should not cause more metro-

TABLE 8

EXPECTATIONS ON RUSSIAN RELATIONS OF METROPOLITAN COMPARED WITH NON-METROPOLITAN RESPONDENTS BEFORE AND AFTER MALIK'S SPEECH

	Before		After	
	% Better	% Worse	% Better	% Worse
Metropolitan	26	74	57	43
Nonmetropolitan	19	81	27	74

politans than nonmetropolitans to become more optimistic about relations with Russia.

In connection with Table 7, which ranks, in terms of significance, the shifts on foreign policy questions following Malik's speech, there is evidence lending some support to the third hypothesis on the relevance of an event to an attitude. We should expect, for example, that the public's judgment on Truman and MacArthur and on troops to Europe would be less influenced than its judgment on relations with Russia. But there is less apparent reason for satisfaction with the administrators of foreign policy to shift twice as many percentage points as satisfaction with the administration of foreign policy, even though the questions are by no means the same. If this difference in response on the two questions were statistically significant, and if the difference between policy and administration were not a real one, the problem with relation to the hypothesis would be serious.

The relative smallness of the sample prohibits any exploration of the fourth and fifth hypotheses in connection with Malik's speech.

III

The foregoing analysis hints at certain preconceptions and makes certain inferences which merit clarification. One of our preconceptions has to do with the focus of research interest in the fields of political attitudes and behavior. A relatively large amount of research has been concerned with describing political behavior in terms of the subject's or the respondent's socio-economic class, his religion, his education, or his family background. Stemming perhaps from a strong attraction to the notion of class determination of personality and, by inference, of political attitude and behavior, such research errs not so much in its findings as in the implication that an individual's political behavior is determined *wholly* by unconscious, nonrational forces over which he has no control whatsoever—even perceptual control. The panorama of politics is always, according to such research, viewed through the eyes of an individual preformed by his socio-economic class, his religious group, etc. The individual becomes a passive instrument of the vast social forces of history.

According to this notion, an ignorant working man should always see things as an ignorant working man and not as an individual whose perceptual processes operate pretty much the same as those of the next fellow—whether the next fellow be a business man, a doctor, or a social scientist. Our objection to this notion is not to an assumption of the partial validity, for example, of class theory, but to the assumption that class or occupation or education or religious influences are, or can ever promise to become, entirely valid, entirely explanatory rationales of how individuals form their political attitudes and how they behave politically.

It can scarcely be true that, because both the unskilled laborer and the professional man are more alike than different in their interpretations of the influence of such events as a commodity market slump or a proposal for truce negotiations in Korea, both types of person will vote alike. The laborer characteristically will continue to vote for Democrats and the professional for Republicans. The point is that the series of large public events which are a considerable portion of the total perceptual field of both kinds of person are substantially the same for both. Our data suggest that there is some variation in the impact of events on different segments of the population. But the objective event of general public significance is itself the same, is presented to all citizens in pretty much the same forms, and is seen as having much the same effect by all groups.

If the impact of large public events were otherwise, there would be little basis for a relatively stable political community, because the sole basis for opinion and action would be such slow-changing determinants as class and education—and the conflicting, even irreconcilable interests which these determinants are likely to imply. If the threat of economic depression or war were seen much differently by the working man than by his boss, there would be not even the perceptual basis for the relatively peaceful compromise of interest which politics (rather than war) entails. It is difficult, for example, solely on the basis of Lazarsfeld's analysis of the voters in Erie County, to conceive either of political compromise or of change in party leadership of the national administration. If the citizen always voted as his socio-economic class position dictated, it is doubtful that the Republicans would have lost the 1932 election or—to reverse the coin—that the Democrats would ever lose one in the future. Without the interposition of broad public events, how could *any* individual have ever been moved to shift his party allegiance?

The relative homogeneity of response among all social and economic groups to the two events examined casts some doubt on the notion that any particular class is fitted by superior sensitivity to reality, or by superior ability to test reality, to rule over the rest of the public. The ability to react sensibly to public events is by no means the only criterion for effectual political participation, but it is at least a minimum essential for the forming of judgments which may be the basis for choosing between two or more alternative lines of policy offered to the general public by the leadership of political parties. The response to the two events by no means demonstrates that the criteria for political judgment are sensible ones but does suggest that a focusing of research on the relationship between events and attitudes may in time lead to finding out what portion of the congeries of determinants are realistically perceived by the citizen and what are a function of unconscious forces.

Analyzing the relationship between events and attitudes raises the obvious question of how the researcher knows that attitudes were shifted in consequence of any one event or series of events rather than in consequence of some other, extraneous, factor. On the basis of the data used here, there is by way of answer only the possibility of reasonable inference. It may be that it was not the commodity slump that induced a pronounced shift in price expectations. It may be that it was not Malik's speech or the events surrounding his speech, such as talk of peace in Washington, that induced a shift in expectations on relations with Russia. But it seems more reasonable to explain the shifts observed on the basis of reaction to the events mentioned than to explain them on the basis of any other factor so uniformly resulting in a nation-wide change in attitudes logically related to the events and so uniformly not resulting in such change in attitudes less related or unrelated to the events.

The hypotheses advanced and the data examined prove neither the rationality of the American citizen nor the viability of government which is institutionally responsible to the general public. But the hypotheses and the data offer a suggestion of the kinds of empirical research which can qualify and quantify some of the assumptions which underlie our democratic institutions and aspirations.

RESPONSIVENESS, RESPONSIBILITY, AND MAJORITY RULE

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"Responsiveness," "responsibility," and "majority rule" comprise a trio of terms that are basic to the discipline of political science, and particularly to the analysis of democratic political institutions; yet so undeveloped is our science that they represent apples of discord rather than areas of agreement. Where we should have clear concepts for scientific analysis, we are confronted rather with thought receptacles whose unexplored ambiguities constitute standing solicitations to fallacy—solicitations, it may be added, that receive a bountiful response. In view of this situation, it is little wonder that, when we go beyond description to evaluation, we find the doctors in violent disagreement.

This article is not limited to definitions. The writer takes a stand on more than one of the issues that plague and divide students of the democratic political process. It is written, therefore, not only in the firm belief that terms ought to be defined, but also with the conviction that in this case an analysis of meanings will lead almost automatically to a resolution of some of the mooted issues, while contributing substantially to a rational appraisal of others.

It will be assumed throughout that we are broadly agreed upon the desirability of democratic institutions. It is also believed that for present purposes, in spite of what was just said about the importance of definitions, it is unnecessary to formulate a careful definition of "democratic institutions." Indeed, one of my tasks will be to try to disentangle arguments about what is "democratic" from disputes about what is desirable.[1] While I shall deal with each of the terms under consideration separately, they are in fact interrelated and the discussions will tend to overlap. I shall discuss responsiveness first, then majority rule, and last responsibility, in the belief that the cumulative effect will contribute to the organization of the whole.

I. RESPONSIVENESS

The word "responsiveness" is less frequently encountered in the literature of political science than either of the other terms under discussion, but the idea is central to any study of politics. It is the counterpart of influence. The person or group that exerts influence is influential; the person or group on whom it is exerted is responsive. In the context of democracy, and as applied to the government as a whole, the primary meaning of responsiveness might be defined as "reflecting and giving expression to the will of the people." No sooner are these words uttered, however, than difficulties become apparent. "The will of the people" is a slippery concept at best. The substitution of the more respectable term "public opinion" does not avoid the basic difficulty that often there are many wills, many opinions, but neither a consensus nor even a majority. Under such circumstances (which prevail more often than not) the primary meaning of responsiveness has no application.

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[1] The last statement might seem to contradict the previous assumption of agreement upon the desirability of democratic institutions. Actually, however, it only points to the fact that the broad area of agreement is qualified when it comes to details. Here, all too frequently, discussion of what is desirable is obfuscated by debate over what is "democratic."

By responsiveness we may also mean "responding easily to any and all demands." Presumably the democrat who used the term in this sense and who considered it a virtue would mean "popular" demands. Even so, just what responsiveness calls for, under certain circumstances, is not entirely clear. Suppose there are two pressures (demands) which, while being in the strictest sense compatible, lead to mutually self-defeating results. Probably the government that yields to both rather than to neither of these pressures would generally be considered the more responsive (whether or not the more desirable). We may also note at this point, for later reference, that the question of responsiveness to popular demands raises immediately the matter of the intensity of those demands. Is the responsive government content to count demands, or does it attempt to measure their strength? And how should it respond to a situation in which 35 per cent of the electorate are strongly in favor of certain proposed legislation, 55 per cent are mildly opposed to it, and the remaining 10 per cent are indifferent? The definition of responsiveness provides no answer.

The uncertainty as to the meaning and the application of the term "responsiveness" makes it impossible to say much, in general terms, about its desirability. From the broad philosophical orientation that we have assumed, it is clear that governments should be responsive to any clear and settled popular demand. Some would say that they should respond quickly to any clear expression of public opinion, whether or not "settled," while others would hold that the opinion should persist long enough to give some assurance that it represented more than a passing whim. We shall have more to say about this difference later. At present it may be noted simply that, while the writer would support the second position, the practical difference between the two is less than might appear. Where most people have definite opinions on a subject—in other words, where public opinion is "clear"—it is unlikely that general sentiment will be quickly reversed. Experience shows that a large section of the public will have no opinion at all on most public issues unless these issues have been the subject of prolonged and intensive public debate or have been forced upon the attention of nearly everyone by events so compelling as to brook no indifference. Under such circumstances opinions are likely to be held with sufficient firmness that they will not be quickly reversed.

II. MAJORITY RULE

We have been speaking in such vague terms as "clear public demand." Those who wish to describe the kind and degree of responsiveness they think desirable in more precise terms frequently resort to the concept of "majority rule." Again, we may start with what may be called an essential or minimum meaning. The principle of majority rule requires, at the least, that no minority shall be entitled to impose its will upon a majority. (In this sense, majority rule is the simple negation of minority rule.) In other words, the vote of each must be given the same weight as that of every other; otherwise, by a combination of individuals having extra votes, a minority might be able to impose its will on the majority. The principle of the majority is the principle of equality, the denial of the right of any minority to rule.

To this meaning, however, some would add another. They would say that majority rule means not only the negation of minority rule, but also the positive affirmation of the right of the majority to rule. Majority rule, according to this definition, includes the right of a bare majority of one-half plus one to decide any issue.[2] This meaning we may designate "absolute" majority rule. To place any limitations upon the majority, such as a requirement of two-thirds concurrence for certain purposes, is, according to the supporters of the absolutist position to permit a minority to rule, because a minority can prevent the majority from realizing its demands.[3] There can be no quarrel with this definition. Whether majority rule so defined is desirable is another question, to which we shall turn in a moment. It should be clearly understood at this point, however, that there are two definitions of majority rule; that the first is a clear and useful concept; and that the second is in no way implied by it. Limitations upon a majority may give power to a minority, but that power is not "rule" in the same sense as the majority's rule. The power to say "thou shalt not" is a mighty one, but it is by no means equivalent to the power to say "do so-and-so," when "so-and-so" may be anything the speaker desires. Occasionally the President may be able to use his veto power in such a way as to force the enactment of legislation he wants; but more frequently he cannot, as is abundantly testified by the substantial number of presidentially sponsored bills that remain unenacted at the close of every Congress. It leads only to confusion to speak of a veto power as "rule."

It should also be pointed out that there is a great difference between *a* minority and *the* minority. In its minimum sense, majority rule implies that no particular group of persons shall be given more power than others. To give a power to *any* minority of, say, 40 per cent of the electorate to prevent certain action is by no means the same thing as to endow a *specified* 40 per cent of the electorate with a veto. In the former case, all are treated alike: those who are in today's majority may be in tomorrow's minority, and *vice versa*. The difference is one between equality and special privilege. Here, again, is an important distinction that is ignored by the second definition of majority rule.

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[2] It may well be contended that this is the literal and more obvious meaning of the phrase. There is need, however, for some expression to cover what we have called the minimum meaning, and no alternative to the term "majority rule" has gained currency for this purpose.

[3] Willmoore Kendall is the most active current defender of this position, which was earlier championed by Hugo Krabbe and by J. Allen Smith. See Kendall's "The Majority Principle and the Scientific Elite," *Southern Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 463–473 (Winter, 1939), and his "Prolegomena to Any Future Work on Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 694–713 (Nov., 1950).

At this point it may be well to say a word about the relationship of majority rule to "democracy," although this matter is not our primary concern. It would seem clear that the minimum meaning of majority rule—equality of voting power—is included in practically any definition of democracy. It does not appear to the writer that general usage supports the claim that democracy implies the second, and much more restrictive, definition of majority rule. Note, for instance, that it is rather the normal than the unusual practice for small groups to insist on considerably more than a bare majority as a basis for action in matters of importance. They prolong discussion and delay voting in hopes of obtaining a consensus. The Quaker practice of acting on the basis of the "sense of the meeting" is only a somewhat extreme application of a principle that receives wide recognition in the procedures of small groups. Moreover, this consideration for the individual and for minorities and this desire to achieve something approaching unanimity is not generally thought of as an undemocratic practice. On the contrary, it is felt to be highly democratic. Although it is recognized that the same procedure has, at best, limited application in large political units, that recognition is usually tinged with regret and with an understanding that to this extent the larger unit cannot achieve as great a degree of democracy as the smaller.[4] However all this may be, it is important that we should not let ourselves be bogged down on the matter of the definition of democracy. We are immediately concerned with the merits of majority rule, and we should take care to use definitions to clarify our problem rather than to obscure it.

About the desirability of majority rule in its minimum meaning there can be no question here. It is implied by all definitions of democracy, the value of which we have assumed, for present purposes. Equality of votes, certainly. Beyond this, however, we must proceed with caution. To insist on majority rule in the more extended sense of the second definition above, seems to the writer unwise and undesirable.

Before setting forth the major reasons for taking this position, it will be well to consider certain practical questions that arise as soon as one attempts to apply the majoritarian position. Is it the majority of the electorate or the majority of the elected representatives that should rule? Since the former would be impracticable for any major state, it is perhaps safe to assume that it is not what is meant. Quite apart from the unfeasibility of submitting all questions to a popular referendum, we are confronted with the further difficulty that there is no such thing as a majority will on many questions, so widespread are ignorance and indifference.

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[4] *Cf.* A. D. Lindsay's general argument in *The Essentials of Democracy* (Philadelphia, 1929), and especially the following statement: "We cannot, I think, ever make our political government, *considered in itself*, really representative. The scale on which it has to operate is too vast—its units, the constituencies, are, if taken in themselves, too big and far too little informed by any public spirit to be really democratic. But if a vigorous nonpolitical democratic life exists, the political machinery may harmonize and coordinate all that partial focussing of public opinion which the nonpolitical associations perform" (p. 81).

If, however, we substitute for the electorate their elected representatives, further difficulties emerge. Perhaps we can summarize them by saying that any representative system will be imperfectly representative, and that this fact itself raises serious questions for a theory that defends the absolute right of a bare majority to do anything it pleases. It should be remembered, too, that perfect representativeness is not even a conceivable ideal, so long as the electorate remains as it is. Whether or not it is desirable that a majority of *the electorate* should have its way, when it has a "way," there would seem to be no good reason for insisting, as a matter of absolute right, that a bare majority of *elected representatives* should always be able to enact *their* wishes, even though there may be no majority will for them to represent. This conclusion is reinforced when we consider that, on any particular question, the representatives may not even reflect the views of a plurality of those who have any opinion on the matter.

It is partly because of this inherent imperfection of the representative process that constitutions frequently provide for more than one method of representation, on the theory that the errors of one may offset those of another. Both bicameralism and the device of an independently elected chief executive are means to this end. I am not now concerned to defend any particular means or combinations of means for achieving representation. Obviously one might defend an independently elected chief executive without defending the electoral college, and so on. We merely point out that there are inherent errors in representative systems and that this fact provides a basis of support for multiple constituency systems.[5]

Waiving these difficulties, for the sake of argument, we may proceed to evaluate the desirability of applying the majority rule principle in the absolutist sense. I believe that rigid adherence to any such principle is not desirable; and in support of this position, I shall advance four considerations, each of which, under certain circumstances, would justify a limitation upon the absolute power of the majority. First, there is the preservation of the majority rule itself, or of some principle, such as that of free speech, which is so intimately related to majority rule as to be virtually inseparable from it. It is difficult to see how a provision the sole effect of which was to prevent a majority from voting away its own power to rule could be judged bad by a person who has accepted the desirability of democracy (or of majority rule, minimum meaning) in the first place.[6] To make such a judgment would come perilously close to self-contradiction. To refute the extreme majoritarian position, all that is required is to establish the defensibility of a simple provision that would make it unconstitutional for a bare majority to vote away its powers irrevocably. It need not even be an absolute prohibition of such action; it might be a requirement of, say, a two-thirds majority.

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[5] By a "multiple constituency system," is meant one in which the electorate is organized in more than one way for the purpose of getting it to register its opinions, as for instance by congressional districts and by states.

[6] Note that we are avoiding the question of whether or not it is democratic. If someone wants to argue that it is undemocratic to prevent democracy from committing suicide, let him take that position. To argue that point here would merely distract attention from the essential question of whether or not to prevent such action would be a good thing.

There is, moreover, a slightly different kind, or condition, of democracy that needs to be protected even against majorities themselves. It is a commonplace that democracy will fail where a certain undefinable minimum of agreement ceases to exist.[7] Without some degree of consensus, the democratic process, and especially bare majority decisions, will not be tolerated. Again, commonsense suggests the desirability of taking any steps that may prevent the technique (majority rule) from destroying the end that the technique serves (democracy). It is pertinent in this connection to recall the behavior of small groups when they are trying to operate democratically. Within a family, for instance, decision by a majority on important issues is recognized to be a last resort. The attempt is made to continue discussion, exploration of alternatives, evaluation, and reëvaluation of objectives, until unanimity is reached. In such a group, too, the members are sensitive to differences in intensity of interest; accordingly, majorities are especially loath to override minorities when it is recognized that the minority feels more strongly about the matter in question than does the majority.

The recognition within small groups of the desirability of maintaining a maximum of unity generally operates to restrain reliance upon majority rule without any special rules or institutional provisions. What has been said, moreover, is by no means true only of the family. Committees, college faculties, and many other relatively small groups generally are disinclined to decide important issues by bare majorities. In large organizations, however, this degree of self-restraint is not always to be counted upon. Majorities in societies at large are more likely to be unmindful of, if not unaware of, the effect of actions of bare majorities on matters of great importance to the minority. Yet the consequences of such action can be disastrous to consensus. It is true that the Great Society cannot be expected to attain to the degree of solidarity that is normal to many smaller groups; but this does not mean that it can afford to be careless with its consensus reserve. Its margin of safety is likely to be no greater, at best, than that of the smaller group.

The discussion of family decision-making suggests two other desiderata for the democratic process, both of which may be fostered by placing some limitations upon what may be called, with apologies to Charles Beard, "hair-trigger majorities." The first of these is adequate opportunity for investigation, analysis, exploration of alternatives, and reflection, with the aid of discussion by individuals acting singly. Whether these objectives themselves ever merit the use of the device of requiring an extraordinary majority for action is a matter of judgment. All that is contended here is that we are not entitled to decide *a priori* that the advantage of making possible a fuller consideration of a question and a more intensive campaign of education does not justify the increased opportunity for obstructionism by minority groups that is provided by special majority requirements. Minorities may be right. The democratic faith itself insists that they may, and that, if full opportunity for discussion is provided, the truth will tend to prevail. Nothing about the logic of the case for free speech tells us that it will ensure truth's prevailing over fifty per cent plus one of the the people at any given time.

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[7] It is interesting to note that Professor Kendall admits that a majority loses its claim to obedience when there ceases to be a community ("Prolegomena to Any Future Work on Majority Rule," p. 706). Perhaps, then, it may be wise to try to keep it from doing certain things peculiarly likely to undermine its moral (and practical) foundation.

Finally, it has now twice been intimated that the weight to be accorded an opinion or a demand should be a function of its intensity as well as of the numbers by whom it is expressed. In the small group, this proposition seems obvious; in the state, we easily lose sight of it. Surely, however, the equal consideration to which we feel that each individual is entitled does not mean that the demand of a millionaire for a yacht should be considered as of equal importance with the demand of anyone for enough to eat. Because each alike has a life to protect and a wellbeing to further, we hold that votes should be counted equally; but it does not follow that, where ancillary devices for giving some effect to the intensity of felt interest can be found, they should not be used.

The problem of giving effect to intensity of demand is less a matter of what is desirable than of how to accomplish the desired objective. The kinds of devices that were appropriate for the objectives discussed above—requirements for delaying majority decisions and for extraordinary majorities—are less useful here. It is pertinent to observe in this connection, however, that the ordinary machinery of representative government, just because it does not automatically reflect the will of the majority of the electorate even when there is such a will, does provide some opportunity for giving effect to intensity. Representatives, in considering how to vote, and in anticipating the probable effect of their actions on their prospects for reëlection, seek to find out much more than the kind of information ordinarily supplied by a Gallup poll. They want to know not only how many people favor a given bill, but also how strongly they feel about it. If the majority supporting a given proposal does not feel strongly enough about it to change their usual voting habits, while the minority, on the contrary, does, the representatives may well vote against the wishes of the majority. Even though prompted by pure self-interest, such behavior may achieve the desirable result of giving effect to the interest of the whole in greater degree than would have been accomplished by following the weak majority interest. Other things being equal, longer terms of office for legislators may be presumed to encourage this kind of legislative conduct, for the simple reason that the more intensely a person feels his interest to be affected the longer he is likely to remember, and seek to punish, acts unfavorable to it.

III. RESPONSIBILITY

One of the most basic of the concepts used by political scientists in appraising the operation of governmental institutions is that of "responsibility." This notion, as will appear, is closely related to the two that have just been discussed. Once more we are faced at the outset with a problem of definitions. The term seems to have two quite separate and distinct meanings, neither of which is an extension of the other. In the first place, responsibility means accountability, in the sense of answerability. A person is responsible to another for his actions when he can be held to account for them by another. A government is responsible when its tenure of office is subject to control, within limits, by the electorate. Similarly a ministry that holds power at the pleasure of the legislature is said to be responsible to the legislature. By way of an extension of this meaning, when a government comprises many elective officers, and especially when its functions are divided among different elective organs, it is frequently held that responsibility involves the identifiability of particular individuals or groups who are the effective causes of whatever the government does. In other words, it is maintained that for the government as a whole to be accountable to the electorate is not enough, but that the voters should be able to identify the responsible authorities and hold them accountable as a group for their deeds and misdeeds.

The second meaning of responsibility, according to Webster, and one less frequently referred to in the literature of political science, is that of explicability. A person's conduct is responsible if it is susceptible to rational explanation and, furthermore, if it is conditioned upon an attempt to obtain the relevant facts, upon deliberation, and upon consideration of, and due regard for, the consequences. A person or a legislative body that acts impulsively and without consideration of the bearing of his or its acts is said to be irresponsible. Likewise the attitude of "*après moi le déluge.*"

Political responsibility is generally admitted to be "a good thing." The questions are, "What does it involve?" and "What are the relations between the two kinds of responsibility?" We shall deal first with responsibility in the second of the senses outlined above, because that can be disposed of more easily. It is unlikely that anyone would deny the desirability, other things being equal, of responsible government in this sense. To be sure, other things may not be equal; and most of us might prefer a less responsible democracy to a more responsible benevolent despotism. The question then would be, "How far should we go in this direction?" Responsibility, in the sense now before us, involves some limitations upon absolute majority rule and upon responsiveness. A government that responds immediately, with positive action, to majority wishes cannot take time for full ascertainment of facts, for adequate analysis, for calculation of consequences, and for weighing of values. It may be assumed that there are few who would, in principle, push the demand for responsiveness or for majority rule so far as to sacrifice completely the opportunity for such research and deliberation, although the procedures they support might have this practical effect. The important point here, however, is simply to note that there is a degree of conflict between the ideals of responsiveness and responsibility, and that this conflict adds support to the positions taken above in the discussion of the other terms.

When we turn to a consideration of responsibility in the sense of answerability, the issues become more complicated. It is, of course, of the very essence of the democratic position that the government should be accountable to the people. Our difficulties begin when we go on to the claim that effective accountability necessitates the identifiability, within the government as a whole, of a particular group who can be held jointly answerable for whatever is done or not done. The theory based upon this claim is that, where power is divided among numerous individuals, responsibility can be evaded unless all, or a substantial group, can be held liable. With reference to the responsibility of ministers to legislature, under the cabinet form of government, it is felt that the joint accountability of the ministry for all action within its sphere provides the ideal solution. It is important, also, that those who would hold the ministers accountable should have a workable means for doing so, which in turn involves the possibility of substituting another ministry. The device of alternative political parties, preferably operating under a two-party system, seems to provide the most satisfactory answer for this need.

All of this, however, has no bearing on the problem as it manifests itself under the separation of powers system, where the executive is independent of the legislature. (Moreover, even under the cabinet form of government, there is the further and fundamental problem of enforcement of responsibility on the legislature and executive together by the electorate.) Again, the orthodox theory depends on the expedient of the political party. The electorate cannot be expected, it is reasoned, to follow the votes of individual legislators and cast their ballots accordingly, nor to distinguish between the responsibilities of President, Congressman, and Senator, in the exercise of their suffrage. Rather, the task of the voter must be simplified. The party must be able to enforce its collective will upon all concerned—President, Senator, and Congressman alike. Then the voter need only look to see which party is in power. If he approves of what has been done and of what that party promises to do in the future, he votes for the candidates of that party. If he prefers the program of the opposition party, he votes for its candidates. Walter Lippmann long ago gave a clear and simple statement of this theory, when he wrote: "To support the Ins when things are going well, to support the Outs when they seem to go badly; this, in spite of all that is said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popular government."[8]

Although, as Lippmann recognized, parties in fact must be judged on the basis of very general and vague standards, it has been widely felt to be the ideal that they should take clear stands on specific issues. Then, of course, party members in the executive and legislative branches would have to adhere to these positions; that is to say, they would have to accept party "discipline," for otherwise the whole system would be ineffectual.[9] In other words, those who would stress the role of political parties as instrumentalities of government, as opposed to mere nominating devices, must emphasize the elements of program and discipline.

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[8] Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York, 1925), p. 126. The fact that, if party government worked in full accordance with the theory, the intent of the separation of powers would be defeated is generally thought to be one of the virtues of strong political parties.

[9] Readers of this article will not need to be referred to the very extensive literature setting forth and defending this position. It has, of course, been given its most authoritative recent expression by the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association in "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," Supplement to THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950).

Now it is clear that party government, in this sense seldom very effective in this country, is today at a low ebb.[10] There are also evidences that voters are both less inclined to vote a straight party ticket and readier to shift their support from one major party to the other than once was the case. The 1950 election in New York City, in which a plurality of the voters supported a Republican candidate for Governor, a Democrat for Senator, and an Independent for Mayor, was a spectacular instance of what appears to be a growing tendency.[11] It may also be noted that, even apart from the controversial literature that the American Political Science Association's committee report, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," has elicited, numerous students of politics have come to question the workability of the party responsibility theory as applied to this country. Witness, for example, Professor Lasswell's statement that "America is far too diversified, articulate, and swift to abide the elephantine routines of party obligation."[12]

These facts pose a real problem. If the theory is sound, the situation must be bad. While no attempt at a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the party responsibility theory will be made here, it is believed that some assistance to seeing it in its proper perspective can be derived from approaching it in the light of the preceding discussion of responsiveness, responsibility, and majority rule.

In the first place, the system of government through the agency of disciplined political parties may run counter to the principle of majority rule, at least in the sense of responsiveness to the majority of the electorate. If the party that controls the legislature and executive submits to group discipline and supports whatever is agreed upon by a majority of its own membership, it is clear that this majority of a majority may itself represent only a minority of the electorate. (This problem can be ameliorated, of course, if the party caucus refuses to bind itself by a bare majority vote.) Nor is such a hypothetical case at all improbable. There can be little doubt that it has recently been exemplified in Great Britain. The nationalization of steel is quite clearly an instance, for in 1950 a majority of the voters cast their ballots for candidates who were opposed to this program. It may even be questioned whether most of the nationalization program carried out between 1945 and 1950 had the support of the majority of the voters, in view of the fact that the popular majority for Socialism in 1945 was, at most, a matter of some 65,000 votes, from nearly 25 million.[13] Since the nationalization program was clearly the least popular plank in Labour's platform, their majority, if it is to be counted at all, must be attributed to other factors.

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[10] See Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 69, No. 1 (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 28–34, and especially Table 3, p. 28.

[11] It is true that this phenomenon may itself be a consequence of the indeterminate nature of the parties; but it pretty effectively disposes of the argument that strong parties are needed because of the voters' inability to distinguish between individual candidates.

[12] Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York, 1950), p. 120.

It may be replied that the British voters cast their ballots with their eyes open and must be presumed to have preferred other parts of the Labour program *with* nationalization to opposition programs *without* it. This is perfectly true. It is also true, however, that to force such a harsh alternative upon the voters might not be necessary under a looser party system. And, furthermore, even with disciplined parties, clear programs, and sharp issues, one must be chary indeed about interpreting the results of national elections in terms of particular issues. Did the British electorate express itself in favor of Labour's nationalization program? In view of the fact that anyone who approved of the rest of Labour's program more than he disapproved of nationalization had no alternative but to vote for the latter along with the former, such a conclusion would clearly be unjustified; yet it is the conclusion called for by the orthodox theory.

As a footnote, we may observe that the system of direct primaries not only makes it more difficult to enforce party regularity in the legislature, but also makes the result of such enforcement more unrepresentative, more contrary to rule by the majority of the voters. And yet—and this, for present purposes, is the significant point—the institution of the direct primary is aimed directly at the objective of securing responsiveness to the majority will. The potential conflict between party government and majority rule, in other words, is once more indicated.

A second consequence of the party government system may be briefly noted: it encourages sharp reversals of policy. Again the case of British nationalization of the steel industry is in point. Clearly, in this instance, a decision of basic importance was taken, and acted upon, before it had a sufficiently strong basis in public opinion to be stable. While the example of steel is by no means unique,[14] it is exceptional. The reason it is exceptional, however, is that even in Britain parties, although disciplined, are not highly programmatic. More often than not a decision between them does not contribute greatly to the clarification of the majority opinion about issues, because the parties hedge, or agree, on the issues. In other words, party responsibility does not necessarily mean greater clarity as to issues, as is frequently assumed to be the case. Under such circumstances accountability is not furthered.

An oft-remarked effect of disciplined parties is to diminish the power and importance of the individual legislator. Insofar as a collective judgment is substituted for individual judgment, the sense of responsibility of the individual legislator tends to be weakened. Furthermore, and this would be particularly true in the United States where legislative membership is not the sole avenue to top executive positions in the government, a system that weakens the position of the individual legislator would make it more difficult to interest able and responsible men in running for legislative office.

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[13] See the excellent analysis by R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, *The British General Election of 1945* (London, 1947), pp. 250–253. Even this insignificant margin is cancelled out if the unclassified Independents and Welsh Nationalists be counted as anti-Socialist. *Ibid.*, pp. 252–253.

[14] Cf. the account of the effects of changes of governments on housing programs in Britain during the twenties, in Barbara Wootton, *Freedom Under Planning* (Chapel Hill, 1945), pp. 131–133.

It is time we looked at the other side of the picture. If the system of strong, programmatic parties tends to conflict with the objective of responsiveness to the will of the majority, encourages instability of policy or avoids this evil only on pain of losing its claimed advantage of greater accountability, and if it diminishes the number of responsible individuals in the legislature, what of the situation with weak parties? Is it unresponsive or irresponsible? Although these questions are too large to be given anything like a complete answer in this article, it is hoped that examination from the point of view of the preceding analysis can suggest partial answers.

The American system of loose and undisciplined parties which vie, on scarcely even terms, with pressure groups and other associations for giving expression to public opinion, is frequently referred to as government by consensus, or by "concurrent majorities." By permitting representatives to regroup themselves from issue to issue, with relatively little regard for party affiliation, the very looseness of the American system fosters the maximum response to majority will. (It may be observed in passing that the total product of the legislative process under this system is likely to bear more resemblance to a patchwork quilt than to a woven blanket. The significance of this fact will be discussed at a later stage in the argument.) At the same time, the system of checks and balances tends to make it difficult to secure the enactment of legislation unless it is very strongly supported by public opinion generally or, in the absence of such support, at least is not vigorously opposed by any of the great pressure groups. It will be apparent that this second feature of American government considerably modifies the first (the party system itself). The two must be considered together.

What can be said of the legislative process under the system of government prevailing in this country? As Professor Bailey has said, "one generalization is that the process is almost unbelievably complex."[15] A bill is drafted, perhaps by a legislator, more likely by the staff of an administrative agency, a pressure group, or a policy-leading group such as the National Planning Association or the Committee for Economic Development, or by some combination of two or more such agencies. If it is an important bill with substantial backing, it will be the subject of extensive hearings and subsequent executive deliberations by committees in both houses of Congress. The testimony of experts from within and without the government, arguments and persuasive efforts of all kinds, the views of concerned administrative agencies and of the President, will all be presented. The staff experts of the congressional committees themselves are likely to play an influential role. There will be abundant opportunities for amendment at various stages along the legislative path in an effort to adjust conflicting interests; and especially if the measure is highly controversial, it is unlikely to emerge from the legislative mill in its original form. The result is typically the product of many minds and many interests, acting with the aid of extensive research facilities to bring to bear the relevant facts and to point out distortions or omissions in each other's arguments and factual presentations. The process is designed to maximize the opportunities for criticism, for fresh ideas and insights, and for achieving a result that will receive the widest possible acceptance. By this same token, however, the product is likely to be quite different from what would have been desired by any of the interested groups in the first instance—perhaps quite different from what any of them would still consider ideal. Final votes in all probability may not divide sharply along party lines. Such a situation, it is sometimes held, is bad because no "recognizable group, interest, or individual" can be held responsible.[16]

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[15] Stephen Kemp Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1950), p. 236.

Now it seems clear that the legislative process we have just described involves considerable pains to achieve action that is responsible in the sense of being explicable, rationally supportable. Decision follows only after there has been ample opportunity for investigation and deliberation. The issue before us, then, is whether it is to be condemned because of a failure to meet the test of responsibility in the first sense—answerability. With respect to this question, several observations suggest themselves. In the first place, it would appear that the lack of an identifiable group, interest, or individual as responsible for a given act is certainly not *ipso facto* bad, because such a lack may indicate virtually unanimous support. Surely all unanimous-consent legislation is not to be condemned because of the absence of opposition! In other words, the kind of lack of responsibility that can be attributed to the legislative process as described above, as it operated in the enactment of the Employment Act of 1946, for example, is a function of facts that add to the generality of its acceptability. Responsibility for steel nationalization in England was clear; but it was purchased at the price of such low acceptability that the decision did not stick. Nationalization of the mines, not to mention "cradle-to-the-grave" security, on the other hand, had bipartisan support from the outset. It is hard to view with dissatisfaction the consequent diffusion of responsibility.

If we look again at the example of the Employment Act of 1946, it appears that the only way in which responsibility could have been made clearer would have been either to have had a different final Act—for instance, something more like the original bill—or to have had the whole idea defeated. That is to say, if the result had been more pleasing to one or the other of the (relatively) extreme groups, responsibility would have been clearer. Yet such an achievement would have been more displeasing to the defeated groups, less close to modal opinion, and therefore more likely to prove unstable. Certainly it would have been less representative of public opinion.

We must look further, however, at this matter of answerability. Its purpose, of course, is to enable the electorate to control policy. If something is done which the electorate disapproves, there should be a workable way for the voters to express that disapproval and bring about a change. Legislation which has received very general approval, which represents a substantial consensus, is much less likely than bare majority legislation to become the subject of popular disapproval. The very process that beclouds accountability makes it less essential. Nevertheless, the proof of the pudding is in the eating; that which was approved as a bill may be condemned in operation. Suppose, for example, that we are again beset by severe unemployment and that the President and Congress, lacking the spur of the strong words of the original Full Employment Bill, take inadequate steps to meet the crisis. How can those who are concerned about the situation produce a change? Are they any worse-situated in this respect than they would be if the backers of the law that was enacted had all been members of the same political party, or were otherwise easily identifiable? It would not seem so. In any case, through pressure groups, letters to their representatives, and other avenues of opinion expression, the voters will express their demand for action. If satisfaction is not forthcoming before election time, they will demand that candidates at the primaries (and later at the general election) express themselves on the issue. Incumbents who are up for reëlection and have failed to press for action of the kind demanded will have to account for their failure. In all probability, they will have to campaign against candidates who promise to take a different line. It is unusual, in this country, for important legislation to be repealed, for the reason that transient majorities are seldom able to secure enactment of their projects; but the history of any major field of legislation is a history of major enactments followed, from time to time, by modifications in the form of amendatory legislation, frequently produced by just such a process as has been described.[17]

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[16] Bailey, p. 237.

Indeed, the whole theory that the political party is the primary agency for the enforcement of responsibility with respect to particular issues appears to be somewhat outmoded in contemporary America.[18] When issues were relatively few and simple, it made a great deal of sense. Half a century ago, a few great but relatively simple questions, such as those involving tariffs and trusts, were predominant. It calls for no listing of the issues that face Congress today to prove that the present situation is very different. When each of the major parties must give some indication of its position on such issues as the Point Four program, military aid, the Brannan Plan, price and wage control, aid to education, and how to balance the values of security and liberty, it is unlikely that an election can give a clear indication of what a majority of the public wants.[19] Opinions cluster sufficiently to admit of considerable polar differentiation (but not polar opposites) in any given region, and a slight degree of such differentiation clearly exists nationally; but this is all that can be said. Southern Democrats will vote for a pro-labor presidential candidate only because they can elect Congressmen who will join with Republicans to defeat his policies. Nor is this situation confined to the Democratic Party. The basic condition it reflects has nothing to do with party organization or the form of government; it lies in the number and complexity of issues facing the country and the almost equal number and variety of group interests comprising the electorate. Such a plurality of views cannot be forced into the confines of dichotomous statement.

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[17] See Fred W. Riggs, *Pressures on Congress; A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion* (New York, 1950), for an excellent study of a successful repeal movement.

[18] We may also hazard the guess that even in Great Britain its vitality is on the decline. However, the sharp class-consciousness of British politics contributes greatly to the solidarity of parties and to the difficulty of achieving government by consensus.

[19] It is true, of course, that attitudes on many of these subjects tend to cluster, so that a person's views on health insurance, for instance, may give a very good indication of what his position will be with regard to tax policy. Unless this situation existed, our party system would be completely unworkable. Even after making due allowance for this fact, however, the situation in incompatible with the existence and survival of programmatic major parties.

Moreover, today's public is far more articulate than were the enfranchised masses of half a century ago. Mr. Lippmann's choice between tweedledum and tweedledee is indeed about all that can be expressed in a general election, but this is only the beginning of popular expression in a modern democracy. Or, often enough, it is the last stage, giving formal sanction to policy determinations that represent responses to popular demands more discriminating and more varied than can be expressed at the polls. These determinations are often made in the selection of candidates. Once more, the device of the primary election is only the crude club that, in accordance with Friedrich's "law of anticipated reactions," leads party managers to find candidates who will achieve maximal voter response. Frequently, to be sure, a change in public opinion does not call for a change in the party candidates, much less a change in the party in power; all that is required is a shift in the position of the incumbents. Thus Senator Taft, not generally thought of as one of the most flexible members of Congress, has made numerous changes of tack;[20] one would have to be exceedingly naïve not to see a connection between these changes and Taft's appraisal of popular sentiment in Ohio and in the nation. Certainly readers of this article will need no reminders of the manifold avenues by which public opinions are brought to bear upon policy determinations in this country.[21] They operate at all levels, from the precinct to the administrator; they use all kinds of techniques and all manner of organization. And the difficulties of achieving democratic and responsible policy-making at the legislative level through the sole agency—or even the dominant agency—of the political party are greatly magnified when it comes to the administrative level, where so much of the policy-determining process today takes place.

Before concluding this discussion, we must deal with an objection that is commonly raised against weak political parties. It is said that they facilitate log-rolling in the legislature, since individuals and groups in the legislature are relatively free to shift alignments from issue to issue, and that they encourage competitive bidding for popular support by being free with promises of

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[20] See his recent volume, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (New York, 1951).

[21] For an excellent account of them, see David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York, 1951). See also Riggs, *Pressures on Congress*, for a valuable case study. His dissussion of the "catalytic group" is especially interesting (pp. 43–46). Riggs also gives concrete evidence in support of what was said (above, pp. 795–796) about the effect given to intensity of demand by the American system (*Pressures on Congress*, pp. 197–199).

largesse. Since both of these practices might properly be designated as irresponsible, it is pertinent to consider them in the present context; and the two points are closely enough related to be treated together. That both conditions are far too characteristic of the American scene is painfully evident. The question of whether the existence of disciplined political parties, even if it were attainable, would improve the situation, calls for consideration. A glance at the record is enough to raise serious doubts about the proposed remedy. We may look at what happened in the United States during the early period of the New Deal, when President Roosevelt was in an exceedingly strong position with his party. The inconsistencies and contradictions that were involved in the New Deal program are an old story. Combinations in restraint of trade were at once attacked (strengthened anti-trust enforcement) and fostered (N.R.A.); credit was relaxed (Federal Reserve Board policy) and tightened (pressure from Treasury and F.D.I.C. inspectors); efforts were made to stimulate international economic cooperation (trade agreements program) while we wrecked the International Monetary Conference.[22] A relatively strong party leadership did nothing to prevent such mutually contradictory policies then; and there is nothing to indicate that today such leadership would prevent one arm of the government from spending public money to support the prices of agricultural commodities in a time of great farm prosperity, while other arms struggle to keep down wages and prices.

The situation in England is not radically different. The existence of strong parties there did not prevent the Conservatives in the 1951 campaign from promising to cut expenditures, but to maintain the social services and build more houses. Nor did strong parties hinder the Labour Government from pursuing inconsistent objectives, such as seeking to replenish capital goods while greatly expanding consumption, trying to stimulate private investment while threatening nationalization, and opposing nationalization of British interests abroad while pursuing a nationalization policy at home. Surely the vices of bidding for votes by pursuing opposing objectives at the same time are by no means confined to governments lacking disciplined parties.

As long as political parties can hope to defeat their opponents by winning the votes of groups from within the other party, or from independents, they will be tempted to try to do so by promising good things to the groups they are courting. In fact, the stronger is the discipline of a given party, the better it can afford to make such promises even when they run counter to the interests of some of its constituent elements. We are confronted here with a problem of democracy, not a problem of a particular party system.[23]

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[22] In some of these cases the mutually opposing policies were in effect at the same time, while in others they came in fairly rapid succession.

[23] It is not within the province of this article to offer solutions to this problem. It may be pointed out, however, that government by consensus places power in the hands of any major group to secure the modification of policies opposed to its interests. Where inconsistent programs merely defeat each other, no great harm is done to the general public. Where they do have a harmful general effect, other powerful groups are likely to be aroused and to take effective action. Moreover, the process of political education proceeds by experience. It is often discouragingly slow, but it is sometimes surprisingly effective. It is

Moreover, a strongly disciplined, two-party system can be obtained only by creating a sharp division of the population along class-conscious lines.[24] If the parties are evenly balanced, both competitive bidding for votes and frequent reversals of policy (assuming programmatic parties) are the natural results. If one party or the other gains marked ascendancy, the logical outcome is class rule and exploitation, rather than responsible search for the means of achieving the greatest possible general acceptability.

All of this does not mean that political parties are not important. They are one of the kinds of organization essential to the political process. They are indispensable; but without supplementation they would be woefully inadequate. Moreover, I am not concerned to argue whether or not some strengthening might be both possible and desirable. Some of the recommendations of the Committee on Political Parties are undoubtedly advisable. Possibly most of them are. But, and this *is* part of what I am concerned to argue, they would not accomplish as much as the Committee appears to believe; and it would not be desirable that they should. Tightly disciplined and programmatic political parties would be as inadequate for the task of political brokerage in America as the belief that we could create them would be unrealistic.

IV. CONCLUSION

Our examination of the terms "responsiveness," "majority rule," and "responsibility" has revealed that each of them is ambiguous and that failure to keep in mind the distinctions they conceal has led to inadequate analysis and confusion. Among the various democratic desiderata covered by these terms, the means selected for the pursuit of one may conflict with the attainment of another. Such conflict may even appear when both of the objectives may be signified by the same term.

Responsiveness is perhaps the simplest of the three concepts; yet even here surface simplicity is dispelled when questions as to the distribution and intensity of demands and of interests are raised. Even within the framework of democratic assumptions, a government that is responsive to one set of legitimate demands must deny other demands also having claims to legitimacy.

Majority rule presents difficulties in each of its terms. When we ask "a majority of whom?" we open the door to the intricate problem of representation. We note, too, that the very concept seems to assume the existence of a majority opinion—an assumption that is likely to be false. "Rule" may be absolute or limited. Absolute majority rule, we have argued in opposition to the majoritarians, is potentially self-defeating and almost certain to conflict with other desirable objectives.

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notable that, following the war, we did attain a balanced budget, and even a budget surplus. That the return of a semi-war economy has reversed the situation is hardly a matter for surprise. Whether any government can avoid some form of inflation under such conditions is doubtful. It is not irrelevant to remark, however, that it can come nearer to accomplishing this result if it is able to borrow from abroad.

[24] Conceivably the same result could be obtained by a regional division, with the threat of civil war or national disintegration.

Responsibility may mean accountability (answerability) or it may mean the capacity and tendency to act on the basis of rational consideration of the pertinent facts and values. Responsibility in the latter sense constitutes an important instance of the "other desirable objectives" that may be defeated by absolute majority rule. Moreover, although responsibility in this sense *may* be promoted by the enforcement of accountability, such a happy coincidence is by no means automatic. There are various mechanisms and institutions for holding governments accountable to the electorate. Both the cabinet form of government and the device of disciplined, programmatic political parties are included among them; yet the desirability of using either of these means for achieving responsibility in the United States is open to serious question.

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Further insight into the problems we have discussed may be gained by viewing them in the light of Mill's discussion of the criteria for evaluating forms of government. Mill insisted that it is as important to attend to what the form of government does to the people and to the popular will as it is to concentrate on the efficiency with which the public will is translated into action. The question with regard to majority rule, for instance, is not simply whether the majority should rule, but it is also by what devices it should rule, and what will be the effect of these devices on the majority itself. We, as individuals, do not make important decisions without seeking enlightenment, taking time for deliberation, and checking our thinking by subjecting it to the criticism of others. It seems clear that the same rules should apply to the body politic. The individual correlative of maximum political responsiveness is impulsiveness. The political correlative of responsible individual decision-making involves procedures that put brakes upon majorities, and that also allow opportunity and provide incentive for interests to be weighed as well as counted. The requirement of extraordinary majorities for extraordinary purposes is a device for compelling fuller consideration, as well as a common-sense safeguard for the majority itself, in view of the inevitable inaccuracies of any representative system.

While the principles governing sound and responsible individual decisions are applicable to group decisions, there is at least one principle which should govern the latter that has no application to the former. This principle is the importance of maintaining the unity of the group. Again the effect upon the actors themselves of the means for converting will into action is fundamental. In this case, it is the effect on the actors *as members of the group* that must be watched. Rules that tend to preserve the group can hardly be contrary to its welfare.

With regard to accountability also, it is important that the means used shall produce agreement rather than create dissension. Beyond this point perhaps the most pertinent remark is that elementary, but oft-neglected rule of many sports: "Keep your eye on the ball." Accountability is desirable as a means to an end. That end is the assurance of responsiveness to popular will. Sometimes the mistake is made of insisting on the means as an end in itself when in fact the end has been, or can be, attained in another and better way.

BUREAUCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

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There is an old aphorism that fire is a good servant but a bad master. Something like this aphorism is frequently applied to the appropriate role of the bureaucracy in government. Because bureaucracy is often viewed as tainted with an ineradicable lust for power, it is alleged that, like fire, it needs constant control to prevent its erupting from beneficient servitude into dangerous and tyrannical mastery.

The folklore of constitutional theory relegates the bureaucracy to somewhat the same low but necessary estate as Plato does the appetitive element of the soul. In the conventional dichotomy between policy and administration, administration is the Aristotelian slave, properly an instrument of action for the will of another, capable of receiving the commands of reason but incapable of reasoning. The amoral concept of administrative neutrality is the natural complement of the concept of bureaucracy as instrument; for according to this view the seat of reason and conscience resides in the legislature, whatever grudging concession may be made to the claims of the political executive, and a major, if not the major, task of constitutionalism is the maintenance of the supremacy of the legislature over the bureaucracy. The latter's sole constitutional role is one of neutral docility to the wishes of the day's legislative majority.

The source of this doctrine is found in part in a reading of English constitutional history and in part in the political metaphysics of John Locke. The drama of English constitutional development may be seen as first the concentration of power in the Norman kings, with the suppression of feudal anarchy, and then the gradual attainment of parliamentary supremacy. Because the bureaucracy was created by the kings as an instrument of national unification, it became identified with them and was envisaged as a monarchical rather than a popular element, and one which required control. At a later date the class monopoly of the upper hierarchy of the civil service reinforced liberal suspicions of the bureaucracy, and it seemed especially clear that the most bureaucratic part of the bureaucracy, the military, had to be placed firmly under civilian, i.e., legislative, control.

John Locke, writing the apologia for the Glorious Revolution and its accompanying shift in political power, held that "there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate. . . . "[1] To be sure, Locke conceived of the legislature only as the fiduciary of the people, from whom all legitimate power ultimately stemmed. But since the legislature was considered the authentic voice of the people changeable only by revolution, this limitation could be forgotten in practice. Despite Locke's qualifications, the latter-day exponents of his views have given curference to what Jackson called the "absurd doctrine that the legislature is the people." Professor Charles Hyneman, accepting the majority will metaphysics of Willmoore Kendall, has ably expounded the consequence of that point of view in his recent *Bureaucracy in a Democracy.* It is his position that in a democracy the people should get what they want, and that what the legislature wants is the best approximation of what the people want; ergo, we should fashion our institutions for legislative supremacy, at least with respect to the bureaucracy.[2] Hyneman's position is extreme but not substantially different from others who argue that Congress is our board of directors. Even Paul Appleby reflects at times the conventional bureaucratic homage to Congress, though his central position rejects the claim of any single organ to monopolize the democratic process.[3] Acceptance of the principle of legislative supremacy by practicing administrators is, of course, more a counsel of expediency than an article of faith. It pays for the administrator to call Congress our board of directors, whatever his private conviction may be.

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[1] John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter concerning Toleration* (Oxford, 1947), Ch. 8, p. 87,

Unfortunately for the simplicity of the theory that democracy means giving the people what they want and that this means giving the legislature what it wants, the legislature is divided into two branches and the President is an independently elected official. In case of conflict between any or all of these, who should be supreme as the authentic representative of what the people want? Professor Hyneman has his uneasy moments between President and legislature. Realism compels some doubts as to the validity of the voice of congressional committees, and closer examination bogs the theory down in exceptions and qualifications.

The will of the people, like sovereignty, is regarded as a metaphysical first principle, supplying an absolute from which certain consequences can be deduced. Yet to possess meaning in political analysis, the concept must be defined in operational terms. How do you discover what the people want? The mode of consultation can make a world of difference. At various times President, Senate, House, Supreme Court, Dr. Gallup, and a host of other agents and agencies have claimed a special ability to express the people's will. The Achilles heel of Rousseau's *volonté generale* was that it had to find a voice, and his solutions ranged from enlightened dictatorship to counting the votes. The will of the people in Professor Elliott's sense is the democratic myth, and in Mosca's the political formula. It serves as a symbol to legitimatize the acts of any group that can successfully identify itself with it in the public mind. Properly understood, it probably should be treated as a value symbol of our political culture, an object for investigation involving a political process—and not a principle from which we can logically excogitate the appropriate role of bureaucracy.

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[2] See Part 1 of *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York 1950). For a penetrating but sympathetic criticism of Hyneman's views, see Chester I. Barnard's review of the book in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 990–1004 (Dec., 1950).

[3] For Appleby's central position, see Ch. 16 of his *Big Democracy* (New York, 1945) and p. 164 of his *Policy and Administration* (University, Alabama, 1949).

Dissatisfaction with the view of bureaucracy as instrument and Caliban has grown among students of government as first-hand experience in government and historical research have undermined accepted dogma. Professor C. J. Friedrich has pointed to the beneficent role of bureaucracy as the core of modern government.[4] Dr. Fritz Morstein Marx has described the vital role of the Prussian bureaucracy in developing the *Rechtsstaat.*[5] The studies of Pendleton Herring, John M. Gaus and Leon O. Wolcott, Arthur W. MacMahon and John D. Millett have illustrated the genuinely representative part played by the bureaucracy in American government.[6] And in a widely used text Professor J. A. Corry has not hesitated to refer to administration as the mainspring of government and to the administrative, as distinguished from the political, executive as a fourth branch of government. An assessment of the vital role of bureaucracy in the working American constitution seems to be overdue.

The most ardent advocate of legislative supremacy can no longer blink the fact of administrative discretion and even administrative legislation. Nor does any one seriously suppose that the clock can be turned back. Improvement there may be in the capacity and willingness of the legislature to exercise general policy superintendence, but anything approaching the conditions necessary to achieve a separation of policy from administration is highly doubtful. The bureaucracy is in policy, and major policy, to stay; in fact, barring the unlikely development of strong majority party legislative leadership, the bureaucracy is likely, day in and day out, to be our main source of policy initiative.[7] The role of the legislature and of the political executive may come to consist largely of encouraging, discouraging and passing on policy which wells up from the agencies of administration. All of this is because the bureaucracy is not just an instrument to carry out a will formed by the elected Congress and President. It is itself a medium for registering the diverse wills that make up the people's will and for transmuting them into responsible proposals for public policy.

Growth in the power of the bureaucracy is looked upon as a menace to constitutionalism. By some it is seen as a dangerous enhancement of the power of the President, by others as an alarming accretion of power to a non-elective part of the government. The logic of *either-or* sees a cumulative process in which the supremacy of the elected legislative is replaced by the supremacy of an appointed bureaucracy. Given the alternative, the choice of the supremacy of an elected legislature would be clear, but that choice is an unreal bogy. To meet our needs, we have worked out a complex system in which the bureaucracy and legislature perform complementary and interlocking functions.[8] Both are necessary, and the supremacy of either would be a constitutional misfortune. We sometimes forget that the authors of the *Federalist* and Jefferson alike were aware of the danger of legislative tyranny.

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[4] *Constitutional Government and Democracy,* rev. ed. (Boston, 1950), Ch. 2.

[5] "Civil Service in Germany," in *Civil Service Abroad* (New York, 1935).

[6] Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York, 1936); J. M. Gaus and L. O. Wolcott, *Public Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture* (Chicago, 1940); A. W. MacMahon and J. D. Millett, *Federal Administrators; A Biographical Approach to the Problem of Departmental Management* (New York, 1939).

[7] Cf. George B. Galloway, *Congress at the Cross Roads* (New York 1946), pp. 150–151; Roland A. Young, *This Is Congress* (New York, 1943), Ch. 2.

Professor Friedrich and others have argued that the essence of constitutionalism is the division of power in such a way as to provide a system of effective regularized restraints upon governmental action.[9] The purpose of this division of power is not to create some mechanical equipoise among the organs of government but so to represent the diversity of the community that its own pluralism is reflected in a pluralism within the government. As Mosca has well said, "the only demand that is important, and possible, to make of a political system is that all social values shall have a part in it, and that it shall find a place for all who possess any of the qualities which determine what prestige and what influence an individual, or a class, is to have."[10] Now it is extremely clear that our Congress fails to do this and that the bureaucracy in considerable measure compensates for its deficiency. Important and vital interests in the United States are unrepresented, underrepresented, or malrepresented in Congress. These interests receive more effective and more responsible representation through administrative channels than through the legislature.

In considerable part this is due to the nature of the presidency and its constituency. Responsible behavior in the sense of sensitivity to long-range and broad considerations, the totality of interests affected, and the utilization of expert knowledge by procedures that ensure a systematic collection and analysis of relevant facts, is more characteristic of the executive than of Congress. Despite the exceptions, and there are many, this kind of responsible behavior is more expected, more politically feasible, and more frequently practiced in the administrative branch. The bureaucracy headed by the presidency is both compelled and encouraged to respond to, and even to assist in the development of broad publics (e.g., the public for Ewing's Health Insurance Program); but broad publics seldom emanate from the organization and the geographic concentration necessary for effectiveness in the congressional committee process. The public's conception of the President as national leader creates an expectation as to his role that differs markedly from any stereotype of Congress or Congressman. This general conception of the presidency not only imposes itself on the incumbent of the office, enforcing a degree of responsibility for playing a national part, but also provides the political means for its performance by organizing a nationwide public. As one President has remarked, the presidency is the best pulpit in the land. It has a nation for its congregation. But what is important here is the expectation that the President should offer a national and party program which provides a degree of synthesis for the agencies of administration. Imperfectly effective as are the organs of coordination—

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[8] Appleby, *Policy and Administration*, Ch. 2.

[9] Friedrich, Ch. 1.

[10] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, trans. Hannah D. Kahn, ed. Arthur Livingston (New York, 1939), p. 258.

Cabinet, Bureau of the Budget, National Security Council, inter-Departmental committees, and the rest—they are far more effective at ensuring integration than is even the well-disciplined House Appropriations Committee, with its stubbornly fragmented procedures.

In addition to the broader constituency represented by the presidency and the national concern imposed by this office on the subordinate agencies of administration, there is another factor to account for the vital role of these agencies in supplementing congressional representation. It is simply that the shield of presidential power permits the development of the agencies of administration into institutions to mediate between the narrow and the broad interests at work in the subject matter of their concern. The presidency provides a balancing power that permits and sustains a perspective which the overwhelming concentration of narrow interests in the congressional subject matter committee makes difficult in the legislative process. Representation of consumer interests in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, for example, depends upon presidential protection. Under this same shelter, agencies may develop organizational codes, stereotyped in public expectations, that permit the continuance of broader representation and encourage responsibility in the range and manner in which problems are considered and solutions sought.

To the modern student of government, Aristotle's characterization of an election as an oligarchical device always comes somewhat as a shock. Nonetheless, its implications for representative democracy are significant. If one were to set forth in law the facts of life of the American Congress, it would appear that, to be eligible, overwhelmingly a candidate had first to be in the upper upper-income bracket or second, either personally or through his associates, to be able to command substantial sums of money.[11] Expressed as custom, such conditions are passed over save for the carping criticism of Marxists; yet if they were expressed in law, they would clearly characterize our constitution as oligarchic.

While the Jacksonian conception of the civil service as a domain for the common man was not expressly designed as a balance to the inevitably oligarchical aspects of an elected legislature, it has been influential in that direction. Accustomed as we are to the identification of election with both representation and democracy, it seems strange at first to consider that the non-elected civil service may be both more representative of the country and more democratic in its composition than the Congress.

As it operates in the civil service, the recruitment process brings into federal employment and positions of national power, persons whose previous affiliations, training, and background cause them to conceive of themselves as representing constituencies that are relatively uninfluential in Congress. These constituencies, like that of the presidency, are in the aggregate numerically very large; and in speaking for them as self-appointed, or frequently actually appointed, representatives, the bureaucrats fill in the deficiencies of the process of representation in the legislature. The importance of this representation lies not only in offsetting such defects as rural overrepresentation, the self-contained district, and other vagaries of our system of nominations that leave many without a voice, but in the qualitative representation of science, the professions, the institutions of learning, and the conscience of society as it is expressed in churches, civil liberties groups, and a host of others.

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[11] Galloway, pp. 28 ff.; Young, pp. 173 ff.; F. A. Ogg and P. O. Ray, *Introduction to American Government*, 9th ed. (New York, 1948), pp. 304–305; and M. M. McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Congress," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW Vol. 36, pp. 67–75 (Feb., 1942).

The democratic character of the civil service stems from its origin, income level, and associations. The process of selection of the civil service, its contacts, milieu, and income level after induction make the civil service as a body a better sample of the mass of the people than Congress. Lacking a caste system to wall them off from their fellows, the members of this sample are likely to be more responsive to the desires and needs of the broad public than a highly selected slice whose responsiveness is enforced by a mechanism of elections that frequently places more power in the hands of campaign-backers than voters. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any overhauling of our system of representation in Congress will remove the need for supplementary representation through the bureaucracy. The working interaction of President, Congress, courts, and the administrative branch makes the constitutional system a going concern—not the legal supremacy of anyone of them.

Given the seemingly inevitable growth in the power of the bureaucracy through administrative discretion and administrative law, it is of critical importance that the bureaucracy be both representative and democratic in composition and ethos. Its internal structuring may be as important for constitutional functioning as any theoretical or practicable legislative supremacy. That wonder of modern times, the standing army possessed of a near-monopoly of force yet tamely obedient to the civil power, is a prime example of the efficacy of a balance of social forces as a means to neutralization as a political force. A similar representation of the pluralism of our society in the vitals of the bureaucracy insures its constitutional behavior and political equilibrium.

It is not by any means sure that the people think that what they want is the same as what Congress wants. In fact, there is considerable evidence that the ordinary man views Congressmen, if not Congress as an institution, with considerable skepticism. The retort that the people elected the Congress falls somewhat wide of the mark. Given the system of parties and primaries, rural overrepresentation, seniority rule, interest-dominated committees, and all the devices that give potent minorities a disproportionate say, it should occasion no surprise if Congress' claim exclusively to voice what the people want be taken with reservations.[12] Skepticism of the exclusiveness of the claim, however, is no warrant for denying the vital contribution of the representative legislature to the maintenance of constitutionalism. Without it bureaucratic absolutism would be well-nigh unavoidable.

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[12] Cf. Barnard, *op. cit.* (above, n. 2), p. 1004, and James MacGregor Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949). Hyneman is aware of these misgivings; "If there is widespread and serious doubt that Congress can make the major decisions—including the decision as to what authority the President shall have—in a way that the American people as a whole will find acceptable, then we had better get busy with the improvement of our political

If one rejects the view that election is the *sine qua non* of representation, the bureaucracy now has a very real claim to be considered much more representative of the American people in its composition than the Congress. This is not merely the case with respect to the class structure of the country but, equally significantly, with respect to the learned groups, skills, economic interests, races, nationalities, and religions. The rich diversity that makes up the United States is better represented in its civil service than anywhere else.

While it has distressed those who see in the bureaucracy merely an efficient instrument for executing policy framed elsewhere, its persistent refusal to block the path of the common man by educational qualifications beyond the reach of the poor has made the civil service a democratic *carrière ouverte aux talentes*. Like Napoleon's soldiers, the humble clerk carries a marshals' baton in his knapsack. And the open avenue of opportunity in the government has meant much in providing substance to the forms of democracy. At a time when administration has become a towering fact, the significance of our recruitment process for a democratic and representative bureaucracy over-shadows an academic preoccupation with the objective of a merely technical proficiency. One has only to consider seriously the role of bureaucracy as formulator of the bulk of the policy alternatives for legislature and political executive alike—as rule-maker-in-chief—to recognize that representativeness must be a prime consideration in the recruitment process.

It can hardly be denied that, despite the attempt to achieve it by the recruitment process, representativeness in the agencies of government is seriously inadequate.[13] The capture of commissions such as the I.C.C. by the regulated interests has often been charged, not without persuasive evidence. In his pioneering work, *Public Administration and the Public Interest,* Pendleton Herring has documented the problem. Yet however crassly one-sided an agency of government may become, few indeed will be found so completely under the dominance of a single interest as the subject matter committees of Congress. And those that are so dominated have a bad conscience not shared by their brethren on the Hill.

The Department of Agriculture is probably as clearly a clientele department as any in the United States government. Nevertheless, it compares most favor-

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organization, our electoral system, and the organization of Congress so that the grounds for such doubt will be removed" (*op. cit.*, p. 217). Burns and others have pointed out the road blocks in the way of such reform. Compensation for congressional deficiencies through the presidency and bureaucracy seems the normal course of our development. Had Professor Hyneman considered the possibilities of moral restraints, as Barnard suggests, this road might not have seemed so perilous.

[13] A thoughtful interpretation of the whole problem of interests and the bureaucracy is contained in David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), esp. Chs. 8 and 9.

ably with the Senate and House Agricultural Committees in the breadth of its conception of the public interest. (In point of fact, the luckless Bureau of Agriculture Economics incurred congressional wrath for daring to act on the assumption that it had a responsibility to the consumer.) As mediator, moderator, and synthesizer of the raw demands of the agricultural pressure groups, the Department works to attain a feasible national farm policy in a context of political and group demands. The structure of the Department in itself insures some consideration of the many aspects of the nation's agriculture in the formation and formulation of policy alternatives. Agronomists, soil chemists, nutritionists, economists, market analysts, and a host of others organized in bureaus and divisions bring together and into focus the elements necessary for responsible decisions. The point of view of personnnel trained to think of a national economy and to utilize a scientific outlook is a needed counterpoise to the immediacy of political demands and the narrowness of pressure group perspective. In addition, the very permanence of the Department and the comparative permanence of many of its personnel provide a range of vision that at least partially transcends the headlines of the moment. Of course, it is true that sometimes, as in the Forest Service, the interest of the Department seems to be a bureaucratic contemplation of its own navel. Still the Department institutionalizes, however inadequately in its bad moments, the long view and the broad look on the nation's agricultural problems. While occasional Congressmen and occasional pressure groups also may take the long view, in the main such behavior is exceptional and little reliance can be placed on it.

Responsibility is a product of responsible institutions; and with all their deficiencies—which are many indeed—the departments of administration come closer than any other organs of government to achieving responsible behavior by virtue of the breadth and depth of their consideration of the relevant facts and because of the representative character of their personnel.[14] As continuing organizations, they can learn from their mistakes. They can even make their mistakes meaningful. That is, they can make explicit to themselves the hypotheses on which they act and so make failure itself a source of knowledge. In however limited a form, these agencies are organized to make self-corrective behavior possible.

The difficulties of arriving at self-corrective behavior in the disorganized and heatedly partisan atmosphere of Congress are all too apparent. Legislatures such as the British Parliament have at times developed wisdom and perpetuated it in a sound tradition workably related to the problems confronting the nation. But in the absence of a disciplined party system with reasonable continuity of leadership, conditions are too anarchical in our Congress to permit that body to try to organize its experience for the production of knowledge. The conditions of political success do not encourage the cooperative corporate endeavor that characterizes our successful disciplines dedicated to the discovery of fact and the testing of hypotheses. One must hasten to admit that few agency heads willingly admit failure and search for its causes. The extraordinary but explicable overestimate of the magnitude of reconversion unemployment by the O.W.M.R. after World War II was regarded less as an opportunity and a first-rate challenge to reëxamine some fundamental economic thinking than as a botch to be dealt with by the palliative arts of propaganda. Even the eminently sane strategic bombing survey was frequently imperiled by an expediential urge to color the facts. Nonetheless, for the Air Force to undertake a strategic bombing survey at all is an encouraging instance of the recognition of the need of self-corrective behavior. Similarly, the State Department may undertake a review of China policy not simply to provide a brief for the defense but to examine the causes of past failure and to extract the lessons that may lead to future success. Given the current situation, such a review is beyond the capacity of Congress to undertake. In addition to the anarchic conditions already noted, a major reason for this lies in a phenomenon pointed out by Roland Young: the members of Congress, majority as well as minority, do not identify themselves with administration.[15] Law in action is administration—and it is the work of the bureaucrats from whom and from whose works Congressmen instinctively dissociate themselves. Policy in practice thus is never the responsibility of Congress. The "foul up" is always the fault of the Administration, and Congress is well-nigh in the position of the British King who can do no wrong. Yet the penalty for the failure to accept responsibility for the test of legislation in administration is blindness to the possible lessons of experience. It may be that if government is ever to learn from its experience, the learning process will in large measure depend on the functioning of the bureaucracy.

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[14] Cf. George A. Graham, "Essentials of Responsibility," in F. M. Marx (ed.), *Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946).

Through the breadth of the interests represented in its composition, the bureaucracy provides a significant constitutionalizing element of pluralism in our government. Through its structure, permanence, and processes, it provides a medium in which the conditions requisite for the national interpretation of experience can develop. Thus it has a substantial part to play in the working constitution as representative organ and as source of rationality.

Returning now to Aristotle's suggestive analysis of the real components of a constitution, it is interesting to consider the ethical constitution of the bureaucracy. What is the prevailing ethos of the leading elements in the bureaucracy and how does it compare with those of the other branches of government, notably that of Congress? A detailed analysis of working attitudes towards the rule of law, civil liberties, and due process would be illuminating. A powerful case might well be made that in practice the bureaucracy shows far more concern and respect for each of these constitutional fundamentals than does the Congress. Certainly no agency shows such blatant disregard for due process as is customary with congressional committees, while the entire body's acquiescence in the abuse of congressional immunity bespeaks a disregard for constitutional safeguards that goes beyond committee excesses.

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[15] Young, Ch. 1.

It was the bureaucracy, acting through the Department of Justice, that drafted Truman's unsuccessful veto of the McCarran Act, despite the potentially great power which the administration of this act could place in the hands of reputedly power-hungry bureaucrats. And if the executive branch has a sorry record on a loyalty program whose procedures give less opportunity to the accused than to a common felon, the explanation lies in a pusillanimous attitude to Congress rather than in a lack of scruples. One may search the records of Congress for a wigging administered to the F. B. I. similar to that frequently administered to the Home Office by the British Parliament. It is the nation's good fortune in having a man of the character of J. Edgar Hoover heading the F. B. I. rather than careful congressional scrutiny that has thus far secured us from the danger inherent in a national police.

Clearly the difference in ethos in the congressional and administrative branches of the government is not due to any mysterious vice in the one or virtue in the other. The difference must relate to the backgrounds and education of the personnel recruited for each and the seemingly wide difference in what constitutes successful practice in each as well as to the forces that bear upon them. Both branches are products of the effective political sentiments bearing upon them; they are rivals in political competence, varying according to their respective patterns of representativeness and responsibility. (For example, criticism of law schools and law reviews wrings the withers of no Congressman; it does have effect upon the bureaucracy and the courts.) Altogether, the climate of influential opionion is different, and the working of the group structure through the relevant institutions of selection and election produces a different result.

Given the views and composition of Congress, it is a fortunate fact of our working constitution that it is complemented by a bureaucracy indoctrinated with the fundamental ideals of constitutionalism. This varied group, rooted in the diversity of the country, can be counted on to provide important representation for its pluralism. In a real and important sense, it provides a constitutional check on both legislature and executive.

It is no neutral instrument like the German bureaucracy, available to Nazi and democrat alike, pleading its orders from "*die höhe Ticre*" as an excuse for criminal acts. Be it noted that this plea of duty to carry out orders neutrally met short shrift at Nuremberg. Facing the facts should lead to some interesting changes in the theory of the desirability of administrative neutrality. It is the balance of social forces in the bureaucracy that enables it both to perform an important part in the process of representation and to serve as a needed addition to a functioning division of power in government. Were the administrative branch ever to become a neutral instrument, it would, as a compact and homogeneous power group, either set up shop on its own account or provide the weapon for some other group bent on subverting the constitution.

A candid review of the causes leading to the overthrow of constitutional governments in recent years will show few, if any, examples where prime responsibility can be placed on the bureaucracy. With the exception of the military in Spain and South America, one must look elsewhere. Indeed, the very weakness of bureaucracies incapable of maintaining order has been a major chink in the constitutional armor; but anarchical legislatures incompetent to govern, accompanied by the rise of totalitarian political parties, have been the political causes of the debacle of constitutionalism. It is high time that the administrative branch is recognized as an actual and potentially great addition to the forces of constitutionalism. The advice of the devotees of Locke would make it a neutral instrument, a gun for hire by any party. Fortunately, such advice cannot be taken. Far better would be to recognize that, by appropriate recruitment, structure, and processes, the bureaucracy can be made a vital part of a functioning constitutional democracy, filling out the deficiencies of the Congress and the political executive. The theory of our constitution needs to recognize and understand the working and the potential of our great fourth branch of government, taking a righful place beside President, Congress, and Courts.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES*

COMPILED BY RALPH K. HUITT

University of Wisconsin

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Harold W. Adams, Significance and Impact of Heinrich Treitschke. *Clark.*

Stanislaus Belch, Thomas Hobbes' Concept of Religion and the State's Relation to It. *Notre Dame.*

Charles Blitzer, The Political Theory of James Harrington. *Harvard.*

Joan V. Bondurant, Gandhian Satyagraha and Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

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Burton Russell Brazil, Loyalty Oaths in California and their Relationship to Democratic Theories of the Open Society. *Stanford.*

William R. Brown, Deviations in American Communism: The Influence of American

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* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW as follows: V, 456 (1911); VI, 464 (1912); VII, 689 (1913); VIII, 488 (1914); XIV, 155 (1920); XVI, 497 (1922); XIX, 171 (1925); XX, 660 (1926); XXI, 645 (1927); XXII, 736 (1928); XXIII, 795 (1929); XXIV, 799 (1930); XXV, 798 (1931); XXVI, 769 (1932); XXVII, 680 (1933); XXVIII, 766 (1934); XXIX, 713 (1935); XXX, 811 (1936); XXXI, 772 (1937); XXXII, 796 (1938); XXXIII, 732 (1939); XXXIV, 767 (1940); XXXV, 752 (1941); XXXVI, 734 (1942); XXXVII, 706 (1943); XXXVIII, 766 (1944); XXXIX, 779 (1945); XL, 775 (1946); XLI, 754 (1947); XLII, 759 (1948); XLIII, 787 (1949); XLIV, 689 (1950); XLV, 779 (1951).

Items which appeared in the September, 1951, list are in general classified under the same headings in the present list, and new items have been assimilated to the 1951 classification as far as possible. In cases where classification of an item has been suggested by the institution concerned, the suggestion has been followed. Each item is listed under one classification only.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science. Often dissertations are in progress in departments of economics, history, sociology, etc., which overlap or supplement dissertations in preparation in political science. Attention is called especially to the following lists: "Current Research Projects in Public Administration" (reported to Public Administration Service), the most recent edition of which appeared in 1951; "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Economy in Progress in American Colleges and Universities," in the *American Economic Review;* "List of Doctoral Dissertations in History Now in Progress," published annually by the Division of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution through 1938, and since then by the American Historical Association, as supplements to the *American Historical Review* (1940 and 1941), as Vol. III of its *Annual Report* (1941), and as separate publications (1947 and 1949); and "Higher Degrees in Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology.* These are in addition to the "List of American Doctoral Dissertations Printed in 1938," the most recent of an annual series published by the Library of Congress; and Arnold H. Trotier and Marian Harman, "Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, 1950–1951," the eighteenth of a series beginning in 1933–34, compiled for the Association of Research Libraries. Consult, for other lists, T. R. Palfrey and H. E. Coleman, Jr., "Guide to Bibliographies of Theses, United States and Canada" (Chicago, American Library Association, 2nd ed., 1940).

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Erwin Walther Umbach, A Study of the Foreign Relations of the United States with Austria. *Fletcher School.*

Juliane von K. Valentin, German-Japanese Relations in the Period between the Two World Wars. *Pennsylvania.*

John Peter Vloyantes, The Security-Power Dilemma in International Organization with Special Reference to Article XI of the Charter of the United Nations. *Utah.*

Austin F. Walter, Australian-United States Relations, 1941–1949. *Michigan.*

James Lambert Weber, The Development of the Foreign Policy Objectives of the British Labor Party, 1919–1939. *Fletcher School.*

Clarence N. Weems, Jr., The Korean Revolution. *Columbia.*

Melvin A. Weightman, The Present Status of the Concept of Self-Defense in International Law. *Pennsylvania.*

Haydn Williams, Air Power and American Foreign Policy: the Berlin Air Lift. *Fletcher School.*

Maurice J. Williams, The Problem of Economic Integration in Western Europe. *Chicago.*

Ponnambalam Wignaraja, The Conflict Between Economic Rationality and Cultural Values; an Analysis of Four Policies for Increasing the Availability of Domestic Savings for Developmental Needs. *Yale.*

Ann Ruth Willner, Problems in Agricultural Production for the Domestic Market in Venezuela. *Chicago.*

Harry Winkler, The Political Orientation of Israel in the Struggle Between East and West. *Chicago.*

Sidney Wise, Judicial Impact on Minimum Wage Legislation: Australia, Canada, and United States. *California* (Los Angeles).

William D. S. Witte, Quaker Pacifism in the United States, 1914–1941; with Special Reference to Its Relation to Isolationism and Internationalism. *Columbia.*

Gregory Baker Wolfe, Pan-American Solidarity: Idea and Reality. *Fletcher School.*

Claude Woltz, Bloc Action in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Helen Lorraine Wood, British Concepts of Internationalism in the Nineteenth Century. *Northwestern.*

Herbert H. Wood, Jr., International Supervision of Colonial Administrative Unions. *Columbia.*

Lenoir Wright, United States—Egyptian Relations 1830–1939. *Columbia.*

Pamela Nicholson Wrinch, Winston (Leonard) Spencer Churchill as a Theoretician in the Field of International Relations. *Yale.*

Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883–1921. *Brown.*

Tien-Cheng Young, The Use of Scientific Management Concepts in International Administration. *New York University.*

Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny, Exiles from Eastern and Central Europe in the United States: Their Political Aims and Organizations. *Stanford.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

John T. Amendt; B.S., Loyola University of Los Angeles, 1946; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1951. Philosophic Backgrounds of Recent American Political Theory: A Study in Deterioration. *Georgetown.*

Bernard Borning; A.B., Minnesota, 1936; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. The Political Ideas of Charles A. Beard. *Minnesota.*

William H. Brubeck; A.B., St. Johns, 1948; A.M., Harvard, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The American as Radical, 1870–1900. *Harvard.*

Gaylon Loray Caldwell; B.S., Utah State Agricultural College; A.M., Nebraska, 1948; Ph.D., Stanford, 1952. The Political and Social Theory of Mormonism. *Stanford.*

Shen-Yu Dai; LL.B., Central Institute of Political Science, (Chunking, China), 1946; A.M., Washington (Seattle), 1949; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1952. Mao Tse-tung and Confucianism. *Pennsylvania.*

James C. Davies; A.B., Oberlin College, 1939; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. The Political Implications of Psychoanalytic and Academic Psychology. *California* (Berkeley).

Gottfried Dietze; LL.B., University of Heidelberg, 1948; Dr. Jur., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Princeton, 1952. The Political Theory of the Federalist. *Princeton.*

Patrick Donohoe; A.B., Gonzaga, 1937; A.M., *ibid.*, 1938; Ph.D., St. Louis, 1952. The Speculative and the Practical Life in Aristotle, as Related to the Problem of Church and State. *St. Louis University.*

Helmut Folchert; Abitur, Hellenstein-Oberschule, 1947; A.M., Pennsylvania, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Formal Structure of Legal Norm Systems: A Study Based on the German Legal Codes. *Pennsylvania.*

William A. Glaser; A.B., New York University, 1948; A.M., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. A Critical Evaluation of Some Leading Economic Interpretations of Politics in Contemporary American Political Theory: Charles A. Beard and A. M. Simons. *Harvard.*

Arthur K. Hesselberg; A.B., St. Anselm, 1938; A.M., New Hampshire, 1948; Ph.D., Catholic University, 1952. A Comparison of the Political Philosophy of John Milton with that of Selected Representatives of the Jesuit School, Notably Bellarmine, Suarez, and Mariana. (Abstract, Catholic University of America Press.) *Catholic University.*

Max M. Kampelman; A.B., N.Y.U., 1940; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1945; A.M., Minnesota, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Political Philosophy of the C.I.O. *Minnesota.*

Morton A. Kaplan; B.S., Temple, 1943; Ph.D., Columbia, 1951. The Political Philosophy of Morris Cohen. *Columbia.*

Charles Rush Layton; A.B., Otterbein, 1913; A.M., Michigan, 1917; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Political Theories of John Bright. *Michigan.*

Leslie Grant McConnell, Jr.; A.B., Reed College, 1937; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. The Decline of Agrarian Democracy. *California* (Berkeley).

Louis Menand, III; A.B., Middlebury College, 1943; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1952. The American Concept of Loyalty: A Study of Federal and State Loyalty Oath Requirements in the United States. *Syracuse.*

Ithiel De Sola Pool; A.B., Chicago, 1938; A.M., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Economic Conditions of Political Freedom. *Chicago.*

James W. Prothro; A.B., North Texas State, 1943; A.M., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Political Theory of American Business: Selected Spokesmen and Organizations. *Princeton.*

Richard W. Taylor; A.B., Illinois, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1950. Groups and the Political Process: A Study of the Methodology of Arthur Fisher Bentley. *Illinois.*

Glenn Eric Tinder, Jr.; A.B., Pomona College, 1943; A.M., Claremont Graduate School, 1948; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. Politics and Philosophy in Victorian England. *California* (Berkeley).

Tang Tsou; A.B., Southwest Associated University, 1940; A.M., Chicago, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Positivism and Political Science in the United States: A Study in the Development of Scientific Approach. *Chicago.*

Peter J. Turano; A.B., New Mexico, 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., American, 1951. Hawley-Smoot Tariff Legislation: A Study in Legislative Process. *American.*

John C. Wahlke; A.B., Harvard, 1939; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Charles Fourier and Henri Saint-Simon: Two Theorists of the Reaction. *Harvard.*

Richard Barton Wilson; A.B., California

(Berkeley), 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Freedom of Speech and Public Opinion. *California* (Berkeley).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Henry J. Abraham; A.B., Kenyon College, 1948; A.M., Columbia, 1949; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1952. Compulsory Voting: Its Practice and Theory. *Pennsylvania.*

Richard G. Axt; A.B., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Higher Education and the Federal Government. *Harvard.*

Roscoe Baker; A.B., Berea, 1929; A.M., Ohio State, 1933; Ph.D. Northwestern, 1951. The American Legion and American Foreign Policy. *Northwestern.*

Winston W. Benson; B.S., State Teachers College, Bemidji, Minnesota, 1947; A.M., Iowa, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. An Analysis of the Extent to which Arguments Used Against the Social Security Act of 1935 Have Been Vindicated and Repeated. *Iowa.*

Guthrie S. Birkhead, II; A.B., Missouri, 1942; A.M., Princeton, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. The Field Committees of the Department of the Interior. *Princeton.*

Franklin Morton Bridge; A.B., Indiana, 1937; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1951. The Making of Public Policy in the 1949 Indiana General Assembly. *Northwestern.*

Fay Gilkey Calkins; A.B., Oberlin, 1943; A.M., Haverford, 1945; Ph.D., Chicago, 1951. The Relationship Between PAC and the Democratic Party. *Chicago.*

Dean Russell Cresap; A.B., Nebraska State Normal College, 1933; A.M., Stanford, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Party Organization in California. *Stanford.*

Marvin Downey; A.B., Virginia, 1931; A.M., *ibid.*, 1934; Ph.D., Chicago, 1952. Rules and Procedure United States House of Representatives 1789–1949. *Chicago.*

Harold L. Enarson, A.B., New Mexico, 1940; A.M., Stanford, 1948; Ph.D., American, 1951. Fact Finding as a Technique for Settlement of National Emergency Labor Disputes. *American.*

Max Geller; A.B., C.C.N.Y., 1919; LL.B., N.Y.U., 1920; A.M., *ibid.*, 1927; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. The Federal Regulation of Advertising. *New York University.*

Raymond Harris Gusteson; A.B., Morningside, 1942; A.M., Syracuse, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Violence in American Labor Disputes: Problem of Government. *Syracuse.*

Abraham Holtzman; A.B., U.C.L.A., 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Harvard, 1952. The Townsend Movement: A Study in Old Age Pressure Politics. *Harvard.*

Donald Bruce Johnson; A.B., Minnesota, 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Illinois, 1952. Wendell Willkie and the Republican Party. *Illinois.*

Scott D. Johnston; A.B., Minnesota, 1944; B.S., *ibid.*, 1945; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Socialist Party and the Conference for Progressive Political Action. *Minnesota.*

Seymour Z. Mann; B.E., Northern Illinois State Teachers, 1942; A.M., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Congressional Behavior and National Labor Policy: Structural Determinants of the Taft-Hartley Act. *Chicago.*

Edward S. Marshall; A.M., Chicago, 1946; Ph.D., Iowa, 1951. The Coverage of Farm Workers by Old Age and Survivors Insurance: A Legislative History. *Iowa.*

Lee C. McDonald; A.B., Pomona, 1948; A.M., U.C.L.A., 1949; Ph.D., Harvard, 1952. Congress and F.E.P.C. *Harvard.*

Frederic D. Ogden; A.B., Tusculum College, 1938; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1951. The Poll Tax in the South. *Johns Hopkins.*

Robert E. Osgood; A.B., Harvard, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Realism and Idealism in American Foreign Policy: An Interpretation of the Twentieth Century Revolution in the American Attitude Toward World Politics. *Harvard.*

Marian Elizabeth Ridgeway; B.M., Missouri, 1935; A.M., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., Illinois, 1952. The Missouri Basin's Pick-Sloan Plan: A Case Study in Congressional Policy Determination. *Illinois.*

Elston E. Roady; B.Ed., Illinois State Normal, 1942; A.M., Illinois, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Party Regularity in Congress, 1913–1921. *Illinois.*

Francis E. Rourke; A.B., Yale, 1947; A.M., Minnesota, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Reorganization of the Labor Department. *Minnesota.*

Karl M. Schmidt, Jr.; A.B., Colgate, 1948; A.M., Johns Hopkins, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Wallace Progressive Party. *Johns Hopkins.*

William C. Seyler; A.B., Pittsburgh, 1942; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Duke, 1952. The Socialist Party in the United States: Its Rise and Decline, 1901–1951. *Duke.*

Ralph Herbert Smuckler; A.B., Wisconsin, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Isolationism, 1933–1950; Its Geographic and Socio-Political Centers. *Wisconsin.*

Christopher Van Hollen; A.B., Haverford College, 1947; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1951. The House Rules Committee in Relation to Party Strategy. *Johns Hopkins.*

Holt B. Westerfield; A.B., Yale, 1947; Ph.D., Harvard, 1952. The Role of Political Parties in the Control of American Foreign Relations, 1943–1950. *Harvard.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Talat Ali-Sheibani; College of Law, Baghdad, Iraq, 1941; Diploma in Political Science, Fouad the 1st University (Cairo, Egypt), 1944; Diploma in Economics and Law, *ibid.*, 1945; Ph.D., Indiana, 1952. The High Court of Iraq and the Supreme Court of the United States: A Comparison Study. *Indiana.*

Mary Margaret Clarke; A.B., College Misericordia, 1944; A.M., Fordham, 1946; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1952. Justice Murphy and the Problem of Civil Liberties. *Johns Hopkins.*

Robert E. Goostree; A.B., Southwestern University, 1943; A.M., Iowa, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1950. Civil Rights in Iowa. *Iowa.*

Clyde Edward Jacobs; A.B., Kansas, 1946; A.M., Michigan, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Publicists and Laissez Faire Constitutional Principles. *Michigan.*

Richard H. Leach; A.B., Colorado College, 1944; A.M., Princeton, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Benjamin R. Curtiss: Case Study of a Supreme Court Justice. *Princeton.*

Emmet Vaughn Mittlebeeler; A.B., Louisville, 1936; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1939; A.M., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. The Law of Disciplinary Removal of Public Officers in England, Massachusetts, and Kentucky: A Comparison. *Chicago.*

Felix Rackow; B.S., Cornell, 1946; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Right to Counsel in the United States. *Cornell.*

Jesse W. Reeder; B.S., Utah State, 1935; M.S., *ibid.*, 1937; Ph.D., Cornell, 1952. The Federal Control of Lynching and the Related Constitutional Problems. *Cornell.*

Richard Schier; A.B., Iowa, 1946; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1951. State Adoption of Federal Law: A Study in Federalism. *California* (Los Angeles).

Phillip L. Sirotkin; A.B., Wayne, 1946; A.M., Chicago, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. An Analysis of Congressional Attitudes Toward Supreme Court Decisions 1937–47. *Chicago.*

J. Malcolm Smith; A.B., Washington, 1946; A.M., Stanford, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Judicial Tenure: The California Method of Selecting Judges. *Stanford.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

George Simms Blair; A.B., Kansas State Teachers, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1951. Cumulative Voting in Illinois. *Northwestern.*

James Lynn Busey; A.B., College of Puget Sound, 1939; A.M., Ohio State, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Domination and the Vote in a Southwestern Border Community: The 1950 Primary Campaign in El Paso, Texas. *Ohio State.*

Carroll H. Clark; A.B., Alma College, 1927; A.M., Columbia, 1932; Ph.D., Michigan, 1952. A Study of Nonpartisan Elections in Flint, Michigan. *Michigan.*

James M. Collier; A.B., Kentucky, 1941; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1947; A.M., Rutgers, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. County Government in New Jersey. *Rutgers.*

Albert Gorvine; A.B., Harvard, 1944; M.S. in Government Management, Denver, 1947; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. The Governor and Administration: State of Nevada. *New York University.*

J. Steele Gow; A.B., Williams, 1944; Ph.D., Pittsburgh, 1952. Metropolitics: A Study of the Politics of the Metropolitan Consolidation Movement in Allegheny County. *Pittsburgh.*

Priscilla M. Greeley; A.B., Radcliffe, 1945; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Harvard, 1952. The County in Massachusetts. *Harvard.*

Walter G. Held; A.B., Bucknell, 1943; A.M., American, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. The Budget Process of the District of Columbia. *American.*

Ned Vernon Joy; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. State Regulation of Political Parties in the United States. *California* (Berkeley).

William Joseph Keefe; B.E., Illinois Normal, 1948; A.M., Wayne, 1949; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1951. A Study of the Role of Political Parties in the Legislative Process. *Northwestern.*

Martin Landau; A.B., Brooklyn College, 1947; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. The New York State Public Service Commission in the Political

Environment of its first Quarter Century with Special Emphasis on the Decade of the 1920's. *New York University.*

James Edward Larson; A.B., Cornell College, 1940; M.P.A., Michigan, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Fiscal Capacity and State Aid in Michigan Counties. *Michigan.*

Walter Duane Lockard; A.B., Yale, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Role of Party in the Connecticut General Assembly, 1931–1951, *Yale.*

Thomas B. Page; A.B., Kansas, 1934; A.M., Minnesota, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Legislative Apportionment in Kansas. *Minnesota.*

William H. Reynolds; B.Ed., Southern Illinois State Normal, 1943; Ph.D., Chicago, 1951. The State Departments of Agriculture. *Chicago.*

Earl Carwile Segrest; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Administration of Federal Grants-in-Aid in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert Daniels Seltzer; A.B., Pennsylvania; M.S., *ibid.*, 1936; Ph.D., Indiana, 1952. Rotten Boroughism in Indiana. *Indiana.*

Ralph A. Straetz; A.B., Chicago, 1938; Ed.M., Boston, 1942; Ph.D., Illinois, 1951. The Origin and History of the Progressive Movement in Illinois, 1910–1916. *Illinois.*

Henry Newton Williams; B.S., State Teachers College, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, 1937; A.M., Tennessee, 1938; Ph.D., Chicago, 1951. The Legislative Process in Tennessee: With Special Reference to Gubernatorial Control. *Chicago.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Clark David Ahlberg; A.B., Wichita, 1937; A.M., Syracuse, 1944; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Administration of the Federal Position Classification System in Selected Federal Departments. *Syracuse.*

Robert Sterling Avery; A.B., Baldwin-Wallace, 1939; A.M., Northwestern, 1940; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. The Decentralization of Personnel Administration in the Tennessee Valley Authority. *Northwestern.*

Edward Christie Banfield; A.B., Connecticut State, 1938; A.M., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Government Project. *Chicago.*

William C. Beyer; A.B., Grinnell College, 1912; A.M., Wisconsin, 1913; D.Sc. (Honorary), Temple, 1932; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1952. Limited-term and Excepted Appointment in the Civil Service. *Pennsylvania.*

Herbert Block; A.B., Syracuse, 1940; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. Wage Administration in the Federal Civil Service. *New York University.*

Sidney Borden; B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1942; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. Exemption of Real Property from Taxation. *New York University.*

Donald P. Brown; A.B., Northwestern, 1930; A.M., *ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., American, 1952. The Administrative Budget of UNRRA. *American.*

Howard Andrew Calkins; A.B., Ohio Wesleyan, 1927; A.M., Wisconsin, 1928; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. A Survey of Personnel Practices in Selected Texas Administrative Agencies. *Wisconsin.*

Frederick N. Cleaveland; A.B., Duke, 1937; A.M., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Federal Reclamation Policy and Administration. *Princeton.*

Joseph D. Cooper; A.B., George Washington, 1944; A.M., American, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Decision Making and the Action Process in the Department of State. *American.*

Lynn W. Eley; A.B., Harvard, 1949; A.M., Iowa, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Corn Program in Iowa, 1933–1940: A Study in Public Administration. *Iowa.*

J. Leiper Freeman, Jr., A.B., Princeton, 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. The New Deal for Indians: A Study in Bureau-Committee Relations in American Government. *Princeton.*

Lyman Albert Glenny; A.B., Minnesota State Teachers, 1947; A.M., Colorado, 1948; Ph.D., Iowa, 1950. Civil Rights in Iowa. *Iowa.*

Lowell H. Hattery; A.B., Ohio, 1936; Ph.D., American, 1951. Management of Social Science Research in the Federal Government: With Special Reference to the Division of Statistical and Historical Research, U. S. Department of Agriculture. *American.*

Kathryn G. Heath; A.B., American, 1931; A.M., Syracuse, 1936; Ph.D., American, 1951. Army Civilian Personnel Policy and Problems in the United States Zone of Germany with Special Reference to Indigenous Personnel: 1947–48. *American.*

George H. Hieronymus; A.B., Berea, 1927; A.M., Kentucky, 1930; Ph.D., American, 1952. Job Engineering—A Process for Manpower Utilization. *American.*

David Templeton Kenney; B.S., Southern Illinois, 1947; M.S., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Illinois, 1952. The Administration of Federal Loans and Grants to Local Governments. *Illinois.*

Ernest Kurnow; B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1932; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1951. The Modern Foundation: A Problem in Social and Administrative Control. *New York University.*

Martin Landau; A.B., Brooklyn College, 1947; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. The New York State Public Service Commission in the Political Environment of Its First Quarter Century, with Special Emphasis on the Decade of the 1920's. *New York University.*

Theodore Lang; B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1936; M.S. in Ed., *ibid.,* 1938; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. An Evaluation of the Personnel Function As Administered in Operating Agencies of the Municipal Government in New York. *New York University.*

Earl M. Lewis; A.B., Tougaloo College, 1942; A.M., Loyola, 1948; Ph.D., Chicago, 1951. History of Public Regulation in New York State. *Chicago.*

Robert H. Marden; A.B., Harvard, 1949; A.M., *ibid.,* 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1952. The Organizational and Operational Principles of Civil Defense. *Harvard.*

Martin B. Moser; A.B., Pittsburgh, 1948; A.M., *ibid.,* 1949; Ph.D., Maryland, 1952. The Personnel System of the Foreign Service of the United States. *Maryland.*

Orville Thomas Payne; A.B., Westminster College, 1941; A.M., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1951. The Administrative Theory and Practice of Grover Cleveland. *Chicago.*

Charles Redfield; B.S., 1935; A.M., Chicago, 1940; Ph.D., N.Y.U., 1952. Internal Communications in Public Administration. *New York University.*

James E. Skillington; Jr., A.B., Dickinson, 1940; A.M., Buffalo, 1941; Ph.D., American, 1951. Proposed Modifications in Congressional Participation in the Budgetary Process, 1946–1950. *American.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Vernon V. Aspaturian; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1951. The Impact of Soviet Ideology and Institutions on Eastern Europe. *California* (Los Angeles).

Eliot S. Berkley; A.B., Harvard, 1947; A.M., Princeton, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1951. The Re-Establishment of Foreign Relations by the German Federal Republic. *Princeton.*

Eric Hartsell Boehm; A.B., College of Wooster, 1940; A.M., Fletcher School, 1942; Ph.D., Yale, 1951. Policy-Making of the Nazi Government. *Yale.*

Richard Gerard Brown; B.S., Florida, 1938; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1951. Ministerial Responsibility in Japan. *Northwestern.*

Eleanore Bushnell; A.B., University of Washington, 1935; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. A Study of Federalism in Australia with Emphasis upon the High Court's Interpretation of Federal Powers. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert Y. Fluno; A.B., Rollins College, 1938; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1952. Organization for the Administration of Nationalized Industries in Great Britain. *Minnesota.*

William Joseph Gane; A.B., Pennsylvania, 1949; A.M., Northwestern, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1951. Foreign Affairs of South Korea, 1945–1950. *Northwestern.*

John Sharp Harris; B.S., University of Richmond, 1939; A.M., William and Mary, 1941; M.S., Syracuse, 1942; Ph.D., Chicago, 1951. The Inspection of British Local Authorities by the Central Government. *Chicago.*

Karel Hulicka; Ing., Czech University of Technical Sciences of Prague, 1946; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. The Politics of Czechoslovakia, 1938–1951. *California* (Berkeley).

Franklyn A. Johnson; A.M., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1952. Defense by Committee: The Origins and Early Development of the British Committee of Imperial Defense. *Harvard.*

Carey B. Joynt; A.B., Western Ontario, 1945; A.M., *ibid.,* 1948; Ph.D., Clark, 1951. Canadian Foreign Policy Between the Wars. *Clark.*

George McTurnan Kahin; A.B., Harvard, 1940; A.M., Stanford, 1946; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1952. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. *Johns Hopkins.*

Harry Kantor; A.B., Illinois, 1946; A.M., Wisconsin, 1947; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1952. The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement. *California* (Los Angeles).

Morton Kroll; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1952. Spanish Socialism and the Spanish Political Environment. California (Los Angeles).

Haakon Lindjord; A.B., Washington, 1941; A.M., Princeton, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1951. The Foundation of Norway's Role in International Politics. *Princeton.*

Frederic F. Liu; B.C., Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1946; A.M., Princeton, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1951. The Nationalist Army of China. *Princeton.*

Lowell Gerald Noonan; A.B., San Francisco

State College, 1944; A.M., Stanford University, 1946; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1951. Study of the Theory and Tactical Policy of the French Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.), 1920–1937: An Evaluation of French Reformist Socialism. *California* (Berkeley).

Eleanor Tananbaum; A.B., Cornell, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Christian Democracy in Italy: Ideology and Practice. *Cornell.*

Jacob Walkin; A.B., Cornell, 1938; A.M., Yale, 1947; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1952. State and Society in Tsarist and Communist Russia. *California* (Berkeley).

G. Carl Wiegand; A.B., New Mexico, 1944; A.M., *ibid.*, 1945; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1950. Fiscal Developments in Postwar Germany and Their Economic, Political and Monetary Background. *Northwestern.*

Raphael Zariski; A.B., Harvard, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Socialism in Postwar Italy. *Harvard.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, POLITICS AND LAW

Freeland Knight Abbott; A.B., Tufts, 1942; A.M., Fletcher School, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. American Policy in the Middle East, especially during the Period 1919–1936. *Fletcher School.*

Philip Low Bridgham; A.B., Grinnell, 1942; A.M., Fletcher School, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. American Policy Toward Korean Independence, 1866–1910. *Fletcher School.*

Kendal C. Byrnes; Ph.B., Chicago, 1933; J. D., *ibid.*, 1935; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. Status of the Rules of War in International Law. *Chicago.*

John L. Chase; A.B., Harvard, 1939; A.M., *ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Princeton, 1952. The Development of the United States Policy toward Germany During World War II. *Princeton.*

Frank C. Chookolingo; A.B., Southern California, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Implications of the Program to Aid Underdeveloped Areas in Respect to India. *Southern California.*

Nicholas Christ Christy; LL.B., National University of Athens, 1939; A.M., Fletcher School, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1951. Greco-British Relations During the Greek War of Independence. *Fletcher School.*

Bernard Cecil Cohen; A.B., Yale, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. World Affairs Educational Organizations and Foreign Policy. *Yale.*

David S. Collier; B.S., Northwestern, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1952. American Policy Regarding the Foreign Trade of Japan. *Northwestern.*

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON MONGOLIA

The material in the following pages has been gathered with two purposes in mind. The first is to provide a brief survey of the scope of literature on Mongolia. The second is to suggest sources which in themselves either contain extensive bibliographies, thus expanding the coverage of this study, or deal with specific problems in the field of Mongolian researches. Extensive criticism of each of the works listed would unduly expand the paper. In most cases some indication of the value of a source for certain types of research is indicated. Some works have been deliberately ignored as a judgment on their worth. Since the literature on Mongolia covers a wide variety of subjects, ranges over an extensive period of time, and is in many languages, no preference is given to books published in any particular period of years.

Political Mongolia—the Mongol People's Republic—covers an expanse of territory bounded by China on the south and southwest (Chinese Turkestan), Russia on the west and north, and Manchuria on the east. Cultural Mongolia extends over a wider region, including part of West Manchuria, the Chinese provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, part of the Chinghai province, part of Siberia (the area around Lake Baikal), part of Northwest Chinese Turkestan (Dzungaria), and formerly included an outlying cultural group on the Volga. Historically, it is well known, an even broader area lay within the control of the Mongols. Writers on Mongolia and the Mongols have thus been able to produce a vast literature on social, political, religious, economic, ethnological and historical topics with little duplication, and without exhausting the field for research.

Bibliographic aids bring some order out of this apparent chaos. Consequently we shall start our survey with a brief listing of the more important bibliographies and bibliographic periodicals.

I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

One of the most recent collections of titles is that by M. Chang Chih-yi, entitled "A Bibliography of Books and Articles on Mongolia" (reprinted from the *Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society*, Vol. 37, parts II and III, 1950). This bibliography, while quite limited, at least provides a guide for reading in Chinese, Japanese, and Russian works on the area. Mr. Chang has supplied the name of the author and of the work, translation of the title, the library at which the book or article is available in the United States and brief descriptive comments.

An earlier bibliography is that by Robert Kerner, *Northeastern Asia; A Selected Bibliography* (University of California, Berkeley, 1939, 2 vols.). The subtitle, "Contributions to the Bibliography of the Relations of China, Russia, and Japan, with Special Reference to Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Eastern Siberia, in Oriental and European Languages," is indicative of the contents.

Since the titles listed under Mongolia (as well as for the other areas) are classified as to their basic content, material for any given topic, e.g., Mongol-Chinese relations, is easily found.

Still another collection covering Mongolia (Inner and Outer), Manchuria, Tannu Tuva, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) and the Soviet Far East, as well as China Proper, Tibet, Japan, Korea, Indo-China and Indonesia, is that of Rudolf Loewenthal, compiled in 1949 and covering the period 1931–1936. Entitled *Bibliography of Russian Literature on China and Adjacent Countries, 1931–1936* (Harvard Russian Research Center, 1949), this is a mimeographed list "designed to fill a gap in the bibliographical aids at present available for the study of Russian work on China and peripheral areas on East Asia." The major Russian bibliography, that by P. E. Skachkov, *Bibliografiia Kitaiia* [Bibliography of China] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1932. Reprinted in Ann Arbor, 1948, for the American Council of Learned Societies), lists Russian books and articles from early times to the year 1930. A supplementary list of similar materials compiled in the Soviet Union for the years 1937 to 1947 has been translated by Mr. Loewenthal ("Works on the Far East and Central Asia Published in the U.S.S.R., 1937–47," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 8, pp. 172–183 [Feb., 1949]). Mr. Loewenthal's listing for the years 1931 to 1936 emphasizes history and the social sciences. The major drawback to the use of this work is the lack of classification.

Another bibliography in Russian specifically devoted to works on the Mongol People's Republic is that of Etakterina Nilovna Iakovleva, *Bibliografiia Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki; sistematicheskii ukazatel' knig i zhurnalnykh statei na russkom iazyke* [A Systematic Arrangement of Books and Journal Articles in the Russian Language] (Moscow, 1935, pp. 228).

For the Buriat Mongol Republic, two sources may be mentioned briefly. The article by Olga Lang, "Recent Russian Literature on Buriat Mongolia" (*Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 13, pp. 45–62 [March, 1940]), discusses a number of books and articles published between 1927 and 1937 on this area. A more specialized work, the *Bibliography of Buriat Mongolia, 1800–1936* (Moscow, 1946), lists 2527 sources, all in Russian. Volume III (the only one readily available to me) covers Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, Fur Farming and Fisheries.

Two excellent bibliographic periodicals are of much help for their coverage of books and articles in various languages. The *Bulletin of Far Eastern Bibliography*, edited by Earl Pritchard (1936–40), published by the Committee on Far Eastern Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C., was the predecessor of the bibliographic section of the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, and covers most of Asia, with particular attention to journals. The first issue, 1936, is listed only according to author, but later issues classify material by area. For the more recent work on Mongolia, this is one of the most handy references. In a slightly different vein is the *Bibliography of the Orient* [*Bibliografiia Vostoka*] (Leningrad: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.). This periodical carries subject bibliographical articles, accounts of manuscript collections and archival material, book reviews and annotations, a bibliography of periodicals, and a general list of books and foreign periodicals received at the Leningrad libraries. Particularly noteworthy are its listings and reviews of works written in Mongolian. The first issue (1932) carries a list of the contents of the journal *Khozhiaistvo Mongolii* [Mongolian Economy] from 1926 to 1931.

II. HISTORY

For an introduction to the general history of Mongolia as a whole, we must inevitably turn to the compilations produced in the 1800's, drawing upon the scholarship of the 18th and early 19th century. Such works as D'Ohsson's *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz Khan jusqu'à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan* (1834, 4 vols., reprinted in Tientsin, 1940), Henry Hoyle Howorth's *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century* (London, 1876–1927, 4 vols.), and P. S. Pallas' *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften* (Frankfurt, 1779) are essential to the worker desiring a rapid survey of Mongol history from the earliest times to the 19th century. While these works have their faults as to analysis and accuracy of information, they provide a solid foundation for entering into more specialized studies. They have the advantage also of bringing together in one place material from many languages and specialized researches. A brief recent survey of Mongol history almost to the present is that by Berthold Spuler, contained in the book *Geschichte Asiens* (Munich, 1950). Perhaps first attention should be directed to this work for one desiring an accurate, concise account of the scope of Mongol history.

Possibly the greatest attention by historians has been given to the period of the Mongol Empire under Jingis Khan and his successors. For this period we can rely upon such more recent studies as those of Rene Grousset, in his works *L'Empire des steppes* (Paris, 1939) and *L'Empire Mongol* (*I^er phase*) (*Histoire du monde,* Tome VIII, 3, 1941). Fernand Grenard contributes an important study of the period of Jingis in his book *Genghis-Khan* (Paris, 1935). For the military aspects of the empire, the recently published work by Paul Pelliot and L. Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan* [*Cheng-wou ts'in-tcheng lou*] (Paris, 1951) and that of Henry D. Martin, *The Rise of Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China* (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1950) are quite useful. The study of the *Life of Ghingis Khan* (London, 1930, translated into English by Prince D. Mirsky and into French by M. Carsow) by the Russian Mongolist, B. Ia. Vladimirtsov, should also be consulted.

Arabic and Persian sources have been thoroughly discussed by Vladimirtsov in his *Le Régime social des Mongols*: *le feodalisme nomade* (Paris, 1948) [Russian: *Obshchestvennyi Stroi Mongolov: Mongol'skii Kochevoi Feodalism* (Leningrad, 1934)]. The relations of the Mongol Empire with the peoples to the west are covered partly by the study of Dr. E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1888), derived largely from the Chinese sources. A discussion of these sources as well as others is included in the work.

The period of Mongol domination of Russia and its effect on the rise of the Russian nation receives detailed attention by B. Spuler in his work *Die Goldene*

Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland, 1223–1502 (Leipzig, 1943). Spuler's major sources are in Russian, other Slavic languages, and Persian, Arabic, French, and German.

The post-Empire epoch in the history of the Mongols is gradually being clarified by researchers into Mongol history. One of the major sources in a western language for this confused period is that of D. Pokotilov, *History of the Eastern Mongols during the Ming Dynasty from 1368 to 1634* (*Studia Serica. Monograph Series A, No. 1,* Chinese Cultural Studies Research Institute, West China Union University, Chengtu, 1947). Originally written in Russian, this was translated by Rudolf Loewenthal into English for the journal *Studia Serica* (Vol. 6, 1947) and extended and corrected by Wolfgang Franke in the *Monograph Series A, No. 3* of the same journal. Franke's addenda contain also an annotated listing of the more important Mongol, Chinese and Japanese sources for this period of Mongol history. To round out the picture from the Mongol side, I. J. Schmidt's translation of the Mongol work *Erdeni-yin tobchi* (sometimes referred to by the author's name, *Sanang Setsen* (*Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen,* St. Petersburg, 1829), presents a history of the Mongols, particularly those of the East, from the beginnings to 1651. While partly legendary, this is a most important source for the period of the introduction of the form of Buddhism which played such a vital role in the development of Mongol culture until the Soviet period.

To bring us to the more political and recent past, we may cite from many works, one which stands out: M. Courant's *L'Asie Centrale aux XVII et XVIII Siècles: Empire Kalmuck ou Empire Mantchou?* (Annales de L'Université de Lyon, No. 26, New Series, Lyon and Paris, 1912). This is an important study of the struggle between the Western Mongols (Kalmucks) and the Manchus for the domination of Tibet and the Mongol peoples. I. J. Korostovetz' *Von Cinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik* (*eine kurze Geschichte der Mongolei unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der neuesten Zeit*) (Berlin, 1926), covering the period primarily from the 1800's to 1924, and the growing influence of Soviet Russia, brings us to the present.

As a corollary to this work, we must note Vl. L. Kotvich's *Kratkii obzor istorii i sovremennogo politicheskogo polozheniia Mongolii* [A Short Sketch of the History and Present-day Political Organization of Mongolia] (1914). This study was made to accompany a map of the divisions of Mongolia, which appears in Korostovetz' book. It is one of the most important books on Mongolia and its status in 1911–1912, giving attention to the territorial and administrative subdivisions, etc.

Before leaving the subject of Mongol history, we must cast a glance at those works which, while not properly history, contribute mightily to our understanding of it. Some of the most important works on Mongol history have been disguised by library listings as linguistic studies. Of these, to name but a few, we find the work of Haenisch, Heissig, Pelliot, Pozdneev, and Gombojev. Haenisch and Pelliot have both spent long years on the translation of the Mongolian work known as the *Secret History,* and have succeeded in clarifying by their translations—i.e., *Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen* (Leipzig, 1941); *Histoire secrète des Mongols* (Oeuvres Posthumes, 1, Paris, 1949)—many obscure problems in the time leading up to the proclamation of Temuchin as Jingis Khan, as well as correcting errors of interpretation of the social organization of the Empire period. (See L. Krader's review of Haenisch's *geheime Geschichte der Mongolen, Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 1950.) Heissig's translation of the *Bolur Erikhe. Eine kette aus Bergkristallen. Eine Mongolische Chronik der Kienlung-zeit, von Rasipungsuk* (*1774–1775*) (Monumenta serica. Monograph series, X, Peiping, 1946) presents material for analysis of Chinese-Mongol relations as well as offering the picture from the Mongolian standpoint. Pozdneev's translation of the *Erdiniin Erikhe* (St. Petersburg, 1883) continues the story for the Ming and Ch'ing (Manchu) periods. Galsang Gombojev presents a history of the Mongols from their origins to the early 17th century in his work *Mongol'skaia letopis'*, the *Altan Tobchi* (St. Petersburg, 1858). (See also bibliographic section of Vladimirtsov, *Regime.*) N. N. Poppe's *Letopis' Korinskikh Buriat* [Khorin Buriat Annals] (Moscow-Leningrad, Institute of Oriental Studies, 1935–36, 2 vols.) is a Russian translation of an important history of the Buriats written in Mongolian.

Finally, the studies of Vladimirtsov and Poppe on the Mongol folk-epics, apart from their other work, provide oral material relating to the times of Jingis Khan and after (Poppe, *Xalxa-mongol'skii geroicheskii epos* [Khalkha-Mongol Heroic Epics] Moscow, 1937; Vladimirtsov, *Mongolo-oiratskii geroicheskii epos* [Mongol-Oirat Heroic Epics] Moscow, 1923). The extensive knowledge of such scholars makes every one of their works a mine of bibliographic resources as well as a rich storehouse of suggestions and extensive discussions in footnotes. Thus historians, political scientists and sociologists, as well as anthropologists, must investigate such apparently "off-the-track" studies.

III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Under the rubric "International Relations" we have grouped a selection of sources relating roughly to the period from 1700 to the present. Of the more recently published material, Michel N. Pavlovsky's study, *Chinese-Russian Relations* (New York, 1949), contains an extensive treatment of the position of Mongolia in regard to these two nations. A standard reference work on this topic is Baddeley's *Russia, Mongolia, China, being some record of the relations between them in the beginning of the XVIIth century to the death of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich* (London, 1919, 2 vols.). Baddeley drew heavily upon original documents in the Russian Archives. Companion studies are found in Caston Cahen's *Histoire des relations de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre le Grand, 1689–1730* (Paris, 1911) and *Some Early Russo-Chinese Relations* (Peking, 1940, reprint), translated from the French work by W. Sheldon Ridge with footnotes incorporated and some portions of the original text omitted.

One of the latest works to present a detailed and extensive treatment of the relations of Outer Mongolia with Russia, China, Japan and other countries, is the study of Gerard M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position*

(Baltimore, 1951). Friters concentrates primarily on the period from 1900 to 1947, though not completely neglecting the former period. He uses extensively material in Russian, French, German, and English, and to a much lesser extent in Chinese and other languages. A short general survey of international relations to 1936 is found in *China, Mongolia and Russia: A Survey of Their Recent Relations* (Peiping, 1936).

Having reached the modern period, we must begin to distinguish between Inner and Outer Mongolia, which have been separated in fact since the early 1920's. Friters' book deals primarily with Outer Mongolia, as does another quite recent work, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1949), a translation by John De Francis of a Chinese work by Ma Ho-t'ien. The period of the political development of the Mongol People's Republic is discussed in Ma's work, as well as in that of Perry-Ayscough and Otter-Barry, *With the Russians in Mongolia* (London, 1914). A traveller, Hermann Consten, offers another eye-witness account of the developments to 1920 in *Weideplätze der Mongolen* (Berlin, 1920, 2 vols.), though much is drawn from Russian sources without acknowledgment. M. Louis Kervyn, in *Ourga (1912–1930); La politique chinoise en Mongolie* (Peking, 1932) gives a picture which, while unsatisfactory in some respects, is of importance for the period between 1911 and 1919 in Outer Mongolia, with some attention to the Inner Mongols. A similar work is that of Josson and Willaert, *Iorga, relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident* (1923).

Aside from the above mentioned works, there exist only a few books—but many articles—which deal particularly with the political relations of Mongolia and other countries. Levine's *La Mongolie* (Paris, 1937) presents some interesting material from Russian sources while missing a great deal. Its subtitle, "*An Historical, Geographic and Political Study,*" promises much that is not sufficiently supplied. I. Misshima and T. Goto, *A Japanese View of Outer Mongolia* (New York, 1942), is interesting for its tables, economic information, and viewpoint, but is largely drawn from the more extensive work of Victoroff and Khalkin, *The Mongolian People's Republic* (Moscow, 1937).

Of articles dealing with Outer Mongolia, particularly in the last few years, we shall cite but a few. Proceeding chronologically, G. D. R. Phillips in "Mongolia and the Far Eastern War" (*Labour Monthly*, Vol. 20, pp. 307–312, 379–383 [1938]) and "W. H." in "Die Bolschewisierung der ausseren Mongolei" (*Geist der Zeit*, Vol. 16, pp. 824–831 [1938]) present contrasting views of events in Mongolia during the Japanese invasion of China. A series of articles by F. S. Mansvetov, "Inside Outer Mongolia" (*Asia*, Vol. 45, pp. 244–247 [May 1945]), "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia" (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, pp. 143–152 [Oct., 1945]) and "Strategic Mongolia" (*Asia*, Vol. 45, pp. 202–205 [April, 1945]) helps to clarify the developments in Mongolia to the end of World War II. Owen Lattimore in his article "Outer Mongolian Horizon" (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, pp. 648–660 [July, 1946]) discusses the future of Mongolia in the post-war world. The gradual loss of the last vestiges of Chinese control of Outer Mongolia is portrayed by James Burke in his article "China's Losing Game in Mongolia" (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 17, pp. 156–157 [July 7, 1948]). A good, concise summary to 1938 is given in Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941: Vol. 1, 1929–1936* (London and New York, 1947) and in David Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven, 1948).

Inner Mongolia, while it has long been an ethnic and cultural unit, has received less attention as an independent entity by writers, partially because the gradual encroachment of Chinese settlers has made it more and more part of China Proper. Perhaps the most recent work dealing with Inner Mongolia as a unit in itself is Walther Heissig's *Das Gelbe Vorfeld: die Mobilisierung der chinesischen Aussenländer* (*Schriften zur Wehrgeopolitik*, Band 2; Kurt Vowinckel, Berlin, 1941). Heissig uses many sources not easily available in his discussion of the developments in Sinkiang, Outer and Inner Mongolia up to 1939–1940. Numerous sketch maps and sketches of Chinese and Soviet propaganda in Mongolia make the book of great interest.

An older work containing much of importance for the understanding of the position of Inner Mongolia is P. E. Skachkov's *Vnutrenniaia Mongoliia: Ekonomiko-geograficheskii ocherk* [Inner Mongolia; An Economic-Geographic Sketch] (Moscow, 1933). Skachov includes an extensive bibliography of works in Russian and other western languages. In Russian also is the work by A. M. Baranov entitled *Inner Mongolia* (Harbin, 1919?). Baranov deals particularly with Eastern Inner Mongolia, discussing in detail the location and organization of the administrative divisions of the Mongols of this area, using Chinese sources.

Background on both Mongolias, Inner and Outer, may be obtained from the various *China Year Books*. Those for the years 1914, 1921, 1926, 1928, 1938, and 1934 contain in varying degrees discussions of the situation current at the time, as well as a review of the events immediately preceding their publication dates.

A few articles on the struggle between Japan and China for domination of the Inner Mongols may be mentioned. Owen Lattimore contributed to the understanding of this struggle in his article "Inner Mongolia: Chinese, Japanese, or Mongol?" (*Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 10, pp. 64–71 [March, 1937]). A Russian article, "Suiyuan and Japan" by M. Andreev (in *Tikhii Okean*, Vol. 2, pp. 90–104 [1937]) presents an analysis from the Soviet standpoint of the economic and political developments in Inner Mongolia at that time. The Inner Mongolian "Independence" movements and Japan's role in regard to them is partially discussed in Norman D. Hanwell's article, "Japan's Inner Mongolian Wedge" (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 8, pp. 147–153 [June 21, 1939]). A perhaps too enthusiastic appraisal of the Inner Mongolian "State" is offered in Walker Matheson, "Meng Chiang, the New Nation" (*Current History*, Vol. 51, pp. 31–34 [Nov., 1939]).

IV. MONGOLS QUA MONGOLS

In most of the literature so far noted, the Mongols have been presented as the bone of contention between powers, or described in historical perspective as part of the world picture. We shall now mention a few titles which help to depict the Mongols as a people, with a distinctive culture. While a more detailed breakdown of the material could be adopted, we have broadly classified the works in this section as to the following content: (1) Interpretative studies of Mongol culture and development (concerned mainly with socio-political organization); (2) Mongol Law; (3) Description by Travellers; (4) Economics; (5) Buddhism; (6) Literature in Mongolian for the study of Mongol problems.

(*1*) *Interpretative studies* (*government, social organization, religious development*). Studies which have attempted to depict the development of all aspects of Mongol life have been exceedingly few. Of these few, the bulk have been in Russian, though some have been translated into other languages. The works of early Soviet writers may be considered somewhat more objective than more recent studies. For the understanding of the political organization of the Mongols during the time of Jingis and before the Manchu conquest of China, the work of B. Ia. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi Stroi Mongolov, Mongol'skii Kochevoi Feodalism* (previously noted), must be consulted. While Vladimirtsov frequently attempts to read into events in the time of Jinghis Khan concepts which are more applicable to modern developments, and which are analyzed from the Soviet point of view, this is a study of significance .

Jumping a wide gap in time, the studies of A. M. Pozdneev, among them a work of major proportions entitled *Mongoliia i Mongoly* [Mongolia and the Mongols] (St. Petersburg, 1896–1898, 2 vols.), are of first importance for the understanding of the modern Mongols. This and other works of Pozdneev are based upon lengthy journeys through most of the territory inhabited by the Mongols, although most attention is concentrated on Outer Mongolia. A companion study is that by I. M. Maiskii, entitled *Sovremennaia Mongoliia* [Modern Mongolia] (Irkutsk, 1921). Maiskii's study is an important description of Outer Mongolia, its economics, population, clergy, etc., and is also based upon travels in that region. The work of Kotvitch, *Kratkii obzor istorii i sovremennogo polit. polozheniia Mongolii* (St. Petersburg, 1914), might also legitimately fall under this classification.

Recent work by Soviet Russian authors includes a brace of books by E. M. Murzaev. That entitled *Mongol'skaia Narodnaia Respublika* [The Mongolian People's Republic] (Moscow, 1948) emphasizes the physical geography of Outer Mongolia, and the second discusses in detail the geographic explorations made in the country. (For a more extensive discussion of recent Russian work on the area, see William B. Ballis, "Selected Soviet Writings on the Far East since 1945," *Pacific Affairs* [March, 1952].)

Interpretative works in English are creditable largely to the work of Owen Lattimore or to scholars associated with Johns Hopkins University. We have already noted Gerard Friters' *Outer Mongolia*. The introduction to that study, "Mongolia's Place in the World," written by Lattimore, discusses some of the figures prominent in the development of modern Mongolia, and may be considered a short summary of developments in its own right. Another of Lattimore's works which places the Mongols historically in their relation to China, and interprets theoretically their internal development, is the book *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (American Geographic Society Research Series No.

21, 1940, New York, reprinted 1951). Many problems are posed in this work which are worthy of more detailed study. Still another of Lattimore's works which should be consulted to develop the picture of the Mongols *qua* Mongols is his *Mongols of Manchuria* (London, 1935). Finally, two articles by Lattimore should be consulted for a view of the developments in the Mongol world in the 1930's: "The Historical Setting of Inner Mongol Nationalism" (*Pacific Affairs,* Vol. 9, pp. 388–406 [Sept., 1936]) and "Prince, Priest and Herdsman in Mongolia" (*Pacific Affairs,* Vol. 8, pp. 35–48 [March, 1935]).

Another overall survey of Mongolia from the Japanese viewpoint is found in "An Outline of Outer Mongolia" (*Contemporary Manchuria,* Vol. 3, pp. 111–140 [July, 1939]), by Kiyoshi Ishida. This article is of some value particularly for its tables and diagrams. A most valuable study is Lessing's *Mongolen* (Berlin, 1935).

For Inner Mongolia, we have the work of Chang Yin-t'ang, *Economic Development and Prospects of Inner Mongolia* (Shanghai, 1934), which, while emphasizing the possibilities of the area for commercial development and its importance to the Chinese, presents some valuable material regarding the results of Chinese encroachment on the Inner Mongols. M. Louis Kervyn's posthumously published work, *Moeurs et coutumes Mongoles* (Brussels, 1947), gives a rounded picture of the life of Mongols in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. Special studies on the Ordos Mongols, particularly on social organization, appear in *Ordosica: Studies on the Ordos Mongols* (Bulletin No. 9 [1934], Catholic University of Peking), by Fr. Antoine Mostaert.

(*2*) *Mongol Law.* The basic source for the study of Mongol Law and its historical development is the work of V. A. Riasanovsky. The earlier work, *Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes* (3 parts, Harbin, 1929), and the later study, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law* (Tientsin, 1937), together contain a wealth of material concerning not only law, but social organization, customs, etc. An interesting extension of this aspect of Mongol life is found in the study by Riasanovsky on "The Influence of Ancient Mongol Culture and Law on Russian Culture and Law," in the *Chinese Social and Political Review,* Vol. 20 (Jan. 1937). Curt Alinge's *Mongolische Gesetz* (Leipzig, 1934) draws much upon earlier studies by Riasanovsky but is somewhat better organized. Alinge's study briefly surveys Mongol history and Lamaism, then proceeds to a chronological description of the various codes. Both Alinge and Riasanovsky are indebted to the works of K. F. Golstunskii, *Mongolo-Oiratskie Zakony* [Mongol-Oirat Laws] (St. Petersburg, 1895), and O. I. Leontovich, *Kalmutskoe Pravo* [Kalmuck Law] (Odessa, 1880).

Chinese regulations for the Mongols during the Ch'ing dynasty are briefly discussed by Riasanovsky, whose work is based on the early description and translation of Chinese materials by C. Lipovtsov, *Ulozhenie Kitaiskoi palaty vneshnikh snoshenii* [The Regulations of the Chinese Board of Foreign Affairs] (St. Petersburg, 1828, 2 vols.), and Hyacinth Bitchurin, *Zapiski o Mongolii* [Notes on Mongolia] (St. Petersburg, 1828, 2 vols.). A full description of the work of Riasanovsky on Mongol, Chinese, and Russian law, in addition to his studies of the customary law of Siberian tribes, may be found in an article by B. Roomiantseff, "Scientific Works of Professor V. A. Riasanovsky in the Sphere of the Laws of Oriental Peoples" (*Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Vol. 22, pp. 72–91 [Apr.-June 1938]).

Work on modern Mongolian Law has been concentrated on the various constitutions of the Mongol People's Republic. Thus far, to my knowledge, a few articles but no books on the subject as such have appeared. Of these, the article "Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Mongolian People's Republic," in *Soviet Press Translations*, Vol. 3 (Jan. 1, 1948), gives an English translation of the 1924 Mongolian People's Republic Constitution and the 1944 amendment extending the suffrage. The 1940 Constitution is presented in full in an appendix to Gerard Friters' book, and discussed in comparison with the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. in an article by John N. Hazard, "The Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic and Soviet Influences" (*Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 21, pp. 162–170 [June, 1948]). Eleanor Lattimore contributes "A Note on the Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic" in *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 17 (April 7, 1948).

A survey of developments in Mongol Law up to 1948 is found in the *Washington Law Review*, Vol. 23 (1948). V. A. Riasanovsky, now resident in Oregon, contributes the article "Mongol Law: A Concise Historical Survey" (pp. 166–178). Lawrence Krader, now at the Harvard Russian Research Center, brings the survey more up to date in "Mongol Law: Later Developments" (pp. 178–181). The Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic as of 1948 is presented (pp. 181–204).

Finally, we may mention the article by Marshal K. Choibalsang, late Premier of the Mongolian People's Republic, translated from *Pravda* in *Soviet Press Translations*, Vol. 4, pp. 114–116 [Feb. 15, 1950]. In "The Mongol People on the Road to Socialism," Choibalsang notes the February, 1949, amendment introducing "general, direct and equal elections by secret ballot."

(*3*) *Traveller's descriptions.* Under this general heading fall most of the works which are primarily descriptions of some portion of the Mongol world visited by scientists on expeditions, missionaries stationed in the area, geographers, explorers, professional vagabonds, or those passing through en route to some other place. The amount of travel literature on Mongolia and the Mongols is staggering; we shall cull out for this survey only some of the better descriptions or those which have good, extensive bibliographies. The intent of most of the works in this section, as differentiated from those called "interpretative studies," is to present a picture of the life or some aspect of the life of the Mongols, without necessarily placing it in a theoretical framework.

We may start this section by mentioning some of the oldest studies made by Westerners after Marco Polo and his contemporaries. Such works as that of Ysbrants Ides, *Three Years Travels from Moscow Overland to China: Through Great Utsiga, Sirиania, Permia, Siberia, Daour, Great Tartary, etc. to Peking,* (London, 1705), John Bell of Antermony, *Travels from St. Petersburg in Russia to Diverse Parts of Asia* (Glasgow, 1763), and P. S. Pallas' *Sammlungen historischen*

Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften (Frankfurt, 1779), all of the 18th century, are classics of description, better in many respects for their detailed notation of customs, etc., than many of the more recent travellers' reports. In the following century, many travellers crossed various parts of Mongolia and continued the "opening" of Mongolia to the West. One of the best descriptions for the early part of the 19th century is that by George Timkowski, *Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China in 1820–1821* (London, 1827). Timkowski's account offers much for the study of social organization and the relations of the Mongols to China's economy, etc. Shortly after, Huc and Gabet traversed a different portion of Mongolia in their trip to Tibet. In the work of Huc, *Travels in Tartary, Tibet and China, 1844–1846* (edited by Paul Pelliot, London, 1928, 2 vols.), is much material of value for an intimate understanding of the Mongols. There are innumerable editions of their journey, but the best and most carefully edited is the recent one in the Broadway Travellers Series, noted above.

Travelling the main route from Russia to Peking, P. I. Piasetskii observed at a later date (late 1800's) much the same area seen by Timkowski sixty years earlier. In his *Voyages à travers la Mongolie et la Chine* (translated from Russian by A. Kuseinski, Paris, 1883), Piasetskii describes the people and countryside, as well as the problems besetting voyagers, and provides a valuable contrast to Timkowski's observations. The massive work of A. M. Pozdneev, *Mongolia and the Mongols*, has already been mentioned for its comprehensive view of the Mongols of Outer and Inner Mongolia. On a much more limited scale, the works of the missionary James Gilmour, *Among the Mongols* (London, 1888) and *More About the Mongols* (London, 1893) might be suggested for informative observations on the daily life of the nomads. The classic Russian work for this period is Prejevalsky, *Mongolia, the Tangut Country and the Solitudes of Northern Tibet* (London, 1876, translated by E. Delmar Morgan).

The late 1800's and early 19th century saw a great increase in travel literature on Mongolia. The *Report . . . of His Majesty's Consul at Wuchow on a Journey in Mongolia* (London, 1904), by Mr. C. W. Campbell provides much of interest, and in addition suggests the interest of the British in Russian activity on the Manchurian-Mongolian border at this time. Hedley's *Tramps in Dark Mongolia* (London, 1910) is another product of the sharp-eyed traveller who is alert to cultural differences. While both John Hedley and the previously mentioned Gilmour are (as most travellers seem to have been) aware of the dirt, unseemly ways, etc. of the "ignorant" Mongols, they have faithfully chronicled the activities of a people strange to the West of that day.

One of the most frequently referred to travellers in Mongolia is Ney Elias, whose "A Journey Through Mongolia," in the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society* (London, 1873), is another excellent source. A. S. Kent, in his *Old Tartar Trails* (Shanghai, 1919), offers a good deal of material on the manners and customs of the Mongols, particularly around Urga (Ulan Bator). The work of Beatrix Bulstrode in *A Tour in Mongolia* (London, 1920), is made more valuable by the introduction of David Fraser, which discusses the political aspects of the country. The previously mentioned work by Hermann Consten also presents a vivid picture of political activity in Mongolia at this time.

Roy Chapman Andrews' *Across Mongolian Plains* (London and New York, 1921) offers a slightly different account of a journey in that he observes, as a naturalist and scientific explorer, many physical features which are barely noticed by many travellers. The picture of the political life at the time is not slighted by his interest in other fields.

In more recent times, travellers' reports on Mongolia have become much more concentrated on superficial glimpses of the life of the people, or on political activity, etc. An important description of a little investigated area (the southeast corner of Outer Mongolia), however, exists in the Russian language. This is the study *Poezdka v Darigangu* [A Trip to Dariganga] (1930), by V. A. Kazakevich. Ladislaus Forbath's *The New Mongolia* (London, 1936), translated into German as *Die Neue Mongolei. Nach Joseph Geleta's Tagebuch* (Berlin, n.d.), offers a description of parts of Outer Mongolia during the period when the struggle to strip the Lamas and monasteries of their power was still continuing. In addition to providing a store of information, the author adds a great many fine illustrations.

In addition to the above, Owen Lattimore's *Mongol Journeys* (New York, 1941), as the work of an alert traveller and one familiar with many aspects of Mongol life, should not be forgotten. One other book, which has been re-issued in recent years, may be mentioned here, though the journeys were made at an earlier date. V. A. Obruchev's *Vostochnaia Mongoliia* [Eastern Mongolia] (Moscow, 1947) is of primary value to students of geography and geology, but for all interested in Mongolia it offers an extensive annotated bibliography of both general and geographical works. The map to this work is a masterpiece of cartography.

Most of the travellers previously referred to have travelled either in Outer Mongolia or portions of it. We come now to those whose journeys have been limited to areas scattered about Inner Mongolia, Western Outer Mongolia (Dzungaria) or Tannu-Tuva, formerly the Uriangkhai region of Outer Mongolia.

In Inner Mongolia, many travellers have been concerned with the effects of the movement of Chinese farmers into formerly nomadic Mongolian areas. A picture not often drawn is shown by Joseph Edkins in "A Visit to the Agricultural Mongols" (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, North China Branch, new series, Vol. 2, pp. 99–111 [1865]). W. W. Rockhill's *Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet in 1891 and 1892* (Washington, D. C., 1894) gives much insight into the effects of contact between Mongols and Tibetans in the Chinghai (Koko-nor) region of Northeast Tibet. The famous Russian explorer, P. K. Kozlov, has also investigated this region in two works, *Mongoliia i Kam* (St. Petersburg, 1905, 2 vols.) and *Mongoliia i Amdo; Mertvyi gorod Khara-Khota* [Mongolia and Amdo: the Dead City of Khara-Khoto] (Moscow, 1947, re-issue). A very important study of the groups of Mongols and others living in Kansu and Ch'inghai is the work of G. N. Potanin, *Tangutsko-Tibetskaia* *okraina Kitaia* [The Tangut-Tibetan Borderlands of China] (St. Petersburg, 1893, 2 vols.). The work of N. M. Prejevalsky has already been noted. A brief but informative book is that by Comte de Lesdain, entitled *En Mongolie: 15 Juin, 22 Septembre, 1902* (Paris, 1903). A good portion of Inner Mongolia, from Kalgan to Ninghsia, thence back to Kalgan and to Urga in Outer Mongolia, is traversed. A more specialized work on the Tumet Mongols of Suiyüan province is that of Joseph P. van Oost, *Notes sur le T'oemet* (Shanghai, Mission Catholique, 1922, Variétés sinologiques No. 53). This study ranges over the history of the group, their condition at that time, folklore, proverbs, poetry, etc. Of more geographic interest is Dudley-Buxton's "Inner Mongolia" (*Geographical Journal,* 1923).

A long-time resident among the Mongols, F. A. Larson vividly describes their life in his book, *Larson, Duke of Mongolia* (New York, 1930). A geographic study throwing some light upon the economy, culture, and problems of the Mongols of the Ordos desert is George B. Cressey's *The Ordos Desert of Inner Mongolia* (reprinted from Denison University Bulletin, Vol. 33, No. 8, in *Journal of the Scientific Laboratories,* Vol. 28, pp. 155–248 [Oct., 1933]). Cressey also includes a good bibliography for this region. The writings of Henning Haslund Christensen, *Men and Gods in Mongolia* (New York, 1935) and *Tents in Mongolia* (New York, 1934), are by one of the scientists on the Sven Hedin expeditions into Central Asia and are worth reading particularly for their sympathetic insight into the reactions and activities of the Mongols of the western part of Inner Mongolia. Most of the writings of Sven Hedin himself have dealt more fully with Chinese Turkestan, but much data on the Mongols may be found in the *History of the Expedition in Asia, 1927–1935*. Particularly recommended is Part IV of this work, the "General Reports of Travels and Fieldwork." Returning to Eastern Inner Mongolia, we have a report by a traveller who discusses the area just before and after the Japanese invasion. In addition to the factual material and opinion, Walter Bosshard's *Kühles Grasland Mongolei: Zauber und Schönheit der Steppe* (Berlin, 1938) is also full of attractive illustrations. The most recent book on travels in Inner Mongolia is that of Schuyler Camman, *The Land of the Camel: Tents and Temples of Inner Mongolia* (New York, 1951). Camman travelled in the Ordos region in the interval between the Japanese occupation and the conquest of the area by the Chinese Communists, and gives a view of the clash between the nomadic Mongols and Chinese agriculturalists, as well as of the effects of the war on the Mongols. There is a good deal of insight into the religion and role of the lamaseries in Inner Mongolia, and a glimpse of the slow encroachment of modern schools upon them.

Turning to Western Outer Mongolia, we shall mention but a few titles. G. N. Potanin's early work, *Ocherki severo-zapadnoi Mongolii* [Sketches of Northwest Mongolia] (St. Petersburg, 1881–1885, 4 vols.), is an important anthropologic and ethnographic description, although two volumes of the four-volume work are translations of poetry. Among the most famous of Russian travellers in this area are the brothers Grumm-Grzhimailo, and the work of G. E. Grumm-

Grzhimailo, *Zapadnaia Mongoliia i Uriankhanskii Krai* [Western Mongolia and the Uriankhansk region] (Leningrad, Russian Geographic Society, 1926) is one of the more important works on the area. In English a relatively detailed study is available in Douglas Carruthers' *Unknown Mongolia* (Philadelphia, 1914, 2 vols.), a record of travels and exploration in Northwest Mongolia and Dzungaria. More recently this area has been crossed by Edgar von Hartmann, and described in his work *Auf tausendjähriger Karawanenstrasse durch die Mongolei* (Berlin, 1933). The text is accompanied by excellent photographs of the people.

The relatively less discussed area of Tannu-Tuva is dealt with in three works. Otto Mänchen-Helfen's *Reise ins Asiatische Tuva* (Berlin, 1931) is a rapid survey, called by one reviewer an "impressionistic ethnography." A more significant study is that of R. Kabo, *Ocherki Istorii i Ekonomiki Tuvy. Chast' pervaya: Dorevolutsionnaia Tuva* [Studies in the History and Economy of Tuva: Part I: Pre-Revolutionary Tuva] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1934). The final study to be noted here is Werner Leimbach's *Landeskunde von Tuva* (Gotha, 1936). This study has a good bibliography and deals with the problems of acculturation, culture contact with Mongolia proper, and the ethnography of the area.

For the Buriats, we shall mention only V. I. Pomus' *The Buriat Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic* (Moscow, 1937, in Russian); the translation of part of this work by Rose Maurer and Olga Lang, entitled *Buriat-Mongolia—A Brief Survey of Political, Economic and Social Progress* (New York, 1934); M. N. Bogdanov's *Ocherki po istorii Buriat-Mongol'skogo naroda* [Sketches of the History of the Buriat-Mongolian People] (Udinsk, 1926), containing important material on the economy, customs, and history of the Buriats in the 16th and 19th centuries; and three general sources for further inquiry: The *Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiu Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki i Buriat-Mongol'skoi ASSR* [Works of the Commission for the Investigation of the Mongol People's Republic and the Buriat ASSR] (Moscow, 1927–1930), a series running from 1927 through the 1930's, which supplanted the periodical *Severnaia Mongoliia* [Northern Mongolia]; a bibliography by D. K. Zelenin, *Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' Russkoi etnograficheskoi literatury, 1700–1910* (St. Petersburg, 1913) which concentrates on the Buriats, Kalmucks, the Russian peasant and all non-Russian native populations; and the *Borba za Sovety v Buriat-Mongolii* (*1918–1920*) (Moscow, 1940), containing memoirs and documents concerning the struggle for Soviet control of Buriat Mongolia. Other material on the Buriats will be found in many of the travellers' works mentioned, or in bibliographies to these works.

(*4*) *Economics.* A great many of the works previously cited include discussions of the economic problems and life of the Mongols. The few works to be mentioned here are selected by virtue of their emphasis on the problems faced by the Mongols as a result of the continuing encroachment of the Chinese.

Under the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, the Chinese colonists were forbidden until about the last fifty years of the dynasty to settle on Mongol land. The regulations were never entirely adequate, and with the constant pressure of the Chinese, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia were pushed more and more into the arid portions of the territory. Some Mongols succumbed, gave up their nomadic existence, and became sedentary, taking up herding and agriculture. The previously mentioned work of Edkins presents a clear picture of a completely agricultural group of Mongols. Many of the travel books comment upon the changing life of Mongols undergoing the process of acculturation. In recent years some attention was given by Chinese border officials to the economic possibilities of Mongolia. While not involved in the Chinese government, W. Karamisheff in *Mongolia and Western China* (Tientsin, 1925) furnishes a good example of the overestimation of the economic potential of the region. Karamisheff discusses in detail the products of Chinese and Mongols of Kansu, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang (particularly Dzungaria), and presents figures on actual and "potential" production for hides, etc. Chang Yin-t'ang's study, also mentioned above, is based to some degree upon Karamisheff's study, though other material is marshalled to support his case.

R. Verbrugge, in his study "La vie des pionniers chinois en Mongolie aux prises avec un sol ingrat" (*Anthropos*, Vols. 16–17, pp. 256–297, 598–627 [1921–1922]; Vols. 18–19, pp. 189–252, 753–770 [1923–1924]; Vol. 20, pp. 244–275 [1925]), discusses the problem of contact of nomadic and sedentary life from the point of view of the Chinese. This line of inquiry is continued in his "La vie Chinoise en Mongolie" (*Anthropos*, Vol. 26, pp. 783–841 [1931]). Isaiah Bowman, in *The Pioneer Fringe* (American Geographical Society, Special Publication No. 13, New York, 1931), a general study of pioneering in many parts of the world, presents the problem from both sides, Mongol and Chinese. George Cressey shows the gradual movement of Chinese into Mongol territories, and the dislocations arising among the Mongols and Chinese in *Pioneer Settlement* (American Geographical Society, Special Publication No. 14, New York, 1932), another general study of frontier problems. Finally, Walter Heissig discusses the breakdown of traditional Mongol life in his "Beobachtungen über Sesshaftigkeit bei den Mongolen des Jouda cighulghan" [Observations on Sedentariness among the Mongols of the Jouda League] (*Folklore Studies* [Peking], Vol. 3, pp. 176–182 [1945]).

Outer Mongolia has been covered in such works as those of Pozdneev, Maiskii and Misshima, and Goto. The penetration of Soviet Russian control and influence in Outer Mongolia is apparent in the recent work by Soviet authors on the area. In addition to these Russian studies, an earlier volume, P. A. Bobrik's *Mongoliia: Ocherk torgovo-promishlennago i administrativnago byta* [Mongolia: A Sketch of the Trade-Industry and Administrative Life] (Vladivostok, 1914), contains a great deal of material for this period. Other more recent studies include William Mandel, "Outer Mongolia's Five Year Plan" (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 18, pp. 140–144 [June 15, 1949]); "Mongol Farming" (*Contemporary Manchuria*, Vol. 3, pp. 79–96 [Oct., 1936]); and Eleanor Lattimore, "Report on Outer Mongolia" (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 15, pp. 15–22 [Nov. 6, 1946]).

(*5*) *Mongolian Buddhism.* The study of Mongolian Buddhism is a vast field in itself; most travellers have described Lamas, monasteries, ceremonies, etc., but very little analytical work on the religion has appeared. The study of this subject requires the understanding of Tibetan Buddhism from which the Mongol form is derived. The literature on Buddhism in Tibet and Mongolia is extensive, and would require a separate survey to present adequately the material available. We shall mention here but a few titles, more to indicate the major sources than to provide a bibliography.

One of the most important sources is by the Russian scholar A. M. Pozdneev, *Ocherki byta Buddiiskikh monastyrei i Buddiiskogo Dukhovensta* [Sketches of the life of Buddhist Monasteries and Clergy in Mongolia] (St. Petersburg, 1881). The organization of the Lamaist Buddhist Church, the procedures in becoming a monk, the economics of monasteries, etc., are all discussed. A comparative study is that of Robert Bleichsteiner, *Die Gelbe Kirche* (Vienna, 1934); translated into French as *L'Eglise Jaune*, by Jaques Marty (Paris, 1937), presenting an account of Tibetan Buddhism and its historical growth, organization, and relationship with the Mongols. The classic history of the introduction of Buddhism into Mongolia is Georg Huth's *Geschichte des Buddhismus in der Mongolei: mit einer Einleitung: Politische Geschichte der Mongolen* (Strassburg, 1896). Although published in 1896, this book has not yet been superseded as the major source for the study of the effects of Buddhism on the Mongols. The importance of the Mongols in the solidification of the "Yellow Church" in Tibet is brought out in W. W. Rockhill, *The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644–1908* (*T'oung-Pao*, Vol. 10, pp. 1–104 [1910]) and Günther Schulemann's *Die Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas* (Religionsgeschichtliche Bibl., Band 3, Heidelberg, 1911). Carl Friedrich Koeppen's two-volume study, *Die Lamische Hierarchie und Kirche* (Berlin, 1906), contains an extensive analysis of Tibetan, Mongol and Manchu Buddhism.

A very important and outstanding analysis of the teaching and training in Buddhist Schools for Lamas is contained in an appendix to the previously mentioned work of M. N. Bogdanov (*Ocherki* . . .). The appendix, entitled *Buddiiskie Monastyri* [The Buddhist Monasteries] is by Baradin. The description of a monastery and the life of the monks is ably done in Wilhelm Filchner's *Kumbum Dschamba Ling* (Leipzig, 1933). An interesting article is that of A. Yakimov, "On the Question of the Social Structure of Pre-revolutionary Mongolia and the Role of Lamaism" (*Trudy Instituta Vostokovedeniia*, Vol. 2, pp. 139–152 [1940]). The whole problem of the political role of Lamaist Buddhism in Mongolia is at present discussed only sporadically in various articles, books, etc. Lattimore's papers and Friters' book, previously cited, often refer to the question. Studies in progress at the University of Washington, Inner Asia Project, will attempt to produce a more detailed analysis. The titles suggested above, together with many discussed in other sections of this paper, or in the bibliographies of these works, should provide an introduction to this important field of research.

(*6*) *Mongolian Literature on the Mongols.* In an earlier section of this survey, reference has been made to the translations and interpretations of Mongolian texts made by linguists, philologists, and historians, which have contributed to our understanding of the culture of the Mongols. A brief word on the native literature must be added here.

Berthold Laufer, in *Skizze der Mongolischen Literatur* (Keleti Szemle, 8 [1907], Budapest), gives an excellent account of Mongol literature. A later edition of Laufer's study is that of V. A. Kazakevich, *Ocherk Mongol'skoi literatury* [Sketch of Mongolian Literature] (edited by B. Ia. Vladimirtsov, Leningrad, 1927). More recently, Walter Heissig in "Zum Umfang der Mongolischen Geschichtsliteratur" (*Monumenta Serica* [Peking], Vol. 10, pp. 209–221 [1945], has brought to light new materials. Ts. Zh. Zhamtsarano in his *Mongolskie Letopisi XVII Veka* [Mongol Chronicles of the 17th Century] (Trudy Instituta Vostokovedeniia 16, Moscow-Leningrad, 1936) has discussed various manuscripts of the important Mongol works *Erdenin Erikha*, *Altan Tobchi*, *Shara Tudzhi*, *Tsagan Tukhe*, and a second *Altan Tobchi*, all concerned with the history of the Mongols up to that time.

Through the war during the Japanese occupation, many works were printed in Mongol at the Mongol Press in Kalgan. Most of these were historical works, containing little to arouse worry in the Japanese officials. In Outer Mongolia, before and after the war, a great deal of literature has appeared, mostly concerned with the questions of reconstructing the country along Soviet lines and following the Soviet pattern of interpretation. Included are new journals and newspapers, for example *Khoziaistvo Mongolii* (in Russian except for one issue), *Shin-e toli* [The New Mirror], and others. Attention has been turned toward such problems as linguistic reform and adaptation. (See, for example, *Bibliografia Vostoka*, Vol. 10, pp. 189–191 [1936], where the problems of creating a vocabulary for the teaching of mathematics are discussed; and *Bibliografia Vostoka*, Vol. 1, pp. 42–45 [1932], where Dr. N. N. Poppe writes on "New Works on the Latinisation of the Mongolian Written Language.")

Modern textbooks on such subjects as geography, history, natural sciences, veterinary medicine, etc., are all being printed. Our information on the modern literature of Mongolia is all too scanty, and whatever contributions could be made to our knowledge would be of the greatest service to those interested in the area.

V. CHINESE AND JAPANESE STUDIES

Fortunately, many studies in Chinese and Japanese, published in very recent years, have helped clarify the picture of both historical developments and the modern scene in Mongolia. Relying in many cases upon field study combined with library research, and aided by the availability of some materials not readily obtainable in this country, Chinese and Japanese scholars have been offering tantalizing articles, books, and monographs in a steady stream. Again, but a few of these will be mentioned here, to illustrate the scope of the work.

Japanese. For the location of cities, their industry, trade, and chief products Hisataro Yamada's *Encyclopedia of Manchurian and Mongolian Cities* (Tokyo, 1926) is necessary. Communist infiltration in the border areas is dealt with in

Mongolia and Hsinkiang (Res. Div., Neighbourly Friendship Assoc., 1935), Outer Mongolian economy is discussed in *The Republic of Outer Mongolia,* compiled by the Research Department, General Affairs Section of the South Manchurian Railway (Osaka, 1921, 2 vols.). More recent studies include the *Political History of Mongolia* (1938) and a sociological study, *Mongolian Nomad Society* (1942) by Tomio Goto. Hattori's *Introduction to Mongolian Studies* (1947) serves as an excellent introduction for readers of Japanese. Iizuka deals with "*The Political Geography of Nomadic Peoples: Toward an Understanding of Mongol History*" in *Rekishi Hyoron,* 2–6. Hattori summarizes recent developments in "Contemporary Mongol Studies" in the journal *Toyogo Kenkyu,* No. 2. Lamaist Buddhism is the subject of investigation by a number of Japanese, as in Masato Nagao's study, *Mongol Temples of Learning* (Kyoto, 1947—being translated by the Inner Asia Project for the Human Relations Area Files); Hashimoto's *Mongolian Lamaism* (1942); and Nagao's "Account of an Investigation of Mongolian Lamaseries" (*Toho Gakuho* 15, 2[1945]). For an overall picture of Mongol culture we might suggest *Moko daikan* [A General View of Mongolia] (Tokyo, 1938), containing articles on ethnic history, culture and economics, and an extensive bibliography.

Chinese. Aside from the basic source material for the history of Mongolian culture, recent Chinese works have added much to our knowledge of current history. Travellers' reports, economic studies, political investigations, etc., are crying for translation into English. A selection of some of these is noted below.

P'an Kung-chao's *Chin-jih ti Wai-Meng* [Outer Mongolia of Today] (Shanghai, 1947) and Ma Ho-t'ien's *Records of Travels in Kansu, Ch'inghai, and Tibet* (Shanghai, 1947, 3 vols.) are storehouses of information on recent developments in Mongolia. The Ch'ing-hai area is thoroughly investigated in the work by Chou Chen-ho, *Ch'inghai* (Shanghai, 1938). Inner Mongol economy is dealt with in Ho P'ei-hsin's article, "Ch'a Sui Meng-min ti ching-chi sheng-huo" [Economic Life of the Mongols in Chahar and Suiyuan] (*Hsi-pei wen-t'i,* Vol. 1, pp. 15–23 [Jan. 15, 1935]). The book by Fang Fan-chiu, *Meng-ku Kai-k'uang yü Nei-Meng tzu-chih yün-tung* [The Situation of Mongolia and the Self-Government Movement in Inner Mongolia] (Shanghai, 1934), presents the problems of the Mongol "nationalist" movements, noted elsewhere.

Culled from a long list of Chinese works, these few give but a hint of the task which lies before the student of Mongol problems. To the works on Mongolia in western languages, already a mountainous accumulation, must be added vital materials in Chinese and Japanese which are all but untapped. While I have by no means exhausted the possibilities of selection of materials, and many significant books have surely escaped recording, I have attempted to construct a pool wherein the scholar interested in Mongol affairs may at least dip his fingers.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Revolution and the Development of International Relations; Hoover Institute Studies. (Stanford: Stanford University Press.)

Series A: General Studies, No. 1. *The World Revolution of Our Time; A Framework for Basic Policy Research.* By Harold D. Lasswell. (1951. Pp. vi, 66. $1.25.)

Series B: Elites.

No. 1. *The Comparative Study of Elites; An Introduction and Bibliography.* By Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell. (1952. Pp. iii, 72. $1.25.)

No. 2. *The Politburo.* By George K. Schueller. (1951. Pp. vi, 79. $1.25.)

No. 3. *The Nazi Elite.* By Daniel Lerner. (1951. Pp. x, 112. $1.50.)

These four monographs include one dealing with the research framework of the Hoover Institute Studies on Revolution and the Development of International Relations, one discussing the elite concept and the elite research procedures employed, and two analyzing specific elites. In the words of C. Easton Rothwell, "the objective of the project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (R.A.D.I.R.) is to describe and explain the 'world revolution of our time.' More specifically, its purpose is to make clear the major trends of social change throughout the world within the past six decades, to estimate their direction, intensity, and tempo, and to seek explanations of their significance. Because of our concern with a developing world community in which democratic values prevail, we seek to describe these changes in relation to four principal goal values; shared power, shared respect, shared well-being, and shared safety. It is with these values as compass points that we attempt to locate the direction of change and to help reveal the significance of the vast revolution that is reshaping our contemporary world."

Laudable as these objectives are, the magnitude of the task might give pause to any less hardy souls. The collaborators in the project, however, believe they have a method by which the manifold complexities of social change can be reduced to quantitative measurement. Harold Fisher in his introduction to Lasswell's memorandum on scope and method says: "Since we conceived of the world revolution of our times as indexed by changes in the *composition and vocabulary* of the wielders of power, we have concentrated on *elite* studies and *symbol* studies—these studies are largely quantitative and involve the use of newer techniques such as content analysis." Lasswell in his memorandum suggests (it is a pity that he does not critically develop this suggestion) the concept of political index numbers. "It is possible," he says, "to do for certain branches of history what has already been done in the study of changes in population, production, consumption, and price. . . . Our aim is to make available to historical scholars a body of trend data concerning what is variously called 'ideology,' 'public opinion,' 'Zeitgeist,' 'public attention,' 'public attitudes,' 'cultural perspectives,' 'political myths,' 'class attitudes,' 'class analysis,' 'elite analysis,' 'social affiliations,' and the like." As Lasswell points out, "all sorts of hypotheses could be entertained until the data provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research, for example, settled certain questions, and cleared the ground for more refined and sophisticated inquiries." Lasswell envisages the possibility of using the trend data, which the Hoover Institute Studies are intended to stimulate and secure, in the formation of "developmental constructs" designed to facilitate "the task of thinking responsibly and critically about the future. . . . " Lasswell defines "a developmental construct, as characterizing a possible sequence of events running from a selected cross section of the past to a cross section of the future."

The hope that Lasswell entertains seems to be that the use of trend data, if and when such data are available in sufficient quantity and quality, will make it possible to construct various projections and test their implications. This should permit the same degree of intellectual control over potential political developments that the construction and analysis of economic models provide in economics. Lasswell gives some indications as to the selection of values to be measured, but, despite the flashes of insight, he offers no systematic methodology for a political science analogue to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Perhaps we have come some way since Stuart Rice's appeal for "Quantitative Methods In Politics." But this memorandum will convince few of those who were labelled the "*prudenti*" by Merriam in the hopeful early days when statistics was to make political science scientific.

The problem of political measurement is simplified for Lasswell and his co-workers by the dominant importance which they, along with Aristotle, give to the elite. "Elite studies," says Lasswell, "are the heart of research into the world revolution of our time, since an essential criterion of revolution is change in elite structure. The hypothesis that a world revolution is underway during our epoch can only be verified when basic information enables us to estimate the depth and extent of elite changes throughout the globe." To guide his colleagues in their enquiry, Lasswell provided them with a stimulating analysis of the elite concept which he summarizes as follows: "*The political elite comprises the power holders of a body politic. The power holders include the leadership and the social formations from which leaders typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a given generation. In other words, the political elite is the top power class.*" (Lasswell's italics.) Furnished with this suggestive guide as to what is to be studied, Daniel Lerner sets forth the "Elite Research Procedures: The Radir Studies." These procedures are derived from "the operational definition that revolution is 'rapid and extensive change in the composition and vocabulary of the ruling few.'" As Lerner puts it, the elite facts of interest are "*the comparative frequency of selected characteristics in the life histories of elite members at different times.*" In brief, what is proposed is an analysis of the varying characteristics over a period of time of certain segments of national *Who's Who* directories.

The two first studies to emerge are Daniel Lerner's *The Nazi Elite* and

George K. Schueller's *The Politburo*. Lerner's study is a careful analysis of certain categories of Nazis—propagandists, administrators, police and military—to determine their specific attributes. The source of his data is the *Führerlexikon*, the Nazi Who's Who of 1934. Franz Neumann, who is certainly qualified to judge, says in his introduction to the study: "Seen in the light of a social theory of National Socialism and Fascism, this study of the *Nazi Elite* assumes considerable significance. It is the first attempt to quantify the more generalized statements on the social base of National Socialism and thus give it a scientific validity which it heretofore seemed to lack." Perhaps it is the result of a carping turn of mind, but this reviewer would have found it more reassuring if this "scientific" study did not appear to agree so completely with its "non-scientific" predecessors.

Schueller's study of the Politburo seems a less satisfactory analysis of the Soviet elite than Lerner's study of the Nazis, perhaps because the more numerous personages listed in the *Führerlexikon* lend themselves to more impressive statistical manipulation than the lonely occupants of the Politburo. Despite the apparently meager data on which Schueller had to rely in drawing conclusions, he provides us with eight "results" under this head. The more cautious Lerner offers none. It is perhaps a poor way of putting it scientifically, but, in vulgar parlance, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Lacking space, two "Results," one including a recommendation, will have to suffice for the eating. "In many ways," says Schueller, "the Politburo is not at all representative of the population of the Soviet Union. Some areas and nationalities are over-represented (the most noteworthy example being Georgia and the Georgians), while some vast areas are not represented at all. It has been suggested in the body of the paper that this differentiation in representation might be a factor on which national discontent might focus. This point might well be considered by the 'Voice of America' in its propaganda broadcasts to the Soviet Union." And again, "Despite the Soviet emphasis on the emancipation of women, there are no women in the highest ranks of the Soviet elite."

The hasty critic might be inclined to say "*magna mons perturbitur et seq.*" This reviewer would prefer to wait in the hope that the sequel will be more obviously valuable. Hans Morgenthau, reviewing a work of Lasswell and Kaplan in an earlier issue of this REVIEW, warned that the sands were running out. Soon the Foundations will turn their backs on crude empiricism. It will be a pity if our failure to work out a fruitful scientific methodology in the field of politics consigns us to the blind alleys of political metaphysics, be they labelled "Realism" or not.

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Content Analysis in Communications Research. BY BERNARD BERELSON. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1952. Pp. 220. $3.50.)

Revolution and the Development of International Relations; Hoover Institute Studies. Series C: Symbols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press.)

No. 1. *The Comparative Study of Symbols; An Introduction.* By Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1952. Pp. v, 87. $1.25.)
No. 2. *The "Prestige Papers"; A Survey of Their Editorials.* By Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1952. Pp. vii, 146. $1.75.)
No. 3. *Symbols of Internationalism.* By Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1951. Pp. 73. $1.25.)
No. 4. *Symbols of Democracy.* By Ithiel de Sola Pool. (1952. Pp. xi, 80. $1.25.)

Modern content analysis, in the sense of systematic and quantitative examination of a mass of symbolic material, is so new an addition to the research techniques of the social scientist that until the present time it has not itself been completely treated in systematic fashion in any one book. The literature contains a variety of specialized technical discussions as well as reports of completed analyses. Berelson has now put between covers a careful inventory of both types of document and a discussion of the problems and procedures involved in applying the technique. His book will be welcomed, therefore, both by the initiated and by all those who desire to learn something about the tool. It is a thoughtful, informed, and well-balanced treatment of the whole area.

A brief introductory chapter defines content analysis, states in critical and concise terms the assumptions on which the technique is based, and presents a condensed historical survey of the technique and its development over the past 30 years. This is followed by a long chapter on the various uses to which content analysis has been put. Under four broad headings and a large number of subheadings Berelson examines in condensed fashion a variety of the studies in which content analysis has been used. This is a helpful and informative chapter which will give the reader some comprehension of the flexibility and varied applications of the technique. At points the author's effort to be inclusive and at the same time to conserve space makes some of the examples confusing or unclear (e.g., pp. 59, 61). But this is a minor shortcoming in a skillful chapter which evaluates both the contributions and the shortcomings of the technique in frank and forthright terms. The same tone is characteristic of the succeeding chapter on " 'Qualitative' Content Analysis," which does much to eliminate some of the meaningless controversies that have surrounded this term. Particularly notable is the author's sane and intelligent discussion of the conditions under which the elaborate and time-consuming task of quantification is justified. His eminently sound advice is illustrated by the observation (p. 129) that "It is the pretentious counting of the obvious or the unnecessary which gives content analysis a bad name."

The fourth and fifth chapters are fairly technical discussions of the units and the categories of content analysis. The author here not merely discusses procedure in handbook fashion, but offers a thoughtful evaluation of various views of what is sound practice. This is followed by a chapter entitled "Technical Problems," in which are discussed questions of validity, reliability, sampling, presentation, and inference. A short concluding chapter is followed by a valuable bibliography of content analyses published through 1950. Its usefulness and that of the book as a whole would be greater, however, if the volume were indexed.

Probably the most ambitious application of the technique of content analysis to date is that reported in the symbol studies of the Hoover Institute's project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR), the first four titles of which are now in print. This elaborate interdisciplinary project is to include five series of publications—a general series so far containing only Lasswell's "framework" statement of the entire program, a series on elites, one on symbols, one on communities, and one on institutions. The introductory volume of the symbols series opens with a discussion of the role of symbols in politics, stating a point of view developed largely from Lasswell's *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935). It proceeds to a statement of the scope and methods of the Hoover Institute's research on the "world revolution of our time," the starting point of which is the postulate that "the common consequence of revolutionary change . . . is 'rapid and extensive change in the composition and vocabulary of the ruling few' " (p. 28). Since the symbol series is to report on changes in vocabulary, the remainder of the introductory monograph is devoted to techniques and problems of content analysis with special reference to the RADIR project. This section is notable for the frank and even humble discussion of the lessons learned in the course of the symbol series, many points of which supplement those made in the Berelson volume. Perhaps the most suggestive section of this monograph is chapter seven, "Models of Symbolic Behavior," which discusses in particularly effective terms the importance and the difficulty of developing adequate theoretical models, not only for research in which content analysis is used, but equally for all political studies.

The three substantive monographs in the symbols series are reports on segments of an elaborate study, covering roughly a sixty year period, of a sample of editorials in the "prestige papers" in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Each opens with a discussion of problems and methods and then reports on a specialized aspect of the project. The first presents a series of broad findings concerning the variety in the use by these papers of 416 "key symbols," the characteristics of editorial judgments concerning them, and the amount and areas of change which both symbol frequencies and judgments have undergone.

Symbols of Internationalism presents evidence from the editorials in the "prestige papers" concerning friendship and hostility patterns among the powers, the extent to which hostility or friendliness has been reciprocal and the strength of attachments to national and international value symbols.

Symbols of Democracy deals successively with editorial treatment of the symbol "democracy" in terms of both amount and type of use, with the question of whether increased attention to that symbol involves an equal measure of attention to the components of the democratic ideology, and with the treatment of what the authors regard as the three main components of democratic thought—representative government, an orientation to the masses, and individual freedom.

Within the limits of the project's basic assumptions, of which more later, these monographs deal skillfully with the limitations imposed by the procedure and the data. Moreover, they have produced a number of interesting findings, both substantive and technical. In the former category might be mentioned: the conclusion that while war concentrates democratic symbols upon a few goals, totalitarianism impoverishes political symbolism; the finding that the most important determinant of xenophobia is "not the fact of war or conflict, but the satisfaction with one's own position, vis-à-vis the other powers"; and the documentation of differences between the Nazi and Soviet treatment of international political symbols and those between the liberal and totalitarian handling of the "components" of the democratic ideology. Among the ingenious technical devices are: an index of "psychic distance" among the "culturally interdependent" powers; a means of getting at the comparative meanings of the term "democracy" and their stability through time; and an application of a little-known measure of dispersion in the distribution of symbols (Yule's *K*).

As the above examples suggest, the care and ingenuity which have gone into these analyses are of a very high order. They will be respected by anyone familiar with the almost infinite difficulties that beset the content analyst. Those engaged in this research have made a real contribution to the development and refinement of the technique. These virtues make it extremely disturbing to arrive at the conclusion that the substantive findings of these studies seem on the whole to be neither very startling nor very significant. One wonders whether this elaborate and expensive apparatus is justified by the results so far reported. The authors in effect attempt to answer this question in advance by arguing that the technique makes results more certain and precise and that it makes possible a correct choice between two hypotheses, both of which can be supported by common sense. This contention can be granted, but the proving or disproving of such impressions is significant only as it leads to the verification or rejection of some more inclusive proposition about political behavior and political trends. One suspects, in fact, that the authors themselves were somewhat uncertain on this score, if the reviewer's impressionistic content analysis correctly notes that they are as anxious to assert the validity of the technique as to claim significance for the results.

If one were to concede that many of the findings of these studies may appear more valuable at some later stage in the testing of significant political hypotheses, he might still be seriously disturbed about the assumption on which these content analyses depend. "In each major power," the opening sentence of *The "Prestige Papers"* asserts, "one newspaper stands out as an organ of elite opinion." On this assumption the entire analysis is confined to one paper in each of five powers (three successively in Germany and two each successively in Russia and France), which is presumed to reflect "elite opinion." "The RADIR content analyses assume that the prestige paper editorials represent a stable index of elite attitudes." The authors say that they "decided to look into the personnel of these papers" in order to "validate this assumption" (*The "Prestige Papers,"* p. 120). Such looking, one would think, might demonstrate that editors were uniformly high in status, but does it say much about the index?

The assumption is not difficult to accept in the case of *Izvestia* or the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Its acceptability for *Le Temps*, *The Times* (London), and *The New York Times* depends on what meaning one gives to the term "elite." This is a useful but treacherous concept, sometimes used to suggest unified and purposive action, as in the statement, "Both in totalitarian and liberal states, the elite has accepted the obligation and desirability of stating its policies through this medium" (*The "Prestige Papers,"* p. 12). At other times it seems to refer to a segment of a loosely cohesive ruling class, sometimes the government, sometimes a segment of the government, sometimes the business leaders. Given the admitted fact that the United States is a particularly pluralistic society, it is disturbing to have its "elite" dealt with through the same simple index as that used in the analysis of a totalitarian state. If all the papers analyzed, with the exception of the official Nazi and Soviet organs, reflect merely an undefined portion of the ruling class, if they merely "represent, in some sense, elite opinion" (*The "Prestige Papers,"* p. 7), what confidence can be attached to generalizations purporting to apply to the elite as a whole? The authors, it should be said, are not entirely consistent in their position on this point. They go so far as to observe that these papers may be no more than "a peculiarly influential segment of public opinion" and that "If guesses are hazarded here or there about the explanation of a certain content characteristic, they are no more than guesses" (*Symbols of Internationalism*, p. 9). But they can hardly have it both ways. Editorials in the "prestige papers" either are a "stable index of elite attitudes" or are merely "peculiarly influential." Either assumption can be used, although perhaps not with equal degrees of confidence, but they can hardly be employed interchangeably in the same project.

Criticisms such as these may be adequately disposed of as the full series of RADIR reports appears, but standing alone the four volumes in the symbol series have more the quality of brilliant technical exercises than that of significant substantive contributions to political understanding.

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The Organizational Weapon; A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. BY PHILIP SELZNICK. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1952. Pp. viii, 350. $5.00.)

The ability to penetrate layers of cant and self-deception to the underlying power struggles is not always given to academic students of politics. In the monograph, *TVA and the Grass Roots*, published a few years ago, Selznick displayed a keen eye for the niceties of the bureaucratic knife in the back, and a talent for deducing the general principles of the struggle for power in a bureaucratized society. These qualities have been transferred, not without some loss, to the analysis of the Communist movement in the book under review. The loss, I think, lies in the way in which the relationship is shown between the bureaucratic struggle and the larger surrounding society.

As a perceptive analytical struggle of Communism's organizational problems this book is often excellent. Most of the discussion concerns the structure of the Communist movement outside the Soviet Union, stressing the relationship between internal organizational structure and actual behavior in the form of tactics and strategy. Selznick's main thesis asserts that the Bolshevik type of party has solved many of the problems of converting a voluntary organization into what he calls a "combat party." In the "combat party" the entire personality and life of the member is supposedly at the disposal of a tightly knit leadership group intent on one objective, getting power. Total control of the individual is achieved by insulating him from external pressures and by absorbing him into the endless round of party activities at a high pitch of emotional involvement.

Communist techniques of manipulating the masses through what the author calls the "strategy of access," that is, the penetration of other leadership groups, become in Selznick's book the subject of one of the most sophisticated discussions now in print. Yet, because of certain general weaknesses in his approach, that I shall try to make clear in a moment, the author makes too much of this point. Unity with Communists does not always result in absorption by Communists in the manner Selznick indicates. The experience of the French and Italian Communists' participation in their governments after the Second World War and the case of Chiang Kai-shek in the late twenties show this clearly.

Another of Selznick's most suggestive applications of a familiar idea is his interpretation of "dual power tactics" on the eve of revolution. By creating an alternative organizational center with a claim to legitimate obedience, within the framework of the existing social system, it is possible, he suggests, for the Communists to dispense with widespread mass support and carry out a successful coup. This interpretation too somehow fails to carry complete conviction. There has been, after all, only one successful Communist coup that took place without outside assistance—in Russia itself. The Chinese Communist victory, in which Russian help appears to have played a rather minor role, could perhaps be considered another case. Neither of these comes very close to matching the conditions of Selznick's overall analysis. At the same time they help to suggest the fundamental weakness of his interpretation.

The basic image of Communism which Selznick seeks to impress on the reader's mind is an idealized one, resembling a machine-tooled, precision instrument. According to this image, the instrument seems to function without real roots in a society, yet is able to inflict the final blow on a machine-age society that is nearing the point of collapse for other reasons. This image of both the instrument and the society in which it functions most effectively is, in my opinion, grotesquely distorted.

It is characteristic that Selznick takes most of his data on Communism in general from the American Communist movement, which, with a little touching up, comes the closest to fitting such an image. The American party has also been one of the weakest and least significant instruments of the Kremlin. Data from the successful parties are relatively scarce in this interpretation. The illusion of a machine-tooled, precision instrument is heightened by the absence in Selznick's work of any adequate discussion of internal factionalism, the endemic disease of Communism that has paralyzed it on many crucial occasions. By the same token I feel that the author has relied too heavily on organizational manuals for his picture of general Communist strategy, and not enough on what Communists in different parts of the world have actually done in various kinds of situations. The picture that he sketches is thus both idealized and static. It accepts the Communists' own image of themselves at closer to face value than I would, and does not take enough account of the processes of growth, change, and adaptation.

Selznick's view of the kind of society that is most vulnerable to the Communist version of totalitarianism, a topic to which he devotes one chapter but which colors his whole approach, is a mixture of elite theory and the doctrine that industrial society has destroyed the social and cultural bonds of earlier ages, leaving an exposed and manipulatable "mass man" as the easy victim of the totalitarians. Ortega y Gasset is the most prominent figure in Selznick's version of this fashionable intellectual tradition, though there are overtones from many others. This is not the place for an extended polemic with this body of ideas, or for an attempt to distinguish what is scientifically valid in them from what is pure romantic pastoralism on the part of hypersensitive urban intellectuals. But so far as Communism is concerned, it is quite clear that this doctrine focusses attention on the wrong end of the horse. Communism has not gained a strong foothold in those advanced industrial countries where the processes alleged by Selznick to exist have supposedly been going on for the longest time. Instead, the Communist variety of totalitarianism has flourished best in peasant societies that for one reason or another were having difficulty in making the transition to an industrial order. In their various ways the Communist movements in Russia itself and in China, Italy, and France all illustrate this connection. The disintegration of modern industrial society in Germany after the first World War did not produce the victory of Communism but of National Socialism.

For these reasons the interpretation of the Communist threat that emerges from Selznick's pages is open to serious question. His explicit and implicit theoretical conceptions, which suffuse the entire work, have influenced his choice of problem areas and the selection of the evidence in such a manner as to exclude what this reviewer, at least, regards as vital matters. This is a pity since the book appears under the auspices of RAND, a research organization closely allied with the federal government, and is intended, in part, as an "advanced training manual for anti-communist forces" (p. 16). With this aura of semi-official authority it could conceivably diffuse further among influential segments of the public the notion that Communism's strength lies mostly in certain organizational tricks, and thus deflect attention from more important questions. At the same time, within the range given by its limited intellectual focus, the treatment is frequently superb.

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Public Administration and Policy Development; A Case Book. Edited by Harold Stein. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1952. Pp. xlv, 860. $5.00.)

The appearance of this book is a major event in the development of public administration as a field of study. Back of its publication lie several years of planning, research, experimentation, writing, and editing by a considerable number of persons of high competence. It is the reviewer's guess that the "case method" study of public administration here presented will enjoy great popularity in the coming years, and that important further developments will flow from this popularity. But even if this guess is wrong and the general verdict proves negative, the book will become a landmark—in this event, a warning that a certain road leads nowhere in particular though it has six lanes and landscaped shoulders.

Public Administration and Policy Development is a difficult book to review. Large in size, high in specific gravity, and smoothly polished, it is hard to handle. The reviewer's customary handholds—the corners of crotchets, the indentations of idiosyncrasies, the faults of fact, the soft spots in structure—are missing. Paradoxically, this review is largely an attempt to explain why the book has this special quality of "unreviewability."

There is first of all the fact that the book comes with its own built-in book review, in the form of a thirty-six page "Introduction" by the editor. This is the type of introduction—long and carefully done—that authors and editors often dream of but publishers seldom permit. In it the editor presents a history and rationale of the book, explains the techniques of case construction, suggests various ways in which the cases can be used pedagogically, admits possible limitations of the case method in general and of these cases in particular, and blunts by anticipation the edge of nearly every conceivable type of criticism. This is all done urbanely, gently, and with no assertion, not even a suggestion, that all our problems will be solved if all other types of social study are abandoned and everyone begins forthwith to read and write "cases." In fact, the conclusion of the Introduction is so disarming that it deserves quotation: "There are many other public administration activities that would yield useful results if analyzed by the case method; but there is no reason for thinking that every aspect of public administration can be best examined by this technique, nor is there reason for thinking that any given aspect of public administration, even though usefully examined by cases, should not be subject to other types of analysis as well. As in Kipling's jingle,

> There are nine and twenty ways,
> Of making tribal lays,
> And every single one of them is right."

How can one quarrel with that? Or with the invitation to arrange the cases topically any way we wish, if none of the four alternative arrangements provided in the Introduction is to our liking?

There is secondly the fact that the book is a product of a highly unusual type of collective endeavor. Discontinuity and unevenness are the customary results of collective endeavor in book production, but in this instance the collective effort has resulted instead in a uniformity of quality and flavor—all Grade A, pasteurized and homogenized. This result is the more remarkable because the cases themselves were written by more than a score of persons, at different times and places (and, in some instances, originally for other purposes). But the editing and reviewing process has been remarkably thorough and effective. The editor, a sensitive and creative person, has himself spent full time for several years on the project. Back of the editor has been the thought and labor of a committee of prominent scholars, teachers and practitioners of public administration. Many meetings of committee members over a considerable period of time resulted in an accepted body of theories and techniques; and multiple review of manuscripts by committee members helped to secure uniformity of execution. Experiment accompanied theorizing. Many cases were published separately and tested in the classroom before final decisions on "product specifications" were made.

A third reason for the reviewer's difficulties concerns the perspective from which the cases are written. The editors have been highly sensitive to the problems of selectivity and objectivity. Well aware of the role of the unexpressed major premise, they have tried to be knowledgeable and careful about their own. Willing to acknowledge that in public administration "every man is his own codifier and classifier," they do not represent their own categories and case selections as divinely revealed or scientifically determined.

In the treatment of the cases an effort has been made to view administrative reality in the round, but dispassionately and from sufficient distance to insure true proportions. Searching for a phrase to characterize the perspective, the reviewer hit first upon I-Am-a-Camera, decided that Wise-Man-Viewing-From-a-Cloud better expresses the idea, and finally settled upon The-God's-Eye-View as the expression that best conveys the sense of the perspective. This figure was perhaps suggested by the following sentence in the Introduction: "Seen exclusively through the eyes of a single observer and at close range, decision tends to look like a single act of choice precipitated by a dilemma, while to the gods on high, the dilemma is merely a selected point in the perpetual flux of our world."

The problem of the reviewer is obviously a serious one: how to gain enough altitude to see the perspective in perspective. The reviewer confesses that he cannot solve this problem. In general his opinions and prejudices (so far as relevant and except as noted below) are so nearly congruent with those of the authors and editor that there is little with which he disagrees in philosophy or technique. He suggests, however, that both philosophy and technique owe a debt to contemporary literary forms most closely associated with *The New Yorker*, and to the documentary film. No photograph is reproduced in the book, but without the invention of the camera it is not conceivable that it should have happened.

The conception of public administration which helps form the "perspective" needs further comment. Part I of the Introduction is a neat and knowledgeable summary of the major trends, past and contemporary, in American study of public administration. Much of the discussion naturally centers on the historic distinction between "politics" and "administration." While granting and indeed even insisting that from one point of view administration may be considered as a "process," the emphasis chosen by the editor and his associates is upon "policy" as an aspect of administration. To be sure, the official theory of the book is that of a "synthesis" of process and politics (at one point spoken of as "two sides of the same coin"); policy-making itself is regarded as a "process." But the effect of keeping the camera trained upon decision-making is, in terms of traditional emphasis upon processes, to emphasize policy or politics.

A further word of description and summary of the cases is in order also. There is great outward divergence in the cases. In size they vary from a few pages to novelette- or novel-length. There is no fixed formal outline to which all are made to conform; rather, the subject matter determines the development. All have an introductory statement of some kind preceding the narrative, and most end with summaries, "postscripts" or "reflections." (One ends with a lady-or-the-tiger question.) Some cases, especially the larger ones, have supporting appendixes—chronologies, bibliographies, biographies of the dramatis personnae, copies of letters, memoranda, and documents of various kinds. Two cases are autobiographical but are placed in a framework of editorial comment. But despite this outward show of variety and divergence, the obvious and impressive fact is the uniformity of conception and execution commented upon above.

The chief aim of the cases is to enable the reader—usually a college student and often a potential participant in public life—to get the "feel" of administration before actual job experience. Even more important, its aim is to facilitate the earliest attainment of Wisdom: a sense of the all but infinite complexities of administration and policy formulation, of normal and abnormal time-spans for collective action, of the many variations of gray that lie between the blacks and whites of ethical absolutes, of the uses and abuses of such things as clearance, hierarchy, functionalism, and so forth. And the cases strike near the center of this important target in the reviewer's opinion. The reviewer's feeling of authenticity is heightened by the fact that he watched some of the dramas from the wings and played a walk-on role in one. The accounts ring true.

Not to cavil, but in the spirit of the dictum that there are nine and twenty ways of writing tribal lays, the reviewer notes in closing that if he were editing a case book he would introduce two changes in the general scheme here followed. One would be somehow to "point" the case material so that it throws light upon the truth or usefulness of various alternative or complementary theories of bureaucracy and administration—those of Weber, Simon, Barnard, Selznick, and others. We are told in the Introduction that the cases will, among many other things, help perform this function. But from that point on the reader is left to his own devices so far as this objective is concerned.

The second change would be to slow or even to stop the action, at least occasionally, at the point and moment of actual decision. In terms of the camera metaphor, we ought at least to have close-up and slow-motion shots of decisions, which are after all what the book is about. Perhaps this is a protest against an inherent limitation of the camera, not against the way it is used; no doubt it lends itself better to spectator sports than to scientific creation or ethical choice. Very well, in that case stop the camera for a while. What were the alternatives? What was the area of "free will"? What were the "political limitations" on choice? What ethical norms might the administrator employ, with what "justification," and with what results? As indicated above, in the God's-eye-view the administrator's "dilemma" tends to become lost in the "flux." We are occasionally told in a smooth off-hand manner that the administrator faced a hard decision. But the student needs to smell the sweat. The students whom the reviewer faces are very keen about the flux, but they can't recognize a dilemma at two paces. God may be satisfied with noting the sparrow's fall, but among sparrows the rise and fall of sparrows deserves the most earnest consideration.

DWIGHT WALDO.

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Party and Constituency; Pressures on Congress. BY JULIUS TURNER. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1952. Pp. 190. $2.50.)

Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy. BY GEORGE L. GRASSMUCK. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1951. Pp. 181. $2.00.)

These two additions to the distinguished list of Johns Hopkins studies are pioneering attempts to use quantitative techniques in analyzing congressional behavior.

Whatever the present shortcomings of statistical calipers for measuring pliable and elusive motivations—and the shortcomings are many—political science needs the rigor and the patience of Turners and Grassmucks, and needs to cultivate a faith in the promise of statistical techniques for certain kinds of social analysis. We are constantly refining our ability to measure behavioral aggregates, and we are developing tools to check our hunches and insights. The authors and their mentors at Johns Hopkins deserve our thanks for working on the cutting edge of this frontier.

Turner has attempted to measure the relative impact of parties and constituencies upon congressional voting behavior in the years 1921, 1931, 1937, and 1944. All roll calls on public bills in these years have been subjected to party vote analysis, indexes of cohesion and likeness, and a Chi square test. Turner has worked to isolate the impact of metropolitan, rural, native, foreign, and sectional pressures from party pressures as effective factors in voting behavior.

Grassmuck has used standard deviations and percentages to test sectional biases on all foreign policy roll calls from 1921 to 1941.

The weakness of these two works lies in the assumptions upon which their elaborate statistical edifices have been constructed. A mature, non-statistical political science based upon sensitive observation, introspection, historical knowledge, and reflective value analysis has much to offer the patient tabulator.

Both authors assume for purposes of analysis that one legislative issue is as important as another. This leads them to give as much weight to a District of Columbia tax or a fractional cut in a Navy appropriation as they do to the OPA or the World Court. Whatever the risks in setting a value scale to measure the importance of issues, the risks of *not* setting such a scale are enormous. In terms of indexes of party responsibility, for example, it makes a whale of a difference whether a Congressman votes "right" on five *major* issues backed by the President and "wrong" on ten *minor* issues, or vice versa.

Furthermore, the authors assume that roll calls are true indexes of the policy positions of legislators on specific measures. This is a little like assuming that a church supper represents the gastronomical desires of an epicure, or that an appraisal of a rich aunt's poetry is a true reflection of a nephew's highest powers of literary criticism.

And what is a party "pressure" or "influence"? When a Congressman dashes into the House chamber, buttonholes a friend and asks, "What's up and how do we go?," is his vote determined by (a) the party, (b) the impact of the party upon the friend, (c) the impact of the committee chairman reporting the bill upon the friend, (d) the Congressman's recognition that all the important decisions were taken *before* the roll call, (e) the fact that the friend entertained the Congressman at the Willard the night before, or (f) a log-roll?

Is a conservative vote of a Senator from South Dakota a reflection of "rural" or "regional" pressures, or of the carefully spotted campaign contributions of the du Pont, Sloan, Pew, Mellon politico-economic combine?

If you multiply one uncertainty by 1,000, do you necessarily get certainty? Chi squares can help in developing probabilities of accident, but they cannot identify causes of uniformity.

The result is that the authors are frequently superficial and occasionally naive in assigning explanations for the uniformities and divergences which their statistics identify.

But despite these and similar limitations, with most of which the authors are probably far more aware than this reviewer, these monographs represent important contributions to the literature of social and political measurement.

STEPHEN K. BAILEY.

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A Two-Party South? BY ALEXANDER HEARD. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 334. $4.75.)

The burgeoning literature on the politics of the South not only increases in quantity but likewise improves in quality. Six years ago the General Education Board subsidized to the extent of $40,000 an ambitious undertaking, at the University of Alabama, under the leadership of Roscoe Martin, to examine the nature of the one-party system in the South. Three years ago V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* was the first fruit of this enterprise. Now Key's able lieutenant, Alexander Heard, publishes *A Two-Party South?* at a time when the quadrennial rumblings from Dixie may betoken possibly a political earthquake but more likely a July thunder shower. Rarely has a Foundation reaped as rich a harvest from so meager a grant. Such profitable interest should induce further investments in analysis of the political process in other areas of the country. One of the chief byproducts of this collective research project is that it shows that Southerners can study in southern higher educational institutions the most controversial issues and have the results published by a southern university press. This is a notable achievement.

To those whose faith in education has begun to waver, this volume should give heart. The same environment which produced Herman Talmadge, Eugene Cox, and Thomas E. Watson gave birth to Alexander Heard. By and large Heard received his education in the South. The product which emerges from these efforts of a young Southerner, looking at the problems of his native heath through critical but sympathetic eyes, is further illumination on the political process, not only considered on a regional basis but also on the larger scene, as one of the broad institutions of human control.

Heard devotes a great deal of his attention to the possibility of a genuine two-party system in the South. His conclusions are tentative, as all human conclusions necessarily are, but he suggests the possibility of the wedding of the Bourbon plantation elite (self-styled) and the newer industrial forces of the region, already deeply entrenched in the Republican party elsewhere, to form an effective opposition to the farmer-labor-Negro Democratic party. Such a development would produce in the South the pattern already familiar in North and East. It is easier to foresee potentials in politics than to carry them out. The force of inertia in human affairs is at least as great as in the physical world. Once a pattern is set cataclysmic events like war, depression, or profound racial or religious movements are required to change the "set" of things. The Civil War formed the political patterns of the South along the lines of fertility of soil and physiography of regions. The folkways of politics have altered startlingly little since. The South is the last great agrarian region to succumb to the process of industrialization. As that process completes itself the politics of the area will accommodate itself to the new mode of life. The old status will fade and a new one will emerge. The Negro will cease to be a rural majority in ten per cent of southern counties but will become a marginal urban minority in the new cities of the South as well as in metropolises in the North and East. As workers, Negroes will fuse with white laborers or as professional people they will acquire middle class ways. This is a slow but steady development already clear and distinct on the political horizon.

The national importance of this study is clear. The effects of the New and Fair Deals have been to allow the new industrial workers to organize. For twenty years the symbols and organization of the Democratic party have been in the hands of leaders actually or politically sympathetic to this growing urban-industrial political force. If the organization of the Democratic party remains in friendly hands, a two-party system will continue. But if the Democratic name and organization are recaptured by the elements which, with an occasional exception, dominated the party from 1870 to 1932, then the kind of one-party politics seen in the South will prevail once more in the nation. The dominant party will hold the minority party in a captive position. For this reason, Heard's study has national significance.

In two respects these valuable studies are incomplete. In the first place they do not tell us how money affects the political process. Perhaps this is a more explosive subject for research than race, even in the South. Secondly, technology as a political dynamic is not clearly analyzed. For example, the role of highways and highway building in the construction of political machines is not sufficiently emphasized. The federal grant-in-aid system has wrought a revolution.

In treating as large a subject as the politics of the South minor errors are inevitable. For example, Republican senatorial nominees have been successful three rather than two times in Kentucky, 1919 to 1950 (p. 7). The great value of the work is not diminished by these occasional inaccuracies.

J. B. SHANNON.

University of Kentucky.

Sociologie Électorale; Esquisse d'un Bilan: Guide de Recherches. BY FRANÇOIS GOGUEL AND GEORGES DUPEUX. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1951. Pp. 90. 300 fr.)

Géographie des Élections Françaises de 1870 à 1951. BY FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1951. Pp. 144. 500 fr.)

Both of these volumes were published under the auspices of the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,* founded in Paris after the war and making an altogether vigorous contribution not only to political science in the American sense of the word, but to the broad field of social sciences in general. The two volumes on electoral sociology are superb examples of a true integration of political and policy analysis, of social and economic history, of political geography and social psychology. By training, temperament and his encyclopedic knowledge Professor Goguel is better equipped than almost any of his colleagues in present-day continental Europe to conduct and supervise the kind of studies here presented.

The "study-guide" which M. Goguel has prepared with some of his advanced students will prove indispensable and not alone for scholars concerned with French developments. Because of its cogent methodological remarks, its evaluation of all possible source materials, and its prudent, judicious approach to a field where hurried generalizations are as tempting as disastrous, the volume deserves consideration by all who are interested in the study of elections and political parties.

The vitality of recent French research in the field is attested to by the fact that more than eighty studies are listed as dealing with particular aspects of electoral analysis extending to an ever-increasing number of regions and localities; before the war M. André Siegfried's classical book on the political physiognomy of the French West was the only reliable work of this kind.

Professor Goguel's study of French elections from the fall of the Second Empire to the present contains three score carefully drawn and annotated maps. Except for the two elections which have taken place since the establishment of the Fourth Republic, the maps illustrate only the growth and decline of the political Left and Right, not of the broad middle groups; they sometimes present the voting strength, sometimes the alignment of elected deputies; for the Right various groups have to be lumped together since well determined parties hardly existed. But with all these unavoidable and frankly acknowledged imperfections, the overall picture remains highly enlightening.

That in many regions the political orientation of the electorate prevailing today crystallized during the first year of the Third Republic, was known, but never so completely documented. On the other hand, the transformation of French conservatism under the stress of new economic problems, the radical legacy accruing to the socialists, the montagnard traditions profiting the communists, the very ephemeral influence of international developments on electoral results—all these are phenomena that are clarified by Professor Goguel's maps and comments.

The book finally views political polarization against the background of such factors as religious practices, population density, amount of savings accounts, and industrial and agricultural production. (Distribution of credit would be of equal significance, if only sufficient data were available!) After careful evaluation of his evidence, the author reaches, however tentatively, disquieting conclusions: the economically and socially dynamic parts of the country are aligning themselves today with right-wing or left-wing radicalism, while political "stability" is provided by obsolete groups and regions. A precarious stability indeed for a country which by its very geographical position must become the pivot of an anti-totalitarian and dynamic commonwealth!

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Ecuador; Constitutions and Caudillos. BY GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1951. Pp. xii, 196. Cloth $3.00, paper $2.50.)

The study of Latin American government and politics by American political scientists, as this book clearly shows, is entering a new phase. The author became a Latin American specialist as a young man, not when he was pushing middle-age. His interest in Latin America had grown naturally and organically out of his activities as a bureaucrat, not out of an act of will to explore one of the remaining "dark continents" of political science research. He did not rush into print with his "findings": he spent years, not months, in the country he had chosen to study and took time to learn Spanish, not a "smattering" of it. As you lay down his book, you know without having been told that he could take you to good restaurants not only in back streets in Quito and Guayaquil but also out over the country. He refused to accept the axiom that the Latin Americans, because they do not have departments of political science in their universities, create no political literature worth taking into account; and he has not only come up with an astonishing bibliography of Ecuadoran books and articles, but integrated them into his analysis. Best of all, he shows himself to be troubled in his mind and heart by a whole series of questions that his predecessors in this branch of comparative government have been more than content to beg, such as: If you suspect that behind the "written constitution" of the country you are studying, and the institutions clustered around it, there is another constitution and another cluster of institutions, and that the country's political realities must be sought in the latter, not the former, how do you allocate time and space between them in a good comparative government study? How do you maintain the "impartiality" of the laboratory scientist, when the further you get into your problem the more you find yourself taking sides with some microbes you have under your microscope against other microbes you have under your microscope? What do you do, as you go along, with the value judgments and presuppositions and prejudices you bring to your study from the intellectual and political and moral climate in which you have yourself grown up? In a word: Where do you turn for a methodology, an SOP, for the study of a foreign country's government and politics?

Blanksten neither raises nor answers these questions in so many words, but he is clearly suffering with them, even torn by them. One side of him, clearly, wanted to write a straight, traditional political scientist's treatise on Ecuadoran government and politics, limited to deadpan description of the relevant machinery (party organization, electoral arrangements, court system, the congress, the president, the cabinet), duly set in its historical context, and to raising and answering such questions as: Why is Ecuadoran politics so unstable? Does the instability of Ecuadoran politics follow some more or less stable pattern? What might be done, on the level of political gadgeteering, to reduce the instability? Most of his book is in fact given over to this sort of thing, with rich detail and a pervading atmosphere of dullness that may win it, in certain quarters, an undeserved reputation for being just what the doctor ordered. But Blanksten's heart, as he finally says in the last paragraph on p. 155, simply isn't in it. For another side of him, it is easy to see, would have given us a book showing that Ecuadoran politics (but now we are using "politics" in another sense, namely that of who get what, where, when, and how) isn't really unstable at all: the same groups keep on getting the long end of the stick and the same ones the short end. This book would have examined the machinery by which the people who get the long end manage to keep on getting it, and to keep on making the people who get the short end like it. Very little of this book, however, got written. We hear repeatedly of the "seven instruments of power"—the pattern of land ownership, the Roman Catholic Church, the armed forces, the pattern of literacy, the status system, the division of labor, and the constitutional-legal system—by means of which 20 per cent of the population, he believes, keep the other 80 per cent of the population in their place. But for the most part he leaves them unanalyzed, and his position about them undocumented—not because his heart is not in it, but because his energies have already been expended on the seventh alleged instrument of power, too tardily recognized as such, to the exclusion of the other six. Still other sides of him, almost but not quite repressed, appear to want for Ecuador a modern "democracy," all complete with universal suffrage and elections that are genuine plebiscites on public policy and what for lack of a better term we might call social justice, as well as an attempt by the ruling class, *à la Mexicaine*, to preserve the Ecuadoran Indian and his way of life. But he has not yet learned to have it both ways about value judgments and impartiality by taking the reader into his confidence about the former, so that these are reluctant and for the most part implicit emphases in his book. He does not, therefore, have to commit himself as to whether Ecuador is rich enough in resources to afford much more—of political equality, of social justice, of preservation of the Indian—than it is getting, or whether, even if the Ecuadorans took it into their heads to undertake drastic reforms, they would not be well advised to consult, for that purpose, their own values rather than those of Topeka and Toledo.

All this makes Blanksten on Ecuador another and, I think, less valuable book than he might have written if, early in his research, he had made up his mind where to draw the line, at least for the moment, between "political" data and socio-economic data, and if, also early, he had married some conception of the purpose of comparative government research. But that is not to say that he should have done either of these things. In any field beset by confusion and indecision about methodology, it is good for the young writer to let himself become a battleground on which conflicting methodological conceptions can fight it out among themselves. It clears his mind. This is the process by which, in any field, confusion and indecision get themselves replaced by direction and purpose. I predict that Blanksten on Argentina, the research for which is under way, will show that the process pays dividends.

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Spannungen und Kräfte im westdeutschen Verfassungssystem. BY WERNER WEBER. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag. 1951. Pp. 102. DM 4.80.)

Werner Weber's little book offers the curious spectacle of an intelligent and lucid writer employing the conceptual framework erected by Carl Schmitt, in the late twenties and the early thirties, to measure and criticize the constitutional edifice of present-day Germany. After what has occurred over these past twenty years, it is somewhat astonishing to meet again—without prior attempt at some sort of inventory—the old clichés: "the all-embracing authority of the state" with an acknowledged authority and a center of its own, "the strong executive," which neutralizes party politics and preserves the permanence of the state, and the concept of the elite as applied to the German civil service, with the people construed as an elementary unorganized force distinct from and opposed to the pluralism of oligarchic power groups. However, in retrospect, the Weimar Constitution, "with its relative stability and ability to function," gets a somewhat friendlier reception. It is used, so to speak, as a kind of backdrop, against which the shortcomings of the Bonn document show up ever the more clearly. But, this Weimar backdrop in itself is a synthetic concoction, made up of the original 1919 document, the interpretation it suffered in the School of Carl Schmitt, and the political institutions of the twenties and thirties as they actually formed, without much reference to the Weimar document itself.

Weber's effectively presented indictment of the Bonn document's theory and practice unfailingly centers on its psychological and organizational shortcomings: its perfectionism, its too obvious effort to avoid the pitfalls of the Weimar Constitution, its overemphasis on the minutiae of legal procedures, etc. Yet, at the same time, his complete acceptance of Carl Schmitt's conceptual framework and scale of values has stood in the way of a dispassionate analysis of the interplay between constitutional order and the social reality of the Bonn state.

Two institutions are at the center of the author's criticism: (a) the political parties, with their related pluralistic forces, which without much popular authority and without the counterweight of a strong executive, have seized the state and hold it, subject only to a limited popular option to choose every four years between already well-entrenched power groups; and (b) the exaggerated federalism with its predominant powers over the whole field of administration and with its emphasis on the indirect and irresponsible power of the Federal Council.

To be sure, the genesis of the postwar German state has led to the reappearance of political parties, before either a new central bureaucracy or an army could again be organized. But what is the real significance of this initial advantage, which Weber so much emphasizes, and the regularization of the role of political parties, as effected by Article 21 of the Basic Law? Do these factors make for a virtually unchecked party domination of the political scene? To argue in this fashion the author had to minimize, even to distort outright, the powerful support which a new central bureaucracy, rapidly consolidating its position, draws from stabilization of the government, produced at least in part by one of the main innovations of the basic law: the fact that a government can now be overthrown only if the oppositional forces are able to organize a new cabinet. What is worse, the constant recourse to the old cliché of "oligarchic pluralism" shows little readiness to inquire into the role of the parties within the democratic process. Parties in West Germany are as little as elsewhere led by "esoteric circles," as the author dubs them. Whatever mixture of professionalism and charismatic leadership prevails in the internal structure of the main German parties, their claim to legitimacy—so gratuitously denied by Weber—rests in their ability to channel the political and social energies of their clientele of unions, economic associations or churches into political action. While the transfer of a few hundred thousand votes from one traditional party to another has been sufficient under many working systems of parliamentary democracy to effect a change of administration, the Bonn document does not bar competitors from access to the political market. However, it makes an attempt, whose significance is as yet uncertain, to check a new competitor's democratic credentials and to weed out precisely those illegitimate participants whom Weber, in a somewhat veiled reference to the events of 1933, credits posthumously with being "volcanic eruptions of the state's eternal tendency towards self preservation."

There is no doubt that much of the federalism of the Bonn document belongs to its negative rather than positive aspects. The author justifiably makes short shrift of the largely fictitious character of this federalism, especially in the legislative sphere. But he overshoots his mark. According to him, the very fact that the parties which are in possession of the central governmental machinery also control the state administrations, dangerously accentuates the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the whole organizational structure of this federal state. The reality is somewhat more complex. Often coalitions of what the author himself calls "middle parties"—i.e., including the major Bonn opposition party—govern on the *Land* level. These coalitions are predominantly concerned with their own social and economic problems, and have little time, energy or inclination to interfere with central policies, except when their own interests are at stake. If they do intervene, their course of action is largely determined by their own social configuration, which remains constant regardless of whether the administration happens to be in the hands of a left- or right-wing coalition. There is no evidence that those few *Land* governments, which are in the hands of the Bonn opposition party alone, regard themselves as major props for some sort of generalized assault against the Bonn administration. The influence of the central party machines on their *Land* representatives, which varies in magnitude from *Land* to *Land* and from party to party, serves at least as often to counterbalance as to intensify the centrifugal tendencies. Moreover, in his zeal to paint a somber picture of the indirect or concealed exercise of power by the Federal Council, the author somehow loses sight of a basic problem. To what extent do the strong regional differences existing between industrialized and predominantly agricultural, refugee-ridden states require some sort of central clearing house which could attempt to harmonize their legitimate interests with each other and with the central government? His strictures would be justified only if he had shown that the admittedly excessive powers of the Federal Council have been used to block legislative traffic and snarl the governmental machinery. The legislative record of the Bonn Parliament in the last two years seems ample proof to the contrary. But arguing from the whole record, rather than singling out an occasional episode, would probably have lessened the persuasiveness of this brilliant, if dangerously lopsided indictment.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER.

Washington, D. C.

Das Budget: Vol. I, Die Budgetkontrolle; Vol. II, Das Budgetwesen; Vol. III, Inhalts-, Sach- und Namensverzeichnis. BY KURT HEINIG. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1949–51. Pp. vi, 586; iv, 491; xix, 204. GM 82.40, bound GM 94.00.)

How nations go about figuring and meeting their common needs through financial planning is a matter of mounting importance in the era of the modern service state. It is also a subject that casts its shadow across many different fields of special concern. To suggest but a few: How should control over the public purse be organized constitutionally in harmony with the values congenial to the political system? What kinds of arrangements would be most satisfactory in defining the budgetary roles of the representative assembly and the chief executive charged with the direction of public management? How could political responsibility and expert judgment be blended in the budget process? What methods would be best suitable for an effective development of the financial plan and its faithful execution? How could this plan be made to operate as a source of strength to the economy? How would particular revenues or expenditures affect different elements of the public in terms of distributive justice? These questions make clear that the budget in present-day government is not merely an instrumentality of public finance. It is the balance wheel of public policy, the prompting force behind accountable administration, and a principal gauge for checking up on the nation's general condition.

For a subject so deserving of attention, it is remarkable that scientific treatment of governmental budgeting has proved attractive to few scholars. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that penetrating study calls for an unusual combination of different approaches, including those of political science and economics. It is therefore not surprising that the appearance a few years ago of the opening section of Heinig's broadly conceived comparative analysis of governmental budget systems raised high expectations, expressed also in this REVIEW (vol. 42, 1948, pp. 1238–39). Now that the work is completed it is an agreeable duty to report that the early expectations have been fulfilled. The fruit of almost twenty years of labor, twice put in jeopardy when Hitler's cohorts caught up with the author, this massive achievement is without precedent and without rival. It demonstrates in tearful irony how productive can be the shotgun wedding of a lawmaker's practical budgetary experience and an exile's devotion to scholarship. Who in the years of the Weimar republic could have guessed that *Herr Reichstagsabgeordneter* Heinig, up to his ears in the affairs of the parliamentary budget committee, would ever find time to write a three-volume treatise embroidered with some 2,400 footnotes? And who might have thought that the first academic recognition would come to a German for a book written in German in the form of an honorary doctorate from the University of Stockholm?

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of this systematic exposition lies in the degree to which general theory is brought down to the specific features of budgetary organization and procedure in many different countries, including such opposites as the Soviet Union and the United States. The wealth of comparative data, in large part almost inaccessible save to specialists, is extraordinary. No less noteworthy is the high level of accuracy. Two secondary characteristics also warrant mention. The first of these is Heinig's tendency, natural for a man of his background, to stress the legislative perspective. But if there is too much of that, a reviewer whose vantage point is on the executive side should be glad for the chance of praising the author for an excess of virtue. The other secondary characteristic shows up in the keenness of eye with which Heinig traces the deterioration of budgetary integrity under totalitarian auspices. To the American student, who is likely to be wrapped up in the technical aspects of the subject, such candid pursuit of political theses may be a healthy jolt.

The first volume deals with budgetary control in a widely inclusive sense, ranging from the coordinating effects of budget preparation to the powers available to the legislature on the one hand and the auditing agency on the other. The second volume considers the structure and content of the budget, grouped under four "budgetary principles," these being periodicity, prior authorization, comprehensiveness, and clarity. The third volume provides not only an exceptionally detailed index, but simultaneously the equivalent of a very useful glossary of technical terms that occur in different languages. Thus it should be fairly easy to find the way back to the countless subtopics that would elude even the best table of contents.

To those potential readers in the United States who remember German learned writing with mixed feelings, it will be encouraging that Heinig's style is crisp, direct, and often brightened by wry humor. For example, although giving Americans credit for originality in dramatizing complex data pictorially, the author takes exception to the organizational diagrams of the Hoover Commission by saying that they look "as if eels played hide and seek in an aquarium" (vol. II, p. 469, n. 184a). But Heinig's mental reservations toward the output of the Hoover Commission go beyond charts and diagrams. After examining its recommendations, especially those concerned with financial management, he rates them on balance "impressive and disappointing" (vol. II, p. 470). In particular he views the proposals for a performance budget as too simple an answer. As for matters of momentary timeliness, he refers to A. E. Buck's argument to the effect that the statutory deadline for submission of the budget to Congress is especially disadvantageous when there is a change in the presidency by expiration of tenure (vol. II. p. 289, n. 191a).

A foe of totalitarian planning, Heinig on the other hand is far from rejecting that coherence of means and ends which makes the budget the work plan of government. Nor is planning a bad word for him. As a matter of fact, he finds the budgets of the United States characterized by "middle class planning" (vol. II, p. 83). The forms of this democratic kind of planning are put in sharp contrast with the financial trickery and the methodical destruction of budgetary publicity that went for magic under the Nazi regime (vol. I, pp. 497 ff.). But the author is not misled by false dichotomies. He knows, for instance, that the contest between political decision and professional interpretation of the facts runs through all budget systems. He also knows that lawmakers and administrative officials do not pursue identical interests. It is easy to see why budgetary clarity is essential for legislative control, "but the bureaucracy lives in a jungle of figures as cozily as a bear in a national park" (vol. II, p. 407). At the same time, Heinig is too much of a realist to minimize the positive contribution of the career service, or to ignore the causes of "red tape" in government and of "green tape" in private enterprise, which latter term he borrows from Paul Appleby (vol. I, p. 385, n. 308). In brief, in Heinig's tailoring the cloak of the budget is spacious enough to cover a large array of subjects of comparative administration and comparative politics, including such obscure matters as the scope of *Reichswehr*-Red Army collaboration in weapon development and tactical exercises in the twenties (vol. II, p. 156, n. 385).

One lesson that took hold of the author's mind as he plodded along in his research will be of considerable interest to those who feel that perfection still has a long way to come in budgeting. Starting his venture with great respect for "national peculiarities," he came to conclude in the end that in each country the defenders of hallowed but archaic budgetary practices seldom had a leg to stand on and nearly always had a stake of a sort in leaving things as they were.

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX.

United States Bureau of the Budget.

War and Human Progress; An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization. BY JOHN U. NEF. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. Pp. ix, 464. $6.50.)

This is a book which often rises to great heights of insight as well as scholarship. The scholarship is indeed of a quite monumental order throughout the entire work, though there are occasions when it lapses from the role of implementing ideas to one which is somewhat less positive. The book is not one to be read through by continuous application, for the massing of historical detail—presented often in dramatic leaps of centuries—must quickly become overwhelming to even the most earnest and favorably disposed of readers.

On the other hand, when savored chapter by individual chapter at suitably spaced intervals, this same wealth of detail has the opposite effect of illuminating and humanizing all the many recesses of the vast subject area. Moreover, if the book is read in this way, what would otherwise be a severe fault in it becomes a virtue—that is, its quite disjointed organization. The several major themes which run through the book are touched upon, dismissed, and then considered anew, so that in perusing any one chapter the reader is likely to be amply reminded of chapters he has read before.

Although a professional economist or economic historian, Professor Nef reveals himself—not indeed for the first time—as a profound and loving student of Western culture and art. This is evidenced most conspicuously in his broad and intensive treatment of the non-material restraints on war in the past. It is clear that the author does not like the debasement of human values and culture which he is convinced has proceeded from the industrial revolution. Quite apart from the immeasurably greater hazards to life and civilization which have derived from the progress in weapons technology, the gadgetry of present-day life seems to him an excessive price to have paid for the loss in human sensibilities which he considers so conspicuous a mark of our times.

One need not quarrel with this view, except to point out that the blind spots which are perhaps revealed in the author's conception of the present as compared to the past prevent him from making any positive approach to the burning problem of limiting war in the future as it has been limited in the past. He is quite right in his insistence that the moral and cultural restraints on war in the past have in general decayed or disappeared, but that does not enable him to explain the war in Korea, which has certainly been a "limited war" both in the use of force and in objectives. As it is, he suggests only half-heartedly a remedy which his whole analysis must have convinced him was hopeless, that is, a return to God with attendant cleansing of the mind and spirit.

It is no doubt true that "it is precisely these concerns with the special, the immediate, the practical, and the national that have helped to produce not only the weapons needed for total war but the will and the means to use them." But these concerns have certainly not diminished in the average person's mind awareness of the contrast between peace even as we know it and the unutterable catastrophe which any total war of the future must bring. Professor Nef has seen so many historical examples of a new weapon being deemed too horrible to permit of any more war that he simply cannot be impressed with the greater sense of urgency produced by nuclear weapons. Who can say he is wrong? But after all, the atomic bomb *is* different, and two world wars *have* produced as a result simply of cruel experience certain changes in attitudes towards war.

But Professor Nef's interest is essentially historical, which is to say that he seeks to illuminate the present through a survey of the contrasting past rather than through the methods which the political scientist or sociologist normally uses. His success in realizing his intention is quite outstanding. This volume must be placed in the category of large books if not great ones—large in the virtues of scholarship combined with art. The book is of course indispensable to students of war, but social scientists generally and the lay reader as well will find the reading of it profitable and absorbing.

BERNARD BRODIE.

Santa Monica, California.

Soviet Legal Philosophy. TRANSLATED BY HUGH W. BABB WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY JOHN N. HAZARD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. xxxvii, 465. $7.50.)

This new volume in the "Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series" is of considerable value to specialists in the field of legal theory as well as to political scientists interested in general political theory and in particular Soviet developments. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky's *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1948) was the first major presentation in English of the present official Soviet approach to the principal issues of public law; *Soviet Legal Philosophy,* an able selection of materials to which access is often difficult, is the second major work of reference in this field, and Professor Hazard has incurred the gratitude of all scholars who wish to acquaint themselves with the original Soviet sources. In many respects, *Soviet Legal Philosophy* is even more important than Vyshinsky's *The Law of the Soviet State,* because the former presents a variety of viewpoints and—more significant still—because it shows the *development* of Soviet legal thought during the first three decades of Bolshevism, whereas Vyshinsky's book provides the orthodox doctrine of one determinate point in time. Moreover, the crucial turning-points in the history of Soviet legal thought are not the publication of a book or article containing a new theoretical development, but political interventions, be they in the form of a party speech by Stalin or Vyshinsky or an article in *Bolshevik* by Yudin.

Legal scholarship as generally understood in the West is best represented in the writings of the earlier official Soviet jurists such as Stuchka, Reisner, and Pashukanis. The last named was the only Soviet jurist to receive international attention (a critical analysis by Hans Kelsen of his main doctrines will be found in *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 66, pp. 449–521 [1932]). Pashukanis fell in disgrace because he advocated the doctrine that the liquidation of capitalism in the Soviet Union would entail the gradual withering away of law, together with the state. However, the liquidation of capitalism brought about an immense increase of totalitarianism and bureaucratic police power, and Pashukanis himself became a victim of his doctrine, one which was in harmony with the classical ideas of Marx and Engels but out of harmony with the neo-classical practices of Stalin. In 1937, Pashukanis was dropped. As Professor Hazard tersely states in his introduction: "There was no public trial of Pashukanis. He simply disappeared" (p. xxxii). Subsequently, Pashukanis joined Stuchka and Reisner and has always been referred to, by Vyshinsky and others, as a "Trotsky-Bukharin fascist agent" (p. 315) as well as a "wrecker," "traitor," and "provocateur" (p. 311).

As in every other field of Soviet life, the purges in the middle 'thirties eliminated the last vestiges of independent thought, and replaced the old Bolshevik leaders in jurisprudence with the new generation of bureaucrats. These bureaucrats have expressed Stalin's concept of the totalitarian police state in juridical terms, and have relentlessly attacked the older Marxist conception (associated in particular with the name of Pashukanis) that the end of capitalism would also bring about the withering away of the apparatus of force and compulsion and remove the need of the law for the maintenance of the social order.

The main value of *Soviet Legal Philosophy* lies therefore, not so much in its explicit contribution to legal philosophy as in the implicit light it throws on the dynamics of Soviet thought and policy. From a scholarly viewpoint, it is remarkable that most Soviet jurists appear to be totally unaware of American and British contributions to legal thought, the positivist and social orientation of which might greatly arouse the curiosity and interest of Soviet jurists. There is considerable evidence of familiarity with French and German writings. Just as Hans Kelsen was the *bête noire* for the Nazi jurists, he occupies the same position again with the Communist jurists. But the discussions of the relevant German writers often sound about twenty years out of date, and one becomes painfully aware of the gap which existed even before the Iron Curtain came down after World War II. Yet, by implication, *Soviet Legal Philosophy* throws much light on the nature and processes of Soviet scholarship and its relations to public policy as formulated by the Communist Party. In this respect, this volume is likely to remain for a long time an important source for the study of the Soviet Union.

The text in *Soviet Legal Philosophy* reads clearly and fluently, a not inconsiderable accomplishment in any book on legal theory. In transliterating non-Russian names from the original Russian sources, the translator has occasionally misspelled the names of important non-Russian authors, such as "Mering" for Mehring (p. 145), "Korsh" for Korsch (p. 254), "Kunov" for Kunow (p. 283), "Kautskii" for Kautsky (pp. 355, 363), and "Schenier" for Scheuner (p. 425). But such minor errors do not detract from the generally high standards of style, arrangement, and presentation.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN.

Princeton University.

The Jews in the Soviet Union. BY SOLOMON M. SCHWARZ. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1951. Pp. xviii, 380. $5.00.)

The author, an old hand in Soviet affairs, undertook the formidable task of uncovering data which seemed to be hidden behind a particularly dense screen of misrepresentation. His laborious effort has yielded an impressive body of documentation—based primarily on Soviet sources—which is sure to be consulted with profit by students of the Soviet scene.

The subject is approached, sometimes with polemical emphasis, strictly in terms of a national minority problem, whereas the destinies of the Jewish religion under the impact of institutionalized atheism receive merely a peripheral treatment.

Ever since the French Revolution had inaugurated the emancipation of the Jews, vast segments among the European Jewry had undergone an evolutionary process of assimilation, while others preferred to preserve their national and cultural separateness. Under the Soviet regime, whose philosophy and actions alike are so intrinsically motivated by the belief in force, the Jews were left with no freedom of decision for their future in either direction.

In a lucid exposé of the ideological background of Soviet minority policies, Dr. Schwarz demonstrates that in Communist doctrine the Jewish minority had no claim to cultural and national development. The Jewish problem was viewed as an essentially socio-economic and legal one, which, generated by the capitalistic system, was presaged to find its automatic solution with the overthrow of Tsarism and the submergence of the Jewish "caste" in the rest of the Communist society.

Following the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, the Jewish minority, subjected to an inexorable regimentation, was systematically stripped of its corporate identity without being fully absorbed into Soviet society. Dr. Schwarz makes a convincing case in showing that, step by step, their political organizations, schools, press, religious courts and units of municipal administration fell victim to a ruthless sovietization which has led in the postwar years to a far-advanced stage of disintegration of organized Jewish life.

To be sure, reasons of expediency called at times for temporary tactical retreats. For instance, the social and economic constellation in the 1920's, together with considerations of Far Eastern strategy, gave rise to the official encouragement of a Jewish national consolidation in what was later declared the Jewish Autonomous Province of Biro-Bidzhan. This experiment, for years loudly publicized by Soviet propaganda as a model of a magnanimous minority policy, ended, however, in a full debacle. Likewise, the so-called Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee is shown by Dr. Schwarz in its proper perspective as a propaganda instrument for the enlistment of support and good will for the Soviet Union during World War II. As soon as it outlived its usefulness, it was promptly disbanded.

Contrary to Marxist and Communist prognostications, anti-Semitism has continued to manifest itself in Soviet society with obstinate perseverance. Though, according to Dr. Schwarz, "anti-Semitic tendencies until recently failed to find direct and open support in the government or the Party," the officially professed policies of combating anti-Semitism by education and legal repression have often been at marked variance with their actual implementation.

In the wake of the German-Soviet neutrality pact of 1939, the Soviet Government readily appeased Hitler by discouraging any public denunciation in the Soviet Union of the Nazi system and its persecution of the Jews. Upon the invasion of the Soviet Union, Dr. Schwarz states, the Jewish population in her western territories, kept in the dark as to the fate the Nazis had in store for them, made no attempt to save their lives by fleeing before the advancing Wehrmacht, and the Soviet Government, in contradiction to subsequent propaganda boasts, failed to evacuate the Jews as such to the interior of the USSR. In view of the momentous difficulties facing the investigator of this period because of the scanty and therefore sometimes circumstantial evidence on hand, the completeness of the discussion would have been enhanced by a more extensive use of the Nuernberg documents, namely those pertaining to the SS extermination squads (*Einsatzgruppen*) and to the successive phases in the formulation of Nazi anti-Jewish policies which culminated only in 1942 in the "final solution of the Jewish question" through genocide.

In the postwar years, an aggressive Great Russian chauvinism, coupled with an hysterical fear of ideological contamination, set into action a chain of ideological campaigns in the Soviet Union. Numerous Jewish intellectuals, namely, those engaged in the spheres of ideology and politics, came under attack for cosmopolitanism, internationalism, and the like; and, though not exclusively directed against the Jews, such purges were at times accompanied by veiled anti-Semitic overtones. In the opinion of this reviewer, events are still too much in flux to permit definitive judgment as to whether these signs augur government-inspired anti-Jewish discriminatory policies, or whether they follow the familiar pattern of past Soviet ideological purges, when the axe of retribution fell without discrimination on any alleged violator of the currently decreed party line.

PAUL L. HORECKY.

Library of Congress.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Presidential Succession. By Ruth C. Silva. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 213. $3.50.)

This book, published as Volume XVIII of the University of Michigan Publications in History and Political Science, is a careful study of the history, interpretation, statutory development, and practical application of the provisions in our system for presidential succession. The constitutional problems relating to the status of the Vice President, to the power of Congress to control the further succession, and to the meaning and difficulties of dealing with vacancy and disability, are meticulously examined in five chapters, the considerations of policy are reviewed in a sixth chapter, and there is a final chapter of summary and conclusions. Five appendices are added, which reproduce the texts of the three succession statutes and provide two tables listing the vacancies in the Presidency and Vice Presidency and the potential successors under the various statutes. There is an extensive bibliography, a long table of cases, and a good index.

Miss Silva deals exhaustively with the two schools of thought on the status of the Vice President when succeeding to the presidency, that is, whether he becomes President for the term or merely acts as President temporarily until the office can be filled, and expresses her own firm belief that the Founding Fathers intended the Vice President to become only Acting President. She accepts, although most reluctantly, the contrary determination of the matter through the seven cases of actual succession; and she attributes to this wrongful interpretation of the original intent the difficulty in getting further clarification of disability or inability as occasion for succession. "The precedent established in cases of a President's death has been the principal cause for inaction when he is disabled. Examination of attempts to establish a statutory line of succession indicates that the same precedent has complicated all the problems involved" (p. 3 and see other pages throughout). In this connection she contributes a good deal by her full and systematic accounts of the Garfield and Wilson periods of disability, and by the somewhat dramatic attention thus brought to the very serious possibility of being without a functioning executive through the strange neglect of this problem by Congress. It is Miss Silva's own belief that the power to decide when inability or disability exists belongs constitutionally to the successor, although she feels that the initiative ought to be taken by some other body, such as the Cabinet or Congress (pp. 172–173).

With respect to the policy involved in congressional provision for further succession beyond the Vice President, Miss Silva is against vesting the succession in officers of Congress and considers the Cabinet succession far better, because the President pro tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the House generally attain those positions through favorable local politics and consequent seniority of service and not because they are of national stature. "One need only read over a list of the Presidents pro tempore, Speakers, and Secretaries of State to conclude that the last officer is most likely to be of presidential stature." (And how right she is if one thinks about Kenneth McKellar and Joe Martin, or examines the list of potential successors in Appendix E!) She examines the various alternative possibilities that have been suggested for such further succession, rejects the Supreme Court and additional Vice Presidents, and favors an Assistant President appointed by the President and presumably trained in the duties of the office (pp. 175–176). There may be those who will disagree with some of the author's conclusions; but the book brings together all the arguments, precedents, situations, and decisions in respect to the problem of presidential succession, and it provides the definitive study of this long-neglected subject.—Clarence A. Berdahl, *University of Illinois.*

How to Keep Our Liberty; A Program For Political Action. By Raymond Moley. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 339. $4.00.)

The Welfare State and the National Welfare. Edited by Sheldon Glueck. (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 289. $3.50.)

The premise of Mr. Moley's *How to Keep Our Liberty* and of most of the contributors to Sheldon Glueck's *The Welfare State and National Welfare* may be simply stated: The growth of centralized government threatens to destroy our freedom and impair our economic efficiency. After a preliminary, and perfunctory, statement of "principles we live by," Mr. Moley's discussion provides an analysis of "statism," which is his term for doctrines sympathetic to a powerful centralized government, a term loosely associated with socialism. There is, however, a promising "road away from socialism" marked by the following milestones: social security should be revised so that governmental old age pensions may be given out only after a means test (pp. 194–195); the protection of civil rights should be abandoned by the national government in deference to state and regional action (pp. 208–209); the government should cease its "indiscriminate, incompetent, and dangerously socialistic lending" policies and resort to them only in periods of "deep depressions and war" (pp. 213–214); in so far as possible the government should rely upon sales taxes rather than income taxes which hit "accumulation" (p. 230). Finally, Mr. Moley offers to the "middle interests" some political formulas whereby the above ends might be achieved.

Professor Glueck's collection, less coherent, less of a guidebook, more sensible, is made up of three unequal elements. Some of the essays and speeches may be classified, in the light of the above, under the term "Moleyism." Naturally enough, Moley himself is a member of this group, joined by Walter E. Spahr, Harry F. Byrd, and Herbert Hoover. A second group, affected with a strong moral view of social matters, includes Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vannevar Bush, and John Foster Dulles. In a third group there appears, at last, the makings of a conservative doctrine which is wise and prudent and sophisticated about the times in which we live. Here we find Roscoe Pound examining the dangers of extending Bills of Rights beyond the limits of legal defense; Edwin Nourse treating with political realism the dangers of compensatory finance; Bernard Baruch offering a blueprint for a more stable prosperity; and even the editors of *Life*, surely with a knowledge of popular tolerances, offering means of allaying the welfare state by nongovernmental self-help.

In these two books there is only a kernel of worth, but this seed should be nourished for it must grow some day into the formulation of a broad-gauged intelligent conservative doctrine. I have puzzled much over the unsatisfactory nature of the other material and tentatively offer three reasons for its disappointing character. (1) Too much of the argument relies on a kind of reverse *argumentum ad absurdum*—since totalitarianism implies an absolute state, a lesser degree of state power implies a diminutive totalitarianism. (2) Many of the critics, including Professor Glueck himself (p. 15), will not face up to the question, "Which government function shall we cut first?" (3) Arguments urging special interests to refrain from "selfish demands" seem merely hortatory and, without more, fruitless. Thus the political solutions offered are, in most cases, stillborn.—ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*.

The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform. BY WILLIAM SEAL CARPENTER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. 128. $3.00.)

The purpose of this short book is "to relate public policy to the civil service." The "unfinished business" which Mr. Carpenter urges for action is the subordination of the merit system to the chief executive at all levels of government. The merit system, regarded as a "sacred cow" among our political institutions because of regard for its original purpose of thwarting the spoilsman, "has evolved a set of procedural regulations, the unraveling of which consumes time and energy, and contributes to the waste of public funds" (p. 120). Positive administrative control over personnel management by the responsible executive would permit cutting the procedural red tape of civil service, while retaining the basic gains registered by the merit system in the selection and promotion of civil servants.

Mr. Carpenter is not the first, of course, to deplore the "triumph of technique over purpose" in public personnel management, or to urge that the central personnel agency be brought within the control orbit of the chief executive. The value of this statement of familiar themes is that it is made in simple and straightforward language without the encumbrances of footnotes or extensive documentation, and that it comes from a man who has combined a professorship and former chairmanship of the Department of Politics at Princeton with seven years of experience as the top administrator of the civil service system in New Jersey.

The amateur bipartisan civil service commission of the traditional type, located outside the administrative hierarchy, receives the brunt of the criticism, and a personnel department operating under the direction of a single commissioner responsible to the chief executive is urged as a replacement. The Maryland single commissioner system is pointed to as a model. Mr. Carpenter shows impatience with compromise arrangements. He grants that the Hoover Commission recognized the problems to be solved, but criticizes the majority for "lack of courage to press for the right remedies" (p. 118). The majority report "appears to be a compromise at precisely those points where straightforwardness is required." He agrees with Commissioner Pollock's dissent concerning the weakness of the modified commission form, which places responsibility for administrative direction in the hands of the chairman, and relegates the other commission members to lesser roles. His views on this arrangement are of special interest because New Jersey has had a similar system in effect since 1944 and Mr. Carpenter served for several years as commission president.

Although emphasis is on the achievement of firmer administrative control of public personnel, there is some treatment of questions of employer-employee relationships in the public service and of educational training for the public service. Mr. Carpenter rightly cautions teachers of public administration not to claim too much on behalf of their subject, but his advice to future civil servants to "partake sparingly of the social sciences" (p. 101) may cause some headshaking among his colleagues. —Ferrel Heady, *University of Michigan.*

The Use of the Licensing Power by the City of Chicago. By Malcolm B. Parsons. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. x, 198. Cloth $4.50, paper $3.50.)

This is a most interesting and helpful case history of licensing in a large city. It covers the facts, the problems, and the legal situation in regard to the many different kinds of licensing done by the city of Chicago. Not only its conclusions, but its exposition, will prove helpful to those in many cities and states who are concerned with improving the law and practice of licensing.

Chicago's power to license is shown to be inadequate to its needs. Insofar as this power extends, it is exercised by means of ordinances. Enforcement is divided administratively between the police department and the finance department. There are a number of authorizations to act, for example: to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks; to prevent and regulate the depositing of ashes in streets; to license, tax, and regulate certain occupations; to examine, license, and regulate persons having charge of steam boilers; to locate and regulate hospitals; and many more. Each authorization usually applies to a number of stated objects; several are overlapping.

Licensing has been the principal governmental technique used by the city to regulate various activities which may affect public health, such as keeping a bakery or a restaurant, selling milk and milk products, or operating a hospital. Licensing in the interests of public safety is applied to the storage of inflammable and hazardous materials, hazardous occupations, and public vehicles. A summary of the city's adventures in licensing taxicabs is illuminating in many ways. Licensing in the interest of public morals applies to various businesses, including pawnbroking, keeping a massage parlor or a dancing school, showing moving pictures, providing certain amusements, and dealing in liquor.

The licensing of common vocations is treated in a chapter which points out the special characteristics of licensing in this field, where "organized and politically influential occupational groups have sought . . . to use public licensing authority for the furtherance of their own limited occupational ambitions, although under the guise of, and perhaps actually serving, some public purpose." The author warns that in this area monopolistic tendencies are present.

Licensing in order to raise revenue may be done only where this power is expressly granted. In regulatory licensing, fees may be collected, but they must bear a reasonable relation to the burden placed upon the city by the regulation. Chicago has made consistent efforts to obtain from the legislature a broader grant of revenue licensing power, but these efforts have been unsuccessful.

Can licensing serve both public and private interests? The author believes that it can, but only if the whole existing system of political organization and representation can be so reconstituted as to give to the public interest an effective mode of political articulation.—Miriam E. Oatman, *Santa Fe, New Mexico.*

Wendell Willkie, 1892–1944. By Mary Earhart Dillon. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1952. Pp. 378. $4.00.)

The first book-length biography of Willkie is written by the chairman of the Department of Political Science at Queens College. It is essentially a political biography, sketching only briefly his early career and his personal life. On the whole sympathetic to Willkie, Mrs.

Dillon has not written in the adulatory vein of a campaign biographer. She has portrayed him as an amateur in politics seeking only the White House because of its vantage place of leadership, as a sensitive man of many moods often oddly affected by a strain of self-defeat, and as a magnificent publicist always at his best when dramatizing an idea. His vast energy was devoted, with many blunders and with courageous struggles against personal and impersonal obstacles, to ever larger causes in the public interest. Never sure of his goal or even of his métier, Willkie died on the verge of a career as newspaper publisher.

Technical users of this biography, published primarily for the general reader, will regret the absence of footnotes as well as the limited access to Willkie's personal papers. Yet Mrs. Dillon has made an assiduous search for materials and a skillfully selective use of them. Her chapters on the Republican convention of 1940, on the origins of bipartisan foreign policy, and on Willkie's world trip in 1942 as a representative of President Roosevelt, are particularly useful contributions.—FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland.*

A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State. BY EDWARD S. CORWIN. (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie Company. 1951. Pp. viii, 126. $3.00.)

White Foundation lectures at the University of Virginia on "The Passing of Dual Federalism," "The Atom Bomb and the Constitution," and "The Problem of the Presidency." Professor Corwin's well-known article on "The Supreme Court as National School Board" is reprinted as a fourth essay.

Economy in the National Government. BY PAUL H. DOUGLAS. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. vii, 277. $3.75.)

A revised and enlarged version of Senator Douglas' 1951 Walgreen Foundation lectures. In Part I the author summarizes the growth of federal expenditures and the need for economy, and describes, with critical comments, the budget and appropriation process. The section concludes with a chapter on economies made in the first session of the Eighty-second Congress through reduction of overstaffing and the decrease in vacation allowances for federal employees. Part II details the need for economy in selected areas of the civilian budget and in military expenditures, and presents specifications for savings. In Part III Senator Douglas indicates how revenues may be increased by closing tax loopholes, and, in his concluding chapter, discusses some of the practical political problems encountered in attempting to balance the budget. "If we are to trim waste out of the budget, the cuts will primarily have to come from the people and from the legislative branch. They will not come from the executive branch. If the job is to be done, we must develop better organizations and better information and better staff work for Congress itself." Specifically, Senator Douglas proposes a continuing citizens' committee for economy, and suggests that the Comptroller General "be made the legislative equivalent of the Director of the Budget."

Defense, Controls, and Inflation. EDITED BY AARON DIRECTOR. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. x, 342. $3.50.)

Transcript of conference held at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, April 1951, sponsored by the University of Chicago Law School and attended by prominent economists, government officials, lawyers and industrialists. Major issues and conclusions are summarized in an introduction prepared by members of the Law School.

The Black Market; A Study of White Collar Crime. BY MARSHALL B. CLINARD. (New York: Rinehart & Company. 1952. Pp. xvii, 392. $5.00.)

An intensive examination of the World War II black market, with special emphasis on the black market in meat, gasoline and rent. The study analyzes the extent of the black market, problems of control and enforcement, public attitudes, and underlying causes. The author, now a University of Wisconsin sociologist, was with the Enforcement Department of OPA for nearly three years.

Student Deferment and National Manpower Policy. BY THE NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 102. $2.00.)

A statement of policy by the Council, which was established at Columbia University by a grant from the Ford Foundation and includes representatives of industry, labor and education. A second part on facts and issues was prepared by the research staff, headed by Eli Ginzberg, Columbia University.

Sait's American Parties and Elections. BY HOWARD R. PENNIMAN. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1952. Pp. viii, 574. $5.00.)

Fifth edition, extensively revised. Additions include one new chapter on pressure groups and another on the Communist party.

Republicanism Reappraised. By ROLAND N. STROMBERG. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1952. Pp. 93. $2.00.)

Discussion, in popular style, of Republican "mistakes," by University of Maryland historian who believes in progressive Republicanism. "Now . . . that the Old Deal is finished, must they not undertake to give us a Newer Deal?"

The Constitutional Law of Georgia; Cases and Comments. By ALBERT BERRY SAYE AND CHARLES JOSEPH HILKEY. (Atlanta: Harrison Company. 1952. Pp. xxii, 418. $10.00.)

In the past the assumption has been that constitutional law only on the national level was worthy of casebook presentation. The authors here present a casebook, useful both to legal and political science students, on the constitutional law of a single state. It is difficult to see how the casebook could be useful outside the state, since the compilation has necessarily been selective, and the casebook might or might not fit the pattern of selection deemed desirable in other states. For students of Georgia government, the casebook might well be required reading. The selection from *Thompson* v. *Talmadge*, dealing with the disputed succession to the governorship after the election and death of Eugene Talmadge, is one at least that will be of general interest.—J.M.R.

Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States. By FERREL HEADY. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1952. Pp. 137. $1.00.)

A survey, and brief evaluation, of the operation of administrative procedure legislation in six states: four (California, Missouri, North Dakota, and Wisconsin) with general procedure laws; one (Michigan) with a procedural statute of limited application; and one (Oklahoma) with no general administrative procedure legislation. Based primarily on field investigations, the study covers legislation in the fields of administrative rule making, administrative adjudication, and judicial review of administrative action.

Law and Administration; Legislative Committees in North Carolina. By HENRY W. LEWIS. (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, University of North Carolina. 1952. Pp. xii, 144.)

Study by a member of the Institute staff of the recent committee system in North Carolina. Some comparisons with other states are included.

Texas Government. By STUART A. MACCORKLE AND DICK SMITH. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1952. Pp. xi, 506. $4.50.)

Second, revised edition of work first published in 1949.

Administrative Problems in a Metropolitan Area; The National Capital Region. By GEDDES W. RUTHERFORD. (Chicago: Published by the Public Administration Service for the author. 1952. Pp. xiv, 63. $2.50.)

A survey and analysis of the administrative and governmental problems of the Washington metropolitan area, including the Virginia and Maryland suburbs.

Government and Labor in the United States. By JOHN H. LEEK. (New York: Rinehart and Company. 1952. Pp. viii, 336. $3.00.)

Summary of legislation, administration, and major court decisions by University of Oklahoma political scientist. Emphasis is national with occasional references to the states.

What's Right With America; New Perspectives on the Contemporary Scene. EDITED BY FREDERICK UNGAR. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1952. Pp. xvi, 368. $3.50.)

A collection of essays, previously published, by Harry S. Truman, Bernard Baruch, Dean Acheson, Omar N. Bradley, William O. Douglas, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Norman Thomas, David Lilienthal, and others, on America today.

The Cry Is Peace. By LOUIS F. BUDENZ. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. xiii, 242. $3.75.)

An account of Communist penetration in the United States, particularly since World War II.

Atomic Imperialism; The State, Monopoly, and the Bomb. By JAMES S. ALLEN. (New York: International Publishers. 1952. Pp. 288. $3.25.)

An attack on the close relationships between large scientific corporations and the Atomic Energy Commission.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

J. ALTON BURDINE AND EMMETTE S. REDFORD
University of Texas

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Mendelson, Wallace. Mr. Justice Holmes—Humility, Skepticism and Democracy. *Minnesota Law Review.* March, 1952.

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——— Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1952, pertaining to Enabling the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to Bring about a Basic Simplification and Improvement of the Government of the District of Columbia. H. doc. 447, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 1952.

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920; A Study in Nationalism. By John S. Reshetar, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 363. $5.00.)

With considerable scholarship, using a maximum of the Ukrainian, Russian and other sources available on this side of the ocean, Mr. Reshetar tells an extraordinary story.

A handful of intellectuals tried to create a nation where a nation refused to be born. Millions of Ukrainian peasants spoke the Ukrainian language, yet remained lukewarm to the nationalist appeal addressed to them by their anti-Soviet governments—by the Rada, the Hetmanate, and the Directory in turn. Despite their language setting them apart from the Russians, and because of the Orthodox Christianity and the centuries of socio-political history they shared with the Russians, these rural masses considered themselves *russkiye* rather than Ukrainians.

Still less Ukrainian-minded were their urbanized brothers. These had been Russified so thoroughly that they didn't even speak the Ukrainian tongue. In the cities of the Ukraine they were joined by several million immigrant Russians and their descendants who wished to stay Russian. These viewed the efforts of the ardent Ukrainizers as sheer comic opera. The few million Jews and other minorities in the land, when they wanted an assimilation at all, tended to go Russian, not Ukrainian. Interdependent economies of the Ukraine and Russia, with the latter leading, made for a Russification of the country's middle class above all. There was no purely Ukrainian middle class, and "a national movement could not develop in the absence of a middle class" (p. 319).

In the failure of the Ukrainian leaders to satisfy the socio-economic demands of peasants and workers we can see the decisive lack of "that egocentric singleness of purpose which we associate with modern nationalism" (p. 329). The author lists a number of other, lesser failures and weaknesses of the Ukrainian nationalists of that era. Yet, optimistically, he concludes that by now "many of these weaknesses are no longer real because in the several decades since the national revolution Ukrainian nationalism has continued to develop even under Soviet rule" (p. 331).

This reviewer feels that the author's conclusion is debatable; that in World War II it was the Galician or West Ukrainian minority which supplied whatever nationalist sentiment and action there was in the land while the East Ukrainian majority remained either passive or pro-Russian (without necessarily being pro-Communist). Certain surface signs to the contrary, the economic amalgamation and cultural Russification of the Ukraine has been intensified by the Soviets, not reversed. The reviewer does not take it for granted that this rich southern land and its talented people will yet (or even can) become a nation.—Albert Parry, *Colgate University.*

El Poder Ejecutivo; Génesis y Transformaciones. By Alberto Demicheli. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Depalma. 1950. Pp. xix, 207. 18 pesos Arg.)

Although a small nation, Uruguay has long attracted attention not only because of its progressive democracy—a rare commodity in Latin America and elsewhere—but also by virtue of its experimentation in governmental policy in the socio-economic sphere and in constitutional provisions governing the executive branch. In the latter category this experimental tendency again manifested itself in the recently approved creation of a collegial executive, which at least in form is more genuinely pluripersonal than the earlier hybrid Uruguayan types since 1918.

This current experimentation is largely imitative of the unadopted 1913 proposal of the outstanding *Colorado* leader, Jose Batlle y Ordonez, who had been impressed by the Swiss institution as he observed it. Although Demicheli's study was published before this recent change, it has value as a background source in presenting an overall picture of the historical development of the executive branch of the government in his country. With his impressive background as professor of administrative law, author of studies of the *entes autonomos* and other phases of Uruguayan administration, national deputy and senator, and governmental official, Demicheli is eminently qualified to examine this subject. The book is well organized and concise; its chronological treatment of the constitutional provisions governing the various facets of the executive function and the executive-legislative relationships is particularly useful for reference purposes. Unfortunately, however, the author confines himself largely to the formal side of the picture. This reviewer would have preferred more critique of the previous functioning of the quasi-collegial forms and analysis of basic political factors, such as the intricacies of majority party factionalism and Herrerista minority strategy. Such factors may determine the operation—and even existence—of the present *colegiado,* a rather exotic flower without strong Uruguayan roots. —ROGER ABBOTT, *Washington, D. C.*

A Breviate of Parliamentary Papers, 1917–1939. BY P. AND G. FORD. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1951. Pp. xlviii, 571. $8.50. Distributed by Macmillan Company, New York.)

The breviate, prepared at the University College, Southampton, by Prof. P. Ford and Mrs. G. Ford, presents in a broadly classified order abstracts of about 1,200 reports for the period between the two World Wars of British "Royal Commissions and other committees of inquiry in the field of constitutional, economic, financial and social policy, and of legal administration." During the early part of the period covered, Departments began to issue more and more as non-Parliamentary Papers reports having eventual significance from the point of view of policy. Careful citation has been given for each report briefed. There is an index to specific topics of individual reports, not always readily to be located in the table of contents, as well as to the chairmen of the Commissions and committees. This is a welcome reference tool that should do much not only to facilitate the use of important British public documents of the period but to stress importance of an adequate representation of these in libraries, as well as to point the way to the need for guides to similar materials in other important countries.—J.B.C.

Foreign Governments; The Dynamics of Politics Abroad. EDITED BY FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. xxxiv, 717. $6.00.)

Second edition of text first published in 1949. A major change is the separate treatment of France and Italy replacing the earlier combined treatment of these two countries.

Major Foreign Powers; The Governments of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Germany. BY GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, JOHN C. RANNEY, AND JOHN H. HERZ. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1952. Pp. xxiii, 815, cix. $6.00.)

Revised edition of text first published in 1949. Extensive changes have been made in the first three parts and a study of the government of Germany has been substituted for that of China.

Règlement et résolutions règlementaires de l'Assemblée Nationale. Instruction générale et directives du Bureau de l'Assemblée. Constitution. Loi relative aux pouvoirs publics (4e édition) Mai 1952. (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale. 1952. Pp. 492.)

The latest edition of the rules of the French National Assembly is accompanied by a correction supplement of twelve pages bringing various sections up to date. Many changes have been made and are being made in the rules. Availability of the text of the various sections in force at any one time would seem to be essential to the understanding of the actions of that body. There is a detailed index by topic. The text of the Constitution, indexed separately, is accompanied by various pertinent references to laws and other acts. The volume is a reference work essential to the comprehension of the French political scene, and should be available wherever there is an interest in present-day French government.—J.B.C.

Bibliographie sélective des publications officielles françaises, 1re année, no. 1, 15 janvier, 1952. (Paris: Documentation Française. 1952—. Foreign subscription, 1,500 fr. a year.)

The printed semi-monthly select bibliography of French official publications, sponsored jointly by the Comité de Coordination pour la Documentation des Sciences Sociales and by the Commission Interministérielle de Documentation et Diffusion continues the mimeographed publication *France: Documents administratifs,* issued in 1951. Now, it is possible to keep currently informed as to the principal publications of the French government, whether printed separately or not, and their method of procurement. At the same time the bibliography includes tables of the contents of the principal official periodicals and occasional supplements listing the periodical publications of various ministries.—J.B.C.

Conversations on Parliamentary Practice and Procedure; Volume II. BY M. N. KAUL, SECRETARY TO PARLIAMENT. (New Delhi: Parliament Secretariat. 1950. Pp. vii, 81.)

Contains material gathered in 1949 relating to the parliaments of Norway, Denmark, and Netherlands, and also a further statement in reference to the British House of Commons. Material in English on the practice and procedure of Parliaments in non-English speaking countries is rather meager, and this work, while primarily for the new Indian Parliament, should have a much wider interest. The first volume, printed in May, 1949 (pp. vi, 183), records detailed conversations relating to the British House of Commons.—J.B.C.

Committee on the Conduct of a Member (The Mudgal Case); Report, Special Reports, Minutes, Appendices, Evidence and Debates on the Motion. (New Delhi: Parliament Secretariat. 1951. Pp. 387.)

The investigation of H. G. Mudgal, Member of Parliament, in connection with the soliciting of support from and making propaganda for the Bombay Bullion Association. The volume includes the stenographic report of the minutes of the meetings of the five-member investigating committee in June and July, 1951. The committee found that Mr. Mudgal's conduct was "derogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with the standards which Parliament is entitled to expect from its members." The motion to investigate was adopted on June 8, 1951, and the Committee reported at the end of July, 1951, an evidence of unusual promptness in such a matter.—J.B.C.

Administrative directory of the Government of East Bengal. (Dacca, East Bengal: Supt. Govt. Printing. 1950. Pp. iv, 80. Rs. 3/8/-.)

At the time of the Constitution of Pakistan in August, 1947, East Bengal was the only new province. The directory in oblong format gives a convenient statement of the names of the officers of the departments and attached directorates as well as a brief list of subjects dealt with by the various departments, and is especially interesting as showing a pattern of provincial organization in Pakistan.—J.B.C.

Annual Report, 1949–1950. PREPARED BY THE SCIENCE COUNCIL OF JAPAN SECOND DIVISION (LAW AND POLITICS). (Tokyo: Science Council of Japan. 1951. Pp. 67.)

A comprehensive overview of the work of the Division in terms of the organization, personalities, program, and publication activity of the thirteen principal associations of law and politics in Japan: The Association of International Law of Japan, The Criminal Law Society of Japan, Japan Public Law Association, Japan Association of Private Law, Japanese Political Science Association, The Japanese Association of Sociology of Law, The Japan Legal Philosophy Association, Japan Legal History Association, Democratic Scientists' Society Legal Section, The Association of the Law of Civil Procedure in Japan, The Japanese Society of Comparative Law, Japan Labor Law Association, and The Japanese Society for Public Administration. The second portion of the *Report* summarizes the constitutions of the nation-wide societies of law and politics and of thirty-three "societies attached to the universities and other societies."—H.A.S.

The Japan Science Review; Law and Politics, No. 2—List of Books and Articles on Law and Politics. (Tokyo: Union of Japanese Societies of Law and Politics. 1951. Pp. 79.)

Classified list of works published in Japan, 1946–1950.

Red Dust; Autobiographies of Chinese Communists. AS TOLD TO NYM WALES. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1952. Pp. xiv, 238. $5.00.)

First person accounts of the lives of twenty-four important men and women of Communist China, from interviews held while Miss Wales and her husband, foreign correspondent Edgar Snow, visited the Communist regions of China for five months in 1937. Included in the volume are an introduction by Robert Carver North, a list of "Influential Chinese Communists," and a bibliography.

Republic of the Philippines Government Manual, 1950. First edition, revised up to June 15, 1950. BY OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, MALACAÑAN. (Manila: Bureau of Printing. 1950. Pp. viii, 785. P. 4.50.)

Each agency in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is described, with reference to the basic acts. Government corporations are included. Names of the principal officials are also given. Arrangement is as follows: Office of the President, Congress, Courts, Departments in the order designated by the Constitution, Independent Agencies, and Government Corporations. Text of the Constitution is given at the beginning. Organization charts are given for each agency. There are separate indexes to agency and to personal names.—J.B.C.

Uruguay; South America's First Welfare State. BY GEORGE PENDLE. (London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1952. Pp. viii, 100. $2.50.)

The second of the Royal Institute's series on the Latin American republics. Contains a concise and up-to-date survey of Uruguay's history, geography, government, economics, culture and foreign relations, with bibliography.

República Oriental del Uruguay; Ley constitucional sancionada el 26 de octubre de 1951, que sera sometida a plebiscito de ratificación el 16 de diciembre de 1951. (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional. 1951. Pp. 96.)

The revised constitution of Uruguay as approved by a small majority at the plebiscite in December, 1951, provides in section IX that the executive power be exercised by a Consejo Nacional de Gobierno (in place of a single President) in contrast to the practice prevailing elsewhere in Latin America. The nine members of the Council are elected by popular vote for a term of four years, the first Council having taken office on March 1, 1952. There is annual rotation of the presidency of the Council.—J.B.C.

Defense of Freedom. By the Editors of *La Prensa.* (New York: John Day Company. 1952. Pp. 315. $4.00.)

Story of political oppression of well-known Argentine newspaper, followed by selected editorials from the paper.

The Purge of Dutch Quislings; Emergency Justice in the Netherlands. By Henry L. Mason. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1952. Pp. xii, 199.)

A Columbia University doctoral dissertation in political science, paper bound. An analysis of collaboration and its consequences in a country that was singularly united in its opposition to collaboration.

Danske gesandter og gesandtskabspersonale indtel 1914. By Emil Marquard, Udgivet af Rigsarkivet. (København: Kommission hos Ejnar Munksgaards Forlag. 1952. Pp. xi, 493. 20 kr.)

The historical directory of Danish diplomatic personnel, published by the State Archives at Copenhagen, is arranged in two groups. The first extends from the beginning to 1648, the time of the Peace of Westphalia, and the second from 1648 to 1914. In this connection, it may be noted that the first volume of the *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder* by Bittner and Gross (Oldenburg, 1936) covers the period 1648–1715.—J.B.C.

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MARIO EINAUDI
Cornell University

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

The Secretary-General of the United Nations; His Political Powers and Practice. By STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. xiv, 299. $4.75.)

A better understanding both of the Secretary-General's office and of the United Nations itself will result from Mr. Schwebel's study. It reflects an extensive research with documents, together with the author's close contacts with the United Nations as a former official of the Secretariat, as consultant to the Economic and Social Council, and as the representative of the World Federation of United Nations Associations at the United Nations headquarters. The principal thesis of the book is the development of the political activities of the Secretary-General; in its clear and logical presentation, Mr. Schwebel has brought into full view a fact which had been only dimly observed in the past.

The author contrasts the position of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with that of its immediate ancestor, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations; the present office, he finds, carries with it much more in the way of political activity than did its predecessor, and indeed it was founded upon the assumption that such would be the case. Even in the League the political importance of the office was "very great and often underestimated," but as the author asserts "the Secretaries-General of the League are the pale prototype of the United Nations Secretary-General." The bearing of the provisions of the Charter upon this fact, and especially that of Article 99, is analyzed. Part II of the book discusses the political activities of Trygve Lie's office under five chapter headings which explain its relations with the General Assembly, the Security Council, the non-political organs, governments, and world public opinion. The two chapters of Part III deal with the extension of Mr. Lie's term and the future of the office. Mr. Schwebel expresses, without criticism, the view that Mr. Lie has not pushed the political side of his office as much as might have been possible; the observation is made, however, that the tendency of the past two or three years has been toward more aggressive political action. In the Secretary-General's suggestions regarding Chinese representation and Great Power negotiations, Mr. Schwebel sees a beginning of the development of a power of policy proposal, a development which he believes to be auspicious.—NORMAN HILL, *University of Nebraska.*

The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation. By FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xxi, 114. $1.75.)

In this little book, Judge Allen expresses her concern over the effect upon our constitutional system of what she terms "the increasing use of the treaty as a substitute for domestic legislation." She refers specifically to conventions and treaties which are being and have been formulated and promulgated by the United Nations, the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. These, she feels, relate to domestic affairs and are not the proper subject of treaties, since they require ratifying countries to change the domestic laws and economic processes which have long been established. Because under our Constitution these treaties become the law of the land and do not require implementing legislation, as they do in most other nations, mere ratification constitutes a "yielding of a portion of the independence" of our national life. Judge Allen believes that the United Nations system has contributed significantly to the establishment of world peace and world justice and that we should continue to support and participate in its activities. However, she notes that they were never intended to have legislative powers or to take any action which would constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of member governments. Treaties, she feels, should be contracts between governments, arrived at as a result of bargaining by and between responsible political officials rather than commissions of experts who are responsible only to the governing bodies of the agencies of which they are a part. As a remedy, she proposes that the United States Constitution be amended to provide that "any treaty which directly and substantially interferes with the domestic jurisdiction is invalid except where the subject matter presents a truly international problem which requires international action to handle it;" and that "any treaty which conflicts with or contradicts the Constitution of the United States is invalid." Furthermore, she recommends that the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice be amended so as to provide that any member state, when it claims that its domestic jurisdiction is infringed, by action of the United Nations or of any specialized agency, can take the question to the International Court of Justice for decision, a practice which is not now possible in most cases. Finally, she recommends that the United States scrutinize every treaty and convention offered for ratification and give them the greatest publicity possible, bearing in mind that, once ratified and in force for the United States, these treaties become municipal law. This is a provocative little book which is worth reading, even if the reader finds himself in occasional disagreement with the distinguished author.—ELI E. NOBLEMAN, *Washington, D. C.*

The Philippines and the United States. BY GAREL A. GRUNDER AND WILLIAM E. LIVEZEY. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 315. $4.00.)

For students of America's international position, this book makes significant contributions. It spotlights attention on the importance of the Philippines. It exposes the interplay of trade and strategy with honor and destiny in the determination of the national interest. It offers a meticulous chronicle of the half-century of our most outstanding colonial experience. It is an excellent case study in the inseparability of foreign policy and domestic politics.

After reading this book, one may wonder how the United States emerged so creditably from its Philippines connection. President McKinley stated that "he could not have located the islands within two thousand miles" (p. 9); none of the Senators who debated the Treaty of Paris had ever been in the Philippines (p. 39); and very few responsible officials in Washington ever visited the islands. Too often Philippines questions became footballs of domestic politics. Shields of idealism screened a clash of interests between conflicting American political or economic groups. Our attitudes fluctuated between indifference and acrimony.

Grunder and Livezey show how impossible it is to characterize either major American political party as "black" or "white." Neither McKinley nor Bryan rose above partisanship. In the days of Taft and Root, distinguished Democratic Governors-general implemented Washington's instructions. To Democrats the Jones Law was the promise of independence; to Republicans, it was a disguised policy of scuttle. The Wilson administration inclined to the nationalistic demands of the Filipinos; the Republican interregnum preferred to emphasize its responsibility to achieve a stable government. The great depression erased differences in partisan outlook and stampeded the Congress into what Senator Vandenberg called a determination to become independent of the Philippines. World War II uncovered our inadequate preparations for the economic welfare and military defense of an independent Philippines. Reexamination was a casualty of the Japanese invasion.

It is a bit cruel to say that "on December 8, 1941, no provision for civilian aid or defense had been made" (p. 237). It may be fair to say that inadequate provision had been made, but steps had been taken. Since July, an American Coordinating Committee had been meeting regularly; General Grunert and Admiral Bemis had been offering advice on protection and evacuation; and the Commonwealth Government (largely with the encouragement of Colonel Carswell and Major Marron of Mr.

Sayre's staff) had been trying desperately to make effective the Civilian Emergency Administration.

It may also be pertinent to observe that the Philippine defense effort was moving apace even if United States congressional approval was hard to obtain. Military officials were doing their utmost. Time and inertia, indifference or disbelief were far greater villains than congressional inactivity or lack of funds.

The authors summarize admirably wartime and postwar relations between the two countries: the role of the U. S. Army, Osmena's return and the restoration of civil government; the treatment of collaborators, and the urgency of rehabilitation. They see American policy towards the Philippines at mid-century as bearing a close resemblance to concepts prevailing around 1900, with a difference largely of emphasis.

It is to be hoped that the authors will at some future time analyze the Philippines' end of the story with the same thoroughness with which they have dissected the American viewpoint. And perhaps the "who" is as important as the "what" and the "why" of United States-Philippines relations. The personality factor is vital, given such colorful figures as Quezon, Roxas and Laurel; Wood, Stimson and Murphy; Tydings, Ickes and General MacArthur.—CLAUDE A. BUSS, *Stanford University.*

International Organization. BY NORMAN HILL. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xii, 627. $5.00.)

A text book designed to enable the student of international affairs to become "conversant with the machinery and processes by which the nations promote their common interests and try to adjust their differences." Part One deals with general aspects and covers briefly the nature and functions of international organization, its development to the League of Nations, and participation. Part Two covers regional and universal organization and includes a brief treatment of regionalism and regional agencies and a general treatment of the United Nations. Part Three is concerned with disputes and the maintenance of peace, and covers methods of treating disputes, a descriptive analysis of the International Court of Justice, and the background and authority of the United Nations system. In Part Four, attention is given to diplomacy, conference and consultation, both within and outside of the United Nations system. Part Five deals with international administration and includes a brief description of its historical development, followed by the role of the United Nations in administration. Part Six is concerned with the future and contains a discussion of possibilities for revision of the United Nations and the general subject of federation. Major emphasis is placed upon the contemporary scene, in general, and the role of the United Nations system in international organization, in particular.—E.E.N.

The Law of Nations; Cases, Documents, and Notes. EDITED BY HERBERT W. BRIGGS. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 1108. $8.00.)

A combined treatise and documentary source-book. A revision of the author's 1938 work, it contains much new material in the form of new cases, documents and Editor's notes. Considerable emphasis has been given to developments in international law through the United Nations, including the work of the International Law Commission, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Other additions include material on war crimes, military occupation, and privileges and immunities of international organizations, of their officials, and of representatives of their members. A wealth of bibliographical material serves to enable students to delve further into subjects in which additional study may be indicated.—E.E.N.

Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1951. EDITED BY CLYDE EAGLETON AND RICHARD N. SWIFT. (New York: New York University Press. 1952. Pp. vii, 278. $4.50.)

The proceedings of the third Institute for Annual Review of United Nations Affairs held in June, 1951, by New York University with the cooperation of the United Nations for the purpose of providing a survey of the activities of the United Nations during the preceding year. Following the procedure of the two previous annual reports, the lectures of high officials of the United Nations Secretariat are recorded and the ensuing discussion summarized.

Everyman's United Nations; A Ready Reference to the Structure, Functions and Work of the United Nations and its Related Agencies. (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations. 1952. Pp. vi, 388. $1.50. Distributed by the Columbia University Press.)

Third edition.

International Law Documents, 1950–1951. PREPARED BY NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. xvii, 218. $1.50.)

This collection of documents, prepared with the assistance of Judge Manley O. Hudson, consists of all of the conventions dealing with the protection of victims of war, from the United States-Mexico Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, of 1848, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. A prefatory note traces the history of efforts to protect victims of war during the past century.

Readings in International Relations. EDITED BY FREDERICK H. HARTMANN. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1952. Pp. xiv, 303. $3.50.)

Included in this collection are excerpts from the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Moon, Lenin, Lippmann, Kennan, Wilson, Brierly, Hayes, Nicholson, Vansittart, Kirk, Churchill and many others.

Current Research in International Affairs. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1952. Pp. 193. $1.00.)

Annotated bibliography of selected research in progress in private agencies in Australia, Canada, England, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and the United States.

Readings in American Foreign Policy. EDITED BY ROBERT A. GOLDWIN. (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education. 1952. 3 vols. Pp. 217, 308, 231.)

A collection of provocative readings highlighting the most persistent problems of American foreign policy. The materials are set forth in historical sequence and cover such topics as foreign affairs in a democracy, neutrality and isolationism, the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door, war aims in World War II, present foreign policy and alternatives and criticism. Various positions are presented by means of excerpts from the writings of de Tocqueville, Hamilton, Beard, Borchard, Lippmann, Hughes, Root, Kennan, Willkie, Acheson, Hoover, Wilson, and many others. Selected documents and correspondence are also included.

Recent American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents 1941–1951. BY FRANCIS O. WILCOX AND THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1952. Pp. xviii, 927. $6.50.)

Excerpts from "the more important documents and official statements bearing on the foreign policy of the United States in the period following our entrance into World War II." The collection, originally published by the Government Printing Office as *A Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents 1941–1949*, has been revised and now includes material through early 1951 and brief editorial notes.

Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers, 1933. Volume V, The American Republics. COMPILED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. lxxxiv, 887. $3.25.)

Contains sections on relations with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. Documents reveal the early application of the Good Neighbor policy.

Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939. COMPILED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. cii, 1034. $3.75.)

Contains documents previously published in *Foreign Relations* (1933, vol. II) but most of the material is published here for the first time. Covers negotiations relating to recognition of the Soviet government and other exchanges through the end of 1939.

Back Door to War; The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941. BY CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. xxi, 690. $6.50.)

A "revisionist" history of the origins of World War II, by Georgetown University historian.

The Siberian Fiasco. BY CLARENCE A. MANNING. (New York: Library Publishers. 1952. Pp. 210. $3.75.)

The background and story of the military intervention of the United States in Siberia in 1918, by a Columbia University historian.

Moscow, Tokyo, London; Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy. BY HERBERT VON DIRKSEN. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 276. $4.00.)

The memoirs of a German career diplomat who served as Ambassador to Moscow from 1928 until 1933, to Tokyo from 1933 through 1937, and to London in 1938 and 1939. Most of the volume is written from memory because the author's private archives are in East Germany, from which von Dirksen is a refugee. English version of a German book having the same title.

Asia and the West. BY MAURICE ZINKIN. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1951. Pp. xii, 300. $3.50. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.)

Survey, by former civil servant in India, of the basic economic, social and administrative problems of South and East Asia today. From his analysis of these problems the author examines the differences between Asian and Western countries, and undertakes to suggest the road along which the Asian revolution should be directed with Western help.

China, Japan and the Powers. BY MERIBETH E. CAMERON, THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY, AND GEORGE E. MCREYNOLDS. (New York: Ronald Press Co. 1952. Pp. xiii, 682. $6.50.)

A new text for Far Eastern courses, by three historians, covering the period from 1800 through mid-1951, with particular attention to the role of the United States.

The Atom Spies. BY OLIVER PILAT. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1952. Pp. vii, 312. $3.50.)

The story of Russia's atomic espionage in the United States, Canada and England and an analysis of the men and motives behind the deed, by a journalist now with *The New York Post.*

Rapport de la Délégation française sur le traité instituant la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier et la Convention relative aux dispositions transitoires, signés à Paris, le 18 avril 1951. BY MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES. (Paris. Oct. 1951. Pp. 187.)

The official report of the French delegation upon the Schuman plan conventions concluded by France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Italy, and Germany expresses the situation in the following terms: "La préservation de la paix exige qu'après être autrefois passée du stade du démembrement féodal et provincial au stade de l'État, l'Europe passe à présent au stade d'une communauté supranationale."—J.B.C.

Peace, War and You. BY JEROME DAVIS. (New York: Henry Schuman. 1952. Pp. 282. $3.00.)

Contends that war can be avoided if we, as individuals, do not want it.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*
University of California (Los Angeles)

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* Prepared with the assistance of Mr. Linford D. Riley, Jr.

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

John Adams and the Prophets of Progress. By Zoltán Haraszti. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 362. $5.00.)

In the last few years interest in John Adams has increased. However, enthusiasm for Adams is almost certainly going to be, as in the past, intermittent. "Mausoleums, statues, monuments," he wrote to Dr. Benjamin Rush, the Philadelphia scientist and signer of the Declaration of Independence, "will never be erected to me . . . Panegyrical romances will never be written, nor flattering orations spoken to transmit me to posterity in brilliant colors" (p. 1). Perhaps no man ever judged his position in history more accurately than Adams. But the remarkable thing is that Adams could see precisely how people in the coming period would react to his method of thinking.

Implicitly, Adams sensed the power and the historical durability of the thought of the eighteenth century. Adams lived in the Enlightenment, but he analyzed its theories in the cold light of historical and logical knowledge. He was in part a *philosophe*, but he rejected the myth. In contrast, Jefferson is the prime symbol of today because many of his general ideas fit into the later developments of liberal or French eighteenth-century thought. To Adams, progress was not inevitable, while to Jefferson it was; Adams queried the goodness of human nature and institutions were not always the element at fault, but Jefferson took the opposite position, at least in some of his many, varied, and contradictory statements. Today many Jeffersonians take the invective of old political controversy as sound history and as factual interpretations of what Adams stood for.

Haraszti's fine and brilliant book is not for the crusader; it is for the mellow-minded, and for those who reflect on the human comedy or the slowness with which men make their faltering, progressive steps. This volume is built on Adam's comments on the exponents of the new age. It is taken largely from the sharp, yet leisurely comments that Adams wrote in the margins of the books he read from his own library. These comments, as they are included in this volume, deal with Bolingbroke, Rousseau, Frederick the Great, Voltaire, d'Alembert, Abbé de Mably, Turgot, Mary Wollstonecraft, Condorcet, Napoleon's apologists, Dr. Priestly, and other theological writers. Against all of them Adams insisted there are fundamental or natural constitutional laws of good government. Those who would escape from moderation, balance, and a conservative respect for historical fact do not attain their ends; rather, they either fail or create more chaos than was found before. The modern Jeffersonians might remember, too, that there was much in common between Jefferson and Adams in their old age, as their correspondence shows.

Haraszti rejects the proposition that Adams was secretly plotting the establishment of monarchy in America, or that he favored for us the creation of hereditary privilege. This charge is the main one against Adams, and of it the author says (p. 42): "There are no evidences of secret monarchism in Adams's comments; nor could anyone who really knows him have expected any."—FRANCIS G. WILSON, *University of Illinois.*

Democracy and the Economic Challenge. BY ROBERT M. MACIVER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. 86. $2.50.)

Professor MacIver declares in his opening sentence that the "central conflict of the twentieth century . . . rages over the question of the proper role of government in the economic area. . . . " The volume is concerned with that issue. He finds that the older forms of society combined political and economic power in the same hands. That combination was broken by the rising middle class, particularly as demonstrated in British history. The breaking consisted in the appearance of an economic base for the industrial and trading groups outside of land ownership. The new middle class eventually forced its way into government. Political power was separate from economic power, and the latter was mainly in private hands. The middle class insisted on a minimum area of governmental activity which in turn resulted in the new depressed working class. This class moved towards political strength via organization. Laissez faire was the doctrine of the middle class, and socialism in its many forms was the doctrine of the working class. Marxism is castigated as leading the workers toward the ancient combination of political and economic power in the same hands with its undesirable authoritarianism. The planned economy is analyzed to show its danger for democracy. Democracy, although misunderstood by many of its supporters, has as its primary aim the liberation of the individual. Private economic power is necessary for that goal. Democracy then is challenged on the one side by the evils of industrialism in private hands and on the other by the authoritarianism which accompanies public ownership. The way out is through socio-capitalism, i.e., the welfare state.—CHARLES B. HAGAN, *University of Illinois.*

Pioneers of Russian Social Thought; Studies of Non-Marxian Formation in Nineteenth-Century Russia and of its Partial Revival in the Soviet Union. BY RICHARD HARE. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. vi, 307. $4.50.)

Though the rise of Leninism, like that of Hitlerism, was made possible by twentieth century conditions—the effects of World War I and the ensuing social and economic disintegration, the growth of industrialization and of mass-consciousness—it was facilitated, again like Hitlerism, by the ideological trends and social structure prevailing in certain countries in the nineteenth century. In Lenin's theory and work, Russian traditions had as potent an influence as had the doctrines of Marx, and through Marx of Hegel. Scholars, like T. G. Masaryk, who knew Russia well pointed out as far back as 1919 that Lenin was above all a true Russian and that the new system had continued, not outgrown, Tsarism. Developments under Stalin have made the survival of "old" Russia in the Soviet Union more and more manifest. With that the interest in nineteenth century Russian thinkers has been intensified in the Western countries.

The best and most comprehensive book on intellectual and social trends in nineteenth century Russia is still Masaryk's *The Spirit of Russia*, which was originally published in 1913. Now an English scholar, Richard Hare, introduces in a new volume several leading Russian social thinkers of the nineteenth century, the Slavophils, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Herzen, and Leontiev, whose psychological peculiarity "faithfully embodied corresponding peculiarities ingrained in their Russian environment." Mr. Hare rightly stresses the the fact that Russia knew no equivalent of Locke or Montesquieu, but he seems to underestimate the extent to which Herzen, through his long sojourn in England, was ultimately developing into a true liberal. That adherents of "right" (Leontiev) and "left" (Chernyshevsky) share some traits in common, especially an authoritarian dislike or rejection of liberalism, is again nothing peculiar to Russia.

Mr. Hare's book is written with a certain charm and reads easily. It may well serve as a first introduction to a fascinating, important and little known world of thought. Yet it fails to achieve its avowed purpose of integrating the various sketches of personalities and philosophies into a whole and of connecting it with present-day developments in the Soviet Union.

The essays are discursive and rarely penetrate to the deeper layers of meaningful analysis. Mr. Hare knows his subject, but he has not succeeded in building the fragments of Russian nineteenth century intellectual history into a book indispensable to the serious student of the subject. This lack of a guiding idea in interpreting his material is the more regrettable because the material in itself is of much pertinence, and the reader unfamiliar with the Russian sources will find many passages translated from the original which will be helpful to him.—HANS KOHN, *City College of New York.*

The Political Philosophy of Hobbes; Its Basis and Its Genesis. BY LEO STRAUSS. TRANSLATED BY ELSA M. SINCLAIR. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. xx, 172. $4.00.)

Reprint of study first published in England in 1936.

Persecution and the Art of Writing. BY LEO STRAUSS. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1952. Pp. 204. $4.00.)

Reprint of four of the author's essays ("Persecution and the Art of Writing"; "The Literary Character of the *Guide for the Perplexed*"; "The Law of Reason in the *Kuzari*"; and "How to Study Spinoza's *Theologico-Political Treatise*") together with an introduction adapted from an earlier article "Fārābī's *Plato*." "These essays," the author states in the preface, "are here collected into one volume primarily with a view to the fact that they all deal with one problem: the problem of the relation between philosophy and politics."

Leaders of Men. BY WOODROW WILSON. EDITED BY T. H. VAIL MOTTER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 70. $2.00.)

The text of an essay, first delivered as a commencement address at the University of Tennessee in 1890. It is now published for the first time from the original manuscript.

The Literary Criticism of "Young America"; A Study in the Relationship of Politics and Literature, 1837–1850. BY JOHN STAFFORD. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952. Pp. 154. $2.00.)

Analysis of the work and methods of a group of literary critics, published under the auspices of the Department of English at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Dante as a Political Thinker. BY A. P. D'ENTRÈVES. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. vi, 119. $2.00.)

The three Barlow Lectures delivered in London, February and March, 1951, by an Oxford professor, on the political concepts of Dante, especially as found in the *Divine Comedy.*

Process versus Power; Studies in Modern Culture. BY EUGENE N. ANDERSON. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska. 1952. Pp. vii, 136.)

Essays concerned with the culture of a period of change. It is the author's intention "to serve the practical purpose of estimating what is the present state of our culture, what are its potentialities, and what are the major obstacles to the achievement of a good life."

Social Thought from Lore to Science. BY HOWARD BECKER AND HARRY ELMER BARNES. (Washington: Harren Press. 1952. 2 vols. Pp. 1178, cx, cxxxv. $15.00 a set.)

Second edition with a new introductory note, added preface, a terminological commentary, a 1937–50 appendix on contemporary sociology and 1951 bibliographies.

The Anatomy of Revolution. BY CRANE BRINTON. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. xi, 324. $5.00.)

Revision of book first published in 1938. An analytical approach to the phenomenon of revolution as illustrated primarily in the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions.

The Elements of Political Science. BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xvi, 635, xxvi. $5.50.)

Text for beginning students. A relatively brief section on scope and method (two chapters) is followed by sections on the basic elements of political behavior (six chapters), governmental structures and organization (eight chapters) and democracy and policy (two chapters). Most of the illustrative material relates to the United States but frequent reference is made to foreign governments. The sociological and psychological sources of political behavior are examined. Questions and problems and bibliographic notes are included.

Fundamentals of Political Science. EDITED BY OSSIP K. FLECHTHEIM. (New York: Ronald Press Company. 1952. Pp. vii, 587. $5.50.)

This new introductory text contains sections on the nature and scope of political science (the editor); the development of political ideas and institutions (Margaret Spahr); the elements and attributes of the State (Ithiel de Sola Pool); constitutions (Ithiel de Sola Pool and George Schueller); public opinion and parties (Robert J. Koblitz and S. Grover Rich, Jr.); the structure and powers of government (Lawrence L. Pelletier); international relations (Norman D. Palmer); and a concluding part on the potentialities of political science by the editor. The "concept of political power," the editor says in the preface, "serves as the point of departure and gives coherence and unity to the book." The treatment is comparative. Considerable attention is given to the relationship of political science to other social and cultural disciplines.

Which Democratic Government? By D. F. Brown. (Richmond, Va.: Dietz Press. 1950. Pp. xvi, 110. $2.50.)

A layman's reflections on the organization of democratic government.

Faith Is a Weapon. By Thomas B. Morgan. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1952. Pp. vi, 278. $3.75.)

Account of Catholic opposition to political tyranny, especially Communism, in modern Europe, by former Rome correspondent of the United Press.

Some Administrative Problems in Governmental Research. By Clark D. Ahlberg and John C. Honey. (Syracuse: Syracuse University. 1951. Pp. viii, 115+.)

The second report in a series of studies in the administration of scientific research being conducted by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, under contract with the Office of Naval Research. Most of the information was drawn from personal interviews with scientists and covers problems both of national importance and at the laboratory level.

Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers. By David G. Mandelbaum. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 142. $2.75.)

A two-part study, by University of California anthropologist, treating some of the socio-anthropological problems involved in the adjustment of (1) the soldier's personality in primary group relationships under the stresses of Army life, and (2) Negro soldiers under the effects of a segregated Army pattern.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

POLITICAL THEORY

FRANCIS G. WILSON

University of Illinois

History and Criticism

Adcock, F. E. Thucydides in Book I. *Journal of Hellenic Studies.* LXXI. 1951.

Allen, Mary B. P. J. Proudhon in the Revolution of 1848. *Journal of Modern History.* March, 1952.

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The fifth annual meeting of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association was held April 25–26 at the State College of Washington, Pullman, Washington. Approximately sixty-five members of the Association, representing institutions in the States of Washington, Oregon and Idaho, were present at the meeting. The presidential address, by Chester C. Maxey of Whitman College, was entitled "American Politics under the Twenty-Second Amendment." Other addresses delivered at the meeting were as follows: "The Advice and Consent of the Senate," by Joseph P. Harris of the University of California; "Secrecy and the First Amendment," by Morris L. Ernst of the American Civil Liberties Union; and "The Evolution of Post-War German Government," by Edward H. Litchfield, executive director, American Political Science Association. A series of round tables were devoted to discussions of the governments of the Soviet orbit, the United Nations in the framework of power politics, contemporary problems of local government in the Northwest, and the contributions to the study of political science which can be made by other social science disciplines. The program also included a discussion of a committee report on the teaching of political science in the high schools of the Northwest, as well as an audio-visual exhibition of materials in the field of political science. Officers elected by the Association for 1952–53 include: president, Egbert S. Wengert of the University of Oregon; vice-president, Hugh Bone of the University of Washington; secretary-treasurer, Jonathan R. Cunningham, planning director, Spokane County Planning Commission; members of the Executive Council, George Shipman of the University of Washington and Frank Munk of Reed College. The Executive Council of the Association selected the University of Washington as the place of the meeting to be held in 1953, and the Association approved a proposal for a joint meeting with the Western Political Science Association in Portland, Oregon, in 1954.

The New England Political Science Association held its meeting for 1952 at the Littauer Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on May 3. The program of the meeting included two panel discussions, one on the topic, "Domestic Issues and Public Opinion," and the other on the topic, "Foreign Relations and the 1952 Elections." The meeting was addressed by Harold Stein, who discussed the public administration case program. Among the additional activities arranged for members of the Association attending the meeting was a reception given by the Graduate School of Public Administration of Harvard University. The following officers were elected by the Association for 1952–53: president, Robert Dahl; vice-president, Earl Latham; members of the Executive Committee, Andrew Nuquist, Benjamin Nimer, and the Reverend Thomas F. Fleming.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its fifth annual conference on May 10, 1952, at the Coyote Point campus of the San Mateo Junior College, San Mateo, California. The program of the conference included two panel discussions, one on the national elections in 1952, and the other on California state requirements for teaching the United States Constitution and American ideals. In addition, the conference was addressed by James M. Mitchell, United States Civil Service commissioner; James E. Webb, formerly director, United States Bureau of the Budget, and, more recently, United States under-secretary of state; and Thomas C. Blaisdell of the University of California. The topic of Professor Blaisdell's address was "Technical Cooperation in International Relations." The Association elected the following officers for 1952–53: president, George Bemis of Sacramento State College; vice-president, Joseph P. Harris of the University of California; secretary-treasurer, Dallas A. Tueller of Fresno State College.

The next annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association is to be held April 6–7, 1953, on the campus of the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California. The present officers of this Association include: president, Totton J. Anderson of the University of Southern California; vice-president, John Swarthout of Oregon State

College; secretary-treasurer, Allan R. Richards of the University of New Mexico.

During the past several months the Organizational Behavior Project of Princeton University has sponsored two conferences as part of its interdisciplinary research planning program. The first of the two conferences was held in March and had as its subject "Problems of Model Construction in the Social Sciences." The second conference, held June 18–19, was sponsored jointly with the Social Science Research Council, and had as its principal topic the "Theory of Organization." Specific themes to which attention was given at the four sessions of the June conference were: "Patterns of Behavior within Organizations," "Organizational Setting," "Decision Making," and "Theory of Current Research." Participants in the two conferences included persons from various social science disciplines. Members of the Organizational Behavior Project are: Wilbert E. Moore (sociology), director; Richard C. Snyder (political science); Elliot Mishler (psychology); James Hund (economics); Henry Bruck (political science); Burton Sapin (political science); Harold Garfinkle (sociology); Gordon Turner (history); Marion Levy, Jr. (sociology); E. O. Edwards (economics); and James Sykes (sociology).

A conference on research in natural resources policy and administration was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council on the campus of the University of Oregon, August 8–9, 1952, with approximately twenty-five western scholars and public officials in attendance. The conference was addressed by Charles McKinley of Reed College, while Roy Bessey of the Pacific Northwest Field Committee, United States Department of the Interior, and Herbert Peet, field representative of the United States Department of Agriculture, reported on policy research of the Interior and Agriculture Departments in the Northwest. Reports on current research were also made by Ernest Engelbert of the University of California (Los Angeles), Daniel Ogden of the State College of Washington, and Vincent Ostrom of the University of Oregon. The conference was concluded with a session in which plans for collaboration among western scholars in studies of natural resources problems were considered.

The Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia sponsored a conference on Eastern Europe which was held on May 5–6, 1952. The conference gave attention to present-day economic, social and political problems of Eastern Europe, as well as to prospects for a future East European federation. One of the features of the conference was a session which was open to the public, and which included a panel discussion on the topic, "The 'Iron Curtain' Countries and America." Participants on the panel for this session were: Joseph C. Grew, chairman, National Committee for a Free Europe; Stefan Osusky, former citizen of Czechoslovakia now living in exile; and Feliks Gross, of Brooklyn College and New York University.

The Committee on International Relations of the University of California (Berkeley) was the sponsoring academic agency for an international conference on agricultural and cooperative credit conducted by the University of California, August 4 to September 15, 1952. Financed by the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Mutual Security Agency, the conference was attended by delegates from approximately thirty-five countries. Other governmental agencies, as well as various private credit institutions, cooperatives, and other voluntary organizations, assisted in giving the delegates a clear picture of credit practices in the United States.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

An Institute of Public Law and Political Science has been established in Brazil under the auspices of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. Its objectives are to conduct study and research, to promote scientific interchange, and to collaborate with other national and foreign organizations. It has affiliated with the International Political Science Association as the national group representing Brazil in this Association.

Financed by the Getulio Vargas Foundation, the new Institute will include among its activities the organization of courses and conferences, the publication of specialized studies, the arranging of competitions for manuscripts of monographs, the conduct of studies and research looking toward the elaboration of proposals for laws and regulations, and the granting or securing of scholarships in foreign countries for the training of Brazilians in the field of the Institute's interest. Immediate projects include studies of electoral systems, of the control of autarchies, of radio broadcasting, and of legislative rules in the national Congress. A course of ten lectures, by as many authorities, on the operation of the government under the Constitution of 1946, was planned for the month of July, 1952.

The Institute includes both teachers and government officers from all of the twenty states and the Federal District. Its first Council, consisting of seven members, was named by the president of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Luis Simões Lopes. This Council has elected as president of the Institute Themistocles Brandão Cavalcanti, world renowned author in the field of public law, dean of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Brazil and professor in the Brazilian School of Public Administration. He represented Brazil at the Second World Congress of Political Science, held at The Hague during the present month.—HARVEY WALKER.

A seminar in American studies was conducted at Kyoto, Japan, during the summer of 1952. Jointly sponsored by the University of Illinois and Doshisha and Kyoto Universities, the seminar consisted of classes in politics, experimental psychology, industrial relations, educational philosophy and American literature. The seminar was under the direction of Royden Dangerfield of the University of Illinois, and included a faculty of five men from the University of Illinois and Columbia and Duke Universities.

The Bureau of International Relations of the department of political science of the University of California (Berkeley) has announced a new bi-monthly publication, to be known as the *Indian Press Digests*. Intended as a partial means of supplying the need in America for more information concerning India, the publication is to have two primary objectives: (1) that of providing a summary of the important Indian news in each two-month period, and (2) that of reflecting the drift of Indian editorial opinion. The publication will at first be limited to a review of the English language press, but it is assumed that a change of policy may later be made so as to include the various Indian language newspapers.

An interdisciplinary committee at the University of North Carolina began, in June, 1952, a study of political participation in two North Carolina counties. The study is being conducted under a grant from the Ford Foundation, and is to be completed within a period of one year. Participating in the study are Alexander Heard and Frederic N. Cleaveland, both of the department of political science.

The Social Science Research Center of Mississippi State College inaugurated in July, 1952, a program of research and graduate training in political and social psychology, which is being financed in part by General Education Board funds. The research under the program is being conducted by an interdisciplinary team, which includes Assistant Professor William Buchanan, a political psychologist, and Assistant Professor A. Alexander Fanelli, a social psychologist.

The Conference Board of Associated Research Councils calls attention to several awards for lecturing and research in political science and international relations under the 1953–54 Fulbright programs for Europe and the Near East. Some of the openings listed in a recently-issued announcement are:

Austria. Lectureship in political science or international relations, Universities of Graz, Innsbruck, Vienna;

Belgium. Research award at the University of Brussels and the Union of International Associations. Proposed subject: a study of administrative and technical problems of nongovernmental international associations;

Egypt. Lectureship at Farouk University on modern trends in international politics;

France. Lecturing award in international relations which would involve two or three months at the University of Paris and similar periods at one or two provincial universities;

A summer lectureship on American political institutions at a provincial university which has not yet been designated;

Norway. Lecturing award at the University of Oslo;

Netherlands. Lecturing award in political science at the University of Amsterdam.

The European announcement also includes programs for 1953–54 in Japan, Pakistan and South Africa. An award is offered at Chuo University in Tokyo for a professor of municipal and federal administration.

Requests for detailed information and application forms should be addressed to the

Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, Committee on International Exchange of Persons, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington 25, D. C. Applications must be filed by October 15, 1952.

Copies of the booklet, "Opportunities for Federally Sponsored Social Science Research," are available free of charge from the Washington Research Office of Syracuse University, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue N. W., Washington, D. C. Prepared by Herbert N. Rosenberg and Erin Hubbert, the booklet describes in specific terms the programs, fields of interest and project areas covered by government agencies that sponsor social science research. It also includes information on ways in which individuals and universities may proceed in endeavoring to secure federal sponsorship for research projects, and discusses the more significant problems they will have to face should they secure sponsorship.

William R. Willoughby, associate professor of history and government of St. Lawrence University, has been awarded a grant-in-aid by the Social Science Research Council to facilitate his currently conducted study of the political and inter-governmental aspects of the proposed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.

Maure Goldschmidt of Reed College has been awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship for a study of the relationships of political and educational philosophies.

T. Noel Stern addressed a colloquium on the teaching of law and political science, sponsored by the Faculty of Law of the University of Strasbourg in June, 1952. During the present month, he delivered an address on "Proggress in America" before the Sixth French Language Philosophical Congress at Strasbourg.

Richard H. Heindel, deputy director of the staff, United States National Commission for UNESCO, recently delivered public lectures at the University of Florida and Syracuse University.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti of Kenyon College will deliver a series of lectures on Far Eastern politics in major cities of eastern Canada in November, 1952. The lectures will be delivered under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

Hans Kelsen, who recently retired from the University of California (Berkeley), was honored by a program of two lectures on "Institutionalizing International Peace and Security" delivered by Professor Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago, on May 8 and 9, 1952. The lectures were followed by a banquet in honor of Professor Kelsen at the Bohemian Club in San Francisco. A *Festschrift*, containing contributions from eminent scholars in international law and jurisprudence from various countries, is to be published by the University of California Press sometime this year as a tribute to Professor Kelsen.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon of the department of political science of the University of California (Los Angeles) was awarded the LL.D. degree by Hanover College, Hanover, Indiana, on June 16, 1952. The degree was awarded for Professor Fitzgibbon's work in the field of Latin American governments.

The Model International Assembly in American Colleges. "Model meetings of United Nations organs, especially the General Assembly and Security Council, have moved to the top of the popularity poll for intercollegiate conferences," and are now filtering down into the high schools, according to reports of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations.[1] This recent "snowballing of model U.N. meetings" is traced back in the reports to the first intercollegiate Model Assembly of the League of Nations, convened by the School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University in 1927 and attended by 150 student delegates from eleven colleges. This "grandfather of model college international organization meetings" set the patterns and procedures for the large number of such meetings held from 1927 to the present day.

Out of the original Assembly at Syracuse grew the Mid Atlantic Model Assembly, a permanent institution with a regular constitution. This Assembly has had a permanent Continuation Committee, a steady link, valuable for the continuity of experience, with the American Association for the United Nations and deep roots in the colleges of the Mid Atlantic States.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the original Model Assembly was celebrated at the Mid Atlantic Model General Assembly held this year, April 7 to 9, at Barnard College. The Assembly was attended by 250 student delegates from fifty colleges and universities. As founder of the original Assembly, the writer of this note was called upon to present a plaque to Miss Dorothy Robins, the educational director of the American Association for the United Nations, in recognition of the Association's many years of sponsorship of such meetings.[2]

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[1] *Focus on Barnard*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring, 1952; *U.N. on the Campus*, Collegiate Council for the United Nations, Spring, 1952.

The circulation by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace of a Syracuse brochure,[3] which reproduced the Assembly proceedings in miniature, showing what was done and how it could be repeated, produced a crop of model assemblies. The original Assembly was planned as a student body; and the idea spread as a student movement throughout the country. Less than twelve months later (May, 1928), the American *League of Nations News* recorded that "no intercollegiate events, with the exception of the great athletic contests, have taken such a hold of student life or reached so many of the student body. . . . " In February, 1929, this publication reported that forty-seven model assemblies of different types were to be held within the next four months, and that the assemblies would involve 200 educational institutions. In the academic year 1929–30 model assemblies were held in thirty-five states of the Union, with 5300 students actively participating.[4]

In 1930 there were seven regional intercollegiate model assemblies meeting regularly. The centers and numbers of colleges participating that year were as follows: Mid Atlantic (at Yale, 31 colleges); Chicago (21 colleges); Cincinnati (22 colleges); Denver (7 colleges); Kentucky (4 colleges); Western State Teachers College (21 colleges). By 1932 the number of regular regional assemblies had increased to nine, with some 200 colleges taking part.

The decline of the League of Nations in the mid-thirties was reflected in a decline in the number of model League organs, until the Mid Atlantic Assembly was left as the only survivor. With its Continuation Committee, it carried the idea, the pattern, and the experience through the years of World War II. The ground was thus prepared for the new crop of model United Nations organs that sprang up after the war. When Mid Atlantic's twenty-fifth anniversary was celebrated at Barnard this spring, there were in existence at least four other regular regional organs: in the Mid-West, the Model Assembly at the College of Wooster (4 colleges); in the East, organizations at Syracuse University (Model Security Council, 11 colleges) and Harvard University (18 New England colleges); and on the West Coast, the Pacific Regional Model United Nations Conference, with 1000 delegates from 73 colleges, including Hawaii and Alaska.

The scale of this interesting experiment has been considerable. What of its educational value? Its scale has some bearing on its political importance. At the Barnard meeting it was estimated that in the twenty-five years at least 50,000 and probably nearer 100,000 university students had participated actively in this dramatic process. In the period of official American aloofness from the League, leaders of the oncoming generations of students were playing their part, and it was thought an important part, in creating the new public opinion which put the United States at the head of the United Nations. Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, deputy United States representative to the United Nations, underlined at Barnard the importance of such student support of American policies and United Nations objectives. Model assemblies and councils were "framing a new generation" versed, as the old was not, in the new "multilateral diplomacy."

Many educators have emphasized the importance of the training afforded by model organs, including model national parliaments, conferences and party conventions, as well as model international organs. The essence of the matter is the superior value of direct experience, in which the whole personality engages, as against a mere intellectual process of "learning about" something. In preparing for and working in model organs, students show an intensity of interest, an ability for research work, a realistic insight into problems, and an understanding of the uses and meanings of organs and procedures that are not easily attained in the normal work of the classroom. What has always most impressed the observer is the knowledge, realism and ability with which the student delegates to a Model Assembly play the characters of the nations they represent.

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[2] *Report, Model U. N. General Assembly,* Barnard College, 25th Anniversary. The report summarizes the proceedings and includes the speeches delivered at the plenary sessions by the Honorable Ernest A. Gross and Ahmed Shah Bokhari. The latter is permanent representative of Pakistan to the United Nations.

[3] W. E. Mosher and H. Duncan Hall, "A Model Assembly of the League of Nations," Syracuse University *Bulletin,* Vol. 27, No. 17c, 1927.

[4] *Model League Assemblies: What They Are and How to Give Them.* American League of Nations Association, November, 1931. A distinction was made here between two main types of model assemblies already in use: "original" and "verbatim"; the latter presented verbatim reproductions of League Assembly proceedings, and were especially suitable for high schools.

That under proper conditions there are advantages to be gained from allowing model international organs to take over the classroom itself has been shown by an interesting experiment conducted in recent years at New York University.[5] Three of the courses on the United Nations offered in the University's Graduate School are conducted throughout as model organs. One one-term course is conducted as a Model Security Council, while a second is conducted as a Model United Nations General Assembly. Finally, a full-year course is offered as a Model United Nations, in which the relations and work of all the organs are demonstrated.

The method is exacting since it calls for a regular documentary service for each meeting, and therefore for more duplication and staff assistance. It also requires a good library of United Nations documents. The experiment at New York University is no doubt helped much by the proximity of the United Nations headquarters staffs and the permanent delegations. "We undertook this as an experiment," Professor Clyde Eagleton writes, "but are convinced now that it is a useful way of teaching." The judgments which New York University has gathered year by year directly from students emphasize the following advantages of the method: "A sense of practical, rather than abstract, study. A sense of participating, rather than merely listening to a lecturer. Compulsion to prepare, since participation may be called for at any moment. More actual preparation and participation. More activity and variety in the class, therefore more interest. The instructor has much more upon which to judge the student. Much more critical discussion than usual. Better training in research and its application. Thorough knowledge of use of documents (training for librarians). Training in drafting. Practical language training (bringing in Language departments). Practice in negotiation (good for Foreign Service training). Development of cooperative effort, rather than prideful maintenance of a personal viewpoint."

H. Duncan Hall.

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[5] New York University *Bulletin*, No. 28, June 2, 1952; also a personal communication from Professors Clyde Eagleton and Waldo Chamberlin to whom I am indebted for this information.

COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT ON CONVENTION DELEGATIONS

In accordance with plans indicated in the June issue of the Review, pp. 621–623, the headquarters of the Cooperative Research Project was moved to Chicago on June 27 for the duration of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. Office space and some equipment were provided by courtesy of the University of Chicago at its downtown center, 19 South LaSalle Street. Access to convention proceedings was greatly facilitated by accreditation of the American Political Science Review to the Periodical Press Gallery in both conventions.

Project activities at each convention consisted mainly of following the work of certain state delegations, most of which had previously been studied in the states where they originated. In some cases, the political scientists who had worked with delegations in their home states were at Chicago and were able to continue their contacts with the same delegations. In other cases, political scientists who happened to be in Chicago for the conventions, or who were locally available, were prepared to take on specific assignments. Other available volunteers who were qualified and willing to participate on a somewhat experimental basis were recruited and put to work with full instructions.

At the Republican Convention, individual state delegations were assigned as follows:

California: Thomas S. Barclay, Stanford Univ.
Colorado: Henry M. Bain, Jr., Univ. of Chicago graduate student.
Connecticut: Roland Young, Northwestern Univ.
Delaware: Paul Dolan, Univ. of Del.

Idaho: Hobart Sturm, Idaho State Col.
Illinois: Mrs. Harold J. Monger, Chicago, Ill.
Iowa: William S. Shepherd, Beloit Col.
Kansas: Mrs. Harry P. Watson, Chicago, Ill.
Kentucky: Jasper Shannon, Univ. of Ky.
Louisiana: Jasper Shannon, Univ. of Ky.
Maryland: Malcolm Moos, Univ. of Md.
Michigan: James Miller, Mich. State Col.
Mississippi: Mrs. June Duncan, Evanston, Ill.
Montana: Rosanna Shanks, Terre Haute, Ind.
Nebraska: Morris Cohen, Clark Univ.
New Mexico: Mrs. Claudia Wright, Vinita, Okla.
New York: George Watson, Roosevelt Col., and Edward L. Sherman, Roosevelt Col. graduate student.
North Dakota: Jacqueline Prince, Wilmette, Ill.
Ohio: Dale Pontius, Roosevelt Col., and Howard Taslitz, Northwestern Univ. graduate student.
Oregon: Hobart Sturm, Idaho State Col.
Pennsylvania: Paul Dolan, Univ. of Del.
South Dakota: Mrs. Eugene Hotchkiss, Highland Park, Ill.
Tennessee: T. W. Goodman, Univ. of Tenn.
Texas: Charles Clapp, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, graduate student.
Utah: Harold Blostein, Roosevelt Col. graduate student.
Vermont: Robert Babcock, Univ. of Vt.
Washington: William S. Shepherd, Beloit Col.
Wisconsin: William Young, Univ. of Wis.

At the Democratic Convention, working plans were revised in the direction of greater concentration on a smaller number of delegations. The assignments were as follows:

California: Thomas Barclay, Stanford Univ.
Florida: Robert Wright, Cooperative Research Project, and James A. Ball, Fla. State Univ. graduate student.
Idaho: Hobart Sturm, Idaho State Col.
Illinois: Clarence Berdahl, Univ. of Ill.; Robert Friedman, Univ. of Ill. graduate student; Mrs. Harold J. Monger, Chicago, Ill.; and Carl Wimberly, Univ. of Ill. graduate student.
Michigan: James Miller, Mich. State Col.
Minnesota: Arthur Naftalin, Univ. of Minn.
Missouri: Mrs. Harry P. Watson, Chicago, Ill.
New York: Harold Stein, Public Administration Clearing House and Henry M. Bain, Jr., Univ. of Chicago graduate student.
North Carolina: Preston Edsall, N. C. State Col.
Ohio: Dale Pontius, Roosevelt Col., and Mrs. Eugene Hotchkiss, Highland Park, Ill.
South Carolina: Douglas Carlisle, Univ. of S. C.
Tennessee: T. W. Goodman, Univ. of Tenn.
Texas: Charles Clapp, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, graduate student, and Mrs. Claudia Wright, Vinita, Okla.
Utah: Harold Blostein, Roosevelt Col. graduate student.
Washington: Harry R. Davis, Beloit Col.
Wisconsin: William Shepherd, Beloit Col.

Matthew Holden, a student at Roosevelt College, volunteered to make a study of Negro participation in the Republican National Convention; and at the Democratic Convention, he repeated the activity in association with Nathaniel P. Tillman, Jr., a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin.

Television monitoring of both conventions for project purposes was conducted by Edward Sherman, a graduate student at Roosevelt College, and Howard Taslitz, a graduate student at Northwestern University.

George Watson, Roosevelt College, undertook a special study of participation in the Democratic National Convention by the Americans For Democratic Action.

Samuel J. Eldersveld of the University of Michigan, assisted by Daniel McHargue and Dwaine Marvick, directed a cooperating activity under the auspices of that institution. As a part of the University's Political Behavior Research Project, he brought a group of graduate students to Chicago to interview delegation chairmen on the basis of an extensive questionnaire. The group succeeded in interviewing most of the delegation chairmen at each convention.

The Cooperative Research Project, up to July 25, 1952, had received reports prepared in the field on 35 delegations to the Republican National Convention of 1952 and 30 delegations to the Democratic National Convention of 1952. Reports varied in length from 4 pages to 110. It is clear that the initial phase of the project has been more successful than seemed possible when it originated in March.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Harold F. Alderfer has returned to his position as professor of political science and executive secretary of the Institute of Local Government at Pennsylvania State College after an absence of two years. During the two-year period, he served in Greece with the Economic Cooperation Administration, and, later, with the Mutual Security Agency.

Luther Allen, a member of the political science staff of the University of Delaware during the academic year 1951–52, is teaching at Amherst College during the current academic year.

Karl M. Arndt has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Charles S. Ascher has been on partial leave from Brooklyn College during 1952 to act as associate director of the Public Administration Clearing House. He is in charge of the New York Office of the Clearing House.

Elton Atwater of Pennsylvania State College was dean of an International Service seminar held at Woodstock, Vermont, from June 20 to August 9, 1952. The seminar was one of five such meetings held during the summer under the auspices of the American Friends Service Committee.

William M. Beaney, Jr., has been advanced to an assistant professorship in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Kenneth Beasley, instructor in political science at the University of Kansas, has been appointed to the staff of the Bureau of Government Research of that institution as coordinator for an expanded program of training schools for public officials.

Alfons J. Beitzinger, formerly of Marquette University, is an acting instructor in political science at the University of Wisconsin for the academic year 1952–53.

A. LeRoy Bennett has returned to his position as assistant professor of political science at Michigan State College after spending a year in research and observation at the United Nations headquarters under a Ford Foundation grant.

George I. Blanksten has been promoted to an associate professorship at Northwestern University.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, associate professor of government at Kenyon College, served during the past summer as political adviser to the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

Gordon K. Bryan has been advanced to the rank of professor at Mississippi State College.

John Tyler Caldwell resigned as president of the Alabama College for Women to accept the presidency of the University of Arkansas, effective July 1, 1952.

William Cape, formerly instructor in political science at the University of Kansas, has joined the faculty of the University of South Dakota.

Raymond Carmon has been promoted to the position of assistant director of the Bureau of Government Research and appointed instructor in political science at the University of Kansas.

Gwendolen M. Carter is on leave from Smith College for the academic year 1952–53 to study the party system in South Africa. Her study is being conducted under an area research grant from the Social Science Research Council and, also, under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Harold Chase of the University of Delaware has accepted a lectureship in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Taylor Cole will be on leave from Duke University during the academic year 1952–53. He has been awarded a Fulbright Research Fellowship for work in Italy.

Kenneth W. Colegrove retired from his position as professor of political science at Northwestern University on September 1, 1952.

Robert F. Curtis, recently a graduate student at Georgetown University, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

Manning J. Dauer of the University of

Florida was a visiting member of the political science staff of the University of Alabama during the second term of the summer session of 1952.

Harry R. Davis is on leave from Beloit College for the academic year 1952–53 for work under a Ford Foundation fellowship. He will spend the year at the Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University.

Jesus de Galindez, who during the academic year 1951–52 served as lecturer in the Latin American Studies Program offered in the School of General Studies of Columbia University, will continue to serve in that capacity for another academic year. He is offering courses in the government and foreign relations of Latin American countries.

Alfred de Grazia has been appointed as associate professor of political science at Stanford University and as executive officer of the Stanford Committee for Research in the Social Sciences. He will devote one-half of his time to teaching and research in the department of political science, in which he will concentrate attention in the field of political behavior, and one-half of his time to the work of the Committee.

Karl W. Deutsch has been advanced to a full professorship in history and political science in the School of Humanities and Social Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In addition to teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he served during the academic year 1951–52 as associate in the University Seminar on Organization at Columbia University, and is serving during the current academic year as research associate with the rank of visiting professor at Princeton University.

Alfred Diamant has been promoted to an assistant professorship at the University of Florida.

Paul Dolan has been named chairman of the department of political science at the University of Delaware.

Thomas C. Donnelly, formerly professor of government and dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of New Mexico, was named president of New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, New Mexico, effective September 1, 1952.

Alex N. Dragnich has been advanced to a full professorship at Vanderbilt University. He has been awarded a travel grant by the Social Science Research Council for study in Yugoslavia on the subject of the impact of the Tito-Stalin break upon domestic Yugoslav politics and government.

James W. Drury has been advanced to an associate professorship in political science at the University of Kansas.

William Ebenstein, professor of politics at Princeton University, taught at the University of Pennsylvania during the summer session of 1952.

Murray Edelman of the University of Illinois is affiliated with the University of Vienna during the academic year 1952–53, while studying Austrian governmental organizations which are responsible for wage stabilization policy. His study is being conducted under a Fulbright grant.

Henry W. Ehrmann is on leave from the University of Colorado for the academic year 1952–53. He has been awarded a Social Science Area Travel grant and is spending the year in France, where he is engaged in a study of French management organizations.

Lynn W. Eley, formerly a graduate assistant at the State University of Iowa, is engaged in work as a trainee in the junior management assistant program of the Office of Budget and Finance of the United States Department of Agriculture.

Thomas H. Eliot, lawyer of Boston, Massachusetts, and former member of Congress, has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

Leon D. Epstein, on leave from the University of Wisconsin, is spending the academic year 1952–53 in England under a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Alona E. Evans has been advanced to an associate professorship at Wellesley College.

William J. Evans has been advanced to the rank of professor at Mississippi State College.

James W. Fesler, professor of government at Yale University, was a member of a team of four Yale social scientists who spent the summer in British East Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo, under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

Wesley R. Fishel has been appointed assistant director of the Governmental Research Bureau of Michigan State College. He will be in charge of research relating to foreign areas and psychological warfare.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon of the University of California (Los Angeles) taught at Ohio State University during the summer session of 1952.

William A. Glaser, recently a graduate student and teaching fellow in the department of government at Harvard University, has been appointed to an instructorship at Michigan State College.

Charles H. Goodman has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Albert Gorvine of Brooklyn College served as staff consultant to the Temporary Commission on the Coordination of State Activities of the State of New York during the summer of 1952.

George A. Graham has been named chairman of the department of politics at Princeton University, in accordance with that institution's policy of rotating the departmental chairmanship.

Heinz Guradze served as guest professor in international organization and political theory at the University of Cologne during the summer of 1952.

Pearl Handshuh Hack has taken a teaching assignment in the department of political science of Brooklyn College for the current academic year, and is responsible for a new interdepartmental course in urbanism.

Charles B. Hagan is on leave from his position as professor of political science at the University of Illinois for the academic year 1952–53 to serve as intelligence research officer in the United States Department of State.

Frank J. Harris has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Henry C. Hart, on leave from the University of Wisconsin, is serving as visiting professor at the University of Mysore, India, for the academic year 1952–53. He is teaching American government, public administration and political theory.

Frederick H. Hartmann has been promoted to an associate professorship at the University of Florida.

H. Fields Haviland, Jr., has been advanced to an associate professorship in political science at Haverford College.

John N. Hazard of Columbia University will spend the winter session of 1952–53 at Cambridge University on a Fulbright fellowship.

Richard H. Heindel, deputy director of the staff, United States National Commission for UNESCO, offered a course in international understanding and world affairs at the Institute of World Affairs held at Pennsylvania State College, June 30 to August 9, 1952.

Lawrence J. Herson, formerly of Yale University, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at Northwestern University.

Louise W. Holborn has been advanced to an associate professorship at Connecticut College. She spent the past summer in Germany, where she lectured for the American Houses program and engaged in research on the political role of women in Western and Eastern Germany.

Abraham Holtzman, recently a graduate student at Harvard University, has been appointed to an instructorship at Dartmouth College.

John C. Honey has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Robert A. Horn has rejoined the department of political science of the University of Chicago after a leave of absence for army service. During the past summer he served as a member of the American faculty in the program, "The United States and the Atlantic Community," held at Cambridge University under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts.

Marion D. Irish is on leave from Florida State University and is spending the academic year 1952–53 at Harvard University and Radcliffe College on a Ford Foundation fellowship.

Gladys M. Kammerer, associate professor of political science at the University of Kentucky, was a member of the staff of the Public Administration Service during the past summer for work in connection with a proposal for a new election law for the government of Puerto Rico.

Frederick E. Kidder, formerly a graduate student at the University of California (Berkeley), has been appointed county librarian of Stanislaus County, California.

Edgar Lane has been appointed lecturer in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Thomas B. Larson has returned to the United States after serving during 1950–51 as an attache in the American Embassy in Moscow. He has resumed work in the Office of Intelligence Research, United States Department of State, in which he is chief of the Soviet Internal Branch of the Division of Research for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe.

Arnaud B. Leavelle is on sabbatical leave from Stanford University for the academic year 1952–53, and is engaged in research at Oxford University, England, under a Fulbright grant.

Avery Leiserson, formerly associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago, has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at Vanderbilt University.

Hans Leonhardt, on a year's sabbatical leave from Michigan State College, is pursuing studies in Europe.

Charles O. Lerche, associate professor of political science at Knox College, was a visiting associate professor in the department of political science and public administration of Michigan State College during the summer session of 1952.

James L. McCamy has resigned as chairman of the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin because of other duties involving university-wide responsibilities.

William M. McGovern is on leave from Northwestern University for the academic year 1952–53 to teach at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island.

Dayton D. McKean has resigned as professor of government at Dartmouth College in order to accept the position of dean of the Graduate School at the University of Colorado.

Roy Macridis has been promoted to an associate professorship at Northwestern University.

John M. Maki, associate professor at the University of Washington, was a visiting associate professor in the department of political science and public administration of Michigan State College during the summer session of 1952.

Louis Menand, III, recently a graduate student at Syracuse University, has been appointed to an instructorship at Dartmouth College.

James W. Miller, on a six months' sabbatical leave from Michigan State College, is engaged in research on political processes in Michigan.

John D. Millett has returned to his position at Columbia University after a three-year leave of absence during which he served as executive director of the Commission on Financing Higher Education. Sponsored by the Association of American Universities, this Commission has operated under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University has succeeded George F. Kennan as president of the East European Fund, established by the Ford Foundation to assist in the settlement and adjustment of Soviet refugees who have come to the United States.

Milton E. Muelder, formerly chairman of the department of political science and public administration at Michigan State College, has been named dean of the School of Science and Arts at that institution.

Frank Munk, professor of political science at Reed College, taught at the University of Washington during the summer quarter of 1952. He is serving as public member on the Regional Wage Stabilization Board (13th Region), and is vice-chairman of its lumber industry panel.

Allan S. Nanes has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Brooklyn College.

Franz L. Neumann of Columbia University

lectured at the Free University of Berlin during the summer of 1952.

Gerhart Niemeyer was on leave from his position in the United States Department of State during the summer of 1952 to teach courses in international organization at Columbia University.

Lowell G. Noonan, assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California, was awarded a Ford Foundation faculty fellowship for 1952–53. He is conducting research at the Hoover Library at Stanford University and the University of California Library at Berkeley in the areas of political theory and comparative government.

Felix Oppenheim has returned to his position at the University of Delaware after a year's leave which was spent in study at Yale University.

Alan Burr Overstreet is acting chairman of the department of government of Smith College during the absence of Professor Gwendolen M. Carter.

Roland D. Paine, Jr., formerly a graduate student at Northwestern University, has been promoted to the position of chief public information officer, Bureau of Ships, United States Department of the Navy.

Palmer Pilcher has been appointed assistant professor of political science and public administration at American University.

C. Herman Pritchett has been advanced to a full professorship at the University of Chicago.

Lucian Wilmot Pye, on leave from Washington University, St. Louis, has been appointed research associate at the Center of International Studies at Princeton for the academic year 1952–53.

Aldo L. Raffa has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., is on leave from his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Alabama for research at Harvard University under a Ford Foundation faculty fellowship.

Donald H. Riddle, formerly of Princeton University, has been appointed assistant professor at Hamilton College.

Charles B. Robson returned to his position as professor of political science at the University of North Carolina in June, 1952, after a year which he spent in Germany as chief of the Public Affairs Unit of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

Jack W. Rodgers has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Nebraska.

Philip R. Rodgers has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Francis E. Rourke, formerly an instructor at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed to an instructorship at Yale University.

George H. Sabine is serving as visiting professor of political theory at Northwestern University during the absence of Professor William M. McGovern.

J. T. Salter, on leave from the University of Wisconsin, is spending the academic year 1952–53 in Manila as a member of the staff of the University of Michigan's Institute of Public Administration, which is conducting a training program for Philippine public officials.

Walter E. Sandelius of the University of Kansas was a visiting professor of political science at the University of Nebraska during the summer session of 1952.

Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., chairman of the department of political science at Franklin and Marshall College, is serving as visiting assistant professor of political science at Michigan State College.

Victoria Schuck, professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College, was a visiting professor of political science at Stanford University for the summer quarter of 1952.

John P. Senning, who has been a member of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska since 1916, became professor emeritus at the close of the academic year 1951–52.

Jasper B. Shannon, on leave from his position as professor of political science at the University of Kentucky, is a visiting professor at the University of Wisconsin for the academic year 1952–53.

Ruth C. Silva is on leave from Pennsylvania State College for the academic year 1952–53 and is spending the year in Egypt on a Fulbright grant.

Phillip L. Sirotkin has been promoted to an assistant professorship at Wellesley College.

Gordon Skilling is on leave from Dartmouth College for the fall semester of 1952–53 to teach at the Russian Institute at Columbia University during the absence of Professor John N. Hazard from the latter institution.

H. M. Somers, chairman of the department of political science of Haverford College, was a visiting professor in the International Seminar conducted at Harvard University during the summer of 1952.

O. Glenn Stahl has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

T. Noel Stern, on leave from Boston University, has finished his assignment as Fulbright professor on the Faculty of Letters at the University of Rennes, and will become Fulbright professor at the University of Strasbourg in November, 1952. He was appointed to serve as acting director of the *Fondation des Etats-Unis, Cité Universitaire*, Paris, for the period June 25 to October 1, 1952.

John O. Stitely has been granted a semester's extension of his leave of absence from the University of Rhode Island to enable him to continue in his capacity as executive aide to the governor of Rhode Island.

Ivan M. Stone, dean of Beloit College, spent part of the past summer in Germany as a visiting expert attached to the Division of Cultural Affairs of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany. He also served for a three weeks period as chairman of the international seminar at Graz, Austria, which is sponsored by the Quakers.

Earl Strong has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Graham H. Stuart, who retired from his position as professor of political science at Stanford University in June, 1952, is a visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C., for the academic year 1952–53. He has been reappointed for a three-year term as a member of the Committee on the Foreign Service Institute of the United States Department of State.

Joseph Tanenhaus, formerly of Wellesley College, has been appointed as an instructor at Wells College.

James D. Teller has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Carl Tiller has been advanced to an adjunct professorship in the part-time faculty of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Barbara Tovey has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Smith College.

Donald S. Vaughan has resigned his position as assistant director of the University of Alabama Center at Montgomery, Alabama, to become director of the University's Center at Gadsden, Alabama.

Clement Vose, recently a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of government at Beloit College.

Harvey Walker, who, since October, 1951, has been serving as a United Nations lecturer in the new Brazilian School of Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro, will resume his teaching duties at Ohio State University in January, 1953.

Robert A. Walker of Stanford University spent the past summer at the University of Tokyo as one of the five American professors participating in the program of the third annual seminar in American studies sponsored jointly by Stanford University and the University of Tokyo and supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Edward W. Weidner has been advanced to a full professorship and named head of the department of political science and public administration at Michigan State College.

Leo Weinstein, instructor in political science at the University of Chicago during the academic year 1951–52, has been appointed instructor in government at Smith College.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

New Editor of the Review

In accordance with the action taken by the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association, Dr. Hugh L. Elsbree has been selected as the new Managing Editor of the REVIEW. He will succeed Professor Taylor Cole, whose three-year term will be completed on September 1. All manuscripts submitted for publication should now be addressed to Dr. Elsbree, in care of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Professor Emmette S. Redford will serve with Dr. Elsbree as the new Book Review Editor, and Professor Albert Lee Sturm will be the new News and Notes Editor.

New Edition of the Directory

It is hoped that early in 1953 the new edition of the *Directory of the American Political Science Association* will be completed. Through the courtesy and cooperation of The American University in Washington, D. C., Professor George P. Bush has been able to accept the invitation of the Executive Committee to edit the *Directory.*

Professor Bush holds an M.B.A. degree from Harvard University and an M.A. degree from American University, where he has been a lecturer and an associate professor of Public Administration since 1947. In compiling the *Directory,* Professor Bush will have available the data contained on the questionnaires distributed in connection with the National Scientific Register. Any member who has overlooked returning his completed form, which was sent out in November of 1951, should drop a note to Professor Bush at his office at the national headquarters, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

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Because of many requests which came to the Association for microfilm copies of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, the Executive Committee has approved the signing of a contract with University Microfilms. It is hoped that the arrangement agreed to may help solve the space problem for many libraries. Under this plan, the paper copies of the periodical may be kept unbound and circulated in that form for several years; when they are worn and no longer are called for frequently, the microfilm may be substituted at a cost approximately the same as the cost of binding the periodicals for library use.

Effective with the current volume (Vol. XLVI), the REVIEW will be available in microfilm form to all libraries which are regular subscribers. In the form of positive microfilm, volume-length metal reels may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Film copy will be distributed only at the end of the volume year, which is December for the REVIEW.

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

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

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

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

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

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